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PREFACE

Volume Thirteen contains works written by Lenin between June 1907 and April 1908.

The articles "Against Boycott", "Notes of a Publicist", "Revolution and Counter-Revolution", "The Third Duma", "Political Notes", and "The New Agrarian Policy" are devoted to an analysis and appraisal of the political situation in Russia after the defeat of the first revolution and to defining the tasks of the Party organisations during the period of reaction. In these articles, as well as in the speeches delivered at the St. Petersburg and All-Russian conferences of the R.S.D.L.P., which are published in this volume, Lenin also formulated the aims of the Duma tactics of the Bolsheviks at that new stage.

The volume includes such important works of Lenin on the agrarian question as *The Agrarian Question and the Critics of Marx* (Chapters X-XII) and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907*.

Included in the volume is the Preface to the first, three-volume collection of Lenin's writings, entitled *Twelve Years*, which was not published in full owing to persecution by the censorship. The Preface is a short review of the history of Lenin's struggle for revolutionary Marxism against liberalism and opportunism.

The volume contains the article "Trade-Union Neutrality" in which Lenin criticises the opportunism of Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, who attempted to make the labour movement in Russia take the path of trade-unionism.

Two articles under the same title "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" reflect the struggle waged

by Lenin and the Bolsheviks against opportunism in the international labour movement. The articles expose the deviations of the German Social-Democrats from the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

For the first time in any collection of Lenin's works, this volume contains the draft resolution of the Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. ("Second All-Russian") on the question of participation in the elections to the Third Duma, "Outline of a Draft Resolution on the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions", the note "On Plekhanov's Article", and "Statement of the Editors of *Proletary*".

In the "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov (A. V. Lunacharsky) on the Attitude of the Party Towards the Trade Unions", also included for the first time in Lenin's *Collected Works*, Lenin opposes the slogan of "neutrality" of the trade unions and urges the necessity of close alignment of the trade unions with the Party with a view to developing the socialist consciousness of the proletariat and educating the latter in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

AGAINST BOYCOTT
NOTES OF A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PUBLICIST¹

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Written on June 26 (July 9), 1907

Published in 1907 in the pamphlet
Concerning the Boycott of the
Third Duma, Moscow
Signed: N. Lenin

Published according
to the pamphlet text

The recent Teachers' Congress,² in which the majority was influenced by the Socialist-Revolutionaries,³ adopted a resolution calling for a boycott of the Third Duma. The resolution was adopted with the direct participation of a prominent representative of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Social-Democratic teachers and the representative of the R.S.D.L.P. abstained from voting, as they considered that this question should be decided by a Party congress or conference, and not by a non-Party professional and political association.

The question of boycotting the Third Duma thus arises as a current question of revolutionary tactics. Judging by the speech of its spokesman at the Congress, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had already decided that question, although we do not yet have any official decisions of the Party or any literary documents from among its members. Among the Social-Democrats this question has been raised and is being debated.

What arguments do the Socialist-Revolutionaries use to support their decision? The resolution of the Teachers' Congress speaks, in effect, about the utter uselessness of the Third Duma, about the reactionary and counter-revolutionary nature of the government that effected the coup d'état of June 3,⁴ about the new electoral law being weighted in favour of the landlords, etc., etc.* The case is presented

* Here is the text of this resolution: "Whereas: (1) the new electoral law on the basis of which the Third Duma is being convened deprives the working masses of that modest share of electoral rights which they had hitherto enjoyed and the winning of which had cost them so dear; (2) this law glaringly and grossly falsifies the will of the people for the benefit of the most reactionary and privileged strata of the population; (3) the Third Duma, by the manner of its election

in such a manner as if the ultra-reactionary nature of the Third Duma by itself makes such a method of struggle or such a slogan as the boycott necessary and legitimate. The impropriety of such an argument is absolutely clear to any Social-Democrat, since there is no attempt here whatever to examine the historical conditions of the boycott's applicability. The Social-Democrat who takes a Marxist stand draws his conclusions about the boycott not from the degree of reactionariness of one or another institution, but from the existence of those special conditions of struggle that, as the experience of the Russian revolution has now shown, make it possible to apply the specific method known as boycott. If anyone were to start discussing the boycott without taking into consideration the two years' experience of our revolution, without studying that experience, we would have to say of him that he had forgotten a lot and learned nothing. In dealing with the question of boycott we shall start with an attempt to analyse that experience.

I

The most important experience of our revolution in making use of the boycott was, undoubtedly, the boycott of the Bulygin Duma.¹ What is more, that boycott was crowned with complete and immediate success. Therefore, our first task should be to examine the historical conditions under which the boycott of the Bulygin Duma took place.

Two circumstances at once become apparent when examining this question. First, the boycott of the Bulygin Duma was a fight to prevent our revolution from going over (even temporarily) to the path of a monarchist constitution.

and by its make-up, is the product of a reactionary coup; (4) the government will take advantage of the participation of the popular masses in the Duma elections in order to interpret that participation as a popular sanction of the coup d'état—the Fourth Delegate Congress of the All-Russian Union of Teachers and Educational Workers resolves: (1) that it shall have no dealings whatever with the Third Duma or any of its bodies; (2) that it shall take no part as an organisation, either directly or indirectly, in the elections; (3) that it shall, as an organisation, disseminate the view on the Third State Duma and the elections to it as expressed in the present resolution."

Secondly, this boycott took place under conditions of a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid upswing of the revolution.

Let us examine the first circumstance. All boycott is a struggle, not within the framework of a given institution, but against its emergence, or, to put it more broadly, against it becoming operative. Therefore, those who, like Plekhanov and many other Mensheviks, opposed the boycott on the general grounds that it was necessary for a Marxist to make use of representative institutions, thereby only revealed absurd doctrinairism. To argue like that meant evading the real issue by repeating self-evident truths. Unquestionably, a Marxist should make use of representative institutions. Does that imply that a Marxist cannot, under certain conditions, stand for a struggle not within the framework of a given institution but against that institution being brought into existence? No, it does not, because this general argument applies only to those cases where there is no room for a struggle to prevent such an institution from coming into being. The boycott is a controversial question precisely because it is a question of whether there is room for a struggle to prevent the emergence of such institutions. *By their arguments against the boycott Plekhanov and Co. showed that they failed to understand what the question was about.*

Further. If all boycott is a struggle not within the framework of a given institution, but to prevent it from coming into existence, then the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, apart from everything else, was a struggle to prevent a whole system of institutions of a monarchist-constitutional type from coming into existence. The year 1905 clearly showed the possibility of direct mass struggle in the shape of general strikes (the strike wave after the Ninth of January⁶) and mutinies (*Potemkin*⁷). The direct revolutionary struggle of the masses was, therefore, a fact. No less a fact, on the other hand, was the law of August 6, which attempted to switch the movement from the revolutionary (in the most direct and narrow sense of the word) path to the path of a monarchist constitution. It was objectively inevitable that these paths should come into conflict with each other. There was to be, so to speak, *a choice of paths*

for the immediate development of the revolution, a choice that was to be determined, of course, not by the will of one or another group, but by the relative strength of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary classes. And this strength could only be gauged and tested in the struggle. The slogan of boycotting the Bulygin Duma was, therefore, a slogan of the struggle for the *path* of direct revolutionary struggle and against the constitutional-monarchist path. Even on the latter path, of course, a struggle was possible, and not only possible but inevitable. Even on the basis of a monarchist constitution it was possible to continue the revolution and prepare for its new upswing; even on the basis of a monarchist constitution it was possible and obligatory for the Social-Democrats to carry on the struggle. This truism, which Axelrod and Plekhanov tried so hard and irrelevantly to prove in 1905, remains true. But the issue raised by history was a different one: Axelrod and Plekhanov were arguing "beside the point", or in other words, they side-stepped the issue which events put to the conflicting forces by introducing a question taken from the latest edition of the German Social-Democratic textbook. The impending *struggle for the choice of a path of struggle* was historically inevitable in the immediate future. The alternatives were these: was the old authority to convene Russia's first representative institution and thereby for a time (perhaps a very brief, perhaps a fairly long time) switch the revolution to the monarchist-constitutional path, or were the people by a direct assault to sweep away—at the worst, to shake—the old regime, prevent it from switching the revolution to the monarchist-constitutional path and guarantee (also for a more or less lengthy period) the path of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses? That was the issue historically confronting the revolutionary classes of Russia in the autumn of 1905 which Axelrod and Plekhanov at the time failed to notice. The Social-Democrats' advocacy of active boycott was itself a way of raising the issue, a way of consciously raising it by the party of the proletariat, a slogan of the struggle *for the choice of a path of struggle*.

The advocates of active boycott, the Bolsheviks, correctly interpreted the question objectively posed by his-

tory. The October-December struggle of 1905 was really a struggle for the choice of a path of struggle. This struggle was waged with varying fortune: at first the revolutionary people got the upper hand, wrested from the old regime a chance to immediately switch the revolution on to monarchist-constitutional lines and set up *representative institutions* of a purely revolutionary type—Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc., in place of the representative institutions of the police-liberal type. The October-December period was one of maximum freedom, maximum independent activity of the masses, maximum breadth and momentum of the workers' movement on ground cleared of monarchist-constitutional institutions, laws and snags by the assault of the people, on a ground of "interregnum", when the old authority was *already* undermined, and the new revolutionary power of the people (the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) was *not yet* strong enough to completely replace it. The December struggle decided the question in a different direction: the old regime won by repulsing the assault of the people and holding its positions. But, of course, at that time there were no grounds as yet for considering this a decisive victory. The December uprising of 1905 had its continuation in a number of sporadic and partial mutinies and strikes in the summer of 1906. The slogan of boycott of the Witte Duma⁸ was a slogan of struggle for the concentration and generalisation of these uprisings.

Thus, the first conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the experience of the Russian revolution in boycotting the Bulygin Duma is that, in the objective guise of the boycott, history placed on the order of the day a struggle for the form of the immediate path of development, a struggle over whether the old authority or the new self-established people's power would be called upon to convene Russia's first representative assembly, a struggle for a directly revolutionary path or (for a time) for the path of a monarchist constitution.

In this connection there arises a question, which has often cropped up in the literature, and which constantly crops up when this subject is discussed, namely, that of the simplicity, clarity, and "directness" of the boycott

slogan, as well as the question of a straight or zigzag path of development. The direct overthrow or, at the worst, the weakening and undermining of the old regime, the direct establishment of new government agencies by the people—all this, undoubtedly, is the most *direct* path, the most advantageous as far as the people are concerned, but one that requires the maximum force. Given an overwhelming preponderance of force it is possible to win by a direct frontal attack. Lacking this, one may have to resort to roundabout ways, to marking time, to zigzags, retreats, etc., etc. Of course, the path of a monarchist constitution does not, by any means, exclude revolution, the elements of which are prepared and developed by this path *as well* in an indirect manner, but this path is a longer, more zigzag one.

Running through all Menshevik literature, especially that of 1905 (up to October), is the accusation that the Bolsheviks are "bigoted" and also exhortations to them on the need for taking into consideration the zigzag path of history. In this feature of Menshevik literature we have another specimen of the kind of reasoning which tells us that horses eat oats and that the Volga flows into the Caspian Sea, reasoning which befogs the essence of a disputable question by reiterating what is indisputable. That history usually follows a zigzag path and that a Marxist should be able to make allowance for the most complicated and fantastic zigzags of history is indisputable. But this reiteration of the indisputable has nothing to do with the question of what a Marxist should do when that same history confronts the contending forces with the choice of a straight or a zigzag path. To dismiss the matter at such moments, or at such periods, when this happens by arguing about the usual zigzag course of history is to take after the "man in the muffler" and become absorbed in contemplation of the truth that horses eat oats. As it happens, revolutionary periods are mainly such periods in history when the clash of contending social forces, in a comparatively short space of time, decides the question of the country's choice of a direct or a zigzag path of development for a comparatively very long time. The need for reckoning with the zigzag path does not in the least do away with the fact that

Marxists should be able to explain to the masses during the decisive moments of their history that the direct path is preferable, should be able to help the masses in the struggle for the choice of the direct path, to advance slogans for that struggle, and so on. And only hopeless philistines and the most obtuse pedants, after the decisive historical battles which determined the zigzag path instead of the direct one *were over*, could sneer at those who had fought to the end for the direct path. It would be like the sneers of German police-minded official historians such as Treitschke at the revolutionary slogans and the revolutionary directness of Marx in 1848.

Marxism's attitude towards the zigzag path of history is essentially the same as its attitude towards compromise. Every zigzag turn in history is a compromise, a compromise between the old, which is no longer strong enough to completely negate the new, and the new, which is not yet strong enough to completely overthrow the old. Marxism does not altogether reject compromises. Marxism considers it necessary to make use of them, but that does not in the least prevent Marxism, as a living and operating historical force, from fighting energetically against compromises. Not to understand this seeming contradiction is not to know the rudiments of Marxism.

Engels once expressed the Marxist attitude to compromises very vividly, clearly, and concisely in an article on the manifesto of the Blanquist fugitives of the Commune (1874).* These Blanquists wrote in their manifesto that they accepted no compromises whatever. Engels ridiculed this manifesto. It was not, he said, a question of rejecting compromises *to which circumstances condemn us* (or to which circumstances compel us—I must beg the reader's pardon for being obliged to quote from memory, as I am unable to check with the original text). It was a question of clearly realising the true revolutionary aims of the proletariat and of being able to pursue them through all and every circumstances, zigzags, and compromises.¹⁰

* This article was included in the German volume of collected articles *Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat"*. The title of the Russian translation is *Articles from "Volksstaat"*, published by Znaniye.

Only from this angle can we appreciate the simplicity, directness, and clarity of the boycott as a slogan appealing to the masses. All these virtues of the slogan are good not in themselves, but only in so far as the conditions of struggle for the choice of a direct or zigzag path of development are present in the objective situation in which the slogan is used. During the period of the Bulygin Duma this slogan was the correct and the only revolutionary slogan of the workers' party not because it was the simplest, most forthright, and clearest, but because the historical conditions at the time set the workers' party the task of taking part in the struggle for a simple and direct revolutionary path against the zigzag path of the monarchist constitution.

The question arises, by what criterion are we to judge whether those special historical conditions existed at the time? What is that distinctive feature in the objective state of affairs which made a simple, forthright, and clear slogan not a mere phrase but the only slogan that fitted the actual struggle? We shall take up this question now.

II

Looking back at a struggle that is already over (at least, in its direct and immediate form), there is nothing easier, of course, than to assess the total result of the different, contradictory signs and symptoms of the epoch. The outcome of the struggle settles everything at once and removes all doubts in a very simple way. But what we have to do now is to determine such symptoms as would help us grasp the state of affairs *prior to* the struggle, since we wish to apply the lessons of historical experience to the Third Duma. We have already pointed out above that the condition for the success of the boycott of 1905 was a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid upswing of the revolution. We must now examine, in the first place, what bearing a specially powerful upswing of the struggle has on the boycott, and, secondly, what the characteristic and distinctive features of a specially powerful upswing are.

Boycott, as we have already stated, is a struggle not within the framework of a given institution, but against

its emergence. Any given institution can be derived only from the already existing, i. e., the old, regime. Consequently, the boycott is a means of struggle aimed directly at overthrowing the old regime, or, at the worst, i. e., when the assault is not strong enough for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be unable to set up that institution, unable to make it operate.* Consequently, to be successful the boycott requires a direct struggle against the old regime, an uprising against it and mass disobedience to it in a large number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the conditions for preparing an uprising). Boycott is a refusal to recognise the old regime, a refusal, of course, not in words, but in deeds, i. e., it is something that finds expression not only in cries or the slogans of organisations, but in a definite movement of the *mass of the people*, who systematically defy the laws of the old regime, systematically set up new institutions, which, though unlawful, actually exist, and so on and so forth. The connection between boycott and the broad revolutionary upswing is thus obvious: boycott is the most decisive means of struggle, which rejects not the form of organisation of the given institution, but its very existence. Boycott is a declaration of open war against the old regime, a direct attack upon it. Unless there is a broad revolutionary upswing, unless there is mass unrest which overflows, as it were, the bounds of the old legality, there can be no question of the boycott succeeding.

Passing to the question of the nature and symptoms of the upswing of the autumn of 1905 we shall easily see that what was happening at the time was an incessant mass *offensive* of the revolution, which systematically attacked and held the enemy in check. Repression expanded the movement instead of reducing it. In the wake of January 9 came a gigantic strike wave, the barricades in Lodz, the

* Reference everywhere in the text is to active boycott, that is, not just a refusal to take part in the institutions of the old regime, but an attack upon this regime. Readers who are not familiar with Social-Democratic literature of the period of the Bulygin Duma boycott should be reminded that the Social-Democrats spoke openly at the time about *active* boycott, sharply contrasting it to passive boycott, and even linking it with an armed uprising.

mutiny of the *Potemkin*. In the sphere of the press, the unions, and education the legal bounds prescribed by the old regime were everywhere systematically broken, and by no means by the "revolutionaries" alone, but by the man-in-the-street, for the old authority was really weakened, was really letting the reins slip from its senile hands. A singularly striking and unerring indication of the force of the upswing (from the point of view of the revolutionary organisations) was the fact that the slogans of the revolutionaries not only evoked a response but actually *lagged* behind the march of events. January 9 and the mass strikes that followed it, and the *Potemkin* were all events which were in advance of the direct appeals of the revolutionaries. *In 1905, there was no appeal* of theirs which the masses would have met passively, by silence, or by abandoning the struggle. The boycott under such conditions was a natural *supplement* to the electrically charged atmosphere. That slogan did not "invent" anything at the time, it merely formulated accurately and truly the upswing which was going steadily forward towards a direct assault. On the contrary, the "inventors" were our Mensheviks, who kept aloof from the revolutionary upswing, fell for the empty promise of the tsar in the shape of the manifesto or the law of August 6 and seriously believed in the *promised* change over to a constitutional monarchy. The Mensheviks (and Parvus) at that time based their tactics not on the fact of the sweeping, powerful, and rapid revolutionary upswing, but on the tsar's promise of a change to a constitutional monarchy! No wonder such tactics turned out to be ridiculous and abject opportunism. No wonder that in all the Menshevik arguments about the boycott an analysis of the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, i. e., the revolution's greatest experience of the boycott, is now carefully discarded. But it is not enough to recognise this mistake of the Mensheviks, perhaps their biggest mistake in revolutionary tactics. One must clearly realise that the source of this mistake was failure to understand the *objective* state of affairs, which made the revolutionary upswing a reality and the change to a constitutional monarchy an empty police promise. The Mensheviks were wrong not because they approached the question in a mood devoid of subjective revolutionary

spirit, but because the ideas of these pseudo-revolutionaries fell short of the objectively revolutionary situation. It is easy to confuse these reasons for the Mensheviks' mistakes, but it is impermissible for a Marxist to confuse them.

III

The connection between the boycott and the historical conditions characteristic of a definite period of the Russian revolution should be examined from still another angle. What was the political content of the Social-Democratic boycott campaign of the autumn of 1905 and the spring of 1906? Its content did not, of course, consist in repeating the word boycott or calling on the people not to take part in the elections. Nor was its content confined to appeals for a direct assault that ignored the roundabout and zigzag paths proposed by the autocracy. In addition to and not even alongside this theme, but rather at the centre of the whole boycott campaign, was the *fight against constitutional illusions*. This fight was, in truth, the living spirit of the boycott. Recall the speeches of the boycottists and their whole agitation, look at the principal resolutions of the boycottists and you will see how true this is.

The Mensheviks were never able to understand this aspect of the boycott. They always believed that to fight constitutional illusions in a period of nascent constitutionalism was nonsense, absurdity, "anarchism". This point of view of the Mensheviks was also forcibly expressed in their speeches at the Stockholm Congress,¹¹ especially—I remember—in the speeches of Plekhanov, not to mention Menshevik literature.

At first sight the position of the Mensheviks on this question would really seem to be as impregnable as that of a man who smugly instructs his friends that horses eat oats. In a period of nascent constitutionalism to proclaim a fight against constitutional illusions! Is it not anarchism? Is it not gibberish?

The vulgarisation of this question effected by means of a specious allusion to the plain common sense of such arguments is based on the fact that the special period of

the Russian revolution is passed over in silence, that *the boycott of the Bulygin Duma is forgotten*, and that the concrete stages of the course taken by our revolution are replaced by a general designation of the whole of our revolution, both past and future, as a revolution that begets constitutionalism. This is a specimen of the violation of the method of dialectical materialism by people, who, like Plekhanov, spoke about this method with the utmost eloquence.

Yes, our bourgeois revolution as a whole, like every bourgeois revolution, is, in the long run, a process of building up a constitutional system and nothing more. That is the truth. It is a useful truth for exposing the quasi-socialist pretensions of one or another bourgeois-democratic programme, theory, tactics, and so forth. But would you be able to derive any benefit from this truth on the question as to *what kind* of constitutionalism the workers' party is to lead the country to in the epoch of bourgeois revolution? Or on the question as to *how exactly* the workers' party should fight for a definite (and, precisely, a republican) constitutionalism during definite periods of the revolution? You would not. This favourite truth of Axelrod's and Plekhanov's would no more enlighten you on these questions than the conviction that a horse eats oats would enable you to choose a suitable animal and ride it.

The fight against constitutional illusions, the Bolsheviks said in 1905 and at the beginning of 1906, should become the slogan of the moment, because it was at that period that the objective state of affairs faced the struggling social forces with having to decide the issue whether the straight path of direct revolutionary struggle and of representative institutions created directly by the revolution on the basis of complete democratism, or the roundabout zigzag path of a monarchist constitution and police-“constitutional” (in inverted commas!) institutions of the “Duma” type would triumph in the immediate future.

Did the objective state of affairs really raise this issue, or was it “invented” by the Bolsheviks because of their theoretical mischievousness? That question has now been answered by the history of the Russian revolution.

The October struggle of 1905 was indeed a struggle to prevent the revolution from being switched to monarchist-constitutional lines. The October-December period was indeed a period which saw the realisation of a proletarian, truly democratic, broad, bold, and free constitutionalism that really expressed the will of the people as opposed to the pseudo-constitutionalism of the Dubasov and Stolypin¹² constitution. The revolutionary struggle for a truly democratic constitutionalism (that is, one built on ground completely cleared of the old regime and all the abominations associated with it) called for the most determined fight against the police-monarchist constitution being used as a bait for the people. This simple thing the Social-Democratic opponents of the boycott absolutely failed to understand.

Two phases in the development of the Russian revolution now stand out before us in all their clarity: the phase of upswing (1905) and the phase of decline (1906-07). The phase of maximum development of the people's activity, of free and broad organisations of all classes of the population, the phase of maximum freedom of the press and maximum ignoring by the people of the old authority, its institutions and commands—and all this without any constitutionalism bureaucratically endorsed and expressed in formal rules and regulations. And after that the phase of least development and steady decline of popular activity, organisation, freedom of the press, etc., under a (God forgive us!) "constitution" concocted, sanctioned, and safeguarded by the Dubasovs and Stolypins.

Now, when everything *behind* looks so plain and clear, you would hardly find a single pedant who would dare to deny the legitimacy and necessity of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to prevent events from taking a constitutional-monarchist turn, the legitimacy and necessity of the fight against constitutional illusions.

Now you will hardly find a sensible historian worthy of the name who would not divide the course of the Russian revolution between 1905 and the autumn of 1907 into these two periods: the "anti-constitutional" period (if I may be allowed that expression) of upswing and the period of "constitutional" decline, the period of conquest and achievement of freedom by the people without police (mon-

archist) constitutionalism and the period of oppression and suppression of popular freedom by means of the monarchist "constitution".

Now the period of constitutional illusions, the period of the First and Second Dumas is quite clear to us, and it is no longer difficult to grasp the importance of the fight which the revolutionary Social-Democrats waged *at that time* against constitutional illusions. But *at that time*, in 1905 and the beginning of 1906, neither the liberals in the bourgeois camp nor the Mensheviks in the proletarian camp understood this.

Yet the period of the First and Second Dumas was in every sense and all respects a period of constitutional illusions. The solemn pledge that "no law shall become effective without the approval of the Duma" was not violated at that period. Thus, the constitution existed on paper, never ceasing to warm the cockles of all the slavish hearts of the Russian Cadets.¹³ Both Dubasov and Stolypin at that period put the Russian constitution to the test of practice, tried it and verified it in an effort to adjust and fit it to the old autocracy. They, Dubasov and Stolypin, appeared to be the most powerful men of the time, and they worked hard to make the "illusion" a reality. The illusion proved to be an illusion. History has fully endorsed the correctness of the slogan of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. But it was not only the Dubasovs and Stolypins who tried to put the "constitution" into effect, it was not only the servile Cadets who praised it to the skies and like flunkies (*à la* Mr. Rodichev in the First Duma) exerted themselves to prove that the monarch was blameless and that it would be presumptuous to hold him responsible for the pogroms. No. During this period the broad masses of the people as well undoubtedly still believed to a greater or lesser extent in the "constitution", believed in the Duma despite the warnings of the Social-Democrats.

The period of constitutional illusions in the Russian revolution may be said to have been a period of nationwide infatuation with a bourgeois fetish, just as whole nations in Western Europe sometimes become infatuated with the fetish of bourgeois nationalism, anti-semitism, chauvinism, etc. It is to the credit of the Social-Democrats

that they alone were not taken in by the bourgeois hoax, that they alone in the epoch of constitutional illusions always kept unfurled the banner of struggle against constitutional illusions.

Why then, the question now arises, was the boycott a specific means of struggle against constitutional illusions?

There is a feature about the boycott which, at first sight, involuntarily repels every Marxist. Boycott of elections is a renunciation of parliamentarism, something that looks very much like passive rejection, abstention, evasion. So Parvus regarded it (he only had German models to go by) when, in the autumn of 1905, he stormed and raged, angrily but unsuccessfully, attempting to prove that active boycott was all the same a bad thing because it was *still a boycott*.... And so also is it regarded by Martov, who to this day has learned nothing from the revolution and is more and more turning into a liberal. By his last article in *Tovarishch*¹⁴ he has shown that he is unable even to raise the problem in a way that befits a revolutionary Social-Democrat.

But this most objectionable, so to speak, feature of the boycott as far as a Marxist is concerned is fully explained by the specific features of the period that gave rise to such a method of struggle. The First monarchist Duma, the Bulygin Duma, was a bait designed to draw the people away from the revolution. The bait was a dummy clothed in a dress of constitutionalism. One and all were tempted to swallow the bait. Some through selfish class interests, others through ignorance, were inclined to snatch at the dummy of the Bulygin Duma, and later at that of the Witte Duma. Everyone was enthusiastic, everyone sincerely believed in it. Participation in the elections was not just a matter-of-fact, simple performance of one's usual civic duties. It was the solemn inauguration of a monarchist constitution. It was a turn from the direct revolutionary path to the monarchist-constitutional path.

The Social-Democrats *were bound* at such a time to unfurl their banner of protest and warning with the utmost vigour, with the utmost demonstrativeness. And that meant refusing to take part, abstaining oneself and holding the

people back, issuing a call for an assault on the old regime *instead of* working within the framework of an institution set up by that regime. The nation-wide enthusiasm for the bourgeois-police fetish of a "constitutional" monarchy demanded of the Social-Democrats, as the party of the proletariat, an equally nation-wide demonstration of their views protesting against and exposing this fetish, demanded a fight with the utmost vigour against the establishment of institutions that embodied that fetishism.

There you have the full historical justification not only for the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, which met with immediate success, but for the boycott of the Witte Duma, which, *to all appearances*, was a failure. We now see why it was only an *apparent* failure, why the Social-Democrats had to maintain their protest against the constitutional-monarchist turn of our revolution *to the very last*. This turn *in fact* proved to be a turn *into a blind alley*. The illusions about a monarchist constitution proved to be merely a prelude or a signboard, an adornment, diverting attention from preparations for the annulment of this "constitution" by the old regime....

We said that the Social-Democrats had to maintain their protest against the suppression of liberty by means of the "constitution" to the very last. What do we mean by "to the very last"? We mean until the institution *against* which the Social-Democrats were fighting had become an accomplished fact *despite* the Social-Democrats, until the monarchist-constitutional turn of the Russian revolution, which inevitably meant (*for a certain time*) the decline of the revolution, the defeat of the revolution, had become an accomplished fact despite the Social-Democrats. The period of constitutional illusions was an attempt at *compromise*. We fought and had to fight against it with all our might. We had to go into the Second Duma, we had to reckon with compromise once the circumstances *forced* it upon us against our will, despite our efforts, and at the cost of the defeat of our struggle. For how long we have to reckon with it is another matter, of course.

What inference is to be drawn from all this as regards the boycott of the *Third* Duma? Is it, perhaps, that the boycott, which is necessary at the beginning of the period

of constitutional illusions, is also necessary at the end of this period? That would be a "bright idea" in the vein of "analogical sociology" and not a serious conclusion. Boycott *cannot* now have the *same* meaning that it had at the beginning of the Russian revolution. Today we can neither warn the people against constitutional illusions nor fight to prevent the revolution from being turned into the constitutional-monarchist blind alley. Boycott cannot have its former vital spark. If there should be a boycott, it will in any case have a *different* significance, it will be filled in any case with a *different* political content.

Moreover, our analysis of the historical peculiarity of the boycott provides one consideration against a boycott of the Third Duma. In the period at the beginning of the constitutional turn the attention of the whole nation was inevitably focused on the Duma. By means of the boycott we fought and were bound to fight against this focusing of attention on the trend towards the blind alley, to fight against an infatuation that was due to ignorance, unenlightenment, weakness, or selfish counter-revolutionary activity. Today not only any nation-wide, but even any at all widespread enthusiasm for the Duma in general or for the Third Duma in particular is completely ruled out. There is no need for any boycott here.

IV

And so the conditions for the applicability of a boycott should be sought, undoubtedly, in the objective state of affairs at the given moment. Comparing, from this point of view, the autumn of 1907 with that of 1905, we cannot help coming to the conclusion that we have no grounds *today* for proclaiming a boycott. From the standpoint of the relation between the direct revolutionary path and the constitutional-monarchist "zigzag", from the standpoint of mass upswing, and from the standpoint of the specific aims of the fight against constitutional illusions, the present state of affairs differs sharply from that of two years ago.

At that time the monarchist-constitutional turn of history was nothing more than a police promise. Now it is

a fact. Not to acknowledge this fact would be a ridiculous fear of the truth. And it would be a mistake to infer from the acknowledgement of this fact that the Russian revolution is over. No, there are no grounds whatever for drawing such a conclusion. A Marxist is bound to fight for the direct revolutionary path of development when such a fight is prescribed by the objective state of affairs, but this, we repeat, does not mean that we do not have to reckon with the zigzag turn which has in fact already taken definite shape. In this respect the course of the Russian revolution has already become quite definite. At the beginning of the revolution we see a line of short, but extraordinarily broad and amazingly rapid upswing. Next we have a line of extremely slow but steady decline, beginning with the December uprising of 1905. First a period of direct revolutionary struggle by the masses, then a period of monarchist-constitutional turn.

Does this mean that this latter turn is a final one? That the revolution is over and a "constitutional" period has set in? That there are no grounds either for expecting a new upswing or for preparing for it? That the republican character of our programme must be scrapped?

Not at all. Only liberal vulgarians like our Cadets, who are ready to use any argument to justify servility and toadyism, can draw such conclusions. No, it only means that in upholding, at all points, the *whole* of our programme and *all* our revolutionary views, we must bring our direct appeals into line with the objective state of affairs at the given moment. While proclaiming the inevitability of revolution, while systematically and steadily accumulating inflammatory material in every way, while, for this purpose, carefully guarding the revolutionary traditions of our revolution's best epoch, cultivating them and purging them of liberal parasites, we nevertheless do not refuse to do the humdrum daily work on the humdrum monarchist-constitutional turn. That is all. We must work for a new, broad upswing, but we have no ground whatever for butting in blindly with the slogan of boycott.

As we have said, the only boycott that can have any meaning in Russia at the present time is *active* boycott. This implies not passively avoiding participation in the

elections, but ignoring the elections for the sake of the aim of a direct assault. The boycott, in this sense, inevitably amounts to a *call* for the most energetic and decisive offensive. Does such a broad and general upswing exist at the present moment, an upswing without which such a call would be meaningless? Of course not.

Generally speaking, as far as "calls" are concerned, the difference in this respect between the present state of affairs and that of the autumn of 1905 is a very striking one. At that time, as we have already pointed out, there were no calls throughout the previous year to which the masses would not have responded. The impetus of the mass offensive took place in advance of the calls of the organisations. Now we are at a period of a lull in the revolution when *a whole series of calls systematically met with no response among the masses*. That is what happened with the call to sweep away the Witte Duma (at the beginning of 1906), with the call for an uprising after the dissolution of the First Duma (in the summer of 1906), *with the call for struggle* in answer to the dissolution of the Second Duma and the coup d'état of June 3, 1907. Take the leaflet of our Central Committee on these last acts.¹⁵ You will find there a direct call to struggle in the form possible under local conditions (demonstrations, strikes, and an open struggle against the armed force of absolutism). It was a verbal appeal. The mutinies of June 1907 in Kiev and the Black Sea Fleet were calls through action. Neither of these calls evoked a mass response. If the most striking and direct manifestations of reactionary assault upon the revolution—the dissolution of the two Dumas and the coup d'état—evoked no upswing at the time, what ground is there for immediately repeating the call in the form of proclaiming a boycott? Is it not clear that the objective state of affairs is such that the "proclamation" is in danger of being just an empty shout? When the struggle is on, when it is spreading, growing, coming up from all sides, then such a "proclamation" is legitimate and necessary; then it is the duty of the revolutionary proletariat to sound such a war-cry. But it is impossible to invent that struggle or to call it into being merely by a war-cry. And when a whole series of fighting calls, tested by us on more direct occasions, has proved to be una-

vailing, it is only natural that we should seek to have serious grounds for "proclaiming" a slogan which is meaningless unless the conditions exist which make fighting calls feasible.

If anyone wants to persuade the *Social-Democratic* proletariat that the slogan of boycott is a correct one, he must not allow himself to be carried away by the mere sound of words that in their time played a great and glorious revolutionary role. He must weigh the objective conditions for applying such a slogan and realise that to launch it assumes indirectly the existence of conditions making for a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid revolutionary upswing. But in periods such as we are now living in, in periods of a temporary lull in the revolution, such a condition can in no circumstances be indirectly assumed. It must be directly and distinctly realised and made clear both to oneself and to the whole working class. Otherwise one runs the risk of finding oneself in the position of a person who uses big words without understanding their true meaning or who hesitates to speak plainly and call a spade a spade.

V

The boycott is one of the finest revolutionary traditions of the most eventful and heroic period of the Russian revolution. We said above that it is one of our tasks to carefully guard these traditions in general, to cultivate them, and to purge them of liberal (and opportunist) parasites. We must dwell a little on the analysis of this task in order correctly to define what it implies and to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstandings that might easily arise.

Marxism differs from all other socialist theories in the remarkable way it combines complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius, and revolutionary initiative of the masses—and also, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations, and parties that are able to discover and achieve contact with one or another class. A high apprais-

al of the revolutionary periods in the development of humanity follows logically from the totality of Marx's views on history. It is in such periods that the numerous contradictions which slowly accumulate during periods of so-called peaceful development become resolved. It is in such periods that the direct role of the different classes in determining the forms of social life is manifested with the greatest force, and that the foundations are laid for the political "superstructure", which then persists for a long time on the basis of the new relations of production. And, unlike the theoreticians of the liberal bourgeoisie, Marx did not regard these periods as deviations from the "normal" path, as manifestations of "social disease", as the deplorable results of excesses and mistakes, but as the most vital, the most important, essential, and decisive moments in the history of human societies. In the activities of Marx and Engels themselves, the period of their participation in the mass revolutionary struggle of 1848-49 stands out as the central point. This was their point of departure when determining the future pattern of the workers' movement and democracy in different countries. It was to this point that they always returned in order to determine the essential nature of the different classes and their tendencies in the most striking and purest form. It was from the standpoint of the revolutionary period of that time that they always judged the later, lesser, political formations and organisations, political aims and political conflicts. No wonder the ideological leaders of liberalism, men like Sombart, whole-heartedly hate this feature of Marx's activities and writings and ascribe it to the "bitterness of an exile". It is indeed typical of the bugs of police-ridden bourgeois university science to ascribe an inseparable component of Marx's and Engels's revolutionary outlook to personal bitterness, to the personal hardships of life in exile!

In one of his letters, I think it was to Kugelmann, Marx in passing threw out a highly characteristic remark, which is particularly interesting in the light of the question we are discussing. He says that the reaction in Germany had almost succeeded in blotting out the memory and traditions of the revolutionary epoch of 1848 from the minds of the people." Here we have the aims of reaction and the aims

of the party of the proletariat in relation to the revolutionary traditions of a given country strikingly contrasted. The aim of reaction is to blot out these traditions, to represent the revolution as "elemental madness"—Struve's translation of the German *das tolle Jahr* ("the mad year"—the term applied by the German police-minded bourgeois historians, and even more widely by German university-professorial historiography, to the year 1848). The aim of reaction is to make the people forget the forms of struggle, the forms of organisation, and the ideas and slogans which the revolutionary period begot in such profusion and variety. Just as those obtuse eulogists of English philistinism, the Webbs, try to represent Chartism, the revolutionary period of the English labour movement, as pure childlessness, as "sowing wild oats", as a piece of naïveté unworthy of serious attention, as an accidental and abnormal deviation, so too the German bourgeois historians treat the year 1848 in Germany. Such also is the attitude of the reactionaries to the Great French Revolution, which, by the fierce hatred it still inspires, demonstrates to this day the vitality and force of its influence on humanity. And in the same way our heroes of counter-revolution, particularly "democrats" of yesterday like Struve, Milyukov, Kiesewetter, and *tutti quanti* vie with one another in scurrilously slandering the revolutionary traditions of the Russian revolution. Although it is barely two years since the direct mass struggle of the proletariat won that particle of freedom which sends the liberal lackeys of the old regime into such raptures, a vast trend calling itself *liberal* (!!) has already arisen in our publicist literature. This trend is fostered by the Cadet press and is wholly devoted to depicting our revolution, revolutionary methods of struggle, revolutionary slogans, and revolutionary traditions as something base, primitive, naïve, elemental, mad, etc. ... even criminal ... from Milyukov to Kamyshansky *il n'y a qu'un pas!** On the other hand, the successes of reaction, which first drove the people from the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies into the Dubasov-Stolypin Dumas, and is now

* There is only one step.—*Ed.*

driving it into the Octobrist Duma, are depicted by the heroes of Russian liberalism as "the process of growth of *constitutional* consciousness in Russia".

It is undoubtedly the duty of Russian Social-Democrats to study our revolution most carefully and thoroughly, to acquaint the masses with its forms of struggle, forms of organisation, etc., to strengthen the revolutionary traditions among the people, to convince the masses that improvements of any importance and permanence can be achieved solely and exclusively through revolutionary struggle, and to systematically expose the utter baseness of those smug liberals who pollute the social atmosphere with the miasma of "constitutional" servility, treachery, and Molchalism. In the history of the struggle for liberty a single day of the October strike or of the December uprising is a hundred times more significant than months of Cadet flunkey speeches in the Duma on the subject of the blameless monarch and constitutional monarchy. We must see to it—for if we do not no one else will—that the people know much more thoroughly and in more detail those spirited, eventful, and momentous days than those months of "constitutional" asphyxia and Balalaikin-Molchalism" prosperity so zealously announced to the world by our liberal-party and non-party "democratic" (ugh! ugh!) press with the amiable acquiescence of Stolypin and his retinue of gendarme censors.

There is no doubt that, in many cases, sympathy for the boycott is created precisely by these praiseworthy efforts of revolutionaries to foster tradition of the finest period of the revolutionary past, to light up the cheerless slough of the drab workaday present by a spark of bold, open, and resolute struggle. But it is just because we cherish this concern for revolutionary traditions that we must vigorously protest against the view that by using one of the slogans of a particular historical period the essential conditions of that period can be restored. It is one thing to preserve the traditions of the revolution, to know how to use them for constant propaganda and agitation and for acquainting the masses with the conditions of a direct and aggressive struggle against the old regime, but quite another thing to repeat a slogan divorced from the sum total of the

conditions which gave rise to it and which ensured its success and to apply it to essentially different conditions.

Marx himself, who so highly valued revolutionary traditions and unsparingly castigated a renegade or philistine attitude towards them, at the same time demanded that revolutionaries should be able to *think*, should be able to *analyse* the conditions under which old methods of struggle could be used, and not simply to repeat certain slogans. The "national" traditions of 1792 in France will perhaps for ever remain a *model* of certain revolutionary methods of struggle; but this did not prevent Marx in 1870 in the famous Address of the International from warning the French proletariat against the mistake of applying those traditions to the conditions of a different period.¹⁸

This holds good for Russia as well. We must study the conditions for the application of the boycott; we must instil in the masses the idea that the boycott is a quite legitimate and sometimes essential method at moments when the revolution is on the upswing (whatever the pedants who take the name of Marx in vain may say). But whether revolution is really on the upswing—and this is the fundamental condition for proclaiming a boycott—is a question which one must be able to raise independently and to decide on the basis of a serious analysis of the facts. It is our duty to prepare the way for such an upswing, as far as it lies within our power, and not to reject the boycott at the proper moment; but to regard the boycott slogan as being generally applicable to every bad or very bad representative institution would be an absolute mistake.

Take the reasoning that was used to defend and support the boycott in the "days of freedom", and you will see at once that it is impossible simply to apply such arguments to present-day conditions.

When advocating the boycott in 1905 and the beginning of 1906 we said that participation in the elections would tend to lower the temper, to surrender the position to the enemy, to lead the revolutionary people astray, to make it easier for tsarism to come to an agreement with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and so on. What was the fundamental premise underlying these arguments, a premise not always specified but always assumed as something

which *in those days* was self-evident. This premise was the rich revolutionary energy of the masses, which sought and found *direct* outlets apart from any "constitutional" channels. This premise was the continuous *offensive* of the revolution against reaction, an offensive which it would have been criminal to weaken by occupying and defending a position that was deliberately yielded up by the enemy in order to weaken the general assault. Try to repeat these arguments *apart from* the conditions of this fundamental premise and you will immediately feel that all your "music" is off-key, that your fundamental tone is false.

It would be just as hopeless to attempt to justify the boycott by drawing a distinction between the Second and the Third Dumas. To regard the difference between the Cadets (who in the Second Duma completely betrayed the people to the Black Hundreds¹⁹) and the Octobrists²⁰ as a serious and fundamental difference, to attach any real significance to the notorious "constitution" which was torn up by the coup d'état of June 3, is something that in general corresponds much more to the spirit of vulgar democracy than that of revolutionary Social-Democracy. We have always said, maintained, and repeated that the "constitution" of the First and Second Dumas was only an illusion, that the Cadets' talk was only a blind to screen their Octobrist nature, and that the Duma was a totally unsuitable instrument for satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the peasantry. For us June 3, 1907 is a natural and inevitable result of the defeat of December 1905. We were never "captivated" by the charms of the "Duma" constitution, and so we cannot be greatly disappointed by the transition from reaction embellished and glossed over by Rodichev's phrase-mongering to naked, open, and crude reaction. The latter may even be a more effective means of sobering the ranting liberal simpletons or the sections of the population they have led astray....

Compare the Menshevik Stockholm resolution with the Bolshevik London resolution on the State Duma. You will find that the former is pompous, wordy, full of high-flown phrases about the significance of the Duma and puffed up by a sense of the grandeur of work in the Duma. The latter is simple, concise, sober, and modest. The first resolution

is imbued with a spirit of philistine jubilation over the marriage of Social-Democracy and constitutionalism ("the new power from the midst of the people", and so on and so forth in this same spirit of official falsehood). The second resolution can be paraphrased approximately as follows: since the accursed counter-revolution has driven us into this accursed pigsty, we shall work there too for the benefit of the revolution, without whining, but also without boasting.

By defending the Duma against boycott when we were still in the period of direct revolutionary struggle, the Mensheviks, so to speak, gave their pledge to the people that the Duma would be something in the nature of a weapon of revolution. And they completely failed to honour this pledge. But if we Bolsheviks gave any pledge at all, it was only by our assurance that the Duma was the spawn of counter-revolution and that no real good could be expected from it. Our view has been borne out splendidly so far, and it can safely be said that it will be borne out by future events as well. Unless the October-December strategy is "corrected" and repeated on the basis of the new data, there will never be freedom in Russia.

Therefore, when I am told that the Third Duma cannot be utilised as the Second Duma was, that the masses cannot be made to understand that it is necessary to take part in it, I would reply: if by "utilise" is meant some Menshevik bombast about it being a weapon of the revolution, etc., then it certainly cannot. But then even the first two Dumas proved in fact to be only steps to the Octobrist Duma, yet we utilised them for the simple and modest* purpose (propaganda and agitation, criticism and explaining to the masses what is taking place) for which we shall always

* Cf. the article in *Proletary* (Geneva), 1905, ¹¹ "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma" (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 179-87.—Ed.), where it was pointed out that we do not renounce the use of the Duma generally, but that we are now dealing with another issue confronting us, namely, that of fighting for a direct revolutionary path. See also the article in *Proletary* (Russian issue), 1906, ¹² No. 1, "The Boycott" (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 141-49.—Ed.), where stress is laid on the modest extent of the benefits to be derived from work in the Duma.

contrive to utilise even the worst representative institutions. A speech in the Duma will not cause any "revolution", and propaganda *in connection with the Duma* is not distinguished by any particular merits; but the advantage that Social-Democracy can derive from the one and the other is not less, and sometimes even greater, than that derived from a printed speech or a speech delivered at some other gathering.

And we must explain to the masses our participation in the Octobrist Duma just as simply. Owing to the defeat of December 1905 and the failure of the attempts of 1906-07 to "repair" this defeat, reaction inevitably drove us and *will continue to drive* us constantly into worse and worse quasi-constitutional institutions. Always and everywhere we shall uphold our convictions and advocate our views, always insisting that no good can be expected as long as the old regime remains, as long as it is not wholly eradicated. We shall prepare the conditions for a new upswing, and until it takes place, and in order that it may take place, we shall work still harder and not launch slogans which have meaning only when the revolution is on the upswing.

It would be just as wrong to regard the boycott as a *line of tactics* counterposing the proletariat and part of the revolutionary bourgeois democracy to liberalism and reaction. The boycott is not a line of tactics, but a special means of struggle suitable under special conditions. To confuse Bolshevism with "boycottism" would be as bad as confusing it with "boyevism".²²² The difference between the Bolshevik and Menshevik *lines of tactics* is now quite clear and has taken shape in the fundamentally different resolutions adopted in the spring of 1905 at the Bolshevik Third Congress in London and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva. There was no talk then either of boycott or of "boyevism", nor could there have been. As everyone knows, our *line of tactics* differed essentially from the Menshevik line both in the elections to the Second Duma, when we were not boycottists, and in the Second Duma itself. The *lines of tactics* diverge in every field of the struggle whatever its means and methods may be, without any special methods of struggle peculiar to either line being created. And

if a boycott of the Third Duma were to be justified or caused by the collapse of *revolutionary* expectations in regard to *the First or the Second Dumas*, by the collapse of a "lawful", "strong", "stable", and "genuine" constitution, it would be Menshevism of the worst kind.

VI

We have left an examination of the strongest and the only Marxist arguments in favour of a boycott to the last. Active boycott has no meaning apart from a broad revolutionary upswing. Granted. But a broad upswing evolves from one that is not broad. Signs of a certain upswing are in evidence. The boycott slogan ought to be launched by us, since that slogan supports, develops, and expands the incipient upswing.

Such, in my opinion, is the *basic* argument which, in a more or less clear form, determines the tendency towards boycott among Social-Democrats. Moreover, the comrades who stand closest to direct proletarian work proceed not from any argumentation "constructed" according to a certain type, but from a sum total of impressions derived from their contact with the working-class masses.

One of the few questions on which so far it seems there are not, or were not, disagreements between the two factions of the Social-Democrats, is that of the reason for the protracted lull in the development of our revolution. "The proletariat has not recovered"—that is the reason. Indeed, the brunt of the October-December struggle was borne by the proletariat *alone*. The proletariat alone fought in a systematic, organised, and unremitting way for the whole nation. No wonder that in a country with the smallest percentage of proletarian population (by European standards), the proletariat should have found itself utterly exhausted by such a struggle. Besides, ever since December the combined forces of governmental and bourgeois reaction have been striking their hardest all the time at the proletariat. Police persecutions and executions have decimated the ranks of the proletariat in the course of eighteen months, while systematic lock-outs, beginning with

the "punitive" closing down of state-owned factories and ending with capitalist conspiracies against the workers, have increased poverty among the mass of the working class to an unprecedented extent. And now, some Social-Democratic functionaries say, there are signs of a rising challenge among the masses, a mustering of strength by the proletariat. This rather vague and indefinite impression is supported by a stronger argument, namely, indubitable evidence of a business revival in certain branches of industry. The growing demand for workers should inevitably intensify the strike movement. The workers will be bound to attempt to make up for at least some of the tremendous losses they sustained in the period of repression and lock-outs. Finally, the third and most powerful argument is the one that points not to a problematical or generally expected strike movement, but to a single great strike already decided upon by the workers' organisations. At the beginning of 1907, the representatives of 10,000 textile workers discussed their position and outlined steps for strengthening the trade unions in that industry. The delegates have met again, this time representing 20,000 workers, and they resolved to call a *general strike* of the textile workers in July 1907. This movement may involve up to 400,000 workers. It originates in the Moscow region, i.e., the biggest centre of the labour movement in Russia and the biggest trade and industrial centre. It is in Moscow, and only in Moscow, that the mass workers' movement is most likely to develop into a wide popular movement of decisive political importance. As for the textile workers, they are the worst paid and least developed element of the total of the working class, who participated least of all in previous movements and who have the closest connections with the peasantry. The initiative of such workers may be an indication that the movement will embrace much wider strata of the proletariat than before. As regards the connection between the strike movement and the revolutionary upswing of the masses, this has already been demonstrated repeatedly in the history of the Russian revolution.

It is the bounden duty of the Social-Democrats to concentrate supreme attention and special efforts on this move-

ment. Work in this field should certainly be given precedence over the elections to the Octobrist Duma. The masses should be made to see the necessity of converting this strike movement into a general and broad attack on the autocracy. That is just what the boycott slogan means—a shifting of attention from the Duma to the direct mass struggle. The boycott slogan means imbuing the new movement with a political and revolutionary content.

Such, roughly, is the train of thought which has led certain Social-Democrats to the conviction that the Third Duma must be boycotted. This argument in favour of the boycott is undoubtedly a Marxist one, and has nothing in common with the bare repetition of a slogan dissociated from specific historical conditions.

But strong as this argument is, it is not enough, in my opinion, to make us accept the boycott slogan *straightaway*. This argument emphasises what no Russian Social-Democrat who ponders the lessons of our revolution should have any doubts about, namely, that we cannot renounce boycott, that we must be prepared to put that slogan forward at the proper time, and that our way of stating the boycott issue has nothing in common with the liberal, wretchedly philistine way—to keep clear of it or not to keep clear of it?*—which is devoid of all revolutionary content.

Let us take it for granted that everything the Social-Democratic adherents of the boycott say about the changed temper of the workers, about the industrial revival, and about the July strike of the textile workers is wholly in accord with the facts.

What follows from all this? We have before us the beginning of a partial upswing of revolutionary import.**

* See *Tovarishch* for a specimen of *liberal* argumentation by L. Martov, a former contributor to Social-Democratic publications and now a contributor to liberal newspapers.

** Some hold that the textile strike is a movement of a new type which sets the trade-union movement apart from the revolutionary movement. But we pass over this view, first because to read a pessimistic meaning into all symptoms of phenomena of a complex type is generally a dangerous practice which often muddles many Social-Democrats who are not quite "firm in the saddle". Secondly, if the textile strike was found to have these characteristics we Social-Democrats would have to fight against them in the most energetic man-

Must we make every effort to support and develop it, and try to convert it into a general revolutionary upswing, and then into a movement of an aggressive type? Undoubtedly. There can be no two opinions about this among the Social-Democrats (except, perhaps, those contributing to *Tovarishch*). But do we need the boycott slogan for developing the movement *at this very moment*, at the beginning of this partial upswing, before it has definitely passed into a general upswing? Is this slogan capable of promoting the movement today? This is a different question, one which, in our opinion, would have to be answered in the negative.

A general upswing can and should be developed from a partial upswing by direct and immediate arguments and slogans without any relation to the Third Duma. The entire course of events after December fully confirms the Social-Democratic view on the role of the monarchist constitution, on the necessity of direct struggle. Citizens, we shall say, if you do not want to see the cause of democracy in Russia going steadily faster and faster downhill as it did after December 1905 during the hegemony of the Cadet gentlemen over the democratic movement, then support the incipient workers' movement, support the direct mass struggle. Without it there can be no guarantee of freedom in Russia.

Agitation of this type would undoubtedly be a perfectly consistent revolutionary-Social-Democratic agitation. Would we necessarily have to add to it: Don't believe in the Third Duma, citizens, and look at us, Social-Democrats, who are boycotting it as proof of our protest!

Such an addition under prevailing conditions is not only unnecessary, but sounds rather odd, sounds almost like mockery. In any case, no one believes in the Third Duma, i. e., among the strata of the population that are capable of sustaining the democratic movement there is not and cannot be any of that enthusiasm for the constitutional institution of the Third Duma that undoubtedly existed among the public at large for the *First Duma*, for the *first attempts* in Russia to set up any kind of institutions provided they were *constitutional*.

ner. Consequently, in the event of the success of our struggle the question would be just as we have stated it.

Widespread public interest in 1905 and the beginning of 1906 was focused on the *first* representative institution, even though it was based on a monarchist constitution. That is a fact. That is what the Social-Democrats had to fight against and show up as clearly as possible.

Not so today. It is not enthusiasm for the *first* "parliament" that forms a characteristic feature of the moment, not belief in the Duma, but *unbelief in an upswing*.

Under these conditions we shall not be strengthening the movement by prematurely putting forward the boycott slogan, we shall not be paralysing the real obstacles to that movement. Moreover, by doing so we even risk weakening the force of our agitation, for the boycott is a slogan associated with an upswing that has taken definite shape, but the trouble now is that wide circles of the population do not believe in the upswing, do not see its strength.

We must first of all see to it that the strength of this upswing is demonstrated *in actual fact*, and we shall always have time afterwards to put forward the slogan which indirectly expresses that strength. Even so it is a question whether a revolutionary movement of an aggressive character requires a special slogan *diverting* attention from ... the *Third Duma*. Possibly not. In order to pass by something that is important and really capable of rousing the enthusiasm of the inexperienced crowd who have never seen a parliament before, it may be necessary to *boycott* the thing that should be passed by. But in order to pass by an institution that is absolutely incapable of rousing the enthusiasm of the democratic or semi-democratic crowd of today it is not necessary to proclaim a boycott. The crux of the matter now is not in a boycott, but in direct and immediate efforts to convert the partial upswing into a general upswing, the trade-union movement into a revolutionary movement, the defence against lock-outs into an offensive against reaction.

VII

To sum up. The boycott slogan was the product of a special historical period. In 1905 and the beginning of 1906, the objective state of affairs confronted the contending

social forces with the immediate choice between the path of direct revolution or that of a turn to a monarchist constitution. The purpose of the campaign for a boycott was mainly to combat constitutional illusions. The success of the boycott depended on a sweeping, universal, rapid, and powerful upswing of the revolution.

In all these respects the state of affairs now, towards the autumn of 1907, does not call for such a slogan and does not justify it.

While continuing our day-to-day work of preparing for the elections, and while not refusing beforehand to take part in representative institutions, however reactionary, we must direct all our propaganda and agitation towards explaining to the people the connection between the December defeat and the whole subsequent decline of liberty and desecration of the constitution. We must instil in the masses the firm conviction that unless there is a direct mass struggle such desecration will inevitably continue and grow worse.

While not renouncing the use of the boycott slogan at times of rising revolution, when the need for such a slogan may seriously arise, we must at the present moment exert every effort in an endeavour by our direct and immediate influence to convert one or another upswing of the working-class movement into a sweeping, universal, revolutionary, and aggressive movement against reaction as a whole, against its foundations.

June 26, 1907

IN MEMORY OF COUNT HEYDEN

WHAT ARE OUR NON-PARTY "DEMOCRATS" TEACHING
THE PEOPLE? ²³

"The progressive press was unanimous in expressing its profound condolence over the heavy loss sustained by Russia in the death of Count P. A. Heyden. The fine personality of Pyotr Alexandrovich attracted all decent people irrespective of party or trend. A rare and happy lot!" There follows a lengthy quotation from the Right Cadet *Russkiye Vedomosti*:²⁴ containing a sentimental effusion on the life and activities of that "wonderful man" by Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, one of that Dolgorukov breed whose spokesmen bluntly confessed the roots of their democracy: better come to terms with the peasants peacefully than wait until they seize the land themselves!... "We deeply share the feelings of grief evoked by the death of Count Heyden in all who are accustomed to value the *man* irrespective of the party guise in which he may be invested. And the late Heyden was above all a *man*."

So writes the newspaper *Tovarishch*, No. 296, Tuesday, June 19, 1907.

The journalists of *Tovarishch* are not only the most ardent democrats of our legal press, but also consider themselves socialists—critical socialists, of course. They are the nearest thing to Social-Democrats; and the Mensheviks—Plekhanov, Martov, Smirnov, Pereyaslavsky, Dan, etc., etc.—are offered the most cordial hospitality in a paper whose columns are adorned with the signatures of Prokopovich, Kuskova, Portugalov, and other "former Marxists". In a word, there is not the slightest doubt that the journalists of *Tovarishch* are the most "Left" spokesmen of our

"enlightened", "democratic", etc., society, to which narrow illegal activities are alien.

And when you come across lines like those quoted above it is difficult to refrain from exclaiming to these gentlemen: How fortunate it is that we, the Bolsheviks, obviously did not belong to *Tovarishch's* circle of *decent people!*

Gentlemen, "decent people" of Russian enlightened democracy, you are drugging the minds of the Russian people and infecting them with the miasma of toadyism and servility a hundred times worse than those notorious members of the Black Hundred—Purishkevich, Krushevian, and Dubrovin, against whom you are waging such a zealous, such a liberal, such a cheap, such a, for you, profitable, and safe war. You shrug your shoulders and turn to all the "decent people" of your society with a scornful smile at the idea of such "absurd paradoxes"? Yes, we know perfectly well that nothing on earth can shake you out of your vulgar liberal complacency. And that is why we rejoice that we have succeeded in all our activities in setting up a solid wall between ourselves and the circle of decent people of Russian educated society.

Can one give any instance of the Black Hundreds having corrupted and misled any considerable section of the population? One cannot.

Neither their press nor their league, neither their meetings nor the elections to the First and Second Dumas could provide any such instances. The outrages and atrocities of the Black Hundreds, in which the police and the soldiery take part, enrage the people. The frauds, dirty tricks, and bribes of the Black Hundreds arouse hatred and contempt. With the help of government funds the Black Hundreds organise gangs and bands of drunkards who can act only with the permission and at the instigation of the police. In all this there is not a trace of any dangerous ideological influence on any considerable sections of the population.

On the other hand, it is just as unquestionable that such an influence is exerted by our legal, liberal, and "democratic" press. The elections to the First and Second Dumas, meetings, associations, and educational affairs all go to prove this. And *Tovarishch's* utterance in connection with

the death of Heyden clearly shows what kind of ideological influence this is.

"...A heavy loss... fine personality ... happy lot ... was above all a *man*."

Count Heyden, the landlord, magnanimously played the liberal prior to the October revolution.¹⁵ After the first victory of the people on October 17, 1905, he immediately, without the slightest hesitation, went over to the counter-revolutionary camp, to the Octobrist Party, the party of the landlords and big capitalists, who were incensed with the peasants and democracy. In the First Duma this noble character defended the government, and after the dissolution of the First Duma negotiated, but without reaching agreement, for a place in the Ministry. Such are the principal stages in the career of this typical counter-revolutionary landlord.

And along come well-dressed, enlightened, and educated gentlemen, mouthing phrases about liberalism, democracy, and socialism, and making speeches of sympathy for the cause of liberty, the cause of the peasants' struggle against the landlords for land—gentlemen who possess a virtual monopoly of the legal opposition in the press, in the associations, and at meetings and elections—and, lifting up their eyes to heaven, preach to the people: "Rare and happy lot!... The late Count was above all a *man*."

Yes, Heyden was not only a man; he was also a citizen, able to understand the common interests of his class and to defend those interests very skilfully. And you, gentlemen, the enlightened democrats, you are just tearful simpletons, concealing under a cloak of liberal idiocy your inability to be anything but cultured lackeys of this landlord class.

There is no need to fear the landlords' influence on the people. They will never succeed in fooling any considerable number of workers or even peasants for any lengthy period. But the influence of the *intelligentsia*, who take no direct part in exploitation, who have been trained to use general phrases and concepts, who seize on every "good" idea and who sometimes from sincere stupidity elevate their inter-class position to a principle of non-class parties and non-

class politics—the influence of this bourgeois intelligentsia on the people is dangerous. Here, and here alone, do we find a contamination of the masses that is capable of doing real harm and that calls for the utmost exertion of all the forces of socialism to counteract this poison.

"Heyden was an educated, cultured, humane, and tolerant man"—ecstatically exclaim the liberal and democratic droolers, imagining that they have raised themselves above all "partisanship" to the standpoint "common to all mankind".

You are mistaken, most worthy sirs. This is not a standpoint common to all mankind but a common servile standpoint. The slave who is aware of his slavish condition and fights it is a revolutionary. The slave who is not aware of his slavish condition and vegetates in silent, unenlightened, and wordless slavery, is just a slave. The slave who drools when smugly describing the delights of slavish existence and who goes into ecstasies over his good and kind master is a grovelling boor. And you, gentlemen of *Tovarishch*, are just such boors. With disgusting complacency you wax sentimental over the fact that a counter-revolutionary landlord, who supported the counter-revolutionary government, was an educated and humane man. You do not realise that instead of turning the slave into a revolutionary you are turning slaves into grovellers. All your talk about freedom and democracy is sheer claptrap, parrot phrases, fashionable twaddle, or hypocrisy. It is just a painted signboard. And you yourselves are whitened sepulchres. You are mean-spirited boors, and your education, culture, and enlightenment are only a species of thoroughgoing prostitution. For you are selling your souls, and you are selling them not through need, but for "love of the thing".

Heyden was a convinced constitutionalist, you say sentimentally. You are lying, or else you have been completely hoodwinked by the Heydens. Publicly, before the people, to call a man a convinced constitutionalist when that man is known to have founded a party which supported the government of Witte, Dubasov, Goremykin, and Stolypin, is like calling a cardinal a convinced opponent of the pope. Instead of giving the people a correct idea of the constitution you, the democrats, treat the con-

stitution in your writings as something in the nature of salmon mayonnaise. For there can be no doubt that for the counter-revolutionary landlord the constitution is a sort of salmon mayonnaise, a means of perfecting the method of plundering and subjugating the muzhik and the masses of the people. If Heyden was a convinced constitutionalist, then Dubasov and Stolypin as well were convinced constitutionalists, for *in practice* Heyden supported *their* policy. Dubasov and Stolypin could not have been what they were and could not have pursued their policy without the support of the Octobrists, Heyden among them. By what tokens then, O ye sage democrats from among "decent" people, are we to judge the political physiognomy of a man (a "constitutionalist") by his speeches, by the fact that he beats his breast and sheds crocodile tears? Or by his actual deeds in the social arena?

What is characteristic and typical of Heyden's political activities? Is it that he could not reach agreement with Stolypin about joining the Ministry after the dissolution of the First Duma? Or is it that after such an act he *proceeded* to negotiate with Stolypin at all? Is it that formerly, at one time or another, he uttered some kind of liberal phrases? Or is it that he became an Octobrist (=a counter-revolutionary) immediately after October 17? In calling Heyden a convinced constitutionalist, you teach the people that the former is characteristic and typical. And that means that you are senselessly repeating fragments of democratic slogans without understanding the *rudiments* of democracy.

For democracy—remember this, you decent gentlemen and members of respectable society—means fighting against that very domination over the country by counter-revolutionary landlords which Mr. Heyden upheld and of which he was the embodiment throughout his political career.

Heyden was an educated man—say our drawing-room democrats sentimentally. Yes, we have admitted this, and we willingly admit that he was better educated and *cleverer* (which does not always go together with education) than the democrats themselves, for he better understood the interests of his *own* class and his *own* counter-revolutionary social movement than you, gentlemen of *Tovarishch*, un-

derstand the interests of the movement for emancipation. The educated counter-revolutionary landlord knew how to defend the interests of his class subtly and artfully; he skilfully covered up the selfish strivings and rapacious appetites of the semi-feudal landlords with a veil of noble words and outward gentlemanliness; he insisted (to Stolypin) on the protection of these interests by the most civilised forms of class domination. Heyden and his like brought all their "education" to the altar of the interests of the *landlords*. To a real democrat, and not a "respectable" boor from the Russian radical salons, this might have served as an excellent subject for a journalist who wanted to show the *prostitution* of education in modern society.

When the "democrat" prates about education, he wants to create in the reader's mind an impression of superior knowledge, a broad outlook, and an ennobled mind and heart. For the Heydens education is a thin veneer, training, a "coaching" in gentlemanly ways of performing the meanest and dirtiest political deals. For all Heyden's Octobrism, all his "peaceful renovationism",²⁶ all his negotiations with Stolypin after the dissolution of the First Duma were in fact the carrying-out of the meanest and dirtiest political business, arranging how most reliably, craftily, and artfully, how most solidly within and least noticeably without to defend the *rights* of the aristocratic Russian nobility to the blood and sweat of the millions of "muzhiks", who have always and incessantly been robbed by these Heydens, before 1861, during 1861, after 1861, and after 1905.

In their time Nekrasov and Saltykov taught Russian society to see through the outward gloss and varnish of the feudal landlord's education the predatory interests that lay beneath it; they taught it to hate the hypocrisy and callousness of such types. Yet the modern Russian intellectual, who imagines himself to be the guardian of the democratic heritage, and who belongs to the Cadet Party* or to the Cadet yes-men, teaches the people grovelling servility and delights in his impartiality as a non-party dem-

* The Cadets have shown themselves a hundred times more servile in their appreciation of Heyden than the gentlemen of *Tovarishch*. We took the latter as a specimen of the "democracy" of the "decent people" of Russian "society".

ocrat. A spectacle almost more revolting than that offered by the feats of Dubasov and Stolypin....

"Heyden was a 'man'"—exclaims the drawing-room democrat with enthusiasm. "Heyden was humane."

This sentimentalising over Heyden's humaneness reminds us not only of Nekrasov and Saltykov, but also of Turgenev in his *A Hunter's Sketches*. Here we find depicted a civilised educated landlord, a cultured man with a European polish well versed in the social graces. The landlord is treating his guest with wine and conversing on lofty themes. "Why hasn't the wine been warmed?"—he asks the lackey. The lackey turns pale and does not answer. The landlord rings, and when the servant enters, he says, without raising his voice, "About Fyodor... make the necessary arrangements."

Here you have an example of Heyden-like "humaneness", or humaneness *à la* Heyden. Turgenev's landlord^{**} is "humane" too, ... so humane, compared with Saltychikha,^{**} for instance, that he does not go to the stables in person to see that it has been arranged for Fyodor to be flogged. He is so humane that he does not see to it that the birch with which Fyodor is to be flogged has been soaked in salt water. He would never think of hitting or scolding a lackey, would this landlord; he only "arranges things" from a distance, like the educated man he is, in a gentle and humane manner, without noise, without fuss, without making a "public scene"....

Heyden's humaneness was of exactly the same kind. He himself did not join the Luzhenovskys and Filonovs in flogging and maltreating the peasants. He did not join the Rennenkamps and Meller-Zakomelskys in their punitive expeditions.^{**} He did not join Dubasov in his Moscow shootings. So humane was he that he refrained from such actions, leaving all the "arrangements" to these heroes of the national "stable" and controlling from his peaceful and cultured study the political party which supported the government of the Dubasovs and whose leaders drank the health of the conqueror of Moscow, Dubasov.... Was it not indeed humane to send the Dubasovs "to arrange about Fyodor" instead of going to the stables himself? To the old women who run the political department of our liberal and

democratic press, this is a model of humaneness. "He had a heart of gold, he wouldn't hurt a fly!" "A rare and happy lot"—to support the Dubasovs, to enjoy the fruits of the vengeance wreaked by the Dubasovs, and not to be held responsible for the Dubasovs.

The drawing-room democrat considers it the height of democracy to sigh over the fact that we are not being governed by the Heydens (for it never enters the head of this drawing-room simpleton that there is a "natural" division of labour between the Heydens and the Dubasovs). Listen to this:

"...and how sad that he [Heyden] * has died now, when he would have been most useful. He would now have fought the extreme Right, revealing the finest aspects of his soul and defending constitutional principles with all the energy and fertility of mind natural to him." (*Tovarishch*, No. 299, Friday, June 22, "In Memory of Count Heyden", a letter from Pskov Gubernia.)

How sad that the educated and humane Heyden, the peaceful renovator, is not here to cloak with his constitutional phrase-mongering the nakedness of the Third, Octobrist Duma, the nakedness of the autocracy which is destroying the Duma! It is the aim of the "democratic" journalist not to tear off the false cloak, not to show up to the people their oppressor enemies in all their nakedness, but to regret the absence of the experienced hypocrites who adorn the ranks of the Octobrists.... *Was ist der Philister? Ein hohler Darm, voll Furcht und Hoffnung, dass Gott erbarm!* What is a philistine? A hollow gut, full of fear and hope that God will have mercy! ¹⁰ What is the Russian liberal-democratic philistine of the Cadet and near-Cadet camp? A hollow gut, full of fear and hope that the counter-revolutionary landlord will have mercy!

June 1907

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Signed: N. L.

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to the book text

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—Ed.

**THESES OF A REPORT
MADE AT THE ST. PETERSBURG CITY CONFERENCE
OF JULY 8 ON THE ATTITUDE
OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
TO THE THIRD DUMA¹¹**

1. The boycott of the Duma, as the experience of the Russian revolution has shown, is the only correct decision on the part of the revolutionary Social-Democrats under such historical conditions as make it a really active boycott, i. e., one that represents the force of a broad and universal revolutionary upswing moving directly towards a straightforward assault on the old regime (consequently, towards an armed uprising). The boycott fulfils a great historical task when it serves as a warning by the proletariat to the whole people against blind petty-bourgeois infatuation with constitutional illusions and with the first quasi-constitutional institutions granted by the old regime.

2. To regard the boycott as an effective means in itself, apart from a sweeping, universal, powerful, and rapid upswing of the revolution and a direct assault of the whole people aimed at overthrowing the old regime, apart from the aims of the struggle against popular enthusiasm for the granted constitution, is to act under the influence of feeling rather than of reason.

3. Therefore, to proclaim a boycott of the Duma on the grounds that the electoral law favourable to the Cadets has been superceded by one favourable to the Octobrists, on the grounds that a frankly Octobrist Duma is taking the place of the Second Duma, which spoke in a Cadet way and acted in an Octobrist way and in which the Social-Democrats took part not without benefit to the cause of the revolution—to proclaim a boycott on such grounds would mean not only substituting revolutionary excitability for

steady revolutionary work, but revealing that the Social-Democrats themselves are a victim of the worst illusions in regard to the Cadet Duma and the Cadet constitution.

4. The focal point of all the propaganda of the revolutionary Social-Democrats should be to explain to the people that the coup d'état of June 3, 1907 was a direct and absolutely inevitable result of the defeat of the December uprising of 1905. The lesson of the second period of the Russian revolution, that of 1906 and 1907, is that the same systematic offensive of reaction and retreat of the revolution that took place throughout that period, is inevitable so long as a belief in the constitution prevails, so long as quasi-constitutional methods of struggle prevail, so long as the proletariat has not mustered its strength and recovered from the defeats inflicted on it in order to rise in incomparably broader masses for a more decisive and aggressive revolutionary assault aimed at the overthrow of the tsarist regime.

5. The strike movement that is now flaring up in the Moscow industrial area and is beginning to spread to other regions of Russia should be regarded as the most important guarantee of a possible revolutionary upswing in the near future. Therefore, the Social-Democrats should do their utmost not only to support and develop the economic struggle of the proletariat, but to convert this movement, which so far is only a trade-union movement, into a broad revolutionary upswing and direct struggle of the working-class masses against the armed force of tsarism. Only when the efforts of the Social-Democrats in this direction have been crowned with success, only on the basis of an aggressive revolutionary movement that has already come into existence, can the boycott slogan acquire serious importance in its inseparable connection with a direct appeal to the masses for an armed uprising, for the overthrow of the tsarist regime, and the replacement of the latter by a provisional revolutionary government, for the convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

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to the leaflet text

THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (SECOND ALL-RUSSIAN) ¹

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE THIRD DUMA

Whereas,

(1) active boycott, as the experience of the Russian revolution has shown, is correct tactics on the part of the Social-Democrats only under conditions of a sweeping, universal, and rapid upswing of the revolution, developing into an armed uprising, and only in connection with the ideological aims of the struggle against constitutional illusions arising from the convocation of the first representative assembly by the old regime;

(2) in the absence of these conditions correct tactics on the part of the revolutionary Social-Democrats calls for participation in the elections, as was the case with the Second Duma, even if all the conditions of a revolutionary period are present.

(3) the Social-Democrats, who have always pointed out the essentially Octobrist nature of the Cadet Party and the impermanence of the Cadet electoral law (11-XII-1905) under the autocracy, have no reasons whatever for changing their tactics because this law has been replaced by an Octobrist electoral law;

(4) the strike movement which is now developing in the central industrial region of Russia, while being a most important guarantee of a possible revolutionary upswing in the near future, at the same time calls for sustained efforts towards converting the movement, which so far is only a trade-union one, into a political and directly revolutionary movement linked with an armed uprising,

the Conference resolves:

(a) to take part in the elections to the Third Duma too;
 (b) to explain to the masses the connection of the coup d'état of 3-VI-1907 with the defeat of the December uprising of 1905, as well as with the betrayals by the liberal bourgeoisie, while at the same time showing the inadequacy of trade-union struggle alone and striving to convert the trade-union strike movement into a political and direct revolutionary struggle of the masses for the overthrow of the tsarist government by means of an uprising;

(c) to explain to the masses that the boycott of the Duma is not by itself capable of raising the working-class movement and the revolutionary struggle to a higher level, and that the tactics of boycott could be appropriate only provided our efforts to convert the trade-union upswing into a evolutionary assault were successful.

2

**OUTLINE OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS
OF TRADE UNIONS**

The Conference considers it the duty of all members of the Party energetically to carry out the London Congress resolution on the trade unions, all local conditions being taken into consideration when effecting organisational contacts between the trade unions and the Social-Democratic Party or when the latter's leadership is accepted by the former, and always, under all conditions, paying primary attention that the Social-Democrats in the trade unions should not confine themselves to passive accommodation to a "neutral" platform—a favourite practice of all shades of bourgeois-democratic trends (Cadets, non-party Progressists," Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.,)—but should steadfastly uphold the Social-Democratic views in their entirety and should steadfastly promote acceptance by the trade unions of the Social-Democrats' ideological leadership and the establishment of permanent and effective organisational contacts with the trade unions.

NOTES OF A PUBLICIST

After the dissolution of the Second Duma despondency, penitence, and apostasy became the outstanding features of political literature. Beginning with Mr. Struve, continuing with *Tovarishch*, and ending with a number of writers supporting the Social-Democratic movement we witness a renunciation of the revolution, of its traditions, and its methods of struggle, an effort in one way or another to steer a course more to the right. To illustrate what some Social-Democrats are now saying and writing, we shall take the first articles of theirs we come across in the current periodical press—one by Mr. Nevedomsky in *Obrazovaniye*,^{**} No. 7, and one by Mr. Vl. Gorn in *Tovarishch*, No. 348.

Mr. M. Nevedomsky begins his article with a scathing criticism of the Cadets in the Second Duma and a vehement defence of the Left-bloc tactics and behaviour of the Social-Democrats. He ends his article, however, as follows:

"Speaking in the indicative mood, I will only say one thing, which should be obvious to every Social-Democrat, namely, at our present stage of political evolution, the activity of the socialist parties, in the long run, after all merely paves the way for the bourgeois parties and prepares for their temporary triumph.

"The upshot, in the imperative mood, is this: that whatever this 'mimetic' ('one minute a brunette, the next a blonde') Cadet Party may be, it is for the time being the only opposition party, and the activities of the socialist party have to be co-ordinated with its activities. This is dictated by the principle of economy of strength."... "On the whole, speaking without irony [Mr. Nevedomsky had to make this reservation because he cannot write without conceits and extravagances which mislead both the readers and the author himself], this phrase of Milyukov's quite correctly defines, in their essential features, the relations between the parties ... [this refers to the following phrase of Milyukov's: 'The threat of in-

tervention by the people may be put into effect only when the ground has been prepared for that intervention—and that is the object which all those who consider the powers of the Duma inadequate for the performance of its tremendous tasks should work towards'; let the Lefts prepare the ground and build up the movement—Mr. Nevedomsky rightly interprets this phrase—'while the Cadets and the Duma would take account of that work'].... 'Coming from the mouth of a spokesman of the accounting party that may not be devoid of cynicism, but when the question is formulated in that way by Plekhanov, for example, it is merely an exact and realistic definition of the line of conduct for the Social-Democrats and the method by which they are to utilise the forces of the liberal opposition.'"

We are willing to assume that Plekhanov experiences a certain sense of ... well, to put it mildly, embarrassment, when such gentlemen as these kindly pat him on the back. But by his Cadet slogans, such as a single platform for Social-Democrats and Cadets or the safeguarding of the Duma, Plekhanov undoubtedly gave people the right to use his words in just that way.

Now listen to Mr. Vl. Gorn.

"Clearly, in order to defeat it [the anti-democratic coalition of the landowners and big bourgeois created by the electoral law of June 3] two conditions are necessary. First, all democratic sections, including the proletariat, should act together to contrapose one coalition to the other, and, secondly, the struggle should be waged *not by devising the most decisive slogans with a view to splitting off elements that are not revolutionary enough and forcing the movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority* [Mr. Gorn's italics], but by a real concrete fight, in which the masses themselves are drawn in, against the concrete measures of the anti-democratic coalition. To create a democratic coalition we do not need a merger, but only an agreement covering ways and the immediate aims of the struggle. And such agreements—if the conscious representatives of the masses—the parties—will adopt the basis of achieving real changes in the conditions of social life and not merely a propaganda standpoint—are quite possible."

Is it not clear from these excerpts that both our heroes of fashionable Cadet phrase-mongering are, in substance, saying one and the same thing? Mr. Gorn is merely a bit more outspoken and has shown his hand a bit more, but he differs from Mr. Nevedomsky no more than Mr. Struve does from Mr. Nabokov or Mr. Maklakov.

Politics has its inner logic. How many times has it been pointed out that *technical agreements between the Social-*

Democrats and the liberals are possible without leading in any way to a *political bloc*, which has always been rejected by all Party Social-Democrats (we say nothing of the non-Party Social-Democrats or those people who play a double game, saying one thing within the Party and another in the "free" non-Party press). And life has invariably upset these fine statements and good intentions, for under cover of "technical" agreements ideas of a political bloc have steadily forced their way to the top. In a petty-bourgeois country, during a period of bourgeois revolution, where there are a lot of petty-bourgeois intellectuals in the workers' party, the tendency towards political subordination of the proletariat to the liberals has a very real basis. And it is this tendency, rooted in the objective state of affairs, that proves to be the sum and substance of all quasi-socialist political chicanery on the subject of coalitions with the Cadets. Mr. Gorn, with the naïveté of an intellectual whose language only is Social-Democratic, but whose whole mind, whole ideological background, and entire "marrow" are purely liberal or philistine, simply advocates a political bloc, a "*democratic coalition*"—neither more nor less.

It is highly characteristic that Mr. Gorn *was obliged* to make a reservation: "we do not need a merger"! In doing so he merely betrayed the remnants of a guilty socialist conscience. For in saying: "we do not need a merger, but only an agreement", he as good as gave a description of this "agreement", a definition of its *content*, which reveals with the utmost clarity his Social-Democratic apostasy. It is not a question of a word, of whether the thing is called a "merger" or an "agreement". It is a question of what the actual content of this "*conjunction*" is. It is a question of *what price* you are offering the Social-Democratic Labour Party to become the kept woman of liberalism.

The price is clearly defined. It is:

- (1) To abandon the propaganda standpoint.
- (2) To refrain from "devising" decisive slogans.
- (3) To cease splitting off the elements that are not revolutionary enough.
- (4) To refrain from "forcing" the movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority.

I would give a prize to anyone who was capable of formulating a clearer and more precise programme of downright and utterly vile apostasy. The only difference between Mr. Struve and Mr. Gorn is that Mr. Struve sees his way clearly and to a certain extent determines his own steps "independently", while Mr. Gorn is simply held in leading strings by his Cadet mentors.

—To abandon the propaganda standpoint—that is what the Cadets in the Second Duma were all the time telling the people to do. This means not to develop the political consciousness and *demandingness* of the working-class masses and the peasantry, but to diminish both the one and the other, to quell and suppress them, to advocate social peace.

—Not to devise decisive slogans—means to do what the Cadets have done, namely, to give up the advocacy of slogans that the Social-Democrats had put forward long before the revolution.

—Not to split off elements that are not revolutionary enough—means abandoning all public criticism of Cadet hypocrisy, lies, and reactionary views, it means taking Mr. Struve to one's bosom.

—Not to force a movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority—means, in effect, rejecting all revolutionary methods of struggle. For it is absolutely indisputable that those who participated in the revolutionary movement throughout 1905 were the *avowedly revolutionary minority*: it was because the masses who were fighting were in a minority—they were nonetheless masses for being in a minority—that they did not achieve full success in their struggle. But all the successes which the emancipation movement in Russia did achieve, all the gains it did make, were *wholly and without exception* the result of this struggle of the masses *alone*, who were in a minority. That in the first place. Secondly, what the liberals and their yes-men call "forced movements", was the *only* movement in which the masses (although on this first occasion, unfortunately, in a minority) took part independently and not through deputies—the only movement which *was not afraid of* the people, which expressed the interests of the masses, and which had the support (as was proved by the elections to

the First and especially to the Second Dumas) of the vast masses who did not take part directly in the revolutionary struggle.

In speaking about "forcing the movement of the avowedly revolutionary minority", Mr. Gorn is guilty of a very widespread exaggeration of a purely Burenin type. When Burenin's newspaper¹⁵ warred with Alexinsky during the period of the Second Duma, it always tried to make out that its hostility towards him was due not to his fight for political freedom, but to the fact that he wanted freedom in order to ... smash windows, climb lampposts, and so on. The same Black-Hundred preparations are made by the publicist of *Tovarishch*. He tries to make out that the only thing that prevents an agreement between the socialists and the liberals is not that the socialists have always stood and will continue to stand for the development of the revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary activity of the masses in general, but the fact that the socialists are *forcing*, that is precipitating, artificially whipping up the movement, that they are fomenting movements which are *avowedly* hopeless.

Our reply to these tricks will be brief. The whole socialist press, Menshevik as well as Bolshevik, during the period of both the First and Second Dumas condemned the "forcing" of the movement in any way.... It is not on account of the forcing of the movement that the Cadets fought the Social-Democrats during both the First and the Second Dumas, but because the Social-Democrats *develop* the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, their readiness to put forward demands, and *expose* the reactionary nature of the Cadets and the mirage of constitutional illusions. These well-known historical facts cannot be disposed of by any newspaper acrobatics. As regards the form of Mr. Gorn's statement, it is highly characteristic of our times, when "educated society" turns away from the revolution and seizes upon pornography. A person who considers himself a Social-Democrat betakes himself to a non-Party newspaper in order to address the public at large in the manner of *Novoye Vremya* on the subject of the workers' party "forcing" the movement of the "avowed" minority! Renegade moods among us create also renegade morals.

* * *

Now let us examine the question from another angle. The views of the Nevedomskys and Gorns, which arouse such disgust when put forward by quasi-Social-Democrats, are, beyond question, the highly typical and natural views of wide circles of our bourgeois intelligentsia, liberal-minded "society", disaffected civil servants, etc. It is not enough to describe these views as an expression of the politically spineless, flabby, and wavering petty bourgeoisie. They must be explained also from the standpoint of the existing state of affairs in the development of our revolution.

Why is it that certain circles of the petty bourgeoisie develop such views just now, on the eve of the Third Duma? Because these circles, who meekly change their convictions with every shift in government policy, believe in the Octobrist Duma, i. e., they consider its mission practicable and hasten to adjust themselves to the "Octobrist reforms", hasten to find theoretical reasons justifying their accommodation to Octobrism.

The mission of the Octobrist Duma, as envisaged by the government, is to consummate the revolution with a direct deal between the old regime and the landlords and biggest bourgeoisie on the basis of a definite minimum of constitutional reforms. Speaking in the abstract, there is nothing absolutely impossible in this, since in Western Europe a number of bourgeois revolutions are being consummated by the consolidation of "Octobrist" constitutional systems. The only question is whether Octobrist "reforms" capable of stopping the revolution are possible in present-day Russia. Are not these Octobrist "reforms", owing to the deep roots of our revolution, doomed to the same failure as the Cadet "reforms"? Will not the Octobrist Duma be as brief an episode as the Cadet Dumas were, an episode on the road towards re-establishing the rule of the Black Hundreds and the autocracy?

We lived through a period of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses (1905), which resulted in certain gains of freedom. Then we experienced a period of suspension of this struggle (1906 and half of 1907). This period gave reaction

a number of victories and not a single victory to the revolution, which lost the gains of the first period. The second period was a Cadet period, one of constitutional illusions. The masses still believed, more or less, in "parliamentarism" under the autocracy, and the autocracy, realising the danger of pure Black-Hundred domination, sought to come to terms with the Cadets, experimented, tried on various types of constitutional costumes, tested what measure of reforms the "masters" of Russia, the biggest landlords, were capable of adopting. The experiment of the Cadet constitution ended in failure, although the Cadets in the Second Duma behaved in a perfectly Octobrist manner and not only refrained from attacking the government or stirring up the masses against it, but systematically soothed the masses, combating the "Left", i. e., the parties of the proletariat and the peasantry and openly and vigorously supporting the existing government (the budget, etc.). The experiment of the Cadet constitution failed, in short, not because the Cadets or the government lacked good will, but because the objective contradictions of the Russian revolution proved to be *too deep-seated*. These contradictions proved to be so profound, that the Cadet bridge was unable to span the gulf. The experiment showed that even with the mass struggle completely suppressed for a time, even with the old regime having a completely free hand in rigging the elections, etc., the peasant masses (and in a bourgeois revolution the outcome depends most of all on the peasantry) made demands which no art of diplomacy on the part of the Cadet go-betweens was able to adjust to the domination of the privileged landlords. If Mr. Struve now bears malice against the Trudoviks⁶⁶ (not to mention the Social-Democrats), and if Rech⁶⁷ wages a regular campaign against them, this is no accident, no mere annoyance on the part of a bourgeois advocate whose services have been rejected by the muzhik. It is an inevitable political step in the evolution of the Cadets: they failed to reconcile the landlords with the Trudoviks, consequently (for the bourgeois intelligentsia this is the *only possible conclusion*) what is necessary is not to rally still broader masses against the landlords, but to lower the demands of the Trudoviks, to make

*more concessions to the landlords, to "discard revolutionary utopias", as Struve and the *Rech* say, or to stop inventing decisive slogans and forcing the movement, as Mr. Gorn, the new servant of the Cadets, says.*

The government *accommodates* itself to the landlords by placing the elections entirely in their hands and virtually depriving the peasantry of the suffrage. The Cadets accommodate themselves to the landlords by attacking the Trudoviks for their revolutionariness and uncompromising attitude. The non-party politicians, like the contributors to *Tovarishch* in general and Mr. Gorn in particular, accommodate themselves to the landlords by calling upon the proletariat and the peasantry to "harmonise" ("co-ordinate", as Mr. Nevedomsky puts it) their policy with that of the Cadets, to enter into a "democratic coalition" with the Cadets, to renounce "decisive slogans", and so on and so forth.

The government is acting systematically. Step by step it is taking away what has been gained by the "forced movement" and what has been left defenceless during the lull in that movement. Step by step it is trying to find out what "reforms" the landlords could be induced to agree to. Could not the Cadets have done this? Is it owing to interference from the Lefts that the Cadets could not, despite their sincere desire and vain efforts? In that case, the franchise of the "Lefts" will have to be curtailed and the decision placed in the hands of the Octobrists: only if *this experiment, too*, should fail, will it be necessary to place ourselves entirely in the power of the "Council of the United Nobility".¹¹

There is sense, method, and logic in the actions of the government. It is the logic of the landlord's class interests. These interests have to be protected; after all, the bourgeois development of Russia has to be safeguarded too.

To carry out these plans the government requires that the interests and movement of the *masses* should be *forcibly suppressed*, that they should be deprived of the suffrage and handed over to the tender mercies of the 130,000. Whether it will succeed in carrying out these plans no one can say at present. This question will be answered only by struggle.

We Social-Democrats are answering this question *by our struggle*. And the Cadets are answering it *by struggle ... against the Left*. The Cadets are fighting *for the government's* solution of this question: they did this systematically in the Second Duma in the parliamentary field. Now, too, they are doing it systematically by their ideological struggle against the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks.

Of course, to the ordinary Russian intellectual, as well as to any half-educated petty bourgeois, this sounds paradoxical; the Cadets, who call themselves democrats and make liberal speeches, fight for the government solution of the question! It is so obviously incongruous! If they are democrats, then the place for them is the "democratic coalition"! This is such an obvious conclusion for political simpletons, whom even two years of the Russian revolution have not taught to seek the true basis of both the government's measures and the liberals' spate of talk in the *struggle of the different classes*. We have any amount of "Marxists" from the intellectual camp who profess the principles of the class struggle while in reality they use purely liberal arguments when talking about the Cadets, about the role of the Duma, and about the boycott! And how many more Cadet votings for the budget will these political simpletons need before they can digest what has long been a familiar sight in Europe, namely, that of a liberal making speeches against the government and supporting it on every important issue.

The replacement of the Second Duma by the Third is the replacement of the Cadet, who acts in the Octobrist manner, by the Octobrist who acts with the help of the Cadet. Predominant in the Second Duma was the party of the bourgeois intellectuals, who called themselves democrats where the people were concerned and supported the government where the bourgeoisie was concerned. Predominant in the Third Duma will be the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, who hire the bourgeois intellectuals for a make-believe opposition and for business services. This simple truth is borne out by the whole political behaviour of the Cadet Party and by the Second Duma in particular. Even the man in the street has now begun to grasp this simple truth: we shall refer to such a witness as Mr. Zhilkin, whom

it would be absurd to suspect of Bolshevik sympathies or of prejudiced and uncompromising hostility towards the Cadets.

In today's issue of *Tovarishch* (No. 351), Mr. Zhilkin conveys the impressions of a "cheerful" (*sic!* Mr. Zhilkin understands "cheerfulness" in much the same way as Gorn or Nevedomsky) provincial in the following words:

"The Octobrist landlords I spoke to argue as follows: 'It's all right to vote for the Cadets. The good thing about them is that they are tractable. In the First Duma they wanted too much. In the Second they backed down. They even made cuts in their programme. In the Third they'll give way still more. I daresay they'll come to some arrangement. Besides, to tell the truth, there isn't any Octobrist whose election we could ensure.'

"Let the Cadets get elected. The difference between us isn't very great. They are sure to go to the right in the Third Duma.... We're friendly with the Octobrists out of necessity.... What public speakers or big men do they have?'"

Those who judge of parties by their names, programmes, promises, and speeches, or are content with crude Bernsteinised "Marxism", which consists in reiterating the axiom about support for bourgeois democracy in a bourgeois revolution, may cherish hopes in regard to a democratic coalition of the Lefts and the Cadets in the Third Duma. But those with the slightest revolutionary flair and thoughtful attitude towards the lessons of our revolution, or those who are really guided by the principle of the class struggle and judge of parties by their class character, will not be in the least surprised to find that the party of bourgeois intellectuals is fit only to perform flunkey services for the party of the big bourgeois. The Gorns and Nevedomskys are capable of believing that the Cadets' differences with the democrats are an exception, and their differences with the Octobrists a rule. It is exactly the other way round. The Cadets are true kin to the Octobrists by their very class nature. Cadet democracy is sheer window-dressing, a temporary reflection of the democracy of the masses, or a downright hoax, which the Russian Bernsteinians and petty bourgeois, especially those from the newspaper *Tovarishch*, fall for.

And so, if you view the matter from this angle, if you grasp the true historical role of the Cadet—that bourgeois

intellectual, who helps the landlord to satisfy the muzhik with a beggarly reform—the whole infinite wisdom of the Gorn and Nevedomsky gentry, who advise the proletariat to *harmonise* their activity with that of the Cadets, will stand revealed to you! The picture of the Octobrist "reforms", which we are promised, is quite clear. The landlord "sets up" the muzhik, sets him up in such a manner that the population cannot be induced to accept the reforms without punitive expeditions, without floggings of the peasants and shootings of the workers. The Cadet professor registers opposition: he proves, from the standpoint of the modern science of law, the necessity of constitutionally enforcing the regulations governing punitive expeditions, while blaming the police for being over-zealous. The Cadet lawyer registers opposition: he argues that, according to the law, sixty strokes per man should be given and not 200, and that money should be assigned to the government for birch rods, while stipulating that the law should be observed. The Cadet physician is prepared to count the pulse of the victim of flogging and write a research about the necessity of reducing the upper limit of strokes by half.

Was not the Cadet opposition in the Second Duma of just this kind? And is it not clear that for the sake of such an opposition the Octobrist landlord will not only elect a Cadet to the Duma, but will agree to pay him a professorial or some other kind of salary?

A democratic coalition of socialists and Cadets in the Second Duma, after the Second Duma, or during the Third Duma would in fact, by virtue of the objective state of affairs, only mean turning the workers' party into a blind and wretched adjunct of the liberals, complete betrayal by the socialists of the interests of the proletariat and the interests of the revolution. Very likely, the Nevedomskys and Gorns do not realise what they are doing. With such people convictions are very often not more deeply seated than the tip of their tongues. In effect, their endeavours amount to putting an end to the independent party of the working class, putting an end to Social-Democracy. The Social-Democrats, who understand the tasks confronting them, should put an end to these gentlemen. Unfortunately, among us the concept of bourgeois revolution

is still interpreted in a one-sided manner. We overlook, for example, the fact that this revolution should show the proletariat—and it alone can be the first to show the proletariat—what the bourgeoisie of a *given* country is *in actual fact*, what the *national* peculiarities of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie are in the given *national* bourgeois revolution. The real, definitive, and mass separation of the proletariat as a class, in opposition to all the bourgeois parties, can only occur when the history of *its own* country reveals to the proletariat *the entire character* of the bourgeoisie as a class, as a political unit—the entire character of the petty bourgeoisie as a section, as a definite ideological and political unit revealing itself in some open, broadly political activities. We must incessantly explain to the proletariat the theoretical truths about the nature of the class interests of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in capitalist society. These truths, however, will be driven home to really broad masses of the proletariat only when these classes will have visible, tangible experience of the behaviour of the parties of one class or another, when the clear realisation of their class nature is supplemented by the immediate reaction of the proletarian mind to the whole character of the bourgeois parties. Nowhere else in the world, probably, has the bourgeoisie revealed in the bourgeois revolution such reactionary brutality, such a close alliance with the old regime, such "freedom" from anything remotely resembling sincere sympathy towards culture, towards progress, towards the preservation of human dignity, as it has with us—so let our proletariat derive from the Russian bourgeois revolution a triple hatred of the bourgeoisie and a determination to fight it. Nowhere else in the world, probably, did the petty bourgeoisie, beginning with the "Popular Socialists"¹ and the Trudoviks and ending with the intellectuals who have wormed themselves into the Social-Democratic movement, display such cowardice and spinelessness in the struggle, such a shameful epidemic of renegade moods, such toadiness towards the heroes of bourgeois fashion or reactionary outrages—so let our proletariat derive from our bourgeois revolution a triple contempt for petty-bourgeois flabbiness and vacillation. No matter how our revolution

may develop, no matter what severe trials our proletariat may at times have to go through, this hatred and this contempt will help it to close its ranks and rid itself of worthless offshoots of alien classes; it will increase its forces and steel it for dealing the blows with which it will overwhelm the whole of bourgeois society when the time comes.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTTGART⁴⁰

A feature of the International Socialist Congress held in Stuttgart this August was its large and representative composition: the total of 886 delegates came from all the five continents. Besides providing an impressive demonstration of international unity in the proletarian struggle, the Congress played an outstanding part in defining the tactics of the socialist parties. It adopted general resolutions on a number of questions, the decision of which had hitherto been left solely to the discretion of the individual socialist parties. And the fact that more and more problems require uniform, principled decisions in different countries is striking proof that socialism is being welded into a single international force.

The full text of the Stuttgart resolutions will be found elsewhere in this issue.⁴¹ We shall deal briefly with each of them in order to bring out the chief controversial points and the character of the debate at the Congress.

This is not the first time the colonial question has figured at international congresses. Up till now their decisions have always been an unqualified condemnation of bourgeois colonial policy as a policy of plunder and violence. This time, however, the Congress Commission was so composed that opportunist elements, headed by Van Kol of Holland, predominated in it. A sentence was inserted in the draft resolution to the effect that the Congress did not in principle condemn all colonial policy, for under socialism colonial policy could play a civilising role. The minority in the Commission (Ledebour of Germany, the Polish and Russian Social-Democrats, and many others)

vigorously protested against any such idea being entertained. The matter was referred to Congress, where the forces of the two trends were found to be so nearly equal that there was an extremely heated debate.

The opportunists rallied behind Van Kol. Speaking for the majority of the German delegation Bernstein and David urged acceptance of a "socialist colonial policy" and fulminated against the radicals for their barren, negative attitude, their failure to appreciate the importance of reforms, their lack of a practical colonial programme, etc. Incidentally, they were opposed by Kautsky, who felt compelled to ask the Congress to pronounce *against* the majority of the German delegation. He rightly pointed out that there was no question of rejecting the struggle for reforms; that was explicitly stated in other sections of the resolution, which had evoked no dispute. The point at issue was whether we should make concessions to the modern regime of bourgeois plunder and violence. The Congress was to discuss present-day colonial policy, which was based on the downright enslavement of primitive populations. The bourgeoisie was actually introducing slavery in the colonies and subjecting the native populations to unprecedented outrages and acts of violence, "civilising" them by the spread of liquor and syphilis. And in that situation socialists were expected to utter evasive phrases about the possibility of accepting colonial policy in principle! That would be an outright desertion to the bourgeois point of view. It would be a decisive step towards subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois ideology, to bourgeois imperialism, which is now arrogantly raising its head.

The Congress defeated the Commission's motion by 128 votes to 108 with ten abstentions (Switzerland). It should be noted that at Stuttgart, for the first time, each nation was allotted a definite number of votes, varying from twenty (for the big nations, Russia included) to two (Luxembourg). The combined vote of the small nations, which either do not pursue a colonial policy, or which suffer from it, outweighed the vote of nations where even the proletariat has been somewhat infected with the lust of conquest.

This vote on the colonial question is of very great importance. First, it strikingly showed up socialist oppor-

tunism, which succumbs to bourgeois blandishments. Secondly, it revealed a negative feature in the European labour movement, one that can do no little harm to the proletarian cause, and for that reason should receive serious attention. Marx frequently quoted a very significant saying of Sismondi. The proletarians of the ancient world, this saying runs, lived at the expense of society; modern society lives at the expense of the proletarians.⁴²

The non-propertied, but non-working, class is incapable of overthrowing the exploiters. Only the proletarian class, which maintains the whole of society, can bring about the social revolution. However, as a result of the extensive colonial policy, the European proletarian *partly* finds himself in a position when it is *not* his labour, but the labour of the practically enslaved natives in the colonies, that maintains the whole of society. The British bourgeoisie, for example, derives more profit from the many millions of the population of India and other colonies than from the British workers. In certain countries this provides the material and economic basis for infecting the proletariat with colonial chauvinism. Of course, this may be only a temporary phenomenon, but the evil must nonetheless be clearly realised and its causes understood in order to be able to rally the proletariat of all countries for the struggle against such opportunism. This struggle is bound to be victorious, since the "privileged" nations are a diminishing faction of the capitalist nations.

There were practically no differences at the Congress on the question of women's suffrage. The only one who tried to make out a case for a socialist campaign in favour of a limited women's suffrage (qualified as opposed to universal suffrage) was a woman delegate from the extremely opportunist British Fabian Society. No one supported her. Her motives were simple enough: British bourgeois ladies hope to obtain the franchise for themselves, without its extension to women workers in Britain.

The First International Socialist Women's Conference was held concurrently with the Congress in the same building. Both at this Conference and in the Congress Commission there was an interesting dispute between the German and Austrian Social-Democrats on the draft resolution. In

their campaign for universal suffrage the Austrians tended to play down the demand for equal rights of men and women; on practical grounds they placed the main emphasis on male suffrage. Clara Zetkin and other German Social-Democrats rightly pointed out to the Austrians that they were acting incorrectly, and that by failing to press the demand that the vote be granted to women as well as men, they were weakening the mass movement. The concluding words of the Stuttgart resolution ("the demand for universal suffrage should be put forward *simultaneously* for both men and women") undoubtedly relate to this episode of excessive "practicalism" in the history of the Austrian labour movement.

The resolution on the relations between the socialist parties and the trade unions is of especial importance to us Russians. The Stockholm R.S.D.L.P. Congress went on record for *non-Party* unions, thus endorsing the neutrality standpoint, which has always been upheld by our non-Party democrats, Bernsteinians and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The London Congress, on the other hand, put forward a different principle, namely, closer alignment of the unions with the Party, even including, under certain conditions, their recognition as Party unions. At Stuttgart in the Social-Democratic subsection of the Russian section (the socialists of each country form a separate section at international congresses) opinion was divided on this issue (there was no split on other issues). Plekhanov upheld the neutrality principle. Voinov,⁴¹ a Bolshevik, defended the anti-neutralist viewpoint of the London Congress and of the Belgian resolution (published in the Congress materials with de Brouckère's report, which will soon appear in Russian). Clara Zetkin rightly remarked in her journal *Die Gleichheit*⁴² that Plekhanov's arguments for neutrality were just as lame as those of the French. And the Stuttgart resolution—as Kautsky rightly observed and as anyone who takes the trouble to read it carefully will see—puts an end to recognition of the "neutrality" principle. There is not a word in it about neutrality or non-party principles. On the contrary, it definitely recognises the need for closer and stronger connections between the unions and the socialist parties,

The resolution of the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress on the trade unions has thus been placed on a firm theoretical basis in the form of the Stuttgart resolution. The Stuttgart resolution lays down the general principle that in every country the unions must be brought into permanent and close contact with the socialist party. The London resolution says that in Russia this should take the form, under favourable conditions, of party unions, and party members must work towards that goal.

We note that the harmful aspects of the neutrality principle were revealed in Stuttgart by the fact that the trade-union half of the German delegation were the most adamant supporters of opportunist views. That is why in Essen, for example, the Germans were against Van Kol (the trade unions were not represented in Essen, which was a Congress solely of the Party), while in Stuttgart they supported him. By playing into the hands of the opportunists in the Social-Democratic movement the advocacy of neutrality in Germany has *actually* had harmful results. This is a fact that should not be overlooked, especially in Russia, where the bourgeois-democratic counsellors of the proletariat, who urge it to keep the trade-union movement "neutral", are so numerous.

A few words about the resolution on emigration and immigration. Here, too, in the Commission there was an attempt to defend narrow, craft interests, to ban the immigration of workers from backward countries (coolies—from China, etc.). This is the same spirit of aristocratism that one finds among workers in some of the "civilised" countries, who derive certain advantages from their privileged position, and are, therefore, inclined to forget the need for international class solidarity. But no one at the Congress defended this craft and petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness. The resolution fully meets the demands of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

We pass now to the last, and perhaps the most important, resolution of the Congress—that on anti-militarism. The notorious Hervé, who has made such a noise in France and Europe, advocated a semi-anarchist view by naïvely suggesting that every war be "answered" by a strike and an uprising. He did not understand, on the one hand, that

war is a necessary product of capitalism, and that the proletariat cannot renounce participation in revolutionary wars, for such wars are possible, and have indeed occurred in capitalist societies. He did not understand, on the other hand, that the possibility of "answering" a war depends on the nature of the crisis created by that war. The choice of the means of struggle depends on these conditions; moreover, the struggle must consist (and here we have the third misconception, or shallow thinking of Hervéism) not simply in replacing war by peace, but in replacing capitalism by socialism. The essential thing is not merely to prevent war, but to utilise the crisis created by war in order to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. However, underlying all these semi-anarchist absurdities of Hervéism there was one sound and practical purpose: to spur the socialist movement so that it will not be restricted to parliamentary methods of struggle alone, so that the masses will realise the need for revolutionary action in connection with the crises which war inevitably involves, so that, lastly, a more lively understanding of international labour solidarity and of the falsity of bourgeois patriotism will be spread among the masses.

Bebel's resolution (moved by the Germans and coinciding in all essentials with Guesde's resolution) had one shortcoming—it failed to indicate the active tasks of the proletariat. This made it possible to read Bebel's orthodox propositions through opportunist spectacles, and Vollmar was quick to turn this possibility into a reality.

That is why Rosa Luxemburg and the Russian Social-Democratic delegates moved their amendments to Bebel's resolution. These amendments (1) stated that militarism is the chief weapon of class oppression; (2) pointed out the need for propaganda among the youth; (3) stressed that Social-Democrats should not only try to prevent war from breaking out or to secure the speediest termination of wars that have already begun, but should utilise the crisis created by the war to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

The subcommission (elected by the Anti-Militarism Commission) incorporated all these amendments in Bebel's resolution. In addition, Jaurès made this happy suggestion: instead of enumerating the methods of struggle

(strikes, uprisings) the resolution should cite historical examples of proletarian action against war, from the demonstrations in Europe to the revolution in Russia. The result of all this redrafting was a resolution which, it is true, is unduly long, but is rich in thought and precisely formulates the tasks of the proletariat. It combines the stringency of orthodox—i. e., the only scientific Marxist analysis with recommendations for the most resolute and revolutionary action by the workers' parties. This resolution cannot be interpreted *à la* Vollmar, nor can it be fitted into the narrow framework of naïve Hervéism.

On the whole, the Stuttgart Congress brought into sharp contrast the opportunist and revolutionary wings of the international Social-Democratic movement on a number of cardinal issues and decided these issues in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism. Its resolutions and the report of the debates should become a handbook for every propagandist. The work done at Stuttgart will greatly promote the unity of tactics and unity of revolutionary struggle of the proletarians of all countries.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN STUTTGART"

The recent Congress in Stuttgart was the twelfth congress of the proletarian International. The first five congresses belong to the period of the First International (1866-72), which was guided by Marx, who, as Bebel aptly observed, tried to achieve international unity of the militant proletariat from above. This attempt could not be successful until the national socialist parties were consolidated and strengthened, but the activities of the First International rendered great services to the labour movement of all countries and left lasting traces.

The Second International was inaugurated at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1889. At the subsequent congresses in Brussels (1891), Zurich (1893), London (1896), Paris (1900), and Amsterdam (1904), this new International, resting on strong national parties, was finally consolidated. In Stuttgart there were 884 delegates from 25 nations of Europe, Asia (Japan and some from India), America, Australia, and Africa (one delegate from South Africa).

The great importance of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart lies in the fact that it marked the final consolidation of the Second International and the transformation of international congresses into business-like meetings which exercise very considerable influence on the nature and direction of socialist activities throughout the world. Formally, the decisions of the International congresses are not binding on the individual nations, but their moral significance is such that the non-observance of decisions is, in fact, an exception which is rarer than

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Цена 25 коп.

Cover of *Kalendar dlja vsekh, 1908* containing Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart". Lenin's personal copy

Reduced

the non-observance by the individual parties of the decisions of their own congresses. The Amsterdam Congress succeeded in uniting the French socialists, and its resolution against ministerialism⁴⁶ really expressed the will of the class-conscious proletariat of the whole world and determined the policy of the working-class parties.

The Stuttgart Congress made a big stride forward in the same direction, and on a number of important issues proved to be the supreme body determining the political line of socialism. The Stuttgart Congress, more firmly even than the Amsterdam Congress, laid this line down in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to opportunism. *Die Gleichheit*, the organ of the German Social-Democratic women workers, edited by Clara Zetkin, justly observed in this connection:

"On all questions the various deviations of certain socialist parties towards opportunism were corrected in a revolutionary sense with the co-operation of the socialists of all countries."

The remarkable and sad feature in this connection was that German Social-Democracy, which hitherto had always upheld the revolutionary standpoint in Marxism, proved to be unstable, or took an opportunist stand. The Stuttgart Congress confirmed a profound observation which Engels once made concerning the German labour movement. On April 29, 1886, Engels wrote to Sorge, a veteran of the First International:

"In general it is a good thing that the leadership of the Germans is being challenged, especially after they have elected so many philistine elements (which is unavoidable, it is true). In Germany everything becomes philistine in calm times; the sting of French competition is thus absolutely necessary. And it will not be lacking."⁴⁷

The sting of French competition was not lacking at Stuttgart, and this sting proved to be really necessary, for the Germans displayed a good deal of philistinism. It is especially important for the Russian Social-Democrats to bear this in mind, for our liberals (and not only the liberals) are trying their hardest to represent the least creditable features of German Social-Democracy as a model worthy of imitation. The most thoughtful and outstanding

minds among the German Social-Democrats have noted this fact themselves and, casting aside all false shame, have definitely pointed to it as a warning.

"In Amsterdam," writes Clara Zetkin's journal, "the revolutionary *leit-motiv* of all the debates in the parliament of the world proletariat was the Dresden resolution; in Stuttgart a jarring opportunist note was struck by Vollmar's speeches in the Commission on Militarism, by Päplow's speeches in the Emigration Commission, and by David's [and, we would add, Bernstein's] speeches in the Colonial Commission. On this occasion, in most of the commissions and on most issues, the representatives of Germany were leaders of opportunism." And K. Kautsky, in appraising the Stuttgart Congress, writes: "...the leading role which German Social-Democracy has actually played in the Second International up to now was not in evidence on this occasion."

Let us now examine individual questions that were discussed at the Congress. The differences of opinion on the colonial question could not be ironed out in the Commission. The dispute between the opportunists and the revolutionaries was settled by the Congress itself, settled in favour of the revolutionaries by a majority of 127 votes against 108, with 10 abstentions. Incidentally, let us note the gratifying fact that the socialists of Russia *all* voted unanimously on *all* questions in a revolutionary spirit. (Russia had 20 votes of which 10 were given to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party without the Poles, 7 to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 3 to the representatives of the trade unions. Poland had 10 votes: the Polish Social-Democrats—4, and the Polish Socialist Party and the non-Russian parts of Poland—6. Finally the two representatives of Finland had 8 votes.)

On the colonial question an opportunist majority was formed in the Commission, and the following monstrous phrase appeared in the draft resolution: "The Congress does not in principle and for all time reject all colonial policy, which, under a socialist regime, may have a civilising effect." In reality this proposition was tantamount to a direct retreat towards bourgeois policy and a bourgeois world outlook that justifies colonial wars and atrocities.

It was a retreat towards Roosevelt, said one of the American delegates. The attempts to justify this retreat by the tasks of a "socialist colonial policy" and of constructive reform work in the colonies were unfortunate in the extreme. Socialism has never refused to advocate reforms in the colonies as well; but this can have nothing in common with weakening our stand in principle against conquests, subjugation of other nations, violence, and plunder, which constitute "colonial policy". The minimum programme of all the socialist parties applies both to the home countries and the colonies. The very concept "socialist colonial policy" is a hopeless muddle. The Congress quite rightly deleted the above-quoted words from the resolution and substituted for them a condemnation of colonial policy that was sharper than that contained in former resolutions.

The resolution on the attitude of the socialist parties towards the trade unions is of particularly great importance for us Russians. In our country this question is on the order of the day. The Stockholm Congress settled it in favour of *non-Party* trade unions, i. e., it confirmed the position of our *neutralists*, headed by Plekhanov. The London Congress took a step towards *Party* trade unions as *opposed to neutrality*. As is known, the London resolution gave rise to a violent dispute and dissatisfaction in some of the trade unions and especially in the bourgeois-democratic press.

In Stuttgart the actual issue at stake was this: neutrality of the trade unions or their still closer alignment with the Party? And, as the reader may gather from the resolution, the International Socialist Congress went on record for closer alignment of the unions with the Party. There is nothing in the resolution to suggest that the trade unions should be neutral or non-party. Kautsky, who in the German Social-Democratic Party advocated alignment of the unions with the Party as opposed to the neutrality advocated by Bebel, was therefore fully entitled to announce to the Leipzig workers in his report on the Stuttgart Congress (*Vorwärts*,¹⁰ 1907, No. 209, *Beilage*):

"The resolution of the Stuttgart Congress says all that we need. *It puts an end to neutrality for ever.*"

Clara Zetkin writes:

"In principle, no one [in Stuttgart] any longer disputed the basic historical tendency of the proletarian class struggle to link the political with the economic struggle, to unite the political and economic organisations as closely as possible into a single socialist working-class force. Only the representative of the Russian Social-Democrats, Comrade Plekhanov [she should have said the representative of the Mensheviks, who delegated him to the Commission as an advocate of "neutrality"] and the majority of the French delegation attempted, by rather unconvincing arguments, to justify a certain limitation of this principle on the plea that special conditions prevailed in their countries. The overwhelming majority of the Congress favoured a resolute policy of unity between Social-Democracy and the trade unions."

It should be mentioned that Plekhanov's unconvincing (as Zetkin rightly considered it) argument went the rounds of the Russian legally published papers in this form. In the Commission of the Stuttgart Congress Plekhanov referred to the fact that "there are eleven revolutionary parties in Russia"; "which one of them should the trade unions unite with?" (We are quoting from *Vorwärts*, No. 196, 1. *Beilage*.) This reference of Plekhanov's is wrong both in fact and in principle. Actually no more than two parties in every nationality of Russia are contending for influence over the socialist proletariat: the Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Polish Social-Democrats⁴⁹ and the Polish Socialist Party,⁵⁰ the Lettish Social-Democrats and the Lettish Socialist-Revolutionaries (known as the Lettish Social-Democratic League), the Armenian Social-Democrats and the Dashnaktsutyuns,⁵¹ etc. The Russian delegation in Stuttgart also at once divided into two sections. The figure eleven is quite arbitrary and misleads the workers. From standpoint of principle Plekhanov is wrong because the struggle between proletarian and petty-bourgeois socialism in Russia is inevitable everywhere, including the trade unions. The British delegates, for example, never thought of opposing the resolution, although they, too, have two contending socialist parties—the Social-Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party.

That the idea of neutrality, which was rejected in Stuttgart, has already caused no little harm to the labour movement is clearly borne out by the example of Germany. There, neutrality has been advocated and applied more than anywhere else. As a result, the trade unions of Germany have deviated so obviously towards opportunism that this deviation was openly admitted even by Kautsky, who is so cautious on this question. In his report to the Leipzig workers he bluntly stated that the "conservatism" displayed by the German delegation in Stuttgart "becomes understandable if we bear in mind the composition of this delegation. Half of it consisted of representatives of the trade unions, and thus the 'Right wing' of the Party appeared to have more strength than it actually has in the Party."

The resolution of the Stuttgart Congress should undoubtedly hasten a decisive break of Russian Social-Democracy with the idea of neutrality so beloved by our liberals. While observing the necessary caution and gradualness, and without taking any impetuous or tactless steps, we must work steadily in the trade unions towards bringing them closer and closer to the Social-Democratic Party.

Further, on the question of emigration and immigration, a clear difference of opinion arose between the opportunists and the revolutionaries in the Commission of the Stuttgart Congress. The opportunists cherished the idea of *limiting* the right of migration of backward, undeveloped workers—especially the Japanese and the Chinese. In the minds of these opportunists the spirit of narrow craft isolation, of trade-union exclusiveness, outweighed the consciousness of socialist tasks: the work of educating and organising those strata of the proletariat which have not yet been drawn into the labour movement. The Congress rejected everything that smacked of this spirit. Even in the Commission there were only a few solitary votes in favour of limiting freedom of migration, and recognition of the solidarity of the workers of all countries in the class struggle is the keynote of the resolution adopted by the International Congress.

The resolution on women's suffrage was also adopted unanimously. Only one Englishwoman from the semi-bourgeois Fabian Society defended the admissibility of a

struggle not for full women's suffrage but for one limited to those possessing property. The Congress rejected this unconditionally and declared in favour of women workers campaigning for the franchise, not in conjunction with the bourgeois supporters of women's rights, but in conjunction with the class parties of the proletariat. The Congress recognised that in the campaign for women's suffrage it was necessary to uphold fully the principles of socialism and equal rights for men and women without distorting those principles for the sake of expediency.

In this connection an interesting difference of opinion arose in the Commission. The Austrians (Viktor Adler, Adelheid Popp) justified their tactics in the struggle for universal manhood suffrage: for the sake of winning this suffrage, they thought it expedient in their campaign not to put the demand for women's suffrage, too, in the foreground. The German Social-Democrats, and especially Clara Zetkin, had protested against this when the Austrians were campaigning for universal suffrage. Zetkin declared in the press that they should not under any circumstances have neglected the demand for women's suffrage, that the Austrians had opportunistically sacrificed principle to expediency, and that they would not have narrowed the scope of their agitation, but would have widened it and increased the force of the popular movement had they fought for women's suffrage with the same energy. In the Commission Zetkin was supported whole-heartedly by another prominent German woman Social-Democrat, Zietz. Adler's amendment, which indirectly justified the Austrian tactics, was rejected by 12 votes to 9 (this amendment stated only that there should be no abatement of the struggle for a suffrage that would really extend to all citizens, instead of stating that the struggle for the suffrage should always include the demand for equal rights for men and women). The point of view of the Commission and of the Congress may be most accurately expressed in the following words of the above-mentioned Zietz in her speech at the International Socialist Women's Conference (this Conference took place in Stuttgart at the same time as the Congress):

"In principle we must demand all that we consider to be correct," said Zietz, "and only when our strength is in-

adequate for more, do we accept what we are able to get. That has always been the tactics of Social-Democracy. The more modest our demands the more modest will the government be in its concessions...." This controversy between the Austrian and German women Social-Democrats will enable the reader to see how severely the best Marxists treat the slightest deviation from the principles of consistent revolutionary tactics.

The last day of the Congress was devoted to the question of militarism in which everyone took the greatest interest. The notorious Hervé tried to defend a very untenable position. He was unable to link up war with the capitalist regime in general, and anti-militarist agitation with the entire work of socialism. Hervé's plan of "answering" any war by strike action or an uprising betrayed a complete failure to understand that the employment of one or other means of struggle depends on the objective conditions of the particular crisis, economic or political, precipitated by the war, and not on any previous decision that revolutionaries may have made.

But although Hervé did reveal frivolity, superficiality, and infatuation with rhetorical phrases, it would be extremely short-sighted to counter him merely by a dogmatic statement of the general truths of socialism. Vollmar in particular fell into this error (from which Bebel and Guesde were not entirely free). With the extraordinary conceit of a man infatuated with stereotyped parliamentarism, he attacked Hervé without noticing that his own narrow-mindedness and thick-skinned opportunism *make* one admit the living spark in Hervéism, *despite* the theoretically absurd and nonsensical way in which Hervé himself presents the question. It does happen sometimes that at a new turning-point of a movement, theoretical absurdities conceal some practical truth. And it was this aspect of the question, the appeal not to prize only parliamentary methods of struggle, the appeal to act in accordance with the new conditions of a future war and future crises, that was stressed by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, especially by Rosa Luxemburg in her speech. Together with the Russian Social-Democratic delegates (Lenin and Martov—who here spoke in full harmony) Rosa Luxemburg

proposed amendments to Bebel's resolution, and these amendments emphasised the need for agitation among the youth, the necessity of taking advantage of the crisis created by war for the purpose of hastening the downfall of the bourgeoisie, the necessity of bearing in mind the inevitable change of methods and means of struggle as the class struggle sharpens and the political situation alters. In the end Bebel's dogmatically one-sided, dead resolution, which was open to a Vollmarian interpretation, became transformed into an altogether different resolution. All the theoretical truths were repeated in it for the benefit of the Hervéists, who are capable of letting anti-militarism make them forget socialism. But these truths serve as an introduction not to a justification of parliamentary cretinism, not to the sanction of peaceful methods alone, not to the worship of the present relatively peaceful and quiet situation, but to the acceptance of all methods of struggle, to the appraisal of the experience of the revolution in Russia, to the development of the active creative side of the movement.

This most outstanding, most important feature of the Congress resolution on anti-militarism has been very aptly caught in Zetkin's journal, to which we have already referred more than once.

"Here too," Zetkin says of the anti-militarist resolution, "the revolutionary energy [*Tatkraft*] and courageous faith of the working class in its fighting capacity won in the end, winning, on the one hand, over the pessimistic gospel of impotence and the hidebound tendency to stick to old, exclusively parliamentary methods of struggle, and, on the other hand, over the banal anti-militarist sport of the French semi-anarchists of the Hervé type. The resolution, which was finally carried unanimously both by the Commission and by nearly 900 delegates of all countries, expresses in vigorous terms the gigantic upswing of the revolutionary labour movement since the last International Congress; the resolution puts forward as a principle that proletarian tactics should be flexible, capable of developing, and *sharpening* [*Zuspitzung*] in proportion as conditions ripen for that purpose."

Hervéism has been rejected, but rejected not in favour of opportunism, not from the point of view of dogmatism

and passivity. The vital urge towards more and more resolute and new methods of struggle is fully recognised by the international proletariat and linked up with the intensification of all the economic contradictions, with all the conditions of the crises engendered by capitalism.

Not the empty Hervéist threat, but the clear realisation that the social revolution is inevitable, the firm determination to fight to the end, the readiness to adopt the most revolutionary methods of struggle—that is the significance of the resolution of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart on the question of militarism.

The army of the proletariat is gaining strength in all countries. Its class-consciousness, unity, and determination are growing by leaps and bounds. And capitalism is effectively ensuring more frequent crises, which this army will take advantage of to destroy capitalism.

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Signed: N. L.

PREFACE TO THE COLLECTION TWELVE YEARS¹²

The volume of collected articles and pamphlets here offered to the reader covers the period from 1895 through 1905. The theme of these writings is the programmatic, tactical, and organisational problems of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, problems which are being posed and dealt with all the time in the struggle against the Right wing of the Marxist trend in Russia.

At first the struggle was fought on purely theoretical ground against Mr. Struve, the chief spokesman of our legal Marxism of the nineties. The close of 1894 and the beginning of 1895 saw an abrupt change in our legal press. Marxist views found their way into it for the first time, presented not only by leaders of the Emancipation of Labour group¹³ living abroad, but also by Social-Democrats in Russia. This literary revival and the heated controversy between the Marxists and the old Narodnik leaders, who (N. K. Mikhailovsky, for instance) had up till then held practically undivided sway in our progressive literature, were the prelude to an upswing in the mass labour movement in Russia. These literary activities of the Russian Marxists were the direct forerunners of active proletarian struggle, of the famous St. Petersburg strikes of 1896, which ushered in an era of steadily mounting workers' movement—the most potent factor in the whole of our revolution.

The Social-Democrats in those days wrote under conditions which compelled them to use Aesopian language and confine themselves to the most general principles, which were farthest removed from practical activity and politics.

Вл. Ильинъ.



За 12 лѣтъ

СОБРАНИЕ СТАТЕЙ.

Томъ первый.

Два направления
въ русскомъ марксизмѣ
и русской социалдемократії.



С.ПЕТЕРВУРГЪ.

Tipografia B. Белобровъ и К°. В. О., Большой пр., д. № 61.
1908.

The cover of the collection of Lenin's writings
Twelve Years

Reduced

This did much to unite the heterogenous elements of the Marxist movement in the fight against the Narodniks. Besides the Russian Social-Democrats abroad and at home this fight was waged also by men like Struve, Bulgakov, Tugan-Baranovsky, Berdyayev, and others. They were bourgeois democrats for whom the break with Narodism signified transition from petty-bourgeois (or peasant) socialism to bourgeois liberalism, and not to proletarian socialism as was the case with us.

The history of the Russian revolution in general, the history of the Cadet Party in particular, and especially the evolution of Mr. Struve (to the verge of Octobrism) have now made this truth self-evident, made it current small coin for our publicists. But in 1894-95, this truth had to be demonstrated on the basis of relatively minor deviations by one or another writer from Marxism; at that time the coin had still to be minted. That is why, in now printing the full text of my article against Mr. Struve ("The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book", over the signature of K. Tulin in the symposium *Material on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*, published in St. Petersburg in 1895 and destroyed by the censor*), I pursue a triple purpose. First, since the reading public is familiar with Mr. Struve's book and the Narodnik articles of 1894-95 against the Marxists, it is important to give a criticism of Mr. Struve's viewpoint. Secondly, in order to reply to repeated accusations of alliance with these gentry, and in order to appraise the very significant political career of Mr. Struve himself, it is important to cite the warning to Mr. Struve made by a revolutionary Social-Democrat simultaneously with our general statements against the Narodniks. Thirdly, the old, and in many respects outdated, polemic with Struve is important as an instructive example, one that shows the practical and political value of irreconcilable theoretical polemics. Revolutionary Social-Democrats have been accused times without number of an excessive penchant for such polemics with the "Economists", the Bernsteinians, and the Mensheviks. Today, too, these accusations

* See present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.—Ed.

are being bandied about by the "conciliators" inside the Social-Democratic Party and the "sympathising" semi-socialists outside it. An excessive penchant for polemics and splits, we are all too often told, is typical of the Russians in general, of the Social-Democrats in particular and of the Bolsheviks especially. But the fact is all too often overlooked that the excessive penchant for skipping from socialism to liberalism is engendered by the conditions prevailing in the capitalist countries in general, the conditions of the bourgeois revolution in Russia in particular, and the conditions of the life and work of our intellectuals especially. From that standpoint it is well worth taking a look at the events of ten years ago, the theoretical differences with "Struveism" which then began to take shape, and the minor (minor at first glance) divergencies that led to a complete political demarcation between the parties and to an irreconcilable struggle in parliament, in the press, at public meetings, etc.

The article against Mr. Struve, I should add, is based on a paper I read in the autumn of 1894 to a small circle of Marxists of that time. The group of Social-Democrats then active in St. Petersburg, and who a year later founded the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, was represented in this circle by St., R., and myself. The legal Marxist writers were represented by P. B. Struve, A. N. Potresov, and K. "The subject of my paper was "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". As will be seen from the title, the polemic with Struve here was incomparably sharper and more definite (in its Social-Democratic conclusions) than in the article published in the spring of 1895. The latter was toned down partly for censorship reasons and partly for the sake of an "alliance" with the legal Marxists for joint struggle against Narodism. That the "leftward jolt" which the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats then gave Mr. Struve has not remained altogether without result is clearly shown by Mr. Struve's article in the police-destroyed symposium of 1895, and by several of his articles in *Novoye Slovo*" (1897).

Moreover, in reading the 1895 article against Mr. Struve it should be borne in mind that in many respects it is a

synopsis of subsequent economic studies (notably *The Development of Capitalism**). Lastly, I should draw the reader's attention to the concluding pages of this article, which emphasise the *positive* (from the Marxist standpoint) features and aspects of Narodism as a revolutionary-democratic trend in a country that was on the threshold of bourgeois revolution. This was a theoretical formulation of the propositions which twelve or thirteen years later were to find their practical and political expression in the "Left bloc" at the elections to the Second Duma and in the "Left-bloc" tactics. That section of the Mensheviks which opposed the idea of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, maintaining that a Left bloc was absolutely impermissible, had on this issue gone back on the very old and very important tradition of the revolutionary Social-Democrats—a tradition vigorously upheld by *Zarya*^{**} and the old *Iskra*.^{***} It stands to reason that the conditional and limited permissibility of "Left-bloc" tactics follows inevitably from the same fundamental theoretical Marxist views on Narodism.

The article against Struve (1894-95) is followed by *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*,^{**} written towards the close of 1897 on the basis of the experience of Social-Democratic activities in St. Petersburg in 1895. It presents in a positive form the views which in other articles and pamphlets in this volume are expressed in the form of polemics with the Social-Democratic Right wing. The various prefaces to the *Tasks* are reprinted here in order to show the connection between these activities and the various periods of our Party's development (for instance, Axelrod's preface emphasises the pamphlet's connection with the struggle against "Economism", and the 1902 preface stresses the evolution of the *Narodnaya Volya* and *Narodnoye Pravo* members^{**}).

The article "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism"^{***} was published abroad in *Zarya* in 1901. It dissolves, so to speak, Social-Democratic asso-

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 21-632.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 321-51.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80.—*Ed.*

ciation with Struve as a political leader. In 1895, we warned him and cautiously dissociated ourselves from him as an ally. In 1901, we declared war on him as a liberal who was incapable of championing even purely democratic demands with any consistency.

In 1895, several years before the Bernsteinism^{**} in the West and before the complete break with Marxism on the part of quite a few "advanced" writers in Russia, I pointed out that Mr. Struve was an unreliable Marxist with whom Social-Democrats should have no truck. In 1901, several years before the Cadet Party emerged in the Russian revolution, and before the political fiasco of this party in the First and Second Dumas, I pointed out the very features of Russian bourgeois liberalism which were to be fully revealed in the mass political actions of 1905-07. The article "Hannibals of Liberalism" criticised the false reasoning of one liberal, but is now almost fully applicable to the policy of the biggest liberal party in our revolution. As for those who are inclined to believe that we Bolsheviks went back on the old Social-Democratic policy in regard to liberalism when we ruthlessly combated constitutional illusions and fought the Cadet Party in 1905-07—the article "Hannibals of Liberalism" will show them their mistake. The Bolsheviks remained true to the traditions of revolutionary Social-Democracy and did not succumb to the bourgeois intoxication to which the liberals gave their support during the "constitutional zig-zag" and which temporarily misled the Right-wing members of our Party.

The next pamphlet, *What Is To Be Done?*, was published abroad early in 1902.* It is a criticism of the Right wing, which was no longer a literary trend but existed within the Social-Democratic organisation. The first Social-Democratic congress was held in 1898. It founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, represented by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, which incorporated the Emancipation of Labour group. The central Party bodies, however, were suppressed by the police and could not be re-established. There was, in fact, no united

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 347-529.—Ed.

party: unity was still only an idea, a directive. The infatuation with the strike movement and economic struggles gave rise to a peculiar form of Social-Democratic opportunism, known as "Economism". When the *Iskra* group began to function abroad *at the very end* of 1900, the split over this issue was already an accomplished fact. In the spring of 1900, Plekhanov resigned from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and set up an organisation of his own—*Sotsial-Demokrat*.

Officially, *Iskra* began its work independently of the two groups, but for all practical purposes it sided with Plekhanov's group against the Union. An attempt to merge the two (at the Congress of the Union and the *Sotsial-Demokrat* in Zurich, June 1901) failed. *What Is To Be Done?* gives a systematic account of the reasons for the divergence of views and of the nature of *Iskra* tactics and organisational activity.

What Is To Be Done? is frequently mentioned by the Mensheviks, the present opponents of the Bolsheviks, as well as by writers belonging to the bourgeois-liberal camp (Cadets, Bezzaglavtsi¹⁰ in the newspaper *Tovarishch*, etc.). I have, therefore, decided to reprint the pamphlet here, slightly abridged, omitting only the details of organisational relations and minor polemical remarks. Concerning the essential content of this pamphlet it is necessary to draw the attention of the modern reader to the following.

The basic mistake made by those who now criticise *What Is To Be Done?* is to treat the pamphlet apart from its connection with the concrete historical situation of a definite, and now long past, period in the development of our Party. This mistake was strikingly demonstrated, for instance, by Parvus (not to mention numerous Mensheviks), who, many years after the pamphlet appeared, wrote about its incorrect or exaggerated ideas on the subject of an organisation of professional revolutionaries.

Today these statements look ridiculous, as if their authors want to dismiss a whole period in the development of our Party, to dismiss gains which, in their time, had to be fought for, but which have long ago been consolidated and have served their purpose.

To maintain today that *Iskra* exaggerated (*in 1901 and 1902!*) the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries, is like reproaching the Japanese, *after* the Russo-Japanese War, for having exaggerated the strength of Russia's armed forces, for having prior to the war exaggerated the need to prepare for fighting these forces. To win victory the Japanese had to marshal all their forces against the probable maximum of Russian forces. Unfortunately, many of those who judge our Party are outsiders, who do not know the subject, who do not realise that *today* the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries has *already* scored a complete victory. That victory would have been impossible if this idea had not been pushed to the *forefront* at the time, if we had not "exaggerated" so as to drive it home to people who were trying to prevent it from being realised.

What Is To Be Done? is a *summary* of *Iskra* tactics and *Iskra* organisational policy in 1901 and 1902. Precisely a "*summary*", no more and no less. That will be clear to anyone who takes the trouble to go through the file of *Iskra* for 1901 and 1902.* But to pass judgement on that summary without knowing *Iskra*'s struggle against the then *dominant* trend of Economism, without understanding that struggle, is sheer idle talk. *Iskra* fought for an organisation of professional revolutionaries. It fought with especial vigour in 1901 and 1902, vanquished Economism, the then dominant trend, and finally *created* this organisation in 1903. It preserved it in face of the subsequent split in the Iskrist ranks and all the convulsions of the period of storm and stress; it preserved it throughout the Russian revolution; it preserved it intact from 1901-02 to 1907.

And now, when the fight for this organisation has long been won, when the seed has ripened, and the harvest gathered, people come along and tell us: "You exaggerated the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries!" Is this not ridiculous?

* Volume 3 of this publication will contain the most important *Iskra* articles for these years.¹¹

Take the whole pre-revolutionary period and the first two and a half years of the revolution (1905-07). Compare our Social-Democratic Party during this whole period with the other parties in respect of unity, organisation, and continuity of policy. You will have to admit that *in this* respect our Party is *unquestionably* superior to *all* the others—the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc. Before the revolution it drew up a programme which was formally accepted by all Social-Democrats, and when changes were made in it there was no split over the programme. From 1903 to 1907 (formally from 1905 to 1906), the Social-Democratic Party, despite the split in its ranks, gave the public the fullest information on the inner-party situation (minutes of the Second General Congress, the Third Bolshevik, and the Fourth General, or Stockholm, congresses). Despite the split, the Social-Democratic Party earlier than any of the other parties was able to take advantage of the temporary spell of freedom to build a legal organisation with an ideal democratic structure, an electoral system, and representation at congresses according to the number of organised members. You will not find this, even today, either in the Socialist-Revolutionary or the Cadet parties, though the latter is practically legal, is the best organised bourgeois party, and has incomparably greater funds, scope for using the press, and opportunities for legal activities than our Party. And take the elections to the Second Duma, in which all parties participated—did they not clearly show the superior organisational unity of our Party and Duma group?

The question arises, who accomplished, who brought into being this superior unity, solidarity, and stability of our Party? It was accomplished by the organisation of professional revolutionaries, to the building of which *Iskra* made the greatest contribution. Anyone who knows our Party's history well, anyone who has had a hand in building the Party, has but to glance at the delegate list of any of the groups at, say, the London Congress, in order to be convinced of this and notice at once that it is a list of the old membership, the central core that had worked hardest of all to build up the Party and make it what it is. Basically, of course, their success was due to the fact that

the working class, whose best representatives built the Social-Democratic Party, for objective economic reasons possesses a greater capacity for organisation than any other class in capitalist society. Without this condition an organisation of professional revolutionaries would be nothing more than a plaything, an adventure, a mere signboard. *What Is To Be Done?* repeatedly emphasises this, pointing out that the organisation it advocates has no meaning apart from its connection with the "genuine revolutionary class that is spontaneously rising to struggle". But the objective maximum ability of the proletariat to unite in a class is realised through living people, and only through definite forms of organisation. In the historical conditions that prevailed in Russia in 1900-05, no organisation other than *Iskra* could have created the Social-Democratic Labour Party we now have. The professional revolutionary has played his part in the history of Russian proletarian socialism. No power on earth can now undo this work, which has outgrown the narrow framework of the "circles" of 1902-05. Nor can the significance of the gains already won be shaken by belated complaints that the militant tasks of the movement were exaggerated by those who at that time had to fight to ensure the correct way of accomplishing these tasks.

I have just referred to the narrow framework of the circles of the old *Iskra* period (beginning with issue No. 51, at the close of 1903, *Iskra* turned to Menshevism, proclaiming that "a gulf separates the old and the new *Iskra*"—Trotsky's words in a pamphlet approved by the Menshevik *Iskra* editors). This circle spirit has to be briefly explained to the present-day reader. The pamphlets *What Is To Be Done?* and *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back** published in this collection present to the reader a heated, at times bitter and destructive, controversy within the *circles abroad*. Undoubtedly, this struggle has many unattractive features. Undoubtedly, it is something that could only be possible in a young and immature workers' movement in the country in question. Undoubtedly, the present leaders of the present workers' movement in Russia will have to

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 203-425.—Ed.

break with many of the circle traditions, forget and discard many of the trivial features of circle activity and circle squabbles, so as to concentrate on the tasks of Social-Democracy in the present period. Only the broadening of the Party by enlisting *proletarian* elements can, in conjunction with open mass activity, eradicate all the residue of the circle spirit which has been inherited from the past and is unsuited to our present tasks. And the transition to a democratically organised workers' party, proclaimed by the Bolsheviks in *Novaya Zhizn*⁶² in November 1905,* i.e., as soon as the conditions appeared for legal activity—this transition was virtually an irrevocable break with the old circle ways that had outlived their day.

Yes, "that had had outlived their day", for it is not enough to condemn the old circle spirit; its significance in the special circumstances of the past period must be understood. The circles were necessary in their day and played a positive role. In an autocratic state, especially in the situation created by the whole history of the *Russian* revolutionary movement, the socialist workers' party *could not* develop except from these circles. And the circles, i.e., close-knit, exclusive groups uniting a very small number of people and nearly always based on personal friendship, were a necessary stage in the development of socialism and the workers' movement in Russia. As the movement grew, it was confronted with the task of uniting these circles, forming strong links between them, and establishing continuity. This called for a firm base of operations "beyond the reach" of the autocracy—i.e., *abroad*. The circles abroad, therefore, came into being through necessity. There was no contact between them; they had no authority over them in the shape of the Party in Russia, and it was inevitable that they should differ in their understanding of the movement's main tasks at the given stage, that is, an understanding of *how exactly* to set up a base of operations and in what way they could help to build the Party as a whole. A struggle between the circles was, therefore, inevitable. Today, in retrospect, we can clearly see which of the circles was really in a posi-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 29-39.—*Ed.*

tion to act as a base of operations. But at that time, when the various circles were just beginning their work, no one could say that and the controversy could be resolved only through struggle. Parvus, I remember, subsequently blamed the old *Iskra* for waging a destructive circle war and advocated after the event a conciliatory policy. That is an easy thing to say after the event, and to say it reveals a failure to understand the conditions then prevailing. For one thing, there was no criterion by which to judge the strength or *importance* of one or another circle. The importance of many of them, which are now forgotten, was exaggerated, but in their time they wanted through struggle to assert their right to existence. Secondly, the differences among the circles were over the *direction* the work was to take, work which at the time was new to them. I noted at the time (in *What Is To Be Done?*) that these seemingly minor differences were actually of immense importance, since at the beginning of this new work, at the beginning of the Social-Democratic movement, the definition of the general nature of the work and movement would very substantially affect propaganda, agitation, and organisation. All subsequent disputes between the Social-Democrats concerned the direction of the Party's political activity on specific issues. But at that time the controversy was over the most general principles and the fundamental aims of all Social-Democratic policy generally.

The circles played their part and are now, of course, obsolete. But they became obsolete only because the struggle that they waged posed the key problems of the Social-Democratic movement in the sharpest possible manner and solved them in an irreconcilable revolutionary spirit, thereby creating a firm basis for broad party activity.

Of particular questions raised in the literary discussion over *What Is To Be Done?* I shall comment on only two. Writing in *Iskra* in 1904, soon after the appearance of *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, Plekhanov declared that he differed from me in principle on the question of spontaneity and political consciousness. I did not reply either to that declaration (except for a brief note in the

Geneva newspaper *Vperyod***),* or to the numerous repetitions of it in Menshevik literature. I did not reply because Plekhanov's criticism was obviously mere cavilling, based on phrases torn out of context, on particular expressions which I had not quite adroitly or precisely formulated. Moreover, he ignored the general content and the whole spirit of my pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* which appeared in March 1902. The draft Party programme (framed by Plekhanov and amended by the *Iskra* editors) appeared in June or July 1902. Its formulation of the relation between spontaneity and political consciousness was agreed upon by all the *Iskra* editors (my disputes with Plekhanov over the programme, which took place in the editorial board, were not on this point, but on the question of small production being ousted by large-scale production, concerning which I called for a more precise formula than Plekhanov's, and on the difference in the standpoint of the proletariat or of the labouring classes generally; on this point I insisted on a narrower definition of the purely proletarian character of the Party).

Consequently, there could be no question of any difference in principle between the draft Party programme and *What Is To Be Done?* on this issue. At the Second Congress (August 1903) Martynov, who was then an Economist, challenged our views on spontaneity and political consciousness as set forth in the programme. He was opposed by all the Iskrists, as I emphasise in *One Step Forward*. Hence it is clear that the controversy was essentially between the Iskrists and the Economists, who attacked *what was common* both to *What Is To Be Done?* and the programme drafts. Nor at the Second Congress did I have any intention of elevating my own formulations, as given in *What Is To Be Done?*, to "programmatic" level, constituting special principles. On the contrary, the expression I used—and it has since been frequently quoted—was that the Economists had gone to one extreme. *What Is To Be Done?*, I said, straightens out what had been twisted by the Economists (cf. minutes of the Second R.S.D.L.P. Congress in 1903, Geneva, 1904). I emphasised that just because we were

* See present edition, Vol. 8, p. 245.—Ed.

so vigorously straightening out whatever had been twisted our line of action would always be the straightest.*

The meaning of these words is clear enough: *What Is To Be Done?* is a controversial correction of Economist distortions and it would be wrong to regard the pamphlet in any other light. It should be added that Plekhanov's article against the pamphlet was *not* reprinted in the new *Iskra* collection (*Two Years*), and for that reason I do not here deal with Plekhanov's arguments, but merely explain the issue involved to the present-day reader, who may come across references to it in very many Menshevik publications.

My second comment concerns the question of economic struggle and the trade unions. My views on this subject have been frequently misrepresented in the literature, and I must, therefore, emphasise that many pages in *What Is To Be Done?* are devoted to explaining the *immense* importance of economic struggle and the trade unions. In particular, I advocated *neutrality* of the trade unions, and have *not altered* that view in the pamphlets or newspaper articles written since then, despite the numerous assertions by my opponents. Only the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress and the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress led me to conclude that trade-union neutrality is not defensible as a *principle*. The only correct principle is the closest possible alignment of the unions with the Party. Our policy must be to bring the unions closer to the Party and link them with it. That policy should be pursued perseveringly and persistently in all our propaganda, agitation, and organising activity, without trying to obtain mere "recognition" of our views and without expelling from the trade unions those of a different opinion.



The pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* was published in Geneva in the summer of 1904. It reviews the first stage of the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks.

* See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 491.—*Ed.*

viks, which began at the Second Congress (August 1903). I have cut this pamphlet down by half, since minor details of the organisational struggle, especially points concerning the personal composition of the Party centres, cannot possibly be of any interest to the present-day reader and, in fact, are best forgotten. But what is important, I think, is the analysis of the controversy over tactical and other conceptions at the Second Congress, and the polemic with the Mensheviks on matters of organisation. Both are essential for an understanding of Menshevism and Bolshevism as trends which have left their mark upon all the activities of the workers' party in our revolution.

Of the discussions at the Second Congress of the Social-Democratic Party, I will mention the debate on the agrarian programme. Events have clearly demonstrated that our programme at the time (return of the cut-off lands⁶⁴) was much too limited and *underestimated* the strength of the revolutionary-democratic peasant movement—I shall deal with this in greater detail in Volume 2 of the present publication.* Here it is important to emphasise that *even this excessively limited* agrarian programme was at that time considered *too broad* by the Social-Democratic Right wing. Martynov and other Economists opposed it on the grounds that it went too far! This shows the great practical importance of the whole struggle that the old *Iskra* waged against Economism, against attempts to narrow down and belittle the character of Social-Democratic policy.

At that time (the first half of 1904) our differences with the Mensheviks were restricted to organisational issues. I described the Menshevik attitude as "opportunism in questions of organisation". Objecting to this P. B. Axelrod wrote to Kautsky: "My feeble mind just cannot grasp this thing called 'opportunism in questions of organisation' which is now being brought to the fore as something independent and having no direct connection with programmatic and tactical views." (Letter of June 6, 1904, reprinted in the new-*Iskra* collection *Two Years*, Part II, p. 149.)

* See pp. 256-58 of this volume.—Ed.

The direct connection of opportunism in organisational views with that in tactical views has been sufficiently demonstrated by the whole record of Menshevism in 1905-07. As for this "incomprehensible thing", "opportunism in questions of organisation", practical experience has borne out my appraisal more brilliantly than I could ever have expected. It suffices to say that even the *Menshevik* Cherevanin now has to admit (see his pamphlet on the London R.S.D.L.P. Congress of 1907) that Axelrod's organisational plans (the much-talked-of "labour congress", etc.) could only lead to splits that would ruin the proletarian cause. What is more, the same Cherevanin tells us in this pamphlet that in London Plekhanov had to contend with "*organisational anarchism*" within the Menshevik faction. And so it was not for nothing that I fought "opportunism in questions of organisation" in 1904, seeing that in 1907 both Cherevanin and Plekhanov have had to recognise the "*organisational anarchism*" of influential Mensheviks.

From organisational opportunism the Mensheviks passed to tactical opportunism. The pamphlet, *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan** (published in Geneva towards the end of 1904, in November or December if I am not mistaken) marks their first step in that direction. One frequently finds statements in current writings that the dispute over the Zemstvo campaign was due to the fact that the Bolsheviks saw no value at all in organising demonstrations before the Zemstvo people. The reader will see that this was not the case at all. The differences were due to the Mensheviks insisting that we should not cause *panic* among the liberals, and, still more to the fact that, after the Rostov strike of 1902, the summer strikes and barricades of 1903, and on the eve of January 9, 1905, the Mensheviks extolled the idea of demonstrations before the Zemstvo people "as the *highest type* of demonstration. Our attitude to this Menshevik "Zemstvo campaign plan" was expressed in the heading of an article on the subject in the Bolshevik paper *Vpered*, No. 1 (Geneva, January 1905):

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 497-518.—*Ed.*

"Good Demonstrations of Proletarians and Poor Arguments of Certain Intellectuals."*

The last pamphlet included in this collection, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, appeared in Geneva in the summer of 1905.** It is a systematic statement of the fundamental tactical differences with the Mensheviks. These differences were fully formulated in the resolutions of the Third (spring) R.S.D.L.P. (Bolshevik) Congress in London and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva and established the basic divergence between the Bolshevik and Menshevik appraisals of our bourgeois revolution as a whole from the standpoint of the proletariat's tasks. The Bolsheviks claimed for the proletariat the role of *leader* in the democratic revolution. The Mensheviks reduced its role to that of an "extreme opposition". The Bolsheviks gave a positive definition of the class character and class significance of the revolution, maintaining that a victorious revolution implied a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". The Mensheviks always interpreted the bourgeois revolution so incorrectly as to result in their acceptance of a position in which the role of the proletariat would be subordinate to and dependent on the bourgeoisie.

How these differences of principle were reflected in practical activities is well known. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Bulygin Duma; the Mensheviks vacillated. The Bolsheviks boycotted the Witte Duma; the Mensheviks vacillated, appealing to the people to vote, but not for the Duma. The Mensheviks supported a Cadet Ministry and Cadet policy in the First Duma, while the Bolsheviks, parallel with propaganda in favour of an "executive committee of the Left",^{**} resolutely exposed constitutional illusions and Cadet counter-revolutionism. Further, the Bolsheviks worked for a Left bloc in the Second Duma elections, while the Mensheviks called for a bloc with the Cadets, and so on and so forth.

Now it seems that the "Cadet period" in the Russian revolution (the expression is from the pamphlet *The Vic-*

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 29-34.—Ed.

** See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—Ed.

tory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party, March 1906)* has come to an end. The counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets has been fully exposed. The Cadets themselves are beginning to admit that they had been combating the revolution all along, and Mr. Struve frankly reveals the inner thoughts of Cadet liberalism. The more attentively the class-conscious proletariat now looks back on this Cadet period, on the whole of this "constitutional zigzag", the more clearly will it see that the Bolsheviks correctly appraised beforehand both this period and the essence of the Cadet Party, and that the Mensheviks were in fact pursuing a wrong policy, one that, objectively, was tantamount to throwing over independent proletarian policy in favour of subordinating the proletariat to bourgeois liberalism.

* * *

In casting a retrospective glance at the struggle of the two trends in Russian Marxism and Social-Democracy during the last twelve years (1895-1907), one cannot avoid the conclusion that "legal Marxism", "Economism", and "Menshevism" are diverse forms of one and the same historical tendency. The "legal Marxism" of Mr. Struve (1894) and those like him was a *reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature*. "Economism", as a distinct trend in Social-Democratic activities in 1897 and subsequent years virtually implemented the programme set forth in the *bourgeois-liberal "Credo"*: economic struggle for the workers, political struggle for the liberals. Menshevism is not only a literary trend, not only a tendency in Social-Democratic activity, but a close-knit faction, which during the first period of the Russian revolution (1905-07) pursued its own distinct policy—a policy which *in practice subordinated the proletariat to bourgeois liberalism*.**

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 199-276.—Ed.

** An analysis of the struggle of the various trends and shades of opinion at the Second Party Congress (cf. *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, 1904) will show beyond all doubt the direct and close ties between the Economism of 1897 and subsequent years and Menshevism. The link between Economism in the Social-Democratic movement and the "legal Marxism" or "Struveism" of 1895-97 was dem-

In all capitalist countries the proletariat is inevitably connected by a thousand transitional links with its neighbour on the right, the petty bourgeoisie. In all workers' parties there inevitably emerges a more or less clearly delineated Right wing which, in its views, tactics, and organisational "line", reflects the opportunist tendencies of the petty bourgeoisie. In such a petty-bourgeois country as Russia, in the era of bourgeois revolution, in the formative period of the young Social-Democratic Labour Party, these tendencies were bound to manifest themselves much more sharply, definitely, and clearly than anywhere else in Europe. Familiarity with the various forms in which this tendency is displayed in the Russian Social-Democratic movement in different periods of its development is necessary in order to strengthen revolutionary Marxism and steel the Russian working class in its struggle for emancipation.

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onstrated by me in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). Legal Marxism-Economism-Menshevism are linked not only ideologically, but also by their direct historical continuity.

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

In October 1905, Russia was at the peak of the revolutionary upsurge. The proletariat swept away the Bulygin Duma and drew the mass of the people into an open struggle against the autocracy. In October 1907, we are apparently at the lowest ebb of the open mass struggle. But the period of decline that set in after the defeat of December 1905 brought with it not only a flowering of constitutional illusions, but a complete shattering of these illusions. After the dissolution of the two Dumas and the coup d'état of June 3, the Third Duma, which is to be convened, clearly puts an end to the period of belief in peaceful cohabitation between the autocracy and popular representation and ushers in a new epoch in the development of the revolution.

At a moment like the present, a comparison between the revolution and counter-revolution in Russia, between the period of revolutionary onslaught (1905) and that of counter-revolutionary playing with a constitution (1906 and 1907) suggests itself as a matter of course. Such a comparison is implicit in any attempt to define a political line for the immediate future. Contrasting "errors of the revolution" or "revolutionary illusions" with "positive constitutional work" is the keynote of present-day political literature. The Cadets shout about it at their pre-election meetings. The liberal press chants, howls, and rants about it. We have here Mr. Struve, vehemently and spitefully venting his annoyance on the revolutionaries because hopes of a "compromise" have totally collapsed. We have here Milyukov, who, for all his mincing manners and Jesuitism, has been forced by events to arrive at the clear, accurate and—above all—truthful statement: "the enemies are on the left". We have here publicists in the vein of *Tovarishch*, such as Kuskova, Smirnov, Plekhanov, Gorn, Yordansky, Cherevanin, and others who denounce the October-December struggle as folly, and more or less openly

advocate a "democratic" coalition with the Cadets. The real Cadet elements in this turbid stream express the counter-revolutionary interests of the bourgeoisie and the boundless servility of intellectualist philistinism. As for the elements which have not yet sunk quite to the level of Struve, their dominant feature is *failure to understand* the connection between revolution and counter-revolution in Russia, an inability to see everything we have experienced as an integral social movement developing in accordance with its own inner logic.

The period of revolutionary onslaught demonstrated *in action* the class composition of Russia's population and the attitude of the different classes towards the old autocracy. Events have now taught everyone, even people who are utter strangers to Marxism, to reckon the chronology of the revolution from January 9, 1905, that is, from the first *consciously* political movement of the *masses* belonging to a single definite *class*. When the Social-Democrats, from an analysis of Russia's economic realities, deduced the leading role, the hegemony of the proletariat in our revolution, this seemed to be a bookish infatuation of theoreticians. The revolution confirmed our theory, because it is the only truly revolutionary theory. The proletariat actually took the lead in the revolution all the time. The Social-Democrats actually proved to be the ideological vanguard of the proletariat. The struggle of the masses developed under the leadership of the proletariat with remarkable speed, much faster than many revolutionaries had expected. In the course of a single year it rose to the most decisive forms of revolutionary onslaught that history has ever known—to mass strikes and armed uprisings. The organisation of the proletarian masses went forward with astonishing speed in the course of the struggle itself. Other sections of the population, comprising the fighting ranks of the revolutionary people, followed the proletariat's lead and began to organise. The semi-proletarian mass of various kinds of non-manual workers began to organise, followed by the peasant democracy, the professional intelligentsia, and so on. The period of proletarian victories was a period of growth in mass organisation unprecedented in Russian history and vast even by European standards.

The proletariat at that time won for itself a number of improvements in working conditions. The peasant mass won a "reduction" in the arbitrary power of the landlords and lower prices for the lease and sale of land. All Russia won a considerable degree of freedom of assembly, speech, and association, and made the autocracy publicly renounce its old practices and recognise the constitution.

All that the liberation movement in Russia has won up to now was won entirely and exclusively by the revolutionary struggle of the masses headed by the proletariat.

The turning-point in the struggle began with the defeat of the December uprising. Step by step the counter-revolution passed to the offensive as the mass struggle weakened. During the period of the First Duma this struggle was still formidably manifest in the intensification of the peasant movement, in widespread attacks upon the nests of the semi-feudal landlords, and in a number of revolts among the soldiers. The reaction attacked slowly at that time, not daring to carry out a coup d'état straightforwardly. Only after the suppression of the Sveaborg and Kronstadt revolts of July 1906 did it act more boldly, when it introduced the regime of military tribunals, began piecemeal to deprive the population of their franchise (the Senate interpretations⁶⁷), and, finally, surrounded the Second Duma completely with a police siege and overthrew the whole notorious constitution. All self-established free organisations of the masses were replaced at that time by "legal struggle" within the framework of the police constitution as interpreted by the Dubasovs and Stolypins. The supremacy of the Social-Democrats gave place to the supremacy of the Cadets, who predominated in both Dumas. The period of decline in the movement of the masses was a period of peak development for the Party of the Cadets. It exploited this decline by coming forward as the "champion" of the constitution. It upheld faith in this constitution among the people with all its might and preached the need to keep strictly to "parliamentary" struggle.

The bankruptcy of the "Cadet constitution" is the bankruptcy of Cadet tactics and Cadet hegemony in the emancipatory struggle. The selfish class character of all the talk by our liberals about "revolutionary illusions" and the

"errors of the revolution" becomes patently obvious when we compare the two periods of the revolution. The proletarian mass struggle won gains for the whole people. The liberal leadership of the movement produced nothing but defeats. The revolutionary onslaught of the proletariat steadily raised the political consciousness of the masses and their organisation. It set increasingly higher aims before them, stimulated their independent participation in political life, and taught them how to fight. The hegemony of the liberals during the period of the two Dumas lowered the political consciousness of the masses, demoralised their revolutionary organisation, and dulled their comprehension of democratic aims.

The liberal leaders of the First and Second Dumas gave the people a splendid demonstration of slavish legal "struggle", as a result of which the autocratic advocates of serfdom swept away the constitutional paradise of the liberal windbags with a stroke of the pen and ridiculed the subtle diplomacy of the visitors to ministerial ante-rooms. The liberals have not a single gain to show throughout the Russian revolution, not a single success, not a single attempt, at all democratic, to organise the forces of the people in the struggle for freedom.

Until October 1905, the liberals sometimes maintained a benevolent neutrality towards the revolutionary struggle of the masses, but already at that time they had begun to oppose it, sending a deputation to the tsar with abject speeches and supporting the Bulygin Duma not out of thoughtlessness, but out of sheer hostility to the revolution. After October 1905, all that the liberals did was to shamefully betray the cause of the people's freedom.

In November 1905, they sent Mr. Struve to have an intimate talk with Mr. Witte. In the spring of 1906, they undermined the revolutionary boycott, and by refusing to speak out openly against the loan for Europe to hear, helped the government to obtain millions of rubles for the conquest of Russia. In the summer of 1906, they carried on backdoor haggling with Trepov¹⁸ over ministerial portfolios and fought the "Left", i. e., the revolution, in the First Duma. January 1907 saw them running again to the police authorities (Milyukov's call on Stolypin). In the spring

of 1907, they *supported* the government in the Second Duma. The revolution exposed the liberals very quickly and showed them in their true counter-revolutionary colours.

In this respect the period of constitutional hopes served a very useful purpose as far as the people were concerned. The experience of the First and Second Dumas has not only made them realise how utterly contemptible is the role that liberalism plays in our revolution. It has also, in actual fact, quashed the attempt at leadership of the democratic movement by a party which only political infants or senile dotards can regard as being really constitutionally "*democratic*".

In 1905 and the beginning of 1906, the class composition of the bourgeois democrats in Russia was not yet clear to everyone. Hopes that the autocracy could be combined with actual representation of more or less broad masses of the people existed not only among the ignorant and downtrodden inhabitants of various out-of-the-way places. Such hopes were not absent even in ruling spheres of the autocracy. Why did the electoral law in both the Bulygin and the Witte Dumas grant a considerable degree of representation to the peasantry? Because belief in the monarchist sentiments of the countryside still persisted. "The muzhik will help us out"—this exclamation of an official newspaper in the spring of 1906 expressed the government's reliance on the conservatism of the peasant mass. In those days the Cadets were not only not aware of the antagonism between the democracy of the peasants and bourgeois liberalism, but even feared the backwardness of the peasants and desired only one thing—that the Duma should help to convert the conservative or indifferent peasant into a liberal. In the spring of 1906, Mr. Struve expressed an ambitious wish when he wrote, "the peasant in the Duma will be a Cadet". In the summer of 1907, the same Mr. Struve raised the banner of struggle against the Trudovik or Left parties, which he regarded as the main obstacle to an agreement between bourgeois liberalism and the autocracy. In the course of eighteen months the slogan of a struggle for the political enlightenment of the peasants was changed by the liberals to a slogan of struggle against a "too" politically educated and demanding peasantry!

This change of slogans expresses as plainly as can be the complete bankruptcy of liberalism in the Russian revolution. The class antagonism between the mass of the democratic rural population and the semi-feudal landlords proved to be immeasurably deeper than the cowardly and dull-witted Cadets imagined. That is why their attempt to take the lead in the struggle for democracy failed so quickly and irrevocably. That is why their whole "line" aimed at reconciling the petty-bourgeois democratic mass of the people with the Octobrist and Black-Hundred landlords was a fiasco. A great, though negative, gain of the counter-revolutionary period of the two Dumas was this bankruptcy of the treacherous "champions" of the "people's freedom". The class struggle going on below threw these heroes of ministerial ante-rooms overboard, turned them from claimants to leadership into *ordinary lackeys of Octobrism* slightly touched up with constitutional varnish.

He who still fails to see this bankruptcy of the liberals, who have undergone a practical test of their worth as champions of democracy, or at least as fighters in the democratic ranks, has understood absolutely nothing of the political history of the two Dumas. Among these people the meaningless reiteration of a memorised formula about supporting bourgeois democracy becomes counter-revolutionary snivelling. The Social-Democrats should have no regrets at the shattering of constitutional illusions. They should say what Marx said about counter-revolution in Germany: the people gained by the loss of its illusions.¹⁰ Bourgeois democracy in Russia gained by the loss of worthless leaders and weak-kneed allies. So much the better for the political development of this democracy.

It remains for the party of the proletariat to see to it that the valuable political lessons of our revolution and counter-revolution should be more deeply pondered over and more firmly grasped by the broad masses. The period of onslaught on the autocracy saw the deployment of the forces of the proletariat and taught it the fundamentals of revolutionary tactics; it showed the conditions for the success of the direct struggle of the masses, which alone was able to achieve improvements of any importance. The long period during which the proletarian forces were prepared,

trained, and organised preceded those actions of hundreds of thousands of workers which dealt a mortal blow to the old autocracy in Russia. The sustained and imperceptible work of guiding all the manifestations of the proletarian class struggle, the work of building a strong and seasoned party preceded the outbreak of the truly mass struggle and provided the conditions necessary for turning that outbreak into a revolution. And now the proletariat, as the people's fighting vanguard, must strengthen its organisation, scrape off all the green mould of intellectualist opportunism, and gather its forces for a similar sustained and stubborn effort. The tasks which history and the objective position of the broad masses have posed before the Russian revolution have not been solved. Elements of a new, national political crisis have not been eliminated, but, on the contrary, have grown deeper and wider. The advent of this crisis will place the proletariat once more at the head of the movement of the whole people. The workers' Social-Democratic Party should be prepared for this role. And the soil, fertilised by the events of 1905 and subsequent years, will yield a harvest tenfold richer. If a party of several thousand class-conscious advanced members of the working class could rally a million proletarians behind it at the end of 1905, then today, when our Party has tens of thousands of Social-Democrats tried and tested in the revolution, who have become still more closely linked with the mass of the workers during the struggle itself, it will rally tens of millions behind it and crush the enemy.

Both the socialist and the democratic tasks of the working-class movement in Russia have been focused much more sharply and brought to the fore more urgently under the impact of revolutionary events. The struggle against the bourgeoisie is rising to a higher stage. The capitalists are uniting in national associations, are leaguing themselves more closely with the government, and are resorting more often to extreme methods of economic struggle, including mass lock-outs, in order to "curb" the proletariat. But only moribund classes are afraid of persecutions. The more rapidly the capitalists achieve successes the more rapidly does the proletariat grow in numbers and unity. The economic development of both Russia and the whole world is a

guarantee of the proletariat's invincibility. The bourgeoisie first began to take shape as a class, as a united and conscious political force during our revolution. All the more effectively will the workers organise into a united class all over Russia. And the wider the gulf between the world of capital and the world of labour, the clearer will be the socialist consciousness of the workers. Socialist agitation among the proletariat, enriched by the experience of the revolution, will become more definite. The political organisation of the bourgeoisie is the best stimulus to the definitive shaping of a socialist workers' party.

The aims of this party in the struggle for democracy can henceforth be considered controversial only among the "sympathising" intellectuals, who are making ready to go over to the liberals. For the mass of the workers these aims have been made tangibly clear in the fire of revolution. The proletariat knows from experience that the peasant masses are the basis and the only basis of bourgeois democracy as a historical force in Russia. On a national scale the proletariat has already acted as leader of this mass in the struggle against the semi-feudal landlords and the autocracy and no power can now deflect the workers' party from its right path. The role of the liberal Party of the Cadets, who, under the flag of democracy, guided the peasantry under the wing of Octobrism, is now played out, and the Social-Democrats, in spite of individual whiners, will continue their work of explaining this bankruptcy of the liberals to the masses, explaining that bourgeois democrats cannot do what they want to do unless they disentangle themselves once for all from their alliance with the lackeys of Octobrism.

No one at this stage can tell what forms bourgeois democracy in Russia will assume in the future. Possibly, the bankruptcy of the Cadets may lead to the formation of a peasant democratic party, a truly mass party, and not an organisation of terrorists such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries have been and still are. It is also possible that the objective difficulties of achieving political unity among the petty bourgeoisie will prevent such a party from being formed and, for a long time to come, will keep the peasant democracy in its present state as a loose, amorphous, jelly-like Trudovik mass. In either case our line is one: to hammer

out the democratic forces by merciless criticism of all vacillations, by uncompromising struggle against the democrats joining the liberals, who have proved their counter-revolutionariness.

The farther reaction goes, the more violent does the Black-Hundred landlord become; the more control he gets over the autocracy, the slower will be Russia's economic progress and her emancipation from the survivals of serfdom. And that means, all the stronger and wider will class-conscious and militant democracy develop among the masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. All the stronger will be the mass resistance to the famines, tyrannies, and outrages to which the peasantry is doomed by the Octobrists. The Social-Democrats will see to it that, when the democratic struggle inevitably breaks out with new force, the band of liberal careerists called the Cadet Party does not once again divide the democratic ranks and spread discord among them. Either with the people or against the people, that is the alternative that the Social-Democrats have long put to all claimants to the role of "democratic" leaders in the revolution. Up to now not all Social-Democrats have been able to pursue this line consistently; some of them even believed the liberals' promises, others closed their eyes to the liberals' flirting with the counter-revolution. Now we already have the educational experience of the first two Dumas.

The revolution has taught the proletariat to wage a mass struggle. The revolution has shown that the proletariat is able to lead the peasant masses in the struggle for democracy. The revolution has united the purely proletarian party still more closely by casting out petty-bourgeois elements from it. The counter-revolution has taught the petty-bourgeois democrats to give up seeking for leaders and allies among the liberals, who are mortally afraid of the mass struggle. On the basis of these lessons of history we can boldly say to the government of the Black-Hundred landlords: continue along the same line, Mr. Stolypin and Co.! We shall reap the fruits of what you are sowing!

THE THIRD DUMA

The government is garnering the results of the infamous crime which it committed against the people on June 3. The grotesque electoral law which, for the benefit of a handful of landlords and capitalists, completely distorts the will not only of the nation as a whole, but even of the enfranchised minority, has yielded the fruits that tsarism hankered for. At the time of writing this article 432 out of 442 deputies have been returned to the Duma, leaving another 10 to be elected. The results of the elections can, therefore, be considered sufficiently clear. According to a fairly accurate estimate the members elected are 18 Social-Democrats, 13 others of the Left, 46 Cadets, 55 members of groups standing close to them, 92 Octobrists, 21 members of groups belonging to allied trends, 171 members of various Right-wing trends, including 32 members of the Union of the Russian People,⁷⁰ and 16 non-party deputies.

Thus, not counting an insignificant number of non-party deputies, all the others may be divided into four groups: the extreme Left, constituting a little over 7 per cent, the Left (Cadet) Centre 23 per cent, the Right (Octobrist) Centre 25.1 per cent, and the Right 40 per cent; the non-party deputies are a little less than 4 per cent.

None of these groups by itself has an absolute majority. Does this result fully meet the wishes and expectations of those who inspired and drafted the new electoral law? We believe that this question should be answered in the affirmative, and that the new Russian "parliament", from the point of view of the ruling groups supporting the tsar-

ist autocracy, is a *chambre introuvable** in the full sense of that word.

The point is that with us, as in every country that has an autocratic or semi-autocratic regime, there are really two governments: an official one—a Ministry, and another one behind the scenes—the court camarilla. This latter always and everywhere is backed by the most reactionary sections of society, by the feudal—in our country Black-Hundred—nobility, which draws its economic strength from large-scale landownership with the semi-serf economy this involves. Effete, depraved, and degenerate this social group presents a striking example of the most revolting parasitism. To what depths of depravity this degeneration can descend is borne out by the scandalous Moltke v. Harden trial in Berlin, which revealed what a filthy cesspool the influential camarilla at the court of the semi-autocratic German Emperor Wilhelm II really was. It is no secret that with us in Russia similar abominations in corresponding circles are no exception. The mass of the Right in the Third Duma—at least the overwhelming majority if not all of them—will defend the interests of precisely this social cancer, these whitened sepulchres, bequeathed to us from the dismal past. The preservation of a feudal economy, of aristocratic privileges and the regime of the autocracy and nobility is a matter of life and death to these mastodons and ichthyosaurs, for to call them “zubri”⁷¹ is to pay them a compliment.

By using their all-powerful influence at court, the mastodons and ichthyosaurs usually try their utmost to take full monopoly of possession of the official government as well—the Ministry. Usually a considerable part of the Ministry consists of their henchmen. Very often, however, the majority of the Ministry, as regards its composition, does not fully meet the requirements of the camarilla. The antediluvian predator, the predator of the feudal era, finds a competitor here in the shape of a predator of the epoch of primary accumulation—one just as coarse, greedy, and parasitic, but having a certain cultural veneer and, most important of all, desirous also of seizing a sizable share

* Second to none, as Louis XVIII in 1815 called the reactionary French Chamber of Deputies.

of the official pie in the shape of guarantees, subsidies, concessions, protective tariffs, etc. This section of the landowning and industrial bourgeoisie, which is typical of the era of primary accumulation, finds its expression in Octobrism and the trends associated with it. It has many interests in common with the Black Hundreds *sans phrases*—economic parasitism and privileges, as well as jingoism, are as essential from the Octobrist as from the Black-Hundred point of view.

Thus we have a Black-Hundred-Octobrist majority in the Third Duma reaching the imposing figure of 284 deputies out of 432, that is, 65.7 per cent, or over two-thirds of the total number.

This is a stronghold that enables the government in its agrarian policy to help the ruined landlords to get rid of their lands by profitably fleecing the land-poor peasants, to turn labour legislation into an instrument for the gross exploitation of the proletariat by capital, and to ensure that financial policy keeps the main burden of taxation on the shoulders of the masses. It is a stronghold of protectionism and militarism. No one can deny the counter-revolutionary nature of the Octobrist-Black-Hundred majority.

But the main point is that this is not the only majority in the Third Duma. There is another majority.

The Black Hundreds are a dependable ally of the Octobrists, just as the court camarilla is an ally of the Ministry in defending tsarism. But just as the court camarilla displays an inherent urge not so much towards an alliance with the Ministry as towards dominating it, so do the Black Hundreds yearn for a dictatorship over the Octobrists, try to boss them and keep them under.

The interests of capitalism, grossly predatory and parasitic as it is, cannot be reconciled with the undivided sway of feudal landownership. Both of these kindred social groups are trying to seize the lion's share of the pie, and that accounts for their inevitable differences on questions of local self-government and the central organisation of state power. The Black Hundreds in the Zemstvos and municipal councils want to keep things as they are, but in the centre what they want is "down with the accursed constitution". The Octobrists want to increase their influence both in the

Zemstvos and municipal councils, but in the centre there has to be a "constitution", even if a docktailed one that is fictitious as far as the masses are concerned.

Not for nothing does *Russkoye Znamya*⁷² revile the Octobrists, while *Golos Moskvy*,⁷³ in turn, finds that there are more members of the Right in the Third Duma than are needed.

Thus, the objective course of events compels the Octobrists to seek allies in this respect. They could have found them long ago in the Left (Cadet) Centre, which has long been declaring its unhypocritical devotion to the constitution, but the trouble is that the young Russian bourgeoisie of the period of capitalist accumulation now represented by the Cadets has preserved from the past some very inconvenient friends and certain unpleasant traditions. It was found, however, that traditions in the political sphere could easily be dispensed with: the Cadets had declared themselves monarchists long ago, even before the First Duma; they had tacitly refused to form a responsible ministry in the Second Duma; and Cadet schemes for various "freedoms" are hedged in with so many stumbling-blocks, barbed wire entanglements, and pitfalls that there is every hope of further progress in this respect. The Cadets' attitude towards uprisings and strikes had always been one of reproach—at first in a mild, then in a melancholy way; after December 1905 the reproach became half disdain, and after the dissolution of the First Duma flat rejection and condemnation. Diplomacy, deals, bargaining with the powers that be—that is the basis of Cadet tactics. As to inconvenient friends, they have long been called simply "neighbours" and recently have been publicly declared to be "enemies".

An agreement, then, is possible, and so we have another majority, a counter-revolutionary one again—the Octobrist-Cadet majority. To be sure, it is somewhat less than half the number of deputies elected so far—214 out of 432—but, first, some if not all of the non-party deputies will undoubtedly join it, and, secondly, there is every reason to believe that it will increase during the further elections, since the towns and most of the gubernia electoral conferences in which elections have not yet taken place will re-

turn an overwhelming majority of either Octobrists or Cadets.

The government considers itself master of the situation. The liberal bourgeoisie apparently takes this to be a fact. In these circumstances the deal is bound, more than ever before, to bear the stamp of a most disgusting and treacherous compromise, to be more exact—the surrender of all liberal positions that have the slightest democratic tinge. Obviously, no local governing or central legislative bodies can be at all democratically constituted by means of such a deal without a new mass movement. An Octobrist-Cadet majority is not able to give us that. And can we expect any at all tolerable solution of the agrarian question or any alleviation of the workers' situation from a Black-Hundred-Octobrist majority, from the savage landlords in league with the capitalist robbers? The only answer to that question can be a bitter laugh.

The position is clear: *our "chambre introuvable" is incapable of accomplishing the objective tasks of the revolution even in the most distorted form.* It cannot even partly heal the gaping wounds inflicted upon Russia by the old regime—it can only cover up those wounds with wretched, sour, fictitious reforms.

The election results only confirm our firm belief that *Russia cannot emerge from her present crisis in a peaceful way.*

Under these conditions the immediate tasks confronting Social-Democrats at the present time are quite clear. Making the triumph of socialism its ultimate aim, being convinced that political freedom is necessary to achieve that aim, and bearing in mind the circumstance that this freedom at the present time cannot be achieved in a peaceful way, without open mass actions, Social-Democracy is obliged now, as before, to put democratic and revolutionary tasks on the immediate order of the day, without for a moment, of course, abandoning either propaganda of socialism or defence of proletarian class interests in the narrow sense of the word. Representing as it does the most advanced, most revolutionary class in modern society—the proletariat, which in the Russian revolution has proved by deeds its fitness for the role of leader in the mass struggle—

Social-Democracy is obliged to do everything it possibly can to retain that role for the proletariat in the approaching new phase of the revolutionary struggle, a phase characterised more than ever before by a preponderance of political consciousness over spontaneity. To achieve that end *Social-Democracy must strive with all its might for hegemony over the democratic masses and for developing revolutionary energy among them.*

Such a striving brings the party of the proletariat into sharp conflict with the other class political organisations, for whom, by virtue of the group interests which they represent, a democratic revolution is hateful and dangerous not only for its own sake but especially in view of the hegemony of the proletariat in it, a hegemony fraught with the danger of socialism.

It is perfectly clear and beyond doubt that both the Duma majorities—the Black-Hundred-Octobrist and the Octobrist-Cadet—with the alternate backing of which the Stolypin government hopes to balance itself, that both these majorities, each in its own way—on different issues—will be counter-revolutionary. There can be no question of any *struggle* with the Ministry on the part of one or the other of these majorities or even of their separate elements—a struggle in any way systematic or regular. Only separate temporary conflicts are possible. Such conflicts are possible first of all between the Black-Hundred elements of the first-named majority and the government. It should not be forgotten, however, that these conflicts cannot be deep-seated, and the government, without abandoning its counter-revolutionary basis, can quite comfortably and easily emerge the victor in these conflicts through the backing of the second majority. With the best will in the world, revolutionary Social-Democracy and, together with it, all the other revolutionary-minded elements of the Third Duma cannot use these conflicts in the interests of the revolution other than for purely propaganda purposes; there can be no question whatever of "supporting" any of the conflicting sides, because such support, in itself, would be a counter-revolutionary act.

Somewhat greater and better use, perhaps, could be made of possible conflicts between various elements of the

second majority—between the Cadets, on the one hand, and the Octobrists and the government, on the other. But here, too, the position is such that, owing to objective conditions no less than to subjective moods and intentions, these conflicts will be both superficial and transient, merely a means by which political hucksters will find it easier to make deals on terms outwardly more decorous but in essence opposed to the interests of democracy. Consequently, while not refraining from utilising even such superficial and infrequent conflicts, *Social-Democracy must wage a stubborn struggle for democratic and revolutionary aims not only against the government, the Black Hundreds, and the Octobrists, but also against the Cadets.*

These are the principal *aims* which Social-Democracy must set itself in the Third Duma. Obviously, these aims are the same as those that confronted the party of the proletariat in the Second Duma. They have been quite clearly formulated in the first paragraph of the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma. This paragraph reads:

"The immediate political aims of Social-Democracy in the Duma are: (a) to explain to the people the utter uselessness of the Duma as a means of achieving the demands of the proletariat and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry; (b) to explain to the people the impossibility of achieving political freedom by parliamentary means as long as real power remains in the hands of the tsarist government, and to explain the inevitability of an open struggle of the masses against the armed forces of absolutism, a struggle aimed at securing complete victory, namely, the assumption of power by the masses and the convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot."

This resolution, particularly in its concluding words, formulates also the very important *special* task of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma, a task which the Social-Democratic deputies must fulfil in order to expose the full infamy of the crime committed on June 3. They must expose this crime, of course, not from the liberal standpoint of a formal breach of the constitution, but as a gross and brazen violation of the interests of the broad masses of the people, as a shameless and outrageous falsification

of popular representation. Hence the need for *explaining to the broad masses the utter failure of the Third Duma to meet the interests and demands of the people, and consequently for wide and vigorous propaganda of the idea of a constituent assembly with full power based on universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.*

The London resolution also defines very clearly the nature of Social-Democratic activities in the State Duma in the following terms: "The critical, propagandist, agitational, and organisational role of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma should be brought to the fore"; "the general character of the Duma struggle should be subordinated to the entire struggle of the proletariat outside the Duma, it being particularly important in this connection to make use of mass economic struggle and to serve the interests of that struggle." It is perfectly obvious what a close, inseparable connection there is between such Duma activities and the aims, which, as stated above, Social-Democracy should set itself in the Duma at the present moment. Peaceful legislative work by the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma under conditions which make mass movements highly probable would not only be inadvisable, would not only be absurd quixotry, but a downright betrayal of proletarian interests. It is bound to lead Social-Democracy to "a whittling down of its slogans, which can only discredit it in the eyes of the masses and divorce it from the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat". The spokesmen of the proletariat in the Duma could commit no greater crime than this.

The critical activity of Social-Democracy should be expanded to the full and pointed as sharply as possible, all the more as there will be an abundance of material for this in the Third Duma. The Social-Democrats in the Duma must completely expose the class nature of both the government's and the liberals' measures and proposals that will be passed through the Duma. Moreover, in full keeping with the Congress resolution, particular attention must be given to those measures and proposals which affect the economic interests of the broad masses; this applies to the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc. On all these issues Social-Democracy must counter the govern-

mental and liberal standpoints with its own socialist and democratic demands; these issues are the most sensitive nerve of public life and at the same time the most sensitive spot of the government and of those social groups upon which the two Duma majorities rest.

The Social-Democrats in the Duma will carry out all these agitational, propaganda, and organisational tasks not only by their speeches from the Duma rostrum but also by introducing Bills and making interpellations to the government. There is one important difficulty here, however: to introduce a Bill or to make an interpellation the signatures of no less than *thirty* deputies are required.

The Third Duma does not and will not have thirty Social-Democrats. That is indubitable. Hence the Social-Democrats *alone*, without the assistance of other groups, can neither introduce a Bill nor make interpellations. Undoubtedly, this makes matters difficult and complicated.

We have in mind, of course, Bills and questions of a consistently democratic character. Can Social-Democracy in this respect count on assistance from the Constitutional-Democratic Party? Certainly not. Can the Cadets, who are now fully prepared for undisguised compromise on terms which leave nothing of their programmatic demands, skimpy though they are and reduced to a bare minimum by various reservations and exceptions—can the Cadets be expected to annoy the government by democratic interpellations? We all remember that already in the Second Duma the speeches of the Cadet orators in making interpellations became very colourless and often turned into infantile prattle or polite and even deferential inquiries made with a slight bow. And now, when the Duma's "effectiveness" in the matter of weaving strong and reliable nets for the people, nets that would enmesh them like chains, has become the talk of the town, Their Excellencies, the ministers, can sleep in peace: they will seldom be bothered by the Cadets—after all, they have to legislate!—and even if they are bothered, it will be with due observance of all the rules of politeness. Not for nothing did Milyukov at his election meetings promise to "guard the flame". And is Milyukov the only one? Does not Dan's unconditional rejection of the "down-with-the-Duma" slogan signify the

same guarding of the flame? And is not Plekhanov advising Social-Democracy to follow the same policy of "politeness" when he talks about "supporting the liberal bourgeoisie", whose "struggle" amounts to nothing more than curtsies and low bows?

There can be no question of the Cadets seconding the legislative proposals of the Social-Democrats, for these Bills will have a pronounced propaganda character, will express to the full consistently democratic demands, and that, of course, will cause as much irritation among the Cadets as among the Octobrists and even the Black Hundreds.

And so the Cadets will have to be left out of the account in this respect too. In the matter of making interpellations and presenting Bills the Social-Democrats can count only on the support of groups to the left of the Cadets. Apparently, together with the Social-Democrats, they will number up to thirty deputies, thus providing the full technical possibility of displaying initiative in this direction. It is not, of course, a question of any bloc, but only of those "joint actions", which, in the words of the London Congress resolution, "must exclude any possibility of deviations from the Social-Democratic programme and tactics and serve only the purpose of a general onslaught both against reaction and the treacherous tactics of the liberal bourgeoisie".

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ON PLEKHANOV'S ARTICLE¹⁴

In his article in *Tovarishch* of October 20 Plekhanov continues his campaign of lies and scoffing at the discipline of the Social-Democratic Party. Here are some specimens of these lies. "*Tovarishch*, as everyone knows, was an organ of the Left bloc," says Plekhanov in reply to the accusation that he had become a regular collaborator of Prokopovich, Kuskova & Co. It is a lie. First, *Tovarishch* never was an organ of the Left bloc. The latter could not have had a common organ. Secondly, the Bolsheviks never conducted any political campaign in *Tovarishch*, never came out against fellow-members of the Social-Democratic Party in such a newspaper. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks, having formed a Left bloc, split *Tovarishch* and drove out of it (only for a week, it is true) those who stood for the Cadets. And Plekhanov is dragging both the proletariat and the petty-bourgeois democrats towards funkeyism before the Cadets. The Bolsheviks, without participating in *Tovarishch*, shifted it to the left. Plekhanov participates and drags it to the right. It need hardly be said that his reference to a Left bloc is not a happy one!

Plekhanov thus side-steps the question of his being accepted by a bourgeois newspaper to write things agreeable to the bourgeoisie and gives still greater pleasure to the liberals by scoffing at the discipline of the workers' party. I am not obliged to obey when I am asked to betray principles, he exclaims.

This is an anarchist platitude, my dear sir, because the principles of the *Party* are watched over between congresses and interpreted by the Central Committee. You are entitled to refuse to obey if the Central Committee vio-

lates the will of the Congress, the Party Rules, etc. In the present case, however, not a single person has even attempted to contend that the Central Committee violated the will of the Congress by its directives in regard to the elections. Consequently, Plekhanov is simply using the phrase about "betrayal of principles" to cover up his own *betrayal of the Party*.

Lastly, Plekhanov tries to attack the St. Petersburg Committee by saying that it itself refused to obey the Central Committee during the elections to the Second Duma. We answer: first, the St. Petersburg Committee refused to carry out the demand to divide the organisation, i. e., it rejected interference in its autonomy, *which is guaranteed by the Party Rules*. Secondly, during the elections to the Second Duma the Mensheviks *split* the organisation; this aspect of the conflict is passed over in silence by Plekhanov in the bourgeois newspaper! Plekhanov's arguments amount to only one thing: during the elections to the Second Duma the Mensheviks split the St. Petersburg part of the Party, consequently, I have a right now to split the whole Party! Such is Plekhanov's logic, such are Plekhanov's actions. Let everyone bear in mind that *Plekhanov is a splitter*. Only he is afraid to call a spade a spade.

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CONFERENCE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG ORGANISATION OF THE R.S.D.L.P.⁷⁵ FROM A NEWSPAPER REPORT

1

REPORT ON THE THIRD STATE DUMA

The speaker first of all described the composition of the Third Duma. The government, by a simple rule-of-thumb method, so fashioned the electoral law of June 3 that the Duma was found to have *two possible majorities*: The Octobrist-Black-Hundred and the Octobrist-Cadet majorities. Both are certainly counter-revolutionary. In pursuing its reactionary policy the government will rely now on one and now on the other of these majorities, at the same time trying to screen the autocratic and feudal nature of its actions by talk about paper "reforms". The Cadets, for their part, while in fact pursuing a treacherous policy of counter-revolution, will in words claim to be a party of truly democratic opposition.

A deal between the Cadets and the Octobrists in the Duma is inevitable, and the first steps towards it—as the speaker proved by a number of quotations from Cadet and Octobrist Party newspapers, by a number of facts about the activities of these parties and by reports from the recent Cadet Party Congress—have already been taken. In the Third Duma the Cadet policy of a deal with the old regime is assuming clearer shape than it has had hitherto and no one will be left in doubt as to its true nature.

Neither of the Duma majorities, however, is objectively in a position to meet the vital economic and political

demands of any wide mass of the proletariat, peasantry, and urban democracy. The needs of these sections of the people will, as hitherto, be voiced primarily by the Social-Democrats. The make-up and activity of the Third Duma promise to provide the Social-Democrats with abundant and excellent propaganda material, which should be used against the Black-Hundred government, the avowedly feudal-minded landlords, Octobrists, and Cadets. As before, the tasks of Social-Democracy is to popularise among the widest mass of the people the idea of a national constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, etc. There can be no question, therefore, of supporting the "Left" Octobrists or Cadets in the Duma. Few though they are in the Third Duma, the Social-Democrats should pursue an independent, socialist, and consistently democratic policy by making use of the Duma rostrum, the right of interpellation, etc. Some agreements are permissible with the group of Left deputies (especially in view of the need to have thirty signatures for making interpellations), but with no others, and they must be agreements that do not conflict with the programme or tactics of Social-Democracy. With that end in view an Information Bureau should be organised which would be binding upon no one, but would merely enable the Social-Democrats to influence the Left deputies.

Voces can already be heard in the Social-Democratic ranks, the speaker went on, calling for support of the "Left" Octobrists (in the election of the presiding committee, for instance), for the organisation of an Information Bureau with the Cadets, and for the so-called "guarding" of our Duma group. The talk about supporting the Octobrists, which comes from the Mensheviks, testifies as plainly as could be to the utter failure of the Menshevik tactics. When the Duma was dominated by the Cadets the Mensheviks clamoured for support for the Cadets. Stolypin had only to alter the electoral law in favour of the Octobrists for the Mensheviks to show themselves ready to support the Octobrists. Where will this path lead the Mensheviks in the end?

The speaker regarded an Information Bureau with the Cadets as impermissible, because it would mean informing one's avowed enemies.

On the question of "guarding" the Duma group the speaker said that it was true that the group should be guarded. But for what purpose? Only in order that it should hold high the banner of Social-Democracy in the Duma, and that it should wage an irreconcilable struggle in the Duma against the counter-revolutionaries of all shades and descriptions, beginning with the Union people and ending with the Cadets. But on no account in order that it should support the "Left" Octobrists and Cadets. If its existence depended upon its having to support these groups, that is, support a deal with the Stolypin autocracy, then it would be better for it to end its existence honourably, explaining to the whole people why it was expelled from the Duma, should such expulsion follow.

In his concluding remarks Lenin dealt chiefly with the principal mistake of Menshevism—the idea of a "national opposition". The Russian bourgeoisie was never revolutionary in the proper sense of the word, and for a quite understandable reason: owing to the position which the working class occupies in Russia and owing to the role of the working class in the revolution. After examining all the other arguments of the Mensheviks he moved the resolution published in *Proletary*, No. 19.

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2

RESOLUTION ON THE THIRD STATE DUMA

Considering it obligatory for the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma to be guided by the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma, as well as by the resolution on the non-proletarian parties,

the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., in elaboration of these resolutions, considers it necessary to state the following:

1. Two majorities have already taken shape in the Third Duma: the Black-Hundred-Octobrist and the Octobrist-Cadet majorities. The first is counter-revolutionary and stands particularly for increased repression and the protection of landlord privileges, going to the length of striving for complete restoration of the autocracy. The second majority, too, is definitely counter-revolutionary, but inclined to cover up its struggle against the revolution with certain illusory bureaucratic "reforms".

2. Such a situation in the Duma is exceedingly favourable to a double political game being played by both the government and the Cadets. The government, while intensifying repression and continuing its "conquest" of Russia by military force, seeks to pose as a supporter of constitutional reforms. The Cadets, while actually voting with the counter-revolutionary Octobrists, seek to pose not only as an opposition but as spokesmen of democracy. In these circumstances the Social-Democrats have a particular responsibility for ruthlessly exposing this game, laying bare before the people both the oppression of the Black-Hundred landlords and the government on the one hand, and the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cadets, on the other. Direct or indirect support for the Cadets by the Social-Democrats (whether in the form of voting for the Right-

wing Cadets or the "Left" Octobrists in the presiding committee, or in the form of an Information Bureau with the participation of the Cadets, or by adapting our actions to their policy, etc.) would now directly harm the cause of class education of the mass of the workers and the cause of the revolution.

3. While upholding their socialist aims in full and criticising from this standpoint all the bourgeois parties, not excepting the most democratic and "Trudovik" of them, the Social-Democrats in their propaganda, should give prominence to the task of making it clear to the broad masses that the Third Duma fails completely to meet the interests and demands of the people, and in this connection [they should conduct] widespread and vigorous propaganda for the idea of a constituent assembly based on universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

4. One of the principal tasks of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma is to expose the class nature of the government's and the liberals' proposals with special attention to questions affecting the economic interests of the broad masses (the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc.)—the more so as the composition of the Third Duma promises exceptionally abundant material for the propaganda activities of the Social-Democrats.

5. In particular, the Social-Democrats in the Duma should use the right to make interpellations, for which purpose they should co-operate with other groups to the left of the Cadets without in any way retreating from the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy and without entering into any kind of blocs.

To avoid a repetition of the mistakes made by the Social-Democrats in the Second Duma, the Social-Democratic group should immediately propose to the Left, and only to the Left, deputies of the Duma (i. e., those capable of fighting the Cadets) the formation of an Information Bureau which would not bind its participants but would enable the workers' deputies to exert systematic influence upon the democratic elements in the spirit of Social-Democratic policy.

3

**REPORT ON THE PARTICIPATION OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS
IN THE BOURGEOIS PRESS**

Comrade Lenin's second report concerned the question of Social-Democratic participation in the bourgeois press. The speaker set forth the point of view of the two wings of international Social-Democracy on this score and particularly the views of the orthodox members and of the revisionists in the German Social-Democratic Party. The orthodoxes at the Dresden Parteitag¹⁰ agreed to the formula that it was permissible to participate in the press that was not hostile to Social-Democracy, on the grounds that in practice this was tantamount to a complete ban, since in present-day developed capitalist society there were no bourgeois newspapers that were not hostile to Social-Democracy.

The speaker took the stand that *political* participation in the bourgeois press, especially the supposedly non-party press, is absolutely inadmissible. Such newspapers as *Tovarishch*, by their hypocritically disguised fight against Social-Democracy, cause it much greater harm than the bourgeois party newspapers which are frankly hostile to Social-Democracy. This is best illustrated by the contributions to *Tovarishch* made by Plekhanov, Martov, Gorn, Kogan, etc. All their utterances are directed against the Party, and in actual fact it was not the Social-Democratic comrades who made use of the bourgeois newspaper *Tovarishch*, but this newspaper that made use of these comrades against the hateful R.S.D.L.P. Not a single article by a Social-Democrat has so far appeared which the editors of *Tovarishch* would not have approved of.

THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ("THIRD ALL-RUSSIAN")¹⁷

FROM A NEWSPAPER REPORT

1

REPORT ON THE TACTICS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA

Comrade Lenin proceeded from the premise that the objective aims of the Russian revolution have not been achieved and that the period of reaction which has set in imposes upon the proletariat the task of defending the cause of democracy and the cause of the revolution more firmly than ever in face of the widespread vacillation. Hence the view that the Duma should be used for the purposes of the revolution, should be used mainly for promulgating the Party's political and socialist views and not for legislative "reforms", which, in any case, would mean supporting the counter-revolution and curtailing democracy in every way.

In the words of Comrade Lenin, the "crux" of the Duma question must lie in an explanation of the following three points: (a) what is the class composition of the Duma? (b) what should be and will be the attitude of the Duma centres towards the revolution and democracy? (c) what is the significance of Duma activity for the progress of the Russian revolution?

On the first question, on the basis of an analysis of the Duma composition (according to data on the party affiliations of the deputies), Lenin stressed that the views of the famous so-called "opposition" could secure endorsement in the Third Duma only on one condition, that no less than 87 Octobrists co-operated with the Cadets and the Left.

Cadets and the Left were short of 87 votes for obtaining a majority in the voting on a Bill. Consequently, effective legislative activity in the Duma was possible only if the bulk of the Octobrists participated in it. What this kind of legislative activity would lead to and what disgrace Social-Democracy would incur by such a link-up with the Octobrists were all too obvious. This was not a matter of abstract principle. Speaking abstractly, one could and sometimes should support the representatives of the big bourgeoisie. But in this case it was necessary to consider the concrete conditions of development of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie had long embarked on the path of struggle against the revolution and of compromises with the autocracy. The recent Cadet congress had finally stripped off all the fig-leaves with which the Milyukovs and Co. had been covering themselves, and was an important political event inasmuch as the Cadets had declared with cynical frankness that they were going into the Octobrist-Black-Hundred Duma to legislate and that they would fight the "enemies on the Left". Thus, two possible majorities in the Duma—the Octobrist-Black-Hundred and the Cadet-Octobrist—and both, in different ways, would work towards tightening the screw of reaction: the first, by trying to restore the autocracy, the second, by making deals with the government and introducing illusory reforms that disguise the counter-revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Social-Democracy could not lend its support to legislative reforms, as this would be tantamount to supporting the *government*, Octobrist, party. The way of "reforms" on the present political basis and with the present balance of forces would not mean improving the condition of the masses, or expanding freedom, but bureaucratically regulating the non-freedom and enslavement of the masses. Such, for example, were the Stolypin agrarian reforms under Article 87.¹⁸ They were progressive in clearing the way for capitalism, but it was the kind of progress that no Social-Democrat could bring himself to support. The Mensheviks were harping on one string, namely, the class interests of the bourgeoisie are *bound to* clash with those of the autocracy! But there was not a grain of historic truth in this vulgar would-

be Marxism. Did not Napoleon III and Bismarck succeed for a time in appeasing the appetites of the big bourgeoisie? Did they not, by their "reforms", tighten the noose round the neck of the working people for years to come? What grounds then were there for believing that the Russian government, in its deal with the bourgeoisie, was likely to agree to any other kind of reforms?

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RESOLUTION ON THE TACTICS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA

In pursuance of the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma and on non-proletarian parties, the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. deems it necessary, in elaboration of these resolutions, to state the following:

(1) In the Third Duma, which is the outcome of the coup d'état of June 3, there are two possible majorities: that of the Black-Hundreds-Octobrists and that of the Octobrists-Cadets. The first, expressing chiefly the interests of the semi-feudal landlords, is counter-revolutionary and stands mainly for protecting landlord interests and increased repression going to the length of striving for complete restoration of the autocracy. The second majority, expressing chiefly the interests of the big bourgeoisie, is likewise definitely counter-revolutionary, but inclined to cover up its struggle against the revolution with certain illusory bureaucratic reforms;

(2) such a situation in the Duma is extremely favourable to a double political game being played by both the government and the Cadets. The government, while intensifying repression and continuing its "conquest" of Russia by military force, seeks to pose as a supporter of constitutional reforms. The Cadets, while actually voting with the counter-revolutionary Octobrists, seek to pose not only as an opposition, but as spokesmen of democracy. Under these conditions the Social-Democrats have a particular responsibility for ruthlessly exposing this game, laying bare before the people both the oppression of the Black-Hundred landlords and the government and the counter-revolutionary

policy of the Cadets. Direct or indirect support for the Cadets by the Social-Democrats—whether in the form of an Information Bureau with the participation of the Cadets or by adapting our actions to their policy, etc.—would now directly harm the cause of class education of the mass of the workers and the cause of the revolution;

(3) while upholding their socialist aims and criticising all the bourgeois parties from this standpoint, the Social-Democrats, in their propaganda, should give prominence to the task of making it clear to the broad masses that the Third Duma fails completely to meet the interests and demands of the people, and in this connection conduct widespread and vigorous propaganda for the idea of a constituent assembly based on universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot;

(4) one of the principal tasks of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma is to expose the class nature of the government's and the liberals' proposals and to systematically oppose to them the demands of the Social-Democratic minimum programme without any whittling-down, with special attention to questions affecting the economic interests of the broad masses (the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc.)—the more so as the composition of the Third Duma promises exceptionally abundant material for the propaganda activities of Social-Democrats;

(5) the Social-Democratic group should take special care that no outward coincidence between Social-Democratic voting and the voting of the Black-Hundred-Octobrist or Octobrist-Cadet blocs should be used in the sense of supporting one bloc or the other;

(6) the Social-Democrats in the Duma should introduce Bills and use their right to make interpellations, for which purpose they should co-operate with other groups to the left of the Cadets without in any way retreating from the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy and without entering into any kind of blocs. The Social-Democratic group should immediately propose to the Left deputies of the Duma the formation of an Information Bureau which would not bind its participants but would enable the workers' deputies to exert systematic influence upon democratic elements in the spirit of Social-Democratic policy;

(7) among the first concrete steps of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma the Conference deems it necessary to place special emphasis on the need: (1) to come forward with a special declaration; (2) to make an interpellation concerning the coup d'état of June 3; (3) to raise in the Duma, in the most advisable form, the question of the trial of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma.

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THE PREPARATION OF A "DISGUSTING ORGY"

In assessing the tasks of the Social-Democrats in the Second Russian Duma and the aspirations of the Russian liberals, Franz Mehring, the well-known German Marxist, wrote that German Liberalism has for the last sixty years been following a wretched and shameful path under cover of the slogan: "positive work". When the National Assembly, on a single night in the summer of 1789, achieved the emancipation of the French peasants, that brilliantly venal adventurer Mirabeau, the incomparable hero of constitutional democracy, described the event by the picturesque expression "a disgusting orgy". In our (Social-Democratic) opinion, however, this was positive work. On the contrary, the emancipation of the Prussian peasants, which dragged on at a snail's pace for sixty years, from 1807 to 1865, and took cruel and ruthless toll of countless peasant lives, was, from the point of view of our liberals, "positive work", which they proclaim from the house-tops. In our opinion it was a "disgusting orgy".*

Thus Mehring wrote. We cannot but recall his words today, when the Third Duma is opening, when the Octobrists want to start a disgusting orgy in real earnest, when the Cadets are ready to take part in it with servile zeal, when even among the Social-Democrats there are (to our shame) Plekhanovites who are prepared to assist in this orgy. Let us take a closer look at all these preparations.

The eve of the Third Duma was marked by a spate of meetings of the different parties on the question of Duma tactics. The Octobrists at their Moscow conference drew up a draft programme for the parliamentary group of the Union of October Seventeenth, and their spokesman, Mr. Plevako, raised the "banner of the Russian Liberal-Constitutional Party" at a banquet in Moscow. The Cadets completed their

* See present edition, Vol. 12, p. 386.—*Ed.*

Fifth so-called "Party" Congress in three or four days. The Left-wing Cadets were utterly defeated and thrown out of the Cadets' Central Committee (which consists of 38 members, who completely control the "party"). The Right-wing Cadets obtained complete freedom of action—in the spirit of the "report on tactics in the Third Duma", that remarkable, "historical" justification of the "disgusting orgy". The Social-Democrats started to discuss Third Duma tactics in the Central Committee and at the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.

The parliamentary programme of the Octobrists is notable for its frank *admission* of the counter-revolutionary policy which the Cadets virtually pursued in the Second Duma behind a screen of phrases and excuses. For instance, the Octobrists openly declare that revision of the fundamental laws and the electoral law is "untimely" on the grounds that it is first of all necessary to "lull and abolish the war of passions and class interests" by introducing "a number of pressing reforms". The Cadets did not say this, but they acted in just this way in the Second Duma. Another example. The Octobrists stand "for drawing the widest possible circle of people into participation in self-government", while at the same time "ensuring proper representation" of the nobility. This outspoken counter-revolutionism is more honest than the Cadets' policy of promising universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot while in reality fiercely opposing election of the local land committees by such means both in the First and in the Second Dumas and proposing that these committees should consist of peasants and landlords in equal numbers, that is, the same idea of "ensuring representation of the nobility". Yet another example. The Octobrists openly reject the compulsory alienation of the landlords' land. The Cadets "accept" it, but accept it in such a way that they vote in the Second Duma with the Right against the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats on the question of winding up the agrarian debate with a general formula accepting compulsory alienation.

On terms consolidating the "victories" of the counter-revolution the Octobrists are prepared to promise all kinds of liberal reforms. These include "extension of the Duma's

budgetary rights" (this is not a joke!), "extension of its rights of supervision over the legality of the government's actions", measures guaranteeing the independence of the courts, "removal of constraints on workers' economic organisations and on economic strikes" ("which do not prejudice state and public interests"), "strengthening the bases of lawful civil liberties", and so on and so forth. The Octobrist governing party is as lavish of "liberal" phrases as the government of Mr. Stolypin itself.

How did the Cadets put the question of their attitude towards the Octobrists at their congress? The handful of Left Cadets was found to consist of blusterers who were unable even to pose the question intelligently, while the mass of the Right-wing knights of disguised Octobrism rallied strongly to smother the truth in the meanest fashion. The impotence of the Left Cadets is best illustrated by their draft resolution. Its first point recommends the Cadets "to adopt a stand of sharp opposition without aligning themselves with the Octobrists, who are hostile to it (to the Party of Constitutional-Democrats) both in spirit and in programme". The second point calls on the Cadets "not to withhold support from Bills that lead the country along the path of liberation and democratic reforms, no matter from what source they originate". This is a joke, because Bills capable of obtaining a majority in the Third Duma *cannot* originate from any other source than the Octobrists! The Left Cadet gentlemen fully deserve their defeat, for they behaved like wretched cowards or fools, who are incapable of saying clearly and bluntly that it is a disgrace to intend to legislate in such a Duma, that voting with the Octobrists means supporting the counter-revolution. Some individuals among the Left Cadets, apparently, understood the state of affairs, but being drawing-room democrats, they showed their cowardice at the congress. At any rate, Mr. Zhilkin in *Tovarishch* mentions a *private* speech by the Cadet Safonov, in which the latter said: "The Cadet group, in my opinion, should now take the stand of the Trudovik group in the First Duma. Opposition, strong speeches—and nothing more. Yet *those people intend to legislate*. I wonder how? By friendship, by an alliance with the Octobrists? What a strange tendency

towards the Right. The whole country is Left, and we are going Right" (*Tovarishch*, No. 407). Apparently, Mr. Safonov has lucid intervals of shame and conscience ... but only privately!

On the other hand, Mr. Milyukov and his gang revealed themselves in all their old glory as shameless and unprincipled careerists. In the adopted resolution they gloss over the issue in order to fool the public at large, in the way that the liberal heroes of parliamentary prostitution have always fooled the people. In the congress resolutions ("theses") *there is not a word about the Octobrists!* This is incredible, but it is a fact. The crux of the Cadets' congress was the question of the Constitutional-Democrats voting with the Octobrists. All the debates centred around this question. But that is just what the art of the bourgeois politicians consists in—to *fool* the masses, to *conceal* their parliamentary hocus-pocus. The "theses on tactics" adopted by the Congress of the Constitutional-Democrats on October 26 are a classical document, showing, in the first place, how the Cadets coalesce with the Octobrists, and, secondly, how resolutions designed to hoodwink the masses are written by the liberals. This document should be compared with the "parliamentary programme" of the "Union of October Seventeenth". This document should be compared with the "report on tactics" which Milyukov delivered at the Congress of the Constitutional-Democrats (*Rech*, No. 255). The following are the most important passages of this report:

"Placed in opposition, the party, however [precisely—however!], will not play the role of an irresponsible minority, in the sense in which it itself used this term to describe the conduct of the extreme Left in the Duma" [translated from parliamentary into simple and frank language, this means: please, Octobrist gentlemen, give us a place, we are only an opposition in name!]. "It will not regard the Duma as a means for preparing actions outside the Duma, but as a supreme organ of state, possessing a share of the supreme authority as precisely defined by law" [are not the Octobrists, who bluntly declare the revision of the fundamental laws to be untimely, more honest?]. "The party is going into the Third Duma, as into the first

two, with the firm intention of taking an active part in its legislative work. The party always considered this kind of activity to be the chief and basic activity, in contrast to both the agitational aims of the Left and the conspiratorial activity of the Right." As for "conspiracy", gentlemen, that is another lie, for in *both* Dumas you *conspired* with the ministers or the ministers' lackeys. As for the disavowal of agitation, this is a complete and irrevocable disavowal of *democracy*.

To legislate in the Third Duma it is necessary either way, directly or indirectly, to unite with the Octobrists and take one's stand unequivocally with the counter-revolution and with the defence of its victories. The Cadets try to pass this obvious thing over in silence. They let the cat out of the bag, however, in another passage of the report: "The use of the legislative initiative should be made dependent on a preliminary elucidation of the *practicability* of the party projects". The practicability depends on the Octobrists. To elucidate it means having recourse to the Octobrists by the backstairs. To make one's initiative depend on this elucidation means to curtail one's own projects *for the benefit of* the Octobrists, it means making one's own policy dependent on that of the Octobrists.

There is no middle way, gentlemen. Either a party of real opposition, in which case—an irresponsible minority. Or a party of active counter-revolutionary legislation, in which case—servility to the Octobrists. The Cadets chose the latter, and as a reward for this the Black-Hundred Duma is said to be electing the Right-wing Cadet Maklakov to the presidium! Maklakov deserves it.

But how are we to account for the Social-Democrats who are capable, even today, of talking about support for the Cadets? Such Social-Democrats are the product of intellectualist philistinism, the philistinism of Russian life as a whole. Such Social-Democrats have been bred by Plekhanov's vulgarisation of Marxism. At the conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation it became clear that the Mensheviks, following in the wake of the Right Duma, are going still farther to the right. They are prepared to support the Octobrists, i. e., the *government* party! Then why should not the Social-Democrats vote for

Khomyakov, who is better than Bobrinsky? It is a question of expediency! Why not vote for Bobrinsky if the choice is only between him and Purishkevich? Why not support the Octobrists against the Black Hundreds, since Marx taught us to support the bourgeoisie against the feudal squirearchy?⁷⁹

Yes, one is ashamed to admit the fact, but it is a sin to conceal it, that Plekhanov has led his Mensheviks to heap infinite disgrace upon Social-Democracy. Like a true "man in the muffler", he kept repeating the same old words about "support for the bourgeoisie", and by his *mechanical repetition* obscured all understanding of the special tasks and special conditions of the proletariat's struggle in the revolution and the struggle against the counter-revolution. In Marx the whole analysis of revolutionary epochs turns on the struggle of genuine democrats and particularly of the proletariat against constitutional illusions, against the treachery of liberalism, against counter-revolution. Plekhanov recognises Marx—but it is a counterfeit of Marx in the manner of Struve. Let Plekhanov now reap what he has sown!

The counter-revolutionary nature of liberalism in the Russian revolution was proved by the whole course of events prior to October 17 and especially after October 17. The Third Duma will make even the blind see. The alignment of the Cadets with the Octobrists is a political fact, and no excuses and subterfuges can disguise it. Let the newspaper of the dull-witted Bernsteinians, *Tovarishch*, confine itself to impotent whining in this connection, intermingling this whining with pushing the Cadets towards the Octobrists, with political pimping. The Social-Democrats have to understand the class reasons for the counter-revolutionary nature of Russian liberalism. The Social-Democrats must ruthlessly expose in the Duma all the approaches made to the Octobrists by the Cadets, all the baseness of so-called democratic liberalism. The workers' party will dismiss with contempt all considerations about "guarding the flame" and will unfurl the banner of socialism and the banner of the revolution!

BUT WHO ARE THE JUDGES?

Malicious chuckling over the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the R.S.D.L.P. in general and over the sharp struggle at the London Congress in particular has become a regular feature of the bourgeois press. No one thinks of studying the differences of opinion, of analysing the two tendencies, of acquainting the reading public with the history of the split and with the nature of the differences between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. The publicists of *Rech* and *Tovarishch*—the Vergezh-skys, the E. K.'s, the Pereyaslavskys, and other *penny-a-liners* * simply fasten on all kinds of rumours, serve up "piquant" details of "scandals" for blasé society gossips, and go out of their way to addle people's minds with trashy anecdotes about our struggle.

This genre of vulgar scoffing is being taken up, too, by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The editorial in *Znamya Truda*, ^{**} No. 6, drags out Cherevanin's story about the incident of hysteria at the London Congress, sniggers at the expenditure of "tens of thousands", and smacks its lips at "the pretty picture of the internal state of Russian Social-Democracy at the present moment". With the liberals such introductions are preliminaries to lauding the opportunists *à la* Plekhanov; with the Socialist-Revolutionaries they are the preliminaries to a severe criticism of them (the Socialist-Revolutionaries are repeating *now* the arguments of the revolutionary Social-Democrats against a labour congress! They have bethought themselves!). But both of them gloat over the hard struggle in the Social-Democratic ranks.

Lenin gives this word in English.—*Tr.*

We shall say a few words about the liberal heroes of this crusade before we deal in detail with the Socialist-Revolutionary heroes of "the struggle against opportunism".

The liberals sneer at the struggle within Social-Democracy in order to cover up their systematic *deception* of the public in regard to the Cadet Party. It is a thorough-going deception, and the struggle among the Cadets themselves and their negotiations with the authorities are systematically concealed. Everyone knows that the Left Cadets rebuke the Right. Everyone knows that Milyukov, Struve & Co. called at the ante-rooms of the Stolypins. But the exact facts are kept hidden. Differences have been glossed over and not a word has been said of the disputes of the Struve gentry with the Left Cadets. There are no records of the proceedings of the Cadet congresses. The liberals issue no figures of their party membership either as a whole or by organisations. The tendency of the different committees is unknown. Nothing but darkness, nothing but the official lies of *Rech*, nothing but attempts to fool democracy by those on conversational terms with ministers—that is what the party of Constitutional-Democrats is. Lawyers and professors, who make their career by parliamentarism, hypocritically condemn the underground struggle and praise open activity by parties while actually flouting the democratic principle of publicity and concealing from the public the different political tendencies within their party. It needs the short-sightedness of a Plekhanov, who goes down on his knees before Milyukov, not to be able to see this gross dirty deception of democracy by the Cadets, a deception touched up with a gloss of culture.

And what about the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Are they doing their duty as honest *democrats* (we do not say as socialists, for that cannot be said of them), the duty of giving the people a *clear and truthful* account of the struggle of the different political tendencies among those who seek to lead the people?

Let us examine the facts.

The December Congress of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1905 was the first and only one to publish minutes of the proceedings. Mr. Tuchkin, a delegate of the Central Organ, exclaims: "The Social-Democrats were at

one time convinced, apparently quite sincerely, that the advent of political liberties would spell political death to our party.... The epoch of liberties has proved the reverse" (p. 28 of the supplement to the Minutes). You don't really mean that, Mr. Tuchkin, do you? Is that what the epoch of liberties proved? Is that what the actual policy of the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries proved in 1905? In 1906? In 1907?

Let us turn to the facts.

In the minutes of the Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (*December 1905*, published in *1906!*) we read that after October 17 a writers' group, which had a voice but no vote at this Congress, "urged the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to organise a legal party" (p. 49 of the Minutes; further quotations are from the same source). The Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries "*was asked to set up not a legal organisation of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, but a special parallel Popular Socialist Party*" (51). The Central Committee refused and referred the question to the Congress. The Congress *rejected* the motion of the Popular Socialists by a majority of all against one with seven abstentions (66). "Is it conceivable to be in two parallel parties?" cried Mr. Tuchkin, beating his breast (p. 61). And Mr. Shevich hinted at the Popular Socialists' kinship with the liberals, so that the Popular Socialist Mr. Rozhdestvensky *began to lose his equanimity* (p. 59) and avowed that "no one has the right" to call them "*semi-liberals*" (59). *

Such are the facts. In 1905, the Socialist-Revolutionaries *broke with* the "*semi-liberal*" Popular Socialists. But did they?

In 1905, a powerful means for the party openly to influence the masses was the press. During the October "days of liberty" the Socialist-Revolutionaries ran a newspaper *in a bloc with the Popular Socialists*, prior to the December Congress, it is true. *Formally* the Socialist-Revolutionaries

* Mr. Shevich retreated somewhat in face of this *resentment* on the part of a Popular Socialist who had lost his equanimity and "*corrected himself*"—p. 63—saying, "*by way of personal [!!] explanation*": "I had no intention of suggesting that the speaker was a member of the liberal party".

are right on this point. In reality, during the period of the greatest liberties, the period of most direct influence upon the masses, they concealed from the public the existence of two different tendencies within the party. The differences of opinion were as great as those within the Social-Democratic ranks, but the Social-Democrats tried to clarify them, whereas the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried diplomatically to conceal them. Such are the facts of 1905.

Now take 1906. The First-Duma period of "small liberties". The socialist newspapers are revived. *The Socialist-Revolutionaries are again in a bloc with the Popular Socialists, and they have a joint newspaper.* No wonder the break with the "semi-liberals" at the congress was a diplomatic one: if you like—a break, or if you like—no break! The proposal was rejected, the idea of "being in two parallel parties" was ridiculed, and ... and they went on sitting side by side in two parties, reverently exclaiming: We thank thee, O Lord, that we are not as those Social-Democrats who fight one another! Such are the facts. Both periods of the free press in Russia were marked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries aligning themselves with the Popular Socialists and concealing from democracy by deception ("diplomacy") the two profoundly divergent tendencies within their party.

Now take 1907. After the First Duma the Popular Socialists formally organised their own party. That was inevitable, since in the First Duma, in the first address of the parties to the peasant electors *all over Russia*, the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries came forward with *different* agrarian plans (the Bills of the 104 and the 33). The Popular Socialists defeated the Socialist-Revolutionaries by securing three times as many signatures of the Trudovik deputies to their plan, to their agrarian programme. And this programme, as the Socialist-Revolutionary Vikhlyaev admitted (*Nasha Mysl*, Collection, No. 1, St. Petersburg, 1907, article: "The Popular Socialist Party and the Agrarian Question") "similarly" with the law of November 9, 1906, "arrives at negation of the basic principle of communal land tenure". This programme legalises "*the manifestations of selfish individualism*" (p. 89 of Mr. Vikhlyaev's article), "*pollutes the broad ideological stream with*

individualist mud" (p. 91 of the same article), and embarks upon "*the path of encouraging individualist and egoistic tendencies among the masses*" (*ibid.*, p. 93).

Clear enough, it would seem? The overwhelming majority of peasant deputies displayed bourgeois individualism. The S.R.'s first address to the peasant electors of all Russia strikingly confirmed the theory of the Social-Democrats by virtually converting the S.R.'s into the extreme Left wing of the petty-bourgeois democrats.

But, perhaps the S.R.'s, after the Popular Socialists had separated from them and won the Trudovik group over to their programme, definitely dissociated themselves from them? They did not. The elections to the Second Duma in St. Petersburg proved the reverse. Blocs with the Cadets were then the greatest manifestation of socialist opportunism. The Black-Hundred danger was a fiction *covering up* the policy of truckling to the liberals. The Cadet press revealed this very clearly by stressing the "moderation" of the Mensheviks and Popular Socialists. How did the S.R.'s behave? Our "revolutionaries" formed a bloc with the Popular Socialists and the Trudoviks; the terms of this bloc were concealed from the public. *Our revolutionaries trailed after the Cadets*, just like the Mensheviks. The S.R. spokesmen proposed a bloc to the Cadets (the meeting of January 18, 1907. See N. Lenin's pamphlet *When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool...*, St. Petersburg, January 15, 1907,* in which it is established that the S.R.'s behaved in a *politically dishonest* manner in the question of agreements by negotiating simultaneously with the Social-Democrats, who had declared war on the Cadets on January 7, 1907, and *with the Cadets*). The S.R.'s found themselves in the Left bloc *against* their will, owing to the Cadets' refusal.

Thus, after a complete break with the Popular Socialists the S.R.'s *in actual fact* pursued the policy of the Popular Socialists and Mensheviks, i. e., the opportunists. Their "advantage" consists in concealing from the public the motives of this policy and the currents within their party.

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 456-74.—Ed.

The extraordinary Congress of the S.R. Party in February 1907 not only failed to raise this question of blocs with the Cadets, not only failed to assess the significance of such a policy, but, on the contrary, *confirmed* it! We would remind the reader of G.A. Gershuni's speech at that Congress, which at that time *Rech* lauded in exactly the same way as it always lauds Plekhanov. Gershuni said that he adhered to his "old opinion: the Cadets so far are not our enemies" (p. 11 of the pamphlet: "Speech by G. A. Gershuni at the Extraordinary Congress of the S. R. Party", 1907, pp. 1-15, with the party motto of the S.R.'s: "In struggle you will win your rights"). Gershuni warned against mutual struggle within the opposition: "Will not the people lose faith in the very possibility of government by means of a popular representative assembly" (*ibid.*). Obviously, it was in the spirit of this Cadet-lover that the Congress of the S. R.'s adopted a resolution, which stated, among other things:

"The Congress holds that a sharp party alignment of groups within the Duma, with isolated action by each separate group and acute inter-group struggle, could completely paralyse the activities of the oppositional majority and thereby discredit the very idea of popular representation in the eyes of the working classes" (*Partinyye Izvestiya* of the S.R. Party, No. 6, March 8, 1907).

This is the sheerest opportunism, worse than our Menshevism. Gershuni in a slightly more clumsy way made the Congress repeat *Plekhanovism*. And the entire activity of the S.R. Duma group reflected this spirit of Cadet tactics of concern for the unity of the national opposition. The *only* difference between the Social-Democrat Plekhanov and the Socialist-Revolutionary Gershuni is that the former is a member of a party that does not cover up such decadence, but exposes and fights against it, while the latter is a member of a party in which all tactical principles and theoretical views are muddled and hidden from the eyes of the public by a thick screen of parochial diplomacy. "Not to wash one's dirty linen in public" is a thing the S.R.'s are adept at. The trouble is they have *nothing* to show in public but dirty linen. They could not tell the whole truth about their relations with the Popular Socialists in 1905, 1906, or 1907. They cannot disclose how a *party*—not a circle, but a *party*—

can one day adopt an ultra-opportunist resolution by 67 votes to 1, and the next day exhaust themselves shouting "revolutionary" cries.

No, gentlemen "judges", we do not envy you your formal right to rejoice at the sharp struggle and splits within the ranks of Social-Democracy. No doubt, there is much in this struggle that is to be deplored. Without a doubt, there is much in these splits that is disastrous to the cause of socialism. Nevertheless, not for a single minute would we care to barter this heavy truth for your "light" lie. Our Party's serious illness is the growing pains of a *mass* party. For there can be no mass party, no party of a class, without full clarity of essential shadings, without an open struggle between various tendencies, without informing the *masses* as to which leaders and which organisations of the Party are pursuing this or that line. Without this, a party worthy of the name cannot be built, and we are *building* it. We have succeeded in putting the views of our two currents truthfully, clearly, and distinctly before everyone. Personal bitterness, factional squabbles and strife, scandals, and splits—all these are trivial in comparison with the fact that the experience of *two tactics* is actually teaching a lesson to the proletarian masses, is actually teaching a lesson to everyone who is capable of taking an intelligent interest in politics. Our quarrels and splits will be forgotten. Our tactical principles, sharpened and tempered, will go down as cornerstones in the history of the working-class movement and socialism in Russia. Years will pass, perhaps decades, and the influence of one or the other tendency will be traced in a hundred practical questions of different kinds. Both the working class of Russia and the whole people *know* whom they are dealing with in the case of Bolshevism or Menshevism.

Do they know the Cadets? The entire history of the Cadet Party is one of sheer political jugglery that keeps silent about what matters most and whose one and everlasting concern is to keep the truth hidden at all costs.

Do they know the Socialist-Revolutionaries? Will the S. R.'s tomorrow again enter into a bloc with the Social-Cadets? Are they not in that bloc today? Do they dissociate themselves from the "individualist mud" of the Tru-

doviks or are they filling their party more and more with this mud? Do they still adhere to the theory of unity of the national opposition? Did they adopt that theory only yesterday? Will they abandon it tomorrow for a few weeks? No one knows. The S.R.'s themselves do not know it, because the entire history of their party is one of systematically and continuously obscuring, confusing, and glossing over their differences by means of words, phrases and still more phrases.

Why is that? It is not because the S.R.'s are bourgeois careerists like the Cadets. No, their sincerity, as a circle, cannot be doubted. Their trouble is that it is impossible for them to create a mass party, impossible for them to become the party of a *class*. The objective position is such that they have to be merely a *wing* of peasant democracy, an unindependent, unequal appendage, a "subgroup" of the Trudoviks, and not a self-contained whole. The period of storm and stress did not help the S.R.'s to rise to their full stature. It threw them into the clutching arms of the Popular Socialists, a clutch so strong that not even a split can unlock them. The period of the counter-revolutionary war did not strengthen their connection with definite social strata—it merely gave rise to new wavering and vacillations (which the S.R.'s are now trying hard to conceal) about the socialist nature of the muzhik. And today, on reading the passionate articles of *Znamya Truda* about the heroes of S. R. terrorism, one cannot help saying to oneself: your terrorism, gentlemen, is not the outcome of your revolutionism. Your revolutionism is confined to terrorism.

No, these judges are far from being able to judge Social-Democracy!

PREFACE

**TO THE PAMPHLET BY VOINOV (A. V. LUNACHARSKY)
ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTY TOWARDS
THE TRADE UNIONS⁸¹**

Comrade Voinov's pamphlet on the attitude of the socialist party of the proletariat towards the trade unions is open to a good deal of misconstruction. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the author, in the ardour of his fight against a narrow and incorrect conception of Marxism, against an unwillingness to take into consideration the new needs of the working-class movement and take a broader and more profound view of the matter, often expresses himself in too general terms. He attacks orthodoxy—true, orthodoxy in inverted commas, i.e., pseudo-orthodoxy—or German Social-Democracy in general, when, as a matter of fact, his criticism is aimed only at the vulgarisers of orthodoxy, only at the opportunist wing of Social-Democracy. Secondly, the author writes for the Russian public, but hardly takes into consideration the various shadings in the formulation under Russian conditions of the questions he examines. Comrade Voinov's point of view is very far removed from the views of the Russian syndicalists, Mensheviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The inattentive or unconscientious reader, however, can easily cavil at one or another phrase or idea of the writer, seeing that the latter had before his eyes chiefly Frenchmen and Italians and did not undertake the task of dissociating himself from all kinds of Russian muddleheads.

As an example of the latter we would mention the Socialist-Revolutionaries. In *Znamya Truda*, No. 5, they declare with their usual presumption: "The Socialist Internation-

al approved the point of view on the trade-union movement which we [!] have always [!] maintained." Let us take the *Collected Articles*, No. 1 (1907), published by *Nasha Mysl*. Mr. Victor Chernov takes Kautsky to task, but is silent about the Mannheim resolution and Kautsky's struggle against the opportunist neutralists! Kautsky's article, which the S. R. hack writer attacks, was written on the eve of Mannheim.^{**} In Mannheim Kautsky opposed the neutralists. The Mannheim resolution "makes a considerable breach in trade-union neutrality" (Kautsky's expression in an article on the Mannheim Congress published in *Die Neue Zeit*^{**} for October 6, 1906). And now, in 1907, along comes a critic, who poses as a revolutionary and calls Kautsky "a great dogmatist and inquisitor of Marxism", accusing him—quite in unison with the opportunist neutralists!—of tendentiously belittling the role of the trade unions, of a desire to "subordinate" them to the party, and so on. If we add to this that the S. R.'s always stood for non-Party trade unions, and that *Znamya Truda*, No. 2 for July 12, 1907 carried an editorial saying that "party propaganda has its place outside the union", we shall get a full picture of the S.R.'s revolutionism.

When Kautsky combated opportunist neutralism and further developed and deepened the theory of Marxism, moving the trade unions leftwards, these gentlemen fell upon him, repeating the catchwords of the opportunists and continuing on the sly to advocate non-partisanship of the trade unions. When the same Kautsky moved the trade unions still further leftwards by amending Beer's resolution at Stuttgart and laying stress in this resolution on the socialist tasks of the trade unions, the gentlemen of the S. R. fraternity started shouting: the Socialist International has endorsed our point of view!

The question arises, are such methods worthy of members of the Socialist International? Does not such criticism testify to presumption and lack of principle?

A specimen of such presumption among the Social-Democrats is the former revolutionary Plekhanov, who is deeply respected by the liberals. In a preface to the pamphlet *We And They* he declares with inimitable, incomparable complacency that the Stuttgart resolution (on the trade

unions) *with my amendment* deprives the London resolution (that of the London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.) of its significance. Probably many readers, upon reading this declaration of our magnificent Narcissus, will believe that the struggle at Stuttgart was fought precisely over this amendment of Plekhanov's and that generally speaking this amendment had some serious significance.

In reality, this amendment ("unity of the economic struggle should always be borne in mind") had no serious significance whatever. It even had no bearing on the essence of the questions *in dispute* at Stuttgart, on the essence of the differences of opinion in international socialism.

As a matter of fact, Plekhanov's raptures over "his" amendment have a very vulgar significance—*to mislead* the reader by drawing his attention away from the *really* disputable questions of the trade-union movement and to *conceal* the defeat of the idea of neutrality in Stuttgart.

The Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906), at which the Mensheviks won the day, adhered to the point of view of trade-union neutrality. The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. took a different stand and proclaimed the necessity of working towards partisanship of the unions. The Stuttgart International Congress adopted a resolution, which "*puts an end to neutrality once and for all*", as Kautsky rightly expressed it.* Plekhanov went into the Commission of the Stuttgart Congress to defend neutrality, as described in detail by Voinov. And Clara Zetkin wrote in *Die Gleichheit*, the mouthpiece of the women's labour movement of Germany, that "Plekhanov attempted by rather unconvincing arguments to justify a certain limitation of this principle"** (i.e., the principle of close alignment of the unions with the Party).

Thus, the principle of neutrality which Plekhanov advocated was a failure. His arguments were considered "unconvincing" by the German revolutionary Social-Democrats.

* *Vorwärts*, 1907, No. 209, *Beilage*, Kautsky's report to the Leipzig workers on the Congress in Stuttgart. See *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, 1908, Zerno Publishers, p. 173, my article on the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart. (See pp. 87-88 of this volume.—Ed.)

** See *Kalendar dlya vsekh*, p. 173, as well as the collected articles of *Zarnitsy* (St. Petersburg, 1907), which gives a complete translation of this article from *Die Gleichheit*.

And he, self-admiringly, declares: "my" amendment was adopted and the resolution of the London Congress loses its significance....

Yes, yes, but, on the other hand, the Nozdrev presumption⁸⁴ of a socialist respected by the liberals apparently does not lose any of its significance.

Comrade Voinov is wrong, I believe, in saying that the German orthodox socialists consider the idea of storming harmful and that orthodoxy "had all but adopted the whole spirit of the new Economism". This cannot be said of Kautsky, and Comrade Voinov himself admits the correctness of Kautsky's views. While blaming the Germans for "saying too little about the role of the trade unions as organisers of socialist production", Comrade Voinov mentions elsewhere the opinion of Liebknecht senior, who recognised this role in the most emphatic terms. Another mistake of Comrade Voinov was to believe Plekhanov when the latter said that Bebel *deliberately* omitted mention of the Russian revolution in his speech of welcome, and that Bebel *did not want* to speak about Russia. These words of Plekhanov's were simply crude buffoonery on the part of a socialist who is deeply respected by the liberals and should not for a moment have been taken seriously, should not have evoked even the possibility of believing that there was an iota of truth in them. For my part I can testify that during Bebel's speech, Van Kol, a representative of the socialist Right wing who sat next to me in the Bureau, listened to Bebel specially to see whether he would mention Russia. And as soon as Bebel had finished, Van Kol turned to me with a look of surprise; he did not doubt (nor did a single serious member of the Congress) that Bebel had forgotten Russia *accidentally*. The best and most experienced speakers sometimes make slips. For Comrade Voinov to call this forgetfulness on the part of the veteran Bebel "characteristic", is, in my opinion, most unfair. It is also profoundly unfair to speak in general about the "*present-day*" opportunistic Bebel. There are no grounds for such a generalisation.

To avoid misunderstandings, however, let me say at once that if anyone tried to use these expressions of Com-

rade Voinov's against the revolutionary German Social-Democrats, this would be seizing dishonestly on particular words. Comrade Voinov has abundantly proved by his *whole* pamphlet that he is on the side of the German revolutionary Marxists (like Kautsky), that he is working *together with them* to get rid of old prejudices, opportunist clichés, and short-sighted complacency. That is why even in Stuttgart, I lined up with Comrade Voinov on all essentials and agree with him now regarding the entire character of his revolutionary criticism. He is absolutely right in saying that we must now learn from the Germans and profit by their experience. Only ignoramuses, who have still learned nothing from the Germans and therefore do not know the ABC, can infer from this a "divergence" within revolutionary Social-Democracy. We must criticise the mistakes of the German leaders fearlessly and openly if we wish to be true to the spirit of Marx and help the Russian socialists to be equal to the present-day tasks of the workers' movement. Bebel was undoubtedly mistaken at Essen as well when he defended Noske, when he upheld the division of wars into defensive and offensive, when he attacked the *method* of struggle of the "radicals" against Van Kol, when he denied (with Singer) the failure and fallacy of the German delegation's tactics at Stuttgart. We should not conceal these mistakes, but should use them as an example to teach the Russian Social-Democrats how to avoid them and live up to the more rigorous requirements of revolutionary Marxism. And let not the Russian anarchist and syndicalist small fry, the liberals, and S.R.'s crow over our criticism of Bebel. We shall tell these gentlemen: "Eagles sometimes fly lower than hens, but hens can never fly as high as eagles!"

A little over two years ago Mr. Struve, who at that time defended the revolution, wrote about the necessity of open revolutionary action and maintained that the revolution must assume power—this Mr. Struve wrote in *Osvobozhdeniye*,¹¹ No. 71 (published abroad): "In comparison with the revolutionism of Mr. Lenin and his associates the revolutionism of the West-European Social-Democracy of

Bebel, and even of Kautsky, is opportunism". I answered Mr. Struve at the time: "When and where did I ever claim to have created any sort of special trend in international Social-Democracy not identical with the trend of Bebel and Kautsky?" (*Two Tactics*, p. 50 of the Russian edition).*

In the summer of 1907 in a pamphlet on the question of boycott of the Third Duma, I had to point out that it would be basically wrong to identify Bolshevism with boycottism or boyevism.

Now, on the question of the trade unions, equally strong emphasis should be placed on the fact that Bolshevism applies the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy in all fields of struggle, in all spheres of activity. What distinguishes Bolshevism from Menshevism is not that the former "repudiates" work in the trade unions or the co-operative societies, etc., but that the former *takes a different line* in the work of propaganda, agitation, and organisation of the working class. Today activity in the trade unions undoubtedly assumes tremendous importance. In contrast to the neutralism of the Mensheviks we must conduct this activity on the lines of closer alignment of the unions with the Party, of the development of socialist consciousness and an understanding of the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat. In Western Europe revolutionary syndicalism in many countries was a direct and inevitable result of opportunism, reformism, and parliamentary cretinism. In our country, too, the first steps of "Duma activity" increased opportunism to a tremendous extent and reduced the Mensheviks to servility before the Cadets. Plekhanov, for example, in his everyday political work, virtually merged with the Prokopovich and Kuskova gentry. In 1900, he denounced them for Bernsteinism, for contemplating only the "posterior" of the Russian proletariat (*Vademecum* for the editorial staff of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, Geneva, 1900). In 1906-07, the first ballot papers threw Plekhanov into the arms of these gentlemen, who are now contemplating the "posterior" of Russian liberalism. Syndicalism cannot help developing on Russian soil as a reaction against this shameful conduct of "distinguished" Social-Democrats.

* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 66.—*Ed.*

Comrade Voinov, therefore, is quite correct in taking the line of calling upon the Russian Social-Democrats to learn *from* the example of opportunism and *from* the example of syndicalism. Revolutionary work in the trade unions, shifting the emphasis from parliamentary trickery to the education of the proletariat, to rallying the purely class organisations, to the struggle outside parliament, to ability to use (and to prepare the masses for the possibility of successfully using) the general strike, as well as the "December forms of struggle",^{**} in the Russian revolution—all this comes very strongly into prominence as the task of the Bolshevik trend. And the experience of the Russian revolution immensely facilitates this task for us, provides a wealth of practical guidance and historical data making it possible to appraise in the most concrete way the new methods of struggle, the mass strike, and the use of direct force. These methods of struggle are least of all "new" to the Russian Bolsheviks, the Russian proletariat. They are "new" to the opportunists, who are doing their utmost to erase from the minds of the workers in the West the memory of the Commune, and from the minds of the workers in Russia the memory of December 1905. To strengthen these memories, to make a scientific study of that great experience,* to spread its lessons among the masses and the realisation of its inevitable repetition on a new scale—this task of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Russia opens up before us prospects infinitely richer than the one-sided "anti-opportunism" and "anti-parliamentarism" of the syndicalists.

Against syndicalism, as a special trend, Comrade Voinov levels four accusations (p. 19 onwards of his pamphlet), which show up its falsity with striking clearness: (1) the

* It is natural that the Cadets should be eagerly studying the history of the two Dumas. It is natural that they should regard the platitudes and betrayals of Rodichev-Kutlerov liberalism as gems of creation. It is natural that they should falsify history by drawing a veil of silence over their negotiations with the reaction, etc. It is unnatural for the Social-Democrats not to eagerly study October-December 1905, if only because each day of that period meant a hundred times more to the destinies of all the peoples of Russia and the working class in particular than Rodichev's "loyal" phrases in the Duma.

"anarchistic looseness of the organisation"; (2) keeping the workers keyed up instead of creating a firm "stronghold of class organisation"; (3) the petty-bourgeois-individualistic features of its ideal and of the Proudhon theory; (4) a stupid "aversion to politics".

There are here not a few points of resemblance to the old "Economism" among the Russian Social-Democrats. Hence I am not so optimistic as Comrade Voinov in regard to a "reconciliation" with revolutionary Social-Democracy on the part of those Economists who have gone over to syndicalism. I also think that Comrade Voinov's proposals for a "General Labour Council" as a superarbiter, with the participation in it of Socialist-Revolutionaries, are quite unpractical. This is mixing up the "music of the future" with the organisational forms of the present. But I am not in the least afraid of Comrade Voinov's perspective, namely: "subordination of political organisations to a class social organisation" ... *only when [I am still quoting Comrade Voinov, stressing the important words]... all trade-unionists will have become socialists*". The class instinct of the proletarian mass has *already* begun to be manifested in Russia with full force. This class instinct already provides tremendous guarantees both against the petty-bourgeois wooliness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and against the Mensheviks' servility to the Cadets. We can already boldly assert that the mass *workers'* organisation in Russia (if it were to be created and in so far as it is for a minute created, if only by elections, strikes, demonstrations, etc.) is *sure* to be closer to Bolshevism, to revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Comrade Voinov rightly regards the "labour congress" adventure as a "frivolous" affair. We shall work hard in the trade unions, we shall work in all fields to spread the revolutionary theory of Marxism among the proletariat and to build up a "stronghold" of *class* organisation. The rest will come of itself.

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X

THE "WORK" OF THE GERMAN BULGAKOV, E. DAVID

Ed. David's book, *Socialism and Agriculture*, is an exceptionally clumsy and cumbrous summary of all the erroneous methods and arguments which we have seen in the works of Bulgakov, Hertz, and Chernov. We could, therefore, completely ignore David; but since his "work" is undoubtedly at the present time the principal work of revisionism on the agrarian question, we think it necessary once again to show how the revisionist fraternity write learned treatises.

To the question of machinery in agriculture David devotes the whole of Chapter IV of his book (pp. 115-93 of the Russian translation), apart from numerous references to the same subject in other chapters. The politico-economic essence of the matter is completely submerged in hundreds of *technicalities* which the author examines in minute detail. Machinery does not play the same role in agriculture as in industry; in agriculture there is no central motor; most of the machines are only temporarily employed; some machines make no saving in production costs, and so on and so forth. David regards such conclusions (see pp. 190-93, the question of machinery summed up) as a refutation of Marxist theory! But this merely obscures the question instead of clarifying it. That agriculture is backward compared with manufacturing industry is not open to the slightest doubt. This backwardness requires no proof. By examining, point by point, the various ways in which that backwardness is displayed, by piling example upon example and case upon case, David merely pushes into the background the actual subject of the research, namely: is the use

of machines of a capitalist character? Is the increased use of machines due to the growth of capitalist agriculture?

David utterly fails to understand how the question should be presented by a Marxist. David's standpoint is essentially that of the petty bourgeois, who consoles himself with the relatively slow progress of capitalism and is afraid to look at social evolution as a whole. Thus, on the question of agricultural machinery, David quotes Bensing, quotes him innumerable times ** (pp. 125, 135, 180, 182, 184, 186, 189, 506, and others of the Russian translation). David can positively be said to exasperate the reader by passing from detail to detail without sifting his material, without coherence, without a reasoned presentation of the question, without aim. Consequently, David provides no *summing up* of Bensing's conclusions. What I said in 1901 in opposition to Mr. Bulgakov fully applies to David.* First, a summary of Bensing's conclusions shows the indisputable advantage which farms using machines have over those that do not use them. None of the "corrections" to Bensing in minor details, with which David has stuffed his book, can alter this conclusion. *David passes over this general conclusion in silence in exactly the same way as Mr. Bulgakov did!* Secondly, while quoting Bensing without end, without reason, without coherence, David, like Mr. Bulgakov, failed to note Bensing's bourgeois views concerning machinery in both industry and agriculture. In short, David does not even understand the socio-economic aspect of the question. He is unable to generalise and connect the factual data showing the superiority of large-scale over small-scale production. As a result, nothing remains but the reactionary lamentations of the petty bourgeois who places his hopes in technical backwardness, in the slow development of capitalism. In the matter of theory, the Right-wing Cadet and "Christian" renegade Mr. Bulgakov is quite on a level with the opportunist Social-Democrat David.

David fails, hopelessly fails to understand the socio-economic aspect of other questions as well. Take his fundamental thesis, his pet idea, the "kingpin" of the whole

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 133-34.—*Ed.*

work: the viability of *small-scale production* in agriculture and its superiority to large-scale production. Ask David: What is small-scale production?

On page 29, footnote, you will find a neat answer: "Wherever we refer to small-scale production we mean the economic category which functions without regular outside assistance and without an auxiliary occupation." Though clumsily expressed and poorly translated by Mr. Grossman, this is more or less clear. After that we have a right to expect David to outline the conditions of small-scale (*in area*) farming *from the standpoint* of the employment of hired labour, or the sale of the latter by the farmer.

Nothing of the kind.

Nothing brings out David's bourgeois nature so strongly as his complete disregard of the question of the employment of hired labour by "small" farmers and of the conversion of the latter into wage-labourers. Complete disregard—that is literally true. Statistical data on this are to be found in German statistics; Kautsky quotes them briefly in his *Agrarian Question* (I have quoted them in detail*). David knows those statistics, but he does not analyse them. He gives a mass of references to separate monographs, but *completely ignores* the data they contain on this question. In short, this is a case of a petty bourgeois completely *passing over in silence* the question of the "farm-hands" employed by the thrifty mtuzhik.

Here are examples:

On page 109 we read: "On the whole, in market gardening as in agriculture, small-scale production flourishes."

You look for proof. All you are given is the following: "According to the industrial statistics** for 1895, out of 32,540 orchards and vegetable gardens 13,247=40 per cent were of an area less than 20 ares; 8,257=25 per cent ranged from 20 to 50 ares; 5,707=14 per cent from 50 ares to one hectare; 3,397=10 per cent ranged in area from 1

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 194-95.—Ed.

** Evidently, this is the way Mr. Grossman, the editor of the translation, translated the word *Betriebsstatistik*. That's the trouble with Russian translations! It should have been translated: "statistics of agricultural enterprises".

to 2 hectares, and only 1,932=6 per cent occupied an area of 2 hectares and over."

That is all. And this is supposed to prove that small-scale production is flourishing in market gardening. This is supposed to be a scientific work by a man well versed in agronomics. If it is, then we do not know what charlatancy in science is.

Only 6 per cent have an area of 2 hectares and over, says David. In the very same statistics from which he takes those figures there are figures showing the *amount of land* which these 6 per cent occupy. *David ignores those figures.* He ignores them because they demolish his theory. "But more than half of this area (51.39 per cent)," I wrote concerning those very figures,* "is concentrated in the hands of 1,932 proprietors, or 5.94 per cent of all the market gardeners." Of these 1,932 market gardeners 1,441 have vegetable gardens ranging from two to five hectares, making an average of 2.76 hectares per farm and *total land* amounting to an average of 109.6 hectares per farm; 491 farmers have vegetable gardens of five hectares or more, making an average of 16.54 hectares per farm, and *total land* amounting to an average of 134.7 hectares per farm (*ibid.*).

Thus, *only* 6 per cent of the market gardeners concentrate in their hands 51.39 per cent of the total market garden land. They are big capitalists for whom vegetable gardens are *supplementary* to capitalist agriculture (farms of 100 to 135 hectares). Consequently, market gardening is enormously concentrated capitalistically. But David has the ... temerity to assert that "small-scale production is flourishing", i.e., production not using hired labour. As to what size farms in market gardening require hired labourers *he gives no information.*

That is how the scholarly David handles statistics. An example of the way in which he handles monographs is provided by Hecht,** the same notorious Hecht quoted by Bulgakov, Hertz, and Chernov.** In his "work" David paraphrases Hecht for the space of two pages (pp. 394-95). But *how does he paraphrase him? Not a word about hired*

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 215.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 162-67.—*Ed.*

labour. Not a word about the fact that Hecht embellishes the "*settled state*" of the factory worker who has a plot of land, lumping together workers and well-to-do peasants. Not a word about the fact that while a small number of well-to-do peasants are "*flourishing*", the conditions of the bulk of the peasants are such that they even have to sell their milk and use cheaper margarine as a substitute.

David not only says nothing about this; he even declares that "Hecht quotes extremely interesting data on the high living standards of these peasants" (p. 395). A grosser example of bourgeois apologetics is difficult to imagine.

Incidentally, about Hecht's statement that the peasants sell their milk in order to buy cheaper margarine. One would think that this is a generally known fact among economists. As far back as 1847, Marx in *The Poverty of Philosophy* referred to the deterioration of the people's diet under capitalism.¹⁰ In Russia, ever since the time of Engelhardt¹¹ (the 1870s), this fact has been noted very many times by all who have made a more or less conscientious study of the progress of capitalism in dairy farming. The "scholarly" David failed to notice this. He even sneers when socialists point to it.

On pages 427-28 of David's book we read scoffing remarks about Kautsky, who says that the amalgamated dairies, which promote the sale of milk by the peasants, cause a deterioration in the latter's diet. To enable the reader to judge the German Narodnik David at his true worth we shall quote his own words:

"...All other people are in the habit, when receiving a larger income, of using some part of it for the benefit of their stomachs. It is only human nature that a man should want to eat something better, if only he has a little money to enable him to do so. It is, therefore, very strange that the peasant who, as is generally admitted, is getting more money than before for his milk and pigs, thanks to the co-operative, should behave differently from other mortals," and so on and so forth.

This buffoonery of a reactionary petty bourgeois is not worth answering, of course. It is sufficient to exhibit him to the reading public; it is sufficient to drag him into the light of day from under the heap of disconnected agronomic quotations scattered through five hundred and fifty pages.

It is sufficient to note that even the bourgeois apologist Hecht, *quoted by David*, admits as a fact the deterioration in diet as a consequence of the substitution of cheap margarine for marketed milk. This applies to South Germany, the region where small-peasant farming predominates. Concerning another region, East Prussia, we have the very similar statement of Klawki* that the small peasants "consume very little butter and whole milk".

David's bourgeois apologetics can be traced in absolutely all the questions he deals with. Thus, he extols the dairy co-operatives of Germany and Denmark in over a score of pages (413-35 and others). He also quotes statistics... but only on the numerical growth of the co-operatives! He does not quote the German statistics showing the concentration of "co-operative" dairy farming in the hands of big capitalist farms.** The Davids have a blind eye for such data in the statistics they handle!

"The Danish peasants organised in co-operatives," says David, "have even excelled the privately owned farms of the big landed proprietors." Then follows an example: a quotation from the 46th Report of a test laboratory to the effect that the butter produced by the co-operatives is of better quality than that manufactured by the landlord. And David continues:

"Such results have been achieved by peasants who at one time, on their small farms, produced only inferior grades of butter for which they obtained only half the price paid for that of the big proprietors. Moreover, *by and large, we are dealing here with middle and small peasants* [David's italics]. In 1898, there were in Denmark 179,740 cow-sheds of which only 7,544 or 4 per cent contained 30 or more cows each; 49,371 or 27.82 per cent, each contained from 10 to 29 cows; 122,589, or 68.97 per cent contained less than 10 cows each. More than half of these cow-sheds, namely, 70,218, comprising 39.85 per cent of the total, contained only from 1 to 3 cows each, i.e., they belonged to quite small farms. That the great majority of these small farms belong to co-operative organisations is shown by the fact that in 1900 the milk of approximately 900,000 cows out of Denmark's 1,110,000 milch cows was delivered to dairy co-operatives" (p. 424).

Thus argues the scholarly David. He avoids quoting precise data on the distribution of the cows among the farms

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 176-77.—Ed.

** Ibid., p. 216.—Ed.

in the various groups; that is distasteful to him. But even the fragmentary figures he does quote show that he completely distorts the reality. By comparing the total number of cows with the distribution of cow-sheds according to the number of cattle in them we get the following picture, which, *though an approximate one,** undoubtedly, on the whole, corresponds to the reality:

Denmark	Number of farms (thousands)	Number of cows in them (thousands)	Number of cows per farm
Farms with 1 to 3 cows	70	100	1.43
" " 4 to 9 "	52	250	4.81
" " 10 to 29 "	49	550	11.22
" " 30 or more "	8	200	25.00
<i>Total</i>	179	1,100	6.14

From these figures it is seen, first, that the concentration of dairy farming in Denmark is *very high*. 750,000 cows out of 1,100,000, i. e., *over two-thirds of the total*, belong to the *big farms*—57,000 out of 179,000, i. e., less than a third of the total number of farmers. Since each of these farms has ten or more cows, they certainly do not dispense with hired labour. Thus, David "failed to notice" that the size of the farms which keep livestock is by no means small here; Danish farms must not be judged by area of land. David "failed to notice" that here, as everywhere and always in capitalist agriculture, a vast number of

* These figures are approximate, first, because the number of cows is given for 1900, while the number of farms is given for 1898; secondly, because we had to determine the number of cows in each group approximately, since David does not give exact figures. We have put the big farms share lower than it actually is: 7,544 farms have 30 or more cows each. Thus, even if we take the minimum, i. e., 30 cows per farm, we get $7,544 \times 30 = 226,320$ cows. We have taken a smaller figure, otherwise the size of the small farms would approach too closely to the minimum and not to the maximum limits of the groups.

small farms account for an insignificant share of the total production. The small farmers number 70,000, i.e., nearly 40 per cent; but they own one-eleventh of the total number of cows.

Secondly, the figures quoted show that both in Denmark and in Germany the *benefits of co-operation* are enjoyed *mainly by the capitalists*. If out of 1,100,000 cows the milk of 900,000 is delivered to the dairy co-operatives, it follows that 200,000 cows remain *outside* the "beneficial" scope of co-operative marketing. These are mainly the cows of the smallest farmers, for we have seen from the figures for Germany that of the farms up to two hectares, only 0.3 per cent of the total belong to dairy co-operatives, but of the farms of 100 hectares and over, 35.1 per cent belong to such co-operatives. Consequently, all this leads us to assume that the small farmers (70,000 owning 100,000 cows) least enjoy the benefits of co-operative marketing.

The example of Denmark completely refutes David, since it proves that not the small, and not the medium, but the big farms predominate in the production of dairy produce.

To put some life into these lifeless figures and tables and show the class character of bourgeois agriculture (which the obtuse petty bourgeois David totally ignores) we shall quote an outstanding fact from the history of the working-class movement in Denmark. In 1902, the Danish shipowners reduced the wages of the stokers, who answered by going on strike. The union to which all the dock workers belonged supported the stokers and also ceased work. But ... they were unable to make the strike a general one, to extend it to all the ports of Denmark. "Port Esbjerg [on the west coast of Denmark, important for trade with England], which plays such a great part in the export of Danish agricultural produce, could not be drawn into the strike because the Danish agricultural co-operatives declared that they would immediately send the required number of their members to work on loading the ships, that the Danish peasants would not allow a stoppage in the export of their produce."*

Thus, the Danish co-operatives took the side of the ship-

* Emil Helms, *Die socialdemokratische und gewerkschaftliche Bewegung in Dänemark*, Leipzig, 1907, S. 138.

owners against the workers and made the strike a failure. It is quite understandable, of course, that capitalist farmers, owning ten and more cows each, should support their fellow-capitalists against the workers. What is not understandable is that writers like David, who gloss over the class struggle, call themselves socialists.

On the question of combining farming with technical-crop industries (sugar refining, distilling, etc.) David makes *the very same* mistake as Mr. Bulgakov. Like the Russian professor, the German "learned" opportunist *simply copied* the tables given in the German enquiry, without stopping to think what these tables refer to! Kautsky asserts that sugar production is an example of agricultural *large-scale* industry. To refute this David, like Bulgakov, quotes figures showing that there are more small farms connected with technical-crop industries than big ones (pages 406, 407, and 410 of David's book). The learned statistician forgot that, in general, there are more small farms than big ones. Instead of showing what percentage of the farms in each group is combined with technical industries he copied a table giving the percentage of such farms in each group in relation to the total number of farms. I have already dealt in detail with this mistake made by Mr. Bulgakov.* It only remains for me to point out that the equally scientifically conscientious Ed. David equally failed to take the trouble to glance at the figures *showing what share of the land* under sugar beet is in the hands of capitalists.

What a comical degree of soul affinity exists between the German opportunist and the Russian liberal professor can be seen from the fact that not only do they both handle statistics with the same carelessness and lack of skill, but both quote Marx with the same carelessness. Like Bulgakov David recognises the "law of diminishing returns". True, he tries to expound it with special limitations, to surround it with special conditions, but that does not improve matters in the least. For example, on page 476, David says that "this law does not at all concern the change of productivity in the transition from one scientific-technical stage

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 209-10.—*Ed.*

of agriculture to another. It concerns exclusively the change of productivity at one and the same scientific-technical stage." This is exactly the *limitation* of the notorious law that I mentioned when opposing Mr. Bulgakov,* and I at once added that this makes the "law" "so relative that it cannot be called a law, or even a cardinal specific feature of agriculture".

Nevertheless, David continues to elevate this law to a specific feature of agriculture. The result is a hopeless muddle, for if "scientific-technical" conditions remain unchanged, additional investments of capital are extremely restricted in industry too.

"The backwardness of agriculture," says David in the concluding chapter, "is due, in the first place, to the conservatism of organic nature, which finds expression in the law of diminishing returns" (501). This conclusion throws overboard the very thesis that has just been put forward, namely, that the "law" does not apply to transitions to a higher technical stage! "The conservatism of organic nature" is simply a verbal subterfuge of reactionary philistinism, which is incapable of understanding the *social* conditions that hinder particularly the development of agriculture. David shows that he does not understand that among those *social* conditions are, first, the survivals of feudalism in agriculture, the inequality of rights of agricultural labourers, and so on and so forth; and secondly, *ground rent*, which inflates prices and embodies high rents in the *price of land*.

"We think," writes David, "that German agriculture today could not produce the total quantity of grain required ...at the level of productivity which, thanks to overseas production, is considered normal from the standpoint of world economy. The law of diminishing returns does not permit an unlimited increase in the quantity of products on a limited area of land without a diminution in productivity" (519)—the last sentence is in italics in David's book.

Take a look, if you please, at this economist! He declares that the "law" of diminishing returns deals *exclusively* with

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 108-09.—*Ed.*

the change of productivity at one and the same scientific-technical stage (476). Yet he draws the conclusion: "the law does not permit an 'unlimited' increase in the quantity of products!" (519). Why, then, does it follow that German agriculture *could not be raised* to the next "scientific-technical stage" if this were not prevented by the private ownership of the land, by inflated rent, by the lack of rights, the downtrodden state, and degradation of the agricultural labourer, by the barbarous medieval privileges of the Junkers?

The bourgeois apologist naturally tries to ignore the social and historical causes of the backwardness of agriculture and throws the blame on the "conservatism of organic nature" and on the "law of diminishing returns". That notorious law contains nothing but apologetics and obtuseness.

To cover up his shameful retreat to the old prejudices of bourgeois political economy David, exactly like Bulgakov, presents us with a falsified quotation from Marx. David quotes *the same page* of Volume III of *Capital* (III. B., II. Teil, S. 277) which Mr. Bulgakov quotes! (See page 481 of David's book and our previous criticism of Mr. Bulgakov.*)

What I have said about the *scientific conscientiousness* of Mr. Bulgakov applies *wholly* to David as well. Mr. Bulgakov garbled a passage from Marx. David confined himself to quoting the first words of the same passage: "Concerning decreasing productiveness of the soil with successive investments of capital, see Liebig" (*Das Kapital*, III. B., II. Teil, S. 277).** Like Bulgakov, David distorted Marx, making it appear to the reader that this is the only reference by Marx. Actually, we repeat, anyone who has read Volume III of *Capital* (and the second part of Volume II of *Theorien über den Mehrwert***) knows that the opposite is the case. Marx points out *dozens of times* that he regards cases of *diminished* productivity of additional investments of capital as being quite as legitimate and quite as possible as cases of *increased* productivity of additional investments of capital.

See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 116-19.—*Ed.*

In a footnote on page 481 David promises in the future to examine the connection between this law and rent, and also "to examine critically Marx's attempt to develop and extend the theory of rent, while rejecting the basis given by Malthus and Ricardo".

We venture to predict that David's critical examination will be a repetition of bourgeois prejudices *à la* Mr. Bulgakov, or... *à la* Comrade Maslov.

Let us now examine another radically erroneous thesis of David's. To refute his apologetics or his distortion of statistics is a very thankless task. On the question we are now about to deal with we have some new data which enable us to contrast a *factual* picture of reality with the theories of present-day philistinism.

XI

LIVESTOCK IN SMALL AND LARGE FARMS

The "critics" or Bernsteinians in the agrarian question, when defending small-scale production, very often refer to the following circumstance. Small farmers keep far more cattle on a given unit of land than big farmers. Consequently, they say, the small farmers manure their land better. Their farms are on a technically higher level, for manure plays a decisive role in modern agriculture, and the manure obtained from cattle kept on the farm is far superior to any artificial fertilisers.

Ed. David in his book *Socialism and Agriculture* attaches decisive significance to this argument (pp. 326, 526, and 527 of the Russian translation). He writes in italics: "manure is the soul of agriculture" (p. 308), and makes this truism the main basis of his defence of small-scale farming. He quotes German statistics showing that the small farms keep far more cattle per unit of land than the big ones. David is convinced that these figures definitely decide in his favour the question of the advantages of large-scale or small-scale production in agriculture.

Let us examine this theory and the manurial soul of agriculture more closely.

The main argument advanced by David and his numerous adherents among the bourgeois economists is a statistical one. They compare the number of cattle (per unit of land) on different-sized farms, it being tacitly assumed that identical quantities are compared, i. e., that an equal number of cattle of a particular kind represents an equal agricultural value, so to speak, on both big and small farms. It is assumed that an equal number of cattle provides an equal quantity of manure, that the cattle on big and small farms have more or less the same qualities, and so forth.

Obviously, the cogency of the argument in question depends entirely upon whether this usually tacit assumption is correct. Is this postulate correct? If we pass from the bare and rough, indiscriminate statistics to an analysis of the socio-economic conditions of small-scale and large-scale agricultural production as a whole we shall find at once that that postulate takes for granted the very thing that has still to be proved. Marxism affirms that the conditions under which cattle are kept (and also, as we have seen, the tending of the land and the conditions of the agricultural worker) are *worse* in small-scale than in large-scale farming. Bourgeois political economy asserts the opposite, and the Bernsteinians repeat this assertion, namely, that thanks to the *diligence* of the small farmer, cattle are kept under far better conditions on a small farm than on a big one. To find data which would throw light on *this* question requires quite different statistics from those with which David operates. It requires a statistical study not of the number of cattle on different-sized farms, but of their quality. Such a study exists in German economic literature, and perhaps more than one. It is highly characteristic that David, who filled his book with a mass of irrelevant quotations from all kinds of works on agronomics, completely ignored the attempts to be found in the literature to reveal the internal conditions of small-scale and large-scale farming by means of detailed research. We shall acquaint the reader with one of those researches undeservedly ignored by David.

Drechsler, a well-known German writer on agricultural questions, published the results of a monographic "agricul-

tural statistical investigation", which, he rightly said, "for the accuracy of its results is surely without equal". In the Province of Hanover, 25 settlements were investigated (22 villages and three landlord estates), and data showing not only the amount of land and number of cattle, *but also the quality of the cattle* were collected separately for each farm. To determine the quality of the cattle a particularly accurate method was adopted: the *live weight** of each animal was ascertained in kilogrammes "on the basis of the most careful possible appraisal of the individual animals—an appraisal made by experts". Data were obtained giving the live weight of each type of animal on different-sized farms. The investigation was carried out twice: the first in 1875, the second in 1884. The figures were published by Drechsler ** in rough form for each of three estates and for three groups of villages, the peasant farms in the villages being divided into seven groups according to the amount of land (over 50 hectares; 25 to 50; 12.5 to 25; 7.5 to 12.5; 2.5 to 7.5; 1.25 to 2.5, and up to 1.25 hectares). Considering that Drechsler's figures relate to eleven different types of animals, the reader will realise how complicated all these tables are. To obtain summarised figures which will enable us to draw general and basic conclusions, we shall divide *all* the farms into *five* main groups: (a) big estates; (b) peasant farms having over 25 hectares of lands; (c) 7.5 to 25 hectares; (d) 2.5 to 7.5 hectares; and (e) less than 2.5 hectares.

The number of farms in these groups and the amount of land in them in 1875 and in 1884 were as follows:

* David is well aware of this method, employed by agronomists, of ascertaining the live weight of animals. On page 367 he tells us in detail the live weight of *different breeds* of beef and dairy cattle, draught animals, etc. He copies these data from the agronomists. It never occurs to him that what matters to an economist in general, and to a socialist in particular, is not the difference in the breeds of cattle, but the difference in the *conditions under which they are kept* in small and large farms, in "peasant" and in capitalist farming.

** For 1875 in *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, Band XXIV, S. 112 ("Bäuerliche Zustände", B. III), and for 1884 in *Thiel's landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*, Band XV (1886).

	1875			1884		
	Number of farms	Amount of land	Land per farm	Number of farms	Amount of land	Land per farm
	(Hectares)					
(a) Estates	3	689	229	3	766	255
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	51	1,949	38	58	2,449	42
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	274	3,540	13	248	3,135	12
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	442	1,895	4.3	407	1,774	4.3
(e) " up to 2.5 "	1,449	1,279	0.88	1,109	1,027	0.9
Total	2,219	9,352	4.2	1,825	9,151	5.0

To explain these figures we shall deal first of all with the economic types of the different-sized farms. Drechsler considers that all the farms of 7.5 hectares and over employ hired labour. Thus, we get (in 1875) 325 peasant farms employing workers. All the farmers having up to 2.5 hectares have to hire themselves out. Of the farmers having 2.5 to 7.5 hectares (average=4.3 ha) half, according to Drechsler's calculations, do not employ labour, while the other half have to provide hired labourers. Thus, of the total peasant farms, 325 are capitalist farms, 221 are small "Trudovik" farms (as our Narodniks would call them) which do not employ labour nor provide hired labourers, and 1,670 are semi-proletarian, which provide hired labourers.

Unfortunately, Drechsler's grouping differs from that of the general German statistics, which regard as middle peasants those having from 5 to 20 hectares. Nevertheless, it remains an undoubted fact that the majority of these middle peasants do not dispense with hired workers. The "middle peasants" in Germany are small capitalists. The peasants who do not hire labour and do not hire themselves out constitute an insignificant minority: 221 out of 2,216, i.e., one-tenth.

Thus, the groups of farms which we have selected according to their economic type are characterised as follows: (a) big capitalist; (b) middle capitalist ("Grossbauer"); (c) small capitalist; (d) small peasant; and (e) semi-proletarian.

The total number of farms and the total amount of land they occupied diminished between 1875 and 1884. This decrease mainly applied to the small farms: the number of farms occupying up to 2.5 hectares dropped from 1,449 to 1,109, i. e., by 340, or nearly one-fourth. On the other hand, the number of the biggest farms (over 25 hectares) increased from 54 to 61, and the amount of land they occupied increased from 2,638 to 3,215 hectares, i.e., by 577 hectares. Consequently, the general improvement in farming and the raising of agricultural standards in the given area, about which Drechsler goes into raptures, signify the concentration of agriculture in the hands of a *diminishing* number of owners. "Progress" has pushed out of agriculture nearly 400 farmers out of 2,219 (by 1884 there remained 1,825), and raised the average amount of land per farm among the remainder from 4.2 to 5 hectares. In one locality capitalism concentrates the given branch of agriculture and pushes a number of small farmers into the ranks of the proletariat. In another locality the growth of commercial farming creates a number of new small farms (for example dairy farming in suburban villages and in entire countries which export their produce, such as Denmark). In still other localities the splitting up of the medium farms increases the number of small farms. Indiscriminate statistics conceal all these processes, for the study of which detailed investigations must be made.

The progress of agriculture in the locality described found particular expression in the improvement of livestock rearing, although the total head of livestock diminished. In 1875, there were 7,208 head of livestock (in terms of cattle); in 1884 there were 6,993. Going by the gross statistics, this decrease in the total number of livestock would be a sign of decline in livestock breeding. Actually, there was an improvement in the quality of the stock, so that, if we take not the number of animals, but their total "live weight", we shall get 2,556,872 kilogrammes in 1875 and 2,696,107 kilogrammes in 1884.

Capitalist progress in livestock rearing shows itself not only, sometimes even not so much, in an increase in numbers as in an improvement in quality, in the replacement of inferior by better cattle, increase in fodder, etc.

Average Number of Livestock per Farm

	1875			1884		
	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total
	(In terms of cattle)					
(a) Estates	105	69	174	110	41	151
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	13.2	11.0	24.2	13.7	10.5	24.2
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	5.4	3.8	9.2	4.9	4.2	9.1
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	2.2	1.4	3.6	2.2	1.8	4.0
(e) " up to 2.5 "	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.4	0.7	1.1
<i>Total</i>	1.7	1.5	3.2	2.0	1.8	3.8

On the biggest farms the number of cattle diminished. In the smallest the number grew, and the smaller the farm the more rapid was the increase. This seems to show progress in small-scale and regression in large-scale production, that is, confirmation of David's theory, does it not?

But we have only to take the figures of the *average weight* of the cattle for this illusion to be dispelled.

	Average weight per animal (kilograms)					
	1875			1884		
	Cattle	Other live-stock *	Total	Cattle	Other live-stock	Total
(a) Estates	562	499	537	617	624	619
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	439	300	376	486	349	427
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	409	281	356	432	322	382
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	379	270	337	404	287	352
(e) " up to 2.5 "	350	243	280	373	261	301
<i>Average</i>	412	256	354	446	316	385

* The various other types of livestock are expressed in terms of cattle according to the usual standards. For one year, and for one of the eleven types of animals, the number given is approximate: the figures refer only to weight, not to the number of cattle.

The first conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that the bigger the farm the better the quality of the cattle. The difference in this respect between the capitalist farms and the small-peasant, or semi-proletarian, farms is enormous. For example, in 1884, this difference between the biggest and smallest farms was over *one hundred per cent*: the average weight of the average animal on the big capitalist farms was 619 kilogrammes; on the semi-proletarian farms it was 301 kilogrammes, i.e., less than half! One can judge from this how superficial are the arguments of David and those who think like him when they assume that the quality of the cattle is the same on large and small farms.

We have already mentioned above that cattle are generally kept worse in small farms. Now we have factual confirmation of this. The figures for live weight give us a very accurate idea of *all* the conditions under which the cattle are kept: feeding, housing, work, care—all this is summarised, so to speak, in the results which found statistical expression in Drechsler's monograph. It turns out that for all the "diligence" displayed by the small farmer in care for his cattle—a diligence extolled by our Mr. V.V.²⁴ and by the German David—he is unable even approximately to match the advantages of large-scale production, which yields products of a quality twice as good. Capitalism condemns the small peasant to eternal drudgery, to a wasteful expenditure of labour, for with insufficient means, insufficient fodder, poor quality cattle, poor housing, and so forth, the most careful tending is a sheer waste of labour. In its appraisal bourgeois political economy puts in the forefront not this ruin and oppression of the peasant by capitalism, but the "diligence" of the toiler (toiling for the *benefit of capital* under the worst conditions of exploitation).

The second conclusion to be drawn from the figures quoted above is that the quality of cattle improved during the ten years both on the average and in all the categories of farms. But as a result of this general improvement, the difference in the conditions of livestock rearing in the large and small farms became not less, but *more* glaring. The general improvement widened rather than narrowed the gulf between the large and small farms, for in this process

of improvement large-scale farming outstrips small-scale farming. Here is a comparison of the average weight of the average animal by groups in 1875 and in 1884.

	Average weight of average ani- mal in kilo- grammes		In- crease	Per cent in- crease
	1875	1884		
(a) Estates	537	619	+82	+15.2
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	376	427	+51	+13.6
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	356	382	+26	+7.3
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	337	352	+15	+4.4
(e) " up to 2.5 "	280	301	+21	+7.5
<i>Average</i>	354	385	+31	+8.7

The improvement is greatest on the big capitalist farms, then come the medium-sized capitalist farms; it is entirely negligible on the small peasant farms and very inconsiderable in the rest. Like the great majority of agronomists who write on problems of agricultural economics, Drechsler noted only the technical aspect of the matter. In the fifth conclusion he draws from the comparison between 1875 and 1884 he says: "A very considerable improvement in the keeping of livestock* has taken place: a reduction in the number of cattle and an improvement in quality; the average live weight per animal increased considerably in each of the three groups of villages.** That shows that the marked improvement in cattle rearing, feeding, and tending of cattle was *more or less general (ziemlich allgemein)*."

* Drechsler speaks here of all cattle except draught animals (called *Nutzvieh*). Further we quote figures on draught animals separately. The general conclusion remains the same, whatever type or type groups of animals we take.

** Drechsler divides the 22 villages into three groups according to geographical location and other farming conditions. We have taken only the summarised data in order not to overburden this article with figures. The conclusions remain the same, whatever groups of villages we take.

The words "more or less general", which we have underlined, show precisely that the author ignored the socio-economic aspect of the question; "more" applies to the big farms, "less" to the small ones. Drechsler overlooked this, because he paid attention only to the figures concerning the groups of villages and not groups of farms of different types.

Let us now pass to the figures on draught animals, which throw light on farming conditions in the narrow sense of the term "agriculture". In regard to the number of draught animals the farms under review are characterised by the following figures:

	Average number of draught animals per farm	
	1875	1884
(a) Estates	27	44
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	4.7	5.5
(c) " " 7.5 to 25 ha	2.1	2.4
(d) " " 2.5 to 7.5 "	1.3	1.5
(e) " " up to 2.5 "	0.07	0.16
<i>Average</i>	0.7	1.0

Thus, the overwhelming majority of the semi-proletarian farms (up to 2.5 hectares; in 1884, they numbered 1,109 out of 1,825) had no draught animals at all. They cannot even be regarded as agricultural farms in the real sense of the term. In any case, as regards the use of draught animals, there can be no comparison between the big farms and those farms of which 93 or 84 per cent employ no draught animals at all. If, however, we compare the big capitalist farms with the small peasant farms in this respect, we shall find that the former (group a) have 132 draught animals to 766 hectares of land, and the latter (group d) 632 to 1,774 hectares (1884), i.e., the former has one draught animal to approximately six hectares, and the latter one to approximately three hectares. Obviously, the small farms spend twice as

much on the keeping of draught animals. Small-scale production implies dispersion of the technical means of farming and a squandering of labour as a result of this dispersion.

This dispersion is partly due to the fact that the small farmers are obliged to use draught animals of an *inferior quality*, that is, to use cows as draught animals. The percentage of cows in relation to the total number of *draught animals* was as follows:

	1875	1884
(a) Estates	—	—
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	—	2.5%
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	6.3%	11.4%
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	60.7%	64.9%
(e) " up to 2.5 "	67.7%	77.9%
<i>Average</i>	27.0%	33.4%

From this it is clearly evident that the use of cows in field work is increasing, and that cows are the principal draught animals on the semi-proletarian and small-peasant farms. David is inclined to regard this as progress in exactly the same way as Drechsler, who takes entirely the bourgeois standpoint. In his conclusions Drechsler writes: "A large number of the small farms have gone over to the use of cows as draught animals, which is *more expedient for them*." It is "more expedient" for the small farmers because it is *cheaper*. And it is cheaper because inferior draught animals are substituted for better ones. The progress of the small peasants which rouses the admiration of the Drechslers and Davids is quite on a par with the progress of the vanishing hand weavers, who are going over to worse and worse materials, waste products of the mills.

The average weight of draught cows in 1884 was 381 kilogrammes,* that of draught horses being 482 kilogrammes,

* The average weight of cows not employed for field work was 421 kilogrammes.

and oxen 553 kilograms. The latter type of draught animal, the strongest, accounted in 1884 for more than half of the total draught animals of the big capitalist farmers, for about a fourth of those of the medium and small capitalists, for less than a fifth of those of the small peasants, and for less than a tenth of those of the semi-proletarian farmers. Consequently, the bigger the farm the higher the quality of the draught animals. The average weight of an average draught animal was as follows:

	1875	1884
(a) Estates	554	598
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	542	537
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	488	482
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	404	409
(e) " up to 2.5 "	377	378
<i>Average</i>	464	460

Consequently, on the whole, the draught animals have deteriorated. Actually, in the large capitalist farms we see a considerable improvement; in all the others there was either no change, or a deterioration. As regards the quality of draught animals, the difference between large-scale and small-scale production also increased between 1875 and 1884. The use of cows as draught animals by the small farmers has become general practice in Germany.* Our figures show with documentary accuracy that this practice denotes a deterioration of the conditions of agricultural production, the increasing poverty of the peasantry.

To complete our survey of the data in Drechsler's monograph, we shall quote an estimate of the number and weight of all animals per unit of land area, i. e., the estimate which

* Concerning this see above, Chapter VIII, "General Statistics of German Agriculture". (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 194-205.—Ed.)

David made on the basis of the general statistics of German agriculture:

	Per hectare of land there were			
	Total number of livestock (in terms of cattle)		Weight of total livestock in kilogrammes	
	1875	1884	1875	1884
(a) Estates	0.77	0.59	408	367
(b) Farms of 25 ha and over	0.63	0.57	238	244
(c) " 7.5 to 25 ha	0.71	0.72	254	277
(d) " 2.5 to 7.5 "	0.85	0.94	288	328
(e) " up to 2.5 "	1.02	1.18	286	355
<i>Average</i>	0.77	0.76	273	294

The figures of the number of livestock per hectare of land are the figures to which David confines himself. In our example, as in German agriculture as a whole, these figures show a *reduction* in the number of livestock per unit of land area in the big farms. In 1884, for example, the semi-proletarian farms had exactly twice as many cattle per hectare as the big capitalist farms (1.18 as against 0.59). But we are already aware that this estimate seeks to compare the incomparable. The actual relationship between the farms is shown by the figures for weight of livestock: in this respect, too, large-scale production is in a better position than small-scale, for it has the *maximum* of livestock in weight per unit of land area, and consequently, also the *maximum* of manure. Thus, David's conclusion that, on the whole, the small farms are better supplied with manure is the very opposite of the truth. Moreover, it must be borne in mind, first, that our figures do not cover artificial fertilisers, which only well-to-do farmers can afford to buy; and secondly, that comparing the amount of livestock by weight puts cattle and smaller animals on the same level, for example, 45,625 kilogrammes—the weight of 68 head of cattle in the big farms and 45,097 kilogrammes—the weight of 1,786 *goats* in the small farms (1884). Actually,

the advantage the big farms enjoy as regards supplies of manure is greater than that shown in our figures.*

Summary: by means of the phrase "manure is the soul of agriculture", David evaded socio-economic relations in livestock farming in particular and presented the matter in an utterly false light.

Large-scale production in capitalist agriculture has a tremendous advantage over small-scale production as regards the quality of livestock in general, and of draught animals in particular, as regards the conditions under which the livestock is kept, its improvement, and its utilisation for providing manure.

XII

THE "IDEAL COUNTRY" FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE OPPONENTS OF MARXISM ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION**

Agrarian relations and the agrarian system in Denmark are especially interesting for the economist. We have already seen *** that Ed. David, the principal representative of revisionism in contemporary literature on the agrarian question, strongly stresses the example of the Danish agricultural unions and Danish (supposedly) "small peasant" farming. Heinrich Pudor, whose work Ed. David uses, calls Denmark "the ideal country of agricultural co-operation".**** In Russia, too, the exponents of liberal and Na-

* Let us recall the statement made by Klawki, quoted above (Chapter VI) (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 171.—Ed.). "The small farmers have inferior manure, their straw is shorter, it is largely used as fodder (which also means that the feed is inferior), and less straw is used for bedding."

** This article is a chapter (XII) of the author's book *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"* included in his recently published book *The Agrarian Question*, Part I (St. Petersburg, 1908). Only accidental delay in delivering this chapter prevented it from being included in the above-mentioned book. Hence, all the references given in the portion now published are to that book.

*** Vl. Ilyin, *The Agrarian Question*, Part I, article "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", Chapters X and XI. (See pp. 171-194 of this volume.—Ed.)

**** Dr. Heinrich Pudor, *Das landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaftswesen im Auslande*, I. B. S. V., Leipzig, 1904. Pudor is a violent opponent of Marxism.

rodnik views no less frequently resort to Denmark as their "trump card" against Marxism in support of the theory of the vitality of small-scale production in agriculture—take, for example, the speech of the liberal Hertzenstein in the First Duma and that of the Narodnik Karavayev in the Second Duma.

Compared with other European countries, "small-peasant" farming is indeed most widespread in Denmark; and agriculture, which has managed to adapt itself to the new requirements and conditions of the market, is most prosperous there. If "prosperity" is possible for small-scale farming in countries with commodity production, then, of course, of all European countries, Denmark is most favourably situated in that respect. A close study of the agrarian system in Denmark is, therefore, doubly interesting. We shall see from the example of a whole country what methods are employed by the revisionists in the agrarian question, and what the main features of the capitalist agrarian system really are in the "ideal" capitalist country.

Denmark's agricultural statistics are compiled on the model of those of other European countries. In some respects, however, they give more detailed information and more elaborate figures, which enable one to study aspects of the question that usually remain in the shade. Let us start with the general data on the distribution of farms by groups according to area. We shall calculate the "hartkorn", the customary measure of land in Denmark, in terms of hectares, counting 10 hectares to one hartkorn, as indicated in the Danish agricultural statistics.*

Danish agricultural statistics give information on the distribution of farms for the years 1873, 1885, and 1895. All the farms are divided into 11 groups, as follows: owning no land; up to 0.3 hectares (to be more precise: up to $\frac{1}{12}$ of a hartkorn); 0.3 to 2.5 ha; 2.5 to 10 ha; 10 to 20 ha; 20 to 40 ha; 40 to 80 ha; 80 to 120 ha; 120 to 200 ha; 200 to 300 ha; 300 ha and over. To avoid the attention of the reader

* "Danmarks Statistik. Statistik Aarbog", 8-de aargang, 1903, p. 31, footnote. All the following statistics apply to Denmark proper, without Bornholm.

being excessively dispersed, we shall combine these groups into six larger groups.

The main conclusion to be drawn first of all from these data—one which bourgeois political economists and the revisionists who follow in their footsteps usually lose sight of—is that the bulk of the land in Denmark is owned by farmers engaged in capitalist agriculture. There can be no doubt that not only farmers owning 120 hectares and over run their farms with the aid of hired labour, but also those owning 40 hectares or more. These two higher groups accounted for only 11 per cent of the total number of farms in 1895, but they owned 62 per cent, or more than three-fifths of the total land. The basis of Danish agriculture is large-scale and medium *capitalist* agriculture. All the talk about a “peasant country” and “small-scale farming” is sheer bourgeois apologetics, a distortion of the facts by various titled and untitled ideologists of capital.

It should be mentioned in this connection that in Denmark, as in other European countries where the capitalist system of agriculture is fully established, the share of the higher capitalist groups in the whole national economy changes only slightly in the course of time. In 1873, 13.2 per cent of the capitalist farms occupied 63.9 per cent of all the land; in 1885, 11.5 per cent of the farms occupied 62.3 per cent of the land. This stability of large-scale farming must always be borne in mind when comparing the data for different years; for it is often possible to notice in the literature that the *main* features of the given socio-economic system are glossed over by means of such comparisons concerning changes *in details*.

As in other European countries, the mass of small farms in Denmark account for an insignificant part of the total agricultural production. In 1895, the number of farms with areas of up to 10 hectares accounted for 72.2 per cent of the total number of farms, but they occupied only 11.2 per cent of the land. In the main, this ratio was the same in 1885 and in 1873. Often the small farms belong to semi-proletarians—as we have seen, the German statistics bore this out fully in regard to farms of up to two hectares, and partly also in regard to farms of up to five hectares. Later

on, when quoting figures of livestock owned by the farms in the various groups, we shall see that there can be no question of any really independent and more or less stable agriculture as far as the bulk of these notorious representatives of "small-scale farming" are concerned. 47.2 per cent, i. e., nearly half of the farms are proletarian or semi-proletarian (those owning no land and those owning up to 2.5 hectares); 25 per cent, i.e., a further quarter of the farms (2.5 to 10 hectares), belong to needy small peasants—such is the *basis* of the "prosperity" of agricultural capitalism in Denmark. Of course, land area statistics can give us only a general idea in total figures of a country with highly developed commercial livestock farming. As the reader will see, however, the figures of livestock, which we examine in detail below, only *strengthen* the conclusions that have been drawn.

Now let us see what changes took place in Denmark between 1873 and 1895 in the distribution of land as between big and small farms. What strikes us immediately here is the typically capitalist increase at the extremes, and the diminution in the proportion of medium farms. Taking the number of agricultural farms (not counting farms without land), the proportion of the smallest farms, those up to 2.5 hectares, *increased* 27.9 per cent in 1873, 31.8 per cent in 1885, and 34.8 per cent in 1895. The proportion *diminished* in *all* the medium groups, and *only* in the highest group, 120 hectares and over, did it remain unchanged (0.7 per cent). The percentage of the total land occupied by the largest farms, 120 hectares and over, *increased*, being 14.3 per cent, 15.2 per cent, and 15.6 per cent in the respective years; there was also an *increase*, but not to the same extent, among the medium peasant farms (those from 10 to 40 hectares: 25.5 per cent, 26.5 per cent, and 26.8 per cent for the respective years), while the total number of farms in this group diminished. There is an irregular *increase* in the farms of 2.5 to 10 hectares (9.1 per cent, 9.5 per cent, and 9.4 per cent for the respective years) and a *steady increase* in the smallest farms (1.5 per cent, 1.7 per cent, and 1.8 per cent). As a result, we have a very clearly marked tendency towards growth of the biggest and smallest farms. To obtain a clearer idea of this phenomenon we

must take the average area of farms according to groups for the respective years. Here are the figures:

Groups of farms	Average area of farms (hectares)		
	1873	1885	1895
Up to 2.5 ha	0.83	0.75	0.68
2.5 to 10 "	5.08	5.09	5.13
10 to 40 "	22.28	22.08	22.01
40 to 120 "	61.00	61.66	61.97
120 ha and over	281.40	282.30	279.80
<i>Average</i>	15.50	14.07	13.70

From these statistics we see that in the majority of groups the area of farms is extremely stable. The fluctuations are insignificant, being one to two per cent (for example: 279.8 to 282.3 hectares, or 22.01 to 22.28 hectares, etc.). The *only* exception is seen in the smallest farms, which are undoubtedly *splitting up*: a decrease in the average area of those farms (up to 2.5 hectares) by ten per cent between 1873 and 1885 (from 0.83 hectares to 0.75 hectares) and also between 1885 and 1895. The general increase in the total number of farms in Denmark is proceeding with almost no change in the total area of land (between 1885 and 1895 there was even a slight decrease in the total area of land). The increase in the main affects the smallest farms. Thus, between 1873 and 1895 the total number of farms increased by 30,752, while the number of farms up to 2.5 hectares increased by 27,166. Clearly, this decrease in the average area of all farms in Denmark (15.5 hectares in 1873, 14.1 in 1885, and 13.7 in 1895) really signifies *nothing more than the splitting-up of the smallest farms*.

The phenomenon we have noted becomes still more striking when we take the smaller divisions of groups. In the preface to the Danish agricultural statistics for 1895 (*Danmarks Statistik, etc. Danmarks Jordbrug*, 4-de Raekke,

Nr. 9, litra C)* the compilers show the following changes in the number of farms according to groups:

Groups of farms	Per cent increase or decrease	
	1885 to 1895	1873 to 1885
300 ha and over	+ 4.2	+ 5.0
200 to 300 ha	0	+ 6.1
120 to 200 "	+ 5.2	+ 5.1
80 to 120 "	- 1.5	- 2.1
40 to 80 "	- 2.4	- 5.0
20 to 40 "	+ 1.0	+ 3.6
10 to 20 "	+ 2.8	+ 6.5
2.5 to 10 "	- 1.9	+ 3.2
0.3 to 2.5 "	+ 2.1	+ 17.8
0 to 0.3 "	+ 25.1	+ 37.9

Thus, the increase takes place in dwarf farms, which are either farms devoted to the cultivation of special crops or *wage workers' "farms"*.

This conclusion is worth noting, because apologist professorial "science" is inclined to deduce from the decrease in the average area of all farms that small-scale production is beating large-scale production in agriculture. Actually we see progress in the largest scale agriculture, stability in the sizes of farms in all groups except the very smallest, and the *splitting-up* of the farms in this last group. This splitting-up must be ascribed to the decline and impoverishment of small-scale farming: another possible explanation, namely, the transition from agriculture in the narrow sense of the word to livestock farming, cannot be applied to all the smallest farms, for this transition is taking place in *all* groups, as we shall see in a moment. For the purpose of judging the scale on which farming is conducted in a country like Denmark, statistics on livestock farming are far more important than statistics on farm areas, because farming on different scales can be conducted on the same area of land when livestock and dairy farming are developing at a particularly fast rate.

* Danish Statistics, etc., Danish Agriculture, 4th series, No. 9, Letter C.—Ed.

It is well known that it is just this phenomenon that is observed in Denmark. The "prosperity" of Danish agriculture is due mainly to the rapid successes of commercial livestock rearing and the export of dairy produce, meat, eggs, etc., to Britain. Here we meet with the solemn statement by Pudor that Denmark "*owes the colossal development of her dairy farming to the decentralisation of her cattle-breeding and livestock farming*" (loc. cit., p. 48, Pudor's italics). It is not surprising that a man like Pudor, an out-and-out huckster in his whole system of views, who totally fails to understand the contradictions of capitalism, should take the liberty of distorting facts in this way. It is highly characteristic, however, that the petty bourgeois David, who, by some misunderstanding, passes as a socialist, uncritically trails along in his wake!

As a matter of fact, Denmark serves as a striking example of the *concentration* of livestock farming in a capitalist country. That Pudor arrived at the opposite conclusion is due only to his crass ignorance and to the fact that he distorted the *scraps* of statistics which he quotes in his pamphlet. Pudor quotes, and David slavishly repeats after him, figures showing the distribution of the total number of livestock farms in Denmark according to the number of animals per farm. According to Pudor, 39.85 per cent of the total number of farms *having livestock* have only from one to three animals each; 29.12 per cent have from four to nine animals each, etc. Hence, Pudor concludes, most of the farms are "small"; "decentralisation", etc.

In the first place Pudor quotes the *wrong* figures. This has to be noted, because Pudor boastfully declares that in his book one may find all the "latest" figures; and the revisionists "refute Marxism" by referring to ignorant bourgeois scribblers. Secondly, and this is most important, the *method* of argument employed by the Pudors and Davids is too often repeated by our Cadets and Narodniks for us to refrain from dealing with it. Following such a method of argument we should inevitably come to the conclusion that *industry* in the most advanced capitalist countries is becoming "decentralised"; for *everywhere and always* the percentage of very small and small establishments is highest, and the percentage of large establishments is in-

significant. The Pudors and the Davids forget a "trifle": the concentration of by far the greater part of total production in large enterprises which constitute only a small percentage of the total number of enterprises.

The actual distribution of the total cattle in Denmark according to the last census, taken on July 15, 1898, is shown in the following table.*

Farms having	Number of farms	Per cent	Total cattle	Per cent
1 head of cattle	18,376	10.2	18,376	1.0
2 " " "	27,394	15.2	54,788	3.1
3 " " "	22,522	12.5	67,566	3.9
4 to 5 " " "	27,561	15.2	121,721	7.0
6 to 9 " " "	26,022	14.4	188,533	10.8
10 to 14 " " "	20,375	11.3	242,690	13.9
15 to 29 " " "	30,460	16.9	615,507	35.3
30 to 49 " " "	5,650	3.1	202,683	11.6
50 to 99 " " "	1,498	0.8	99,131	5.7
100 to 199 " " "	588	0.3	81,417	4.7
200 head of cattle and over	195	0.1	52,385	3.0
<i>Total</i>	180,641	100.0	1,744,797	100.0

We see from this what role in the total livestock farming in Denmark is played by the numerous small farms and the few big farms, and what the famous "decentralisation" of production in the "ideal country" really amounts to. Small farms having one to three head of cattle number 68,292, or 37.9 per cent of the total; they have 140,730 head, i. e., only 8 per cent of the total. An almost equal number, 133,802, or 7.7 per cent, is owned by 783 big farmers comprising 0.4 per cent of the total number of farmers. Those in the first group have on an average a little over two head of cattle each, i.e., an obviously inadequate number with which to carry on commercial livestock farming; dairy and meat

* *Danmarks Statistik. Statistik Tabelvaerk. Femte Raekke, litra C, Nr. 2. Kreaturholdet d. 15 juli 1898. København, 1901.*

products can only be sold by cutting down household consumption (let us recall well-known facts: butter is sold and cheaper margarine is purchased for home use, etc.). Those in the second group have on an average 171 head of cattle each. They are the biggest capitalist farmers, "manufacturers" of milk and meat; "leaders" of technical progress and of all sorts of agricultural associations, about which petty-bourgeois admirers of "social peace" wax so enthusiastic.

If we add together the small and medium farmers we shall get a total of 121,875 farmers, or two-thirds of the total (67.5 per cent), who own up to nine head of cattle each. They own 450,984 head of cattle, or one-fourth of the total (25.8 per cent). An almost equal number, i.e., 435,616 (25 per cent) is owned by farmers having 30 and more head of cattle each. Those farmers number 7,931, or 4.3 per cent of the total. "Decentralisation" indeed!

By combining the small divisions of Danish statistics given above into three large groups we get the following:

Farms having	Number of farms	Per cent	Number of cattle	Per cent	Average per farm
1 to 3 head of cattle	68,292	37.9	140,730	8.0	2.1
4 to 9 " " "	53,583	29.6	310,254	47.8	5.8
10 head and over	58,766	32.5	1,293,813	74.2	22.0
<i>Total</i>	180,641	100.0	1,744,797	100.0	9.7

Thus, *three-fourths* of the total livestock farming in Denmark is concentrated in the hands of 58,766 farmers, that is, less than *one-third* of the total number of farmers. This one-third enjoys the lion's share of all the "prosperity" of capitalism in Danish agriculture. It should be borne in mind that this high percentage of well-to-do peasants and rich capitalists (32.5 per cent, or nearly one-third) is obtained by an artificial method of calculation which eliminates *all farmers who own no livestock*. Actually, the per-

centage is much lower. According to the census of 1895, as we have seen, the total number of farmers in Denmark is 265,982; and the livestock census of July 15, 1898, puts the total number of farmers at 278,673. In relation to this actual total number of farmers, the 58,766 well-to-do and rich farmers represent only 21.1 per cent, i.e., *only one-fifth*. The number of "farmers" who own no land is 12.4 per cent of the total number of farmers in Denmark (1895: 32,946 out of 265,982), while the farmers who own no livestock * represent 35.1 per cent of the *total number of farmers in Denmark*, i.e., *more than one-third* (1898: 98,032 out of 278,673). One can judge from this the "socialism" of gentlemen of the David type who fail to see that the capitalist prosperity of Danish agriculture is based on the *mass*

Agriculture and Livestock Farming in Denmark

Groups of farms	Number of farms	Per cent	Hectares	Per cent	Horses	Per cent	Cows
Owning no land	13,435	4.8	—	—	1,970	0.5	3,707
Amount of land							
unknown	45,896	16.5	?	?	28,909	6.4	28,072
Up to 2.5 ha	80,582	28.9	55,272	1.5	24,540	5.5	66,171
2.5 to 10 "	63,420	22.8	323,430	8.9	54,900	12.2	175,182
10 to 40 "	45,519	16.3	984,983	27.0	133,793	29.8	303,244
40 to 120 "	27,620	9.9	1,692,285	46.4	168,410	37.5	361,669
120 ha and over	2,201	0.8	588,318	16.2	36,807	8.1	129,220
<i>Total</i>	<i>278,673</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>3,644,288</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>449,329</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1,067,265</i>

Note: The figures for 1898 differ from those for 1895 in regard to the distribution of farms according to the amount of land. This may be due both to changes in time and to somewhat different methods of collecting information. But the general relation between the groups remains the same. The census of 1895 takes into account

* To be more precise, farmers who own no cattle, for unfortunately the Danish statistics do not give the number of farmers who own no

proletarianisation of the rural population, on the fact that the *mass* of the "farmers" are deprived of the means of production.

We shall now pass to the figures characterising agriculture and livestock farming in Denmark as a whole. The census of July 15, 1898 gives detailed information on the number of livestock of the various groups of farmers owning certain amounts of land. The number of these groups in the Danish statistics is particularly large (14 groups: with no land; with up to $\frac{1}{32}$ of a hartkorn; $\frac{1}{32}$ to $\frac{1}{16}$; $\frac{1}{16}$ to $\frac{1}{8}$; $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$; $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$; $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1; 1 to 2; 2 to 4; 4 to 8; 8 to 12; 12 to 20; 20 to 30; 30 and over); but we have reduced them to 6 large groups, as we did with the preceding figures.

According to the Census of July 15, 1898

Per cent	Total cattle	Per cent	Sheep	Per cent	Pigs	Per cent	Poultry	Per cent
0.3	4,633	0.3	8,943	0.8	8,865	0.8	220,147	2.5
2.6	42,150	2.4	42,987	4.0	42,699	3.7	780,585	8.9
6.2	88,720	5.1	99,705	9.3	94,656	8.1	1,649,452	18.8
16.4	247,618	14.2	187,460	17.5	191,291	16.4	1,871,242	21.4
28.5	515,832	29.6	383,950	35.7	308,863	26.4	1,957,726	22.3
33.9	639,563	36.6	310,686	28.9	409,294	35.0	1,998,595	22.8
12.1	206,281	11.8	40,682	3.8	112,825	9.6	289,155	3.3
100.0	1,744,797	100.0	1,074,413	100.0	1,168,493	100.0	8,766,902	100.0

45,860 hectares of undistributed land in addition to 3,645,750 hectares of distributed land. The group of farms with "amount of land unknown" (1898) consists largely of the lower groups, which is proved by the number of livestock.

animals whatever. From these statistics we only learn the number of owners of each type of animal. But undoubtedly, cattle form the principal basis of livestock farming in Denmark.

From these figures we see first of all how great is the concentration of livestock farming *as a whole* in Denmark. Big capitalist farmers owning over 40 hectares of land constitute only *one-tenth* of the total number of farmers (10.7 per cent); but they concentrate in their hands *more than three-fifths* of all the land (62.6 per cent) and *nearly half* of all the livestock: 45.6 per cent of all the horses, 48.4 per cent of all the cattle, 32.7 per cent of all the sheep, and 44.6 per cent of all the pigs.

If to these capitalist farmers we add the well-to-do peasants, i. e., those owning from 10 to 40 hectares, we shall get a little over a quarter of the total number of farmers (27.0 per cent) who concentrate in their hands nine-tenths of all the land, three-fourths of all the horses, four-fifths of all the cattle, seven-tenths of all the pigs, and nearly half of all the poultry. The great bulk of the "farmers", nearly three-fourths (73 per cent), own less than 10 hectares of land each and, on the whole, represent the proletarianised and semi-proletarianised mass, which plays an insignificant part in the sum total of the country's agricultural and livestock economy.

As far as the distribution of the various types of animals is concerned, sheep and pig breeding deserve special attention. The first is a declining branch of livestock farming, unprofitable for the majority of European countries at the present time owing to market conditions and overseas competition. The state of the international market calls for other forms of livestock farming to take the place of sheep farming. On the other hand, pig breeding is a particularly profitable and rapidly developing branch of livestock farming for meat in Europe. Statistics show that sheep farming is also declining in Denmark, whereas pig breeding is increasing very rapidly. From 1861 to 1898, the number of sheep in Denmark dropped from 1,700,000 to 1,100,000. The number of cattle increased from 1,100,000 to 1,700,000. The number of pigs increased from 300,000 to 1,200,000, i.e., almost a fourfold increase.

Comparing the distribution of sheep and pigs among the small and big farms we thus clearly see in the former the maximum of routine, the least adaptability to the require-

ments of the market, and slowness in readjusting the farm to the new conditions. The big capitalist farms (40 to 120 hectares, 120 hectares and over) cut down unprofitable sheep farming most (28.9 per cent and 3.8 per cent of sheep, as against 33-37 per cent and 8-12 per cent of other types of livestock). The small farms were less adaptable: they still keep a larger number of sheep; for example, farms up to 2.5 hectares have 9.3 per cent of the total number of sheep, as against 6-5 per cent of the other types of livestock. They possess 8.1 per cent of the pigs—a *smaller* proportion than of sheep. The capitalists have 35 and 9.6 per cent, i.e., a *larger* share than of sheep. Capitalist agriculture is much better able to adapt itself to the requirements of the international market. In regard to the peasant, we still have to say, in the words of Marx: the peasant turns merchant and industrialist without the conditions enabling him to become a real merchant and industrialist.¹¹ The market demands of *every* farmer, as an absolute necessity, submission to the new conditions and speedy adjustment to them. But this speedy adjustment is impossible without *capital*. Thus, under capitalism small-scale farming is condemned to the utmost of routine and backwardness and the least adaptability to the market.

To envisage more concretely the real economic features of this needy mass and of the small wealthy minority, we shall quote figures of the average amount of land and livestock on the farms of the various groups. It is natural for bourgeois political economy (and for the revisionist gentry) to gloss over capitalist contradictions; socialist political economy must ascertain the difference in *types* of farms and standard of living between the prosperous capitalist farmers and the needy small farmers. See table, page 208.

These figures clearly show that all three lower groups, comprising half the total number of farms, belong to *poor* peasants. "Farmers" owning no horses and no cows predominate. Only in the group with land up to 2.5 hectares is there one *whole* head of cattle, one sheep, and one pig per farm. Obviously, there can be no question of this *half* of the total number of farms making any profit out of dairy and meat livestock farming. For this half, the prosperity of Danish agriculture means dependence upon the big

Average per Farm

Groups of farms	Hec-tares	Horses	Cows	Total cattle	Sheep	Pigs	Poul-try
Owning no land	—	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.7	16.4
Amount of land unknown	?	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	17.0
Up to 2.5 ha	0.6	0.3	0.8	1.1	1.2	1.2	20.4
2.5 to 10 "	5.1	0.9	2.7	3.9	2.9	3.0	29.5
10 to 40 "	21.6	2.9	6.6	11.3	8.4	6.8	43.0
40 to 120 "	61.3	6.1	13.8	23.1	11.2	14.9	72.4
120 ha and over	267.3	16.7	58.7	93.7	18.5	51.2	131.3
<i>Average</i>	13.1	1.6	3.8	6.3	3.9	4.2	31.5

farmers, the necessity of seeking "auxiliary employment", i.e., of selling their labour power in one way or another, perpetual poverty and semi-ruined farms.

Of course, this conclusion holds good only for the whole *mass* of those poorest farms. We have already shown with the aid of German, French, and Russian agricultural statistics that even among the farms having a small amount of land there are big livestock owners, tobacco growers, and so forth. The differentiation is deeper than can be imagined from the returns of Danish statistics. But this differentiation, by singling out in each group an insignificant minority of farms growing special crops, only *emphasises* the poverty and want of the *majority* of the farmers in the poorest groups.

Further, it is also evident from the figures quoted that even the group of small peasants owning from 2.5 hectares to 10 hectares cannot be regarded as being at all secure and economically well established. Let us recall the fact that in this group there are 63,000 farms, or 22.8 per cent of the total, and that the average is 0.9 horses per farm. The horseless farmers probably use their cows for draught, thus worsening the conditions of both agricultural farming (shallow ploughing) and livestock farming (weakening the cattle). The average number of cows in this group is

2.7 per farm. Even if the household consumption of milk and meat products is reduced—and such a reduction is itself a direct sign of bitter need—this number of cows could provide only a very small quantity of products for sale. The share such farms with an average of 2.7 cows and 3 pigs per household enjoy in the "prosperity" of the "national" sale of milk and meat to Britain *can only be* very insignificant. With farms of this size, commercial agriculture and livestock farming mean, partly, selling what is necessary for the family, poorer diet, increased poverty, and partly, selling in very small quantities, i. e., under the most disadvantageous conditions, and the impossibility of having money put by to meet inevitable extra expenses. And the natural economy of the small peasant under the conditions prevailing in modern capitalist countries is doomed to stagnation, to a slow painful death; it certainly cannot prosper. The whole "trick" of bourgeois and revisionist political economy lies in not making a separate study of the conditions of this particular type of small farm, which is below the "average" (the "average" Danish farmer has 1.6 horses and 3.8 cows), and which represents the *overwhelming majority* of the total number of farms. Not only is this type of farm not specially studied; it is glossed over by references exclusively to "average" figures, to the general increase in "production" and "sales", and by saying nothing about the fact that only the well-to-do farms, which represent the small minority, *can sell profitably*.

It is only among the farmers having from 10 to 40 hectares that we see a sufficient number of livestock to create the *possibility* of "prosperity". But these farms represent only 16 per cent of the total. And it is questionable whether they manage entirely without hired labour, since they have on an average 21.6 hectares of land per farm. In view of the high degree of intensive farming in Denmark, farms of such dimensions probably cannot be carried on without the assistance of farm-hands or day-labourers. Unfortunately, both Danish statisticians and the majority of those who write about Danish agriculture adhere entirely to the bourgeois point of view and do not explore the question of hired labour, the size of farms requiring its employment, and so forth. From the Danish census of occupations of 1901

we learn only that in the group of "day-labourers", etc., there are 60,000 men and 56,000 women, i. e., 116,000 out of a total of 972,000 of the rural population distributed according to occupation. As to whether these tens of thousands of wage-workers (and in addition to them small peasants do "by-work" for hire) are employed exclusively by the 30,000 big capitalist farmers (27,620 owning from 40 to 120 hectares and 2,201 owning over 120 hectares each), or whether some of them are also employed by the well-to-do peasants owning from 10 to 40 hectares, we have no information.

Of the two highest groups, the upper Thirty Thousand of Danish agriculture, there is little to say: the capitalist character of their agriculture and livestock farming is graphically illustrated by the figures quoted at the beginning.

Finally, the last data of general interest touched upon and partly analysed in Danish agricultural statistics are those relating to the question whether the development of livestock farming, that main foundation of the "prosperity" of the "ideal country", is accompanied by a process of decentralisation or concentration. The statistics for 1898, already quoted by us, provide extremely interesting data compared with those for 1893; and for one type of livestock, the most important, it is true, namely, total cattle, we can also make a comparison between the figures for 1876 and 1898.

Between 1893 and 1898 the branch of livestock farming which made most progress in Denmark was pig breeding. In this period the number of pigs increased from 829,000 to 1,168,000, or by 40 per cent, while the number of horses increased only from 410,000 to 449,000, of cattle from 1,696,000 to 1,744,000, and the number of sheep even diminished. Who reaped the main benefits of this tremendous progress of the Danish farmers, united in innumerable co-operative societies? The compilers of the 1898 statistics answer this by comparing the returns for 1893 and 1898. All the pig-owners are divided into four groups: big owners having 50 and more pigs; medium-big owners with from 15 to 49; medium-small owners with from 4 to 14; and small owners with from 1 to 3 pigs. The compilers give the following figures for these four groups:

Groups of farms	1893		1898		Per cent increase or decrease		Per cent distribution of total pigs	
	Number of		Number of		Farms	Pigs	1893	1898
	Farms	Pigs	Farms	Pigs	Farms	Pigs		
50 head and over								
15 to 49	844	79,230	1,487	135,999	76.2	71.7	9.6	11.6
4 to 14	20,602	350,277	30,852	554,979	48.2	58.4	42.3	47.5
1 to 3	38,357	211,868	50,668	282,642	32.1	33.4	25.5	24.2
<i>Total</i>	108,820	187,756	108,544	194,873	0.3	3.8	22.6	16.7
<i>Total</i>	168,623	829,131	191,551	1,168,493	13.6	40.9	100.0	100.0

These figures clearly show that a rapid *concentration* of livestock farming is taking place. The larger the farm, the more it gained from the "progress" of livestock farming. The big farms increased their number of livestock by 71.7 per cent; the medium-big farms increased theirs by 58.4 per cent; the medium-small farms by 33.4 per cent; and the small farms only by 3.8 per cent. The increase in wealth occurred mainly among the small "upper" minority. The total increase of pigs during the five years was 339,000; of these 261,000, or, *more than three-fourths*, were accounted for by the big and medium-big farms, numbering 32,000 (out of a total of 266,000-277,000 farms!). Small-scale production in livestock farming of this type is being *ousted* by large-scale production: during the five years there was an *increase* in the share of the big farms (from 9.6 per cent to 11.6 per cent) and that of the medium-big farms (from 42.3 per cent to 47.5 per cent); whereas that of the medium-small farms *diminished* (from 25.5 per cent to 24.2 per cent), and that of the small farms diminished still more (from 22.6 per cent to 16.7 per cent).

If instead of the bare figures of *area* we could get statistics of agricultural farming expressing the scale of production as precisely as the figures of the number of livestock

express * the scale of livestock farming, there is no doubt that here as well we would see the process of *concentration* which the bourgeois professors and opportunists deny.

Still more interesting are the corresponding figures of total cattle. We can supplement the comparison of the figures of 1893 and 1898 made by the compilers of the 1898 statistics with the returns of the census of July 17, 1876. (*Danmarks Statistik. Statistik Tabelvaerk*, 4-de Raekke, litra C, Nr. 1. Kreaturholdet d. 17 juli, 1876, København, 1878.) Here are the figures for the three years.

These figures, covering a longer period of time and a more important type of livestock, illustrate the process of capitalist concentration as graphically as those previously quoted. The growth of livestock farming in Denmark indicates the progress *almost exclusively* of large-scale capitalist farming. The total livestock increase between 1876 and 1898 was 424,000 head. Of these, 76,000 belonged to farms having 50 head and more, and 303,000 to farms having from 15 to 49 head each, i.e., these upper 38,000 farms gained 379,000 head, or *nearly nine-tenths of the total increase*. No more striking picture of capitalist concentration could be imagined.

The total number of cattle-owning farms increased between 1876 and 1898 by 12,645 (180,641-167,996), or by 7.5 per cent. The total population of Denmark increased between 1880 and 1901 (i. e., during a slightly shorter period of time) from 1,969,039 to 2,449,540,** i. e., by 24.4 per cent. Clearly, the relative number of "haves", i. e., owners of livestock, diminished. The smaller part of the population belongs to the class of property-owners. The number of smallest owners (one to three head of livestock) steadily diminished. The number of medium-small owners (with 4 to 14 head) increased very slowly (+12.5 per cent between 1876 and 1893, +2.5 per cent between 1893 and

* We showed above, according to Drechsler's figures, that the livestock in the big farms are bigger. Here too, therefore, the overall statistics minimise the degree of concentration.

** In 1880, the urban population constituted 28 per cent, and in 1901, 38 per cent.

Groups of farms	1876			1893			1898			Per cent increase or decrease			Per cent distribution of total cattle			
										1876 to 1893		1893 to 1898		Number of		
	Number of		Farms		Cattle		Farms		Cattle		Farms		Cattle		Number of	
50 head and over	1,634	156,728	2,209	224,667	2,281	232,933	35,241	44.4	3.3	5.4	11.8	13.0	13.4			
15 to 49	24,096	514,678	35,200	793,474	36,110	818,190	46,154	41	2.6	3.4	39.0	46.8	46.8			
4 to 14	64,110	504,193	72,173	539,304	73,958	552,944	42,5	6.9	2.5	2.5	38.2	31.8	31.7			
1 to 3	78,156	144,930	70,218	141,748	68,292	140,730	10,2	2.2	2.7	0.7	11.0	8.4	8.1			
Total	167,996	1,320,529	179,800	1,696,190	180,641	1,744,797	7.0	28.4	0.5	2.9	100.0	100.0	100.0			

1898) and lagged behind the increase of the population. A real and rapid increase is observed only in large-scale capitalist livestock farming. Between 1876 and 1893 the medium-big farms increased more rapidly than the big farms; but between 1893 and 1898, the biggest farms increased more rapidly.

Taking the figures for 1876 and 1898 for the group of biggest farms, i. e., owners of 200 or more head of cattle, we find that in 1876 they numbered 79 (0.05 per cent of the total number of livestock owners) with 18,970 head of cattle (1.4 per cent of the total); while in 1898, there were twice as many, viz., 195 (0.1 per cent of the total) with 52,385 head of cattle (3.0 per cent of the total). The number of the biggest farmers more than doubled and their output nearly trebled.

The ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production proceeded steadily between 1876 and 1898. The share of the small farms in the total number of cattle continually diminished: from 11.0 per cent in 1876 to 8.4 per cent in 1893, and to 8.1 per cent in 1898. The share of the medium farms also continually diminished, although somewhat more slowly (38.2—31.8—31.7 per cent). The share of the medium-big farms increased from 39.0 per cent in 1876 to 46.8 per cent in 1893, but remained at the same level between 1893 and 1898. Only the share of the biggest farms steadily increased, pushing aside all the other categories (11.8—13.0—13.4 per cent).

The more favourable the conditions for livestock farming, the more rapid is the development and progress of commercial livestock farming, and the more intense is the process of capitalist concentration. For example, in the Copenhagen district, which had a population of 234,000 in 1880 and 378,000 in 1901, dairy and meat products were, of course, the most marketable items. The farmers in that district were richer in cattle than all the other farmers in Denmark, both in 1876 and in 1898, having on an average 8.5 and 11.6 head of cattle each, compared with an average of 7.9 and 9.7 for the whole country. And in this district, in which the conditions are most favourable for the development of livestock farming, we see the process of concentration is most intense.

The following are the figures for this district for 1876 and 1898, according to the groups which we adopted above:

	1876		1898	
	Number of farms	Number of cattle	Number of farms	Number of cattle
50 head and over	44	4,488	86	9,059
15 to 49	1,045	22,119	1,545	35,579
4 to 14	2,011	16,896	1,900	14,559
1 to 3	2,514	4,468	1,890	3,767
<i>Total</i>	5,614	47,971	5,421	62,964

During the 22 years even the absolute number of owners diminished! Livestock wealth was concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of farmers. Both the small and the middle farmers after 22 years proved to be *fewer* and to have *fewer* livestock. The medium-big farmers increased their possessions by fifty per cent (from 22,000 to 35,000). The big farmers *more than doubled* their possessions. Of the biggest farmers, owning 200 and more head of cattle, there were in 1876 *two* who owned 437 head; in 1898, however, there were 10 who owned 2,896 head of cattle.

The concern which the Pudors, Davids, and other voluntary or involuntary servants of capital show for improved marketing conditions, the development of farmers' associations, and technical progress in livestock farming and agriculture can have only one purpose: to bring about throughout the country and in all branches of agriculture conditions like those in the Copenhagen district, i. e., particularly rapid concentration of production in the hands of the capitalists and the expropriation, proletarianisation of the population, a reduction of the proportion of property-owners to the total population, an increase in the proportion of those whom capitalism is forcing out of the country into the towns, etc.

To sum up: the "ideal country" from the standpoint of the opponents of Marxism on the agrarian question very clearly reveals (despite the socio-economic statistics being still at a low level and lacking analysis) the capitalist agrarian system, the sharply expressed capitalist contradictions in agriculture and livestock farming, the growing concentration of agricultural production, the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production, and the proletarianisation and impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of the rural population.

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME
OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY
IN THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
1905-1907 “

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The two years of revolution, from the autumn of 1905 to the autumn of 1907, have furnished a vast amount of experience of historical value concerning the peasant movement in Russia and the character and significance of the peasants' struggle for land. Decades of so-called "peaceful" evolution (i. e., when millions of people peacefully allow themselves to be fleeced by the upper ten thousand) can never furnish such a wealth of material for explaining the inner workings of our social system as has been furnished in these two years both by the direct struggle of the peasant masses against the landlords and by the demands of the peasants, expressed with at least some degree of freedom, at assemblies of representatives of the people. Therefore, the revision of the agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democrats in the light of the experience of these two years is absolutely necessary, particularly in view of the fact that the present agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was adopted at the Stockholm Congress in April 1906, i. e., on the eve of the first public appearance of representatives of the peasantry from all over Russia with a peasant agrarian programme, in opposition to the programme of the government and to that of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The revision of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme must be based on the latest data on landed property in Russia in order to ascertain with the utmost precision what actually is the economic background of all the agrarian programmes of our epoch, and what precisely are the issues in the great historic struggle. This economic basis of the real struggle must be compared with the ideological-political reflection of this basis that is found in the programmes, declarations, demands, and theories of the

spokesmen of the different classes. This is the course, and the only course, that a Marxist should take, unlike the petty-bourgeois socialist who proceeds from "abstract" justice, from the theory of the "labour principle", etc., and unlike the liberal bureaucrat who, in connection with every reform, covers up his defence of the interests of the exploiters by arguments about whether the reform is practicable and about the "state" point of view.

CHAPTER I THE ECONOMIC BASIS AND NATURE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

1. LANDOWNERSHIP IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

The *Landed Property Statistics for 1905*, published by the Central Statistical Committee in 1907, enables us to ascertain precisely the comparative size of the peasant and landlord holdings in the fifty gubernias in European Russia. First of all we will give the general data. The whole territory of European Russia (50 gubernias) is given (see census of January 28, 1897) as 4,230,500 square versts, i. e., 440,800,000 dessiatins. The landed property statistics for 1905 register a total of 395,200,000 dessiatins under the following three main headings:

	Million dessiatins
A. Privately owned land	101.7
B. Allotment land ¹	138.8
C. Land owned by state, church, and various institutions	154.7
<i>Total land in European Russia</i>	<i>395.2</i>

From these general figures it is necessary to deduct, first of all, state lands situated in the far north and consisting partly of tundra and partly of such forest land as cannot be expected to be used for agriculture in the near future. There are 107,900,000 dessiatins of such land in the "north-

ern region" (in the Arkhangelsk, Olonets and Vologda gubernias). Of course, by deducting all these lands we considerably overestimate the area of land unsuitable for agriculture. It suffices to point out that such a cautious statistician as Mr. A. A. Kaufman calculates that in the Vologda and Olonets gubernias 25,700,000 dessiatins of forest land (with over 25 per cent of forest) could be utilised for additional allotment to the peasants.* However, since we are dealing with general data about the land area, without giving separate figures for forest land, it will be more correct to take a more cautious estimate of the land area suitable for agriculture. After deducting 107,900,000 dessiatins, there will be left 287,300,000 dessiatins, or in round figures, 280,000,000 dessiatins, leaving out a portion of urban land (the total of which is 2,000,000 dessiatins) and a portion of the state lands in the Vyatka and Perm gubernias (the total area of state land in these two gubernias is 16,300,000 dessiatins).

Thus, the *aggregate* amount of land suitable for agriculture in European Russia is distributed as follows:

A. Privately owned land	101.7	million dessiatins
B. Allotment land	138.8	" "
C. State land and land owned by various institutions	39.5	" "
<i>Total in European Russia</i>	<i>280.0</i>	<i>" "</i>

Now we must give separate figures for small and large (particularly very large) holdings in order to obtain a concrete idea of the conditions of the peasant struggle for land in the Russian revolution. Such figures, however, are incomplete. Of the 138,800,000 dessiatins of peasant allotment land 136,900,000 dessiatins are classified according to size of holdings. Of the 101,700,000 dessiatins of privately owned land, 85,900,000 dessiatins are so classified; the remaining 15,800,000 dessiatins are recorded as belonging to "societies and associations". Examining the latter we find that 11,300,000 dessiatins are owned by peasant

* *The Agrarian Question*, a collection of articles published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. II, Moscow, 1907, p. 305.

societies and associations, which means that on the whole they are small holdings, unfortunately not classified according to size. Further, 3,700,000 dessiatins belong to "industrial and commercial, manufacturing and other" associations, of which there are 1,042. Of these, 272 own more than 1,000 dessiatins each, the total for the 272 being 3,600,000 dessiatins. These are, evidently, landlord latifundia. The bulk of this land is concentrated in Perm Gubernia, where *nine* such associations own 1,448,902 dessiatins! It is known that the Urals factories own many thousand dessiatins of land—a direct survival in bourgeois Russia of the feudal, seigniorial latifundia.

We therefore single out 3,600,000 dessiatins from the land owned by societies and associations as the biggest landed estates. The remainder has not been classified, but generally it consists of small holdings.

Out of the 39,500,000 dessiatins of state and other lands, only the crown lands** (5,100,000 dessiatins) lend themselves to classification according to size. These, too, are very large semi-medieval landed estates. We thus get a total area of land, both classified and not classified according to size of holdings, as follows:

	Land classified according to size of holdings (million dessiatins)	Land not classified
A. Privately owned land	89.5*	12.2
B. Allotment land	136.9	1.9
C. State land and land owned by various institutions	5.1	34.4
<i>Total</i>	<i>231.5</i>	<i>48.5</i>
<i>Grand total</i>		<i>280.0</i>

Let us now classify the allotment land according to size of holdings. By rearranging the data obtained from our source of information into somewhat larger groups, we get:

* 85,900,000 dessiatins of privately owned land plus 3,600,000 dessiatins of latifundia owned by industrial and commercial associations and societies.

Allotment Land

Groups of households	Number of households	Total area of land (dess.)	Average dessiatins per household
Up to 5 dess. inclusive	2,857,650	9,030,333	3.1
5 to 8 "	3,317,601	21,706,550	6.5
Total up to 8 dess. incl.	6,175,251	30,736,883	4.9
8 to 15 " "	3,932,485	42,182,923	10.7
15 to 30 " "	1,551,904	31,271,922	20.1
Over 30 " "	617,715	32,695,510	52.9
<i>Total in European Russia</i>	<i>12,277,355</i>	<i>136,887,238</i>	<i>11.1</i>

From these data it is evident that more than half of the households (6,200,000 out of 12,300,000) have up to 8 dessiatins each, i. e., in general and on the average, an area of land that is absolutely insufficient to support a family. Ten million one hundred thousand households possess up to 15 dessiatins each (making a total of 72,900,000 dessiatins), i. e., over four-fifths of the total number of households are, at the present level of peasant agricultural technique, on the brink of semi-starvation. Middle and well-to-do households—according to amount of land owned—number only 2,200,000 out of 12,300,000, owning altogether 63,900,000 dessiatins out of 136,900,000 dessiatins. Only households having more than 30 dessiatins each can be regarded as rich; of these there are only 600,000, i. e., one-twentieth of the total number of households. They possess nearly one-fourth of the total land area: 32,700,000 out of 136,900,000 dessiatins. To give an idea as to which categories of peasants constitute this group of rich households, we shall point out that first place among them is held by the Cossacks. In the over-30-dessiatins-per-household group, the Cossack households number 266,929 having a total of 14,426,403 dessiatins, i. e., the overwhelming majority of the Cossacks (in European Russia: 278,650 households having a total of 14,689,498 dessiatins of land, i. e., an average of 52.7 dessiatins per household).

The only data available for the whole of Russia enabling us to judge how all the peasant households are approximate-

ly classified according to scale of farming and not according to area of allotments, are those about the number of horses owned. According to the last army horse censuses of 1888-91, the peasant households in 48 gubernias of European Russia are classified as follows:

		Households
Poor	{ Without horses	2,765,970
	Owning 1 horse	2,885,192
Middle	{ " 2 horses	2,240,574
	" 3 "	1,070,250
Well-to-do	" 4 " or more	1,154,674
<i>Total</i>		10,116,660

Broadly speaking, this means that over one-half are poor (5,600,000 out of 10,100,000), about one-third are middle households (3,300,000 with 2 or 3 horses), and slightly over one-tenth are well-to-do (1,100,000 out of 10,100,000).

Let us now examine the distribution of individual private landed property. The statistics do not give a clear enough idea of the smallest holdings, but they give extremely detailed data on the biggest latifundia.

Individual Private Landed Property in European Russia			
Groups of holdings	Number of holdings	Total area of land (dess.)	Average dess. per holding
10 dess. and less	409,864	1,625,226	3.9
10-50 dess. incl.	209,119	4,891,031	23.4
50-500 "	106,065	17,326,495	163.3
500-2,000 "	21,748	20,590,708	947
2,000-10,000 "	5,386	20,602,109	3,825
Over 10,000 "	699	20,798,504	29,754
<i>Total over 500 dess.</i>	27,833	61,991,321	2,227
<i>Grand total for European Russia</i>	752,881	85,834,073	114

We see here, first, the enormous preponderance of large landownership: 619,000 small holders (up to 50 dessiatins) own only 6,500,000 dessiatins. Secondly, we see vast latifundia: 699 owners have almost 30,000 dessiatins each!

28,000 owners have a total of 62,000,000 dessiatins, i. e., 2,227 dessiatins each. The overwhelming majority of these latifundia are owned by the nobility, namely, 18,102 estates (out of 27,833) and 44,471,994 dessiatins of land, i. e., over 70 per cent of the entire latifundia area. The medieval character of landlordism is very strikingly revealed by these data.

2. WHAT IS THE STRUGGLE ABOUT?

Ten million peasant households own 73,000,000 dessiatins of land, whereas 28,000 noble and upstart landlords own 62,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the arena on which the peasants' struggle for the land is developing. On such a main background amazing technical backwardness, the neglected state of agriculture, an oppressed and downtrodden state of the mass of peasantry and an endless variety of forms of feudal, corvée exploitation are inevitable. Not to wander too far afield we must confine ourselves to mentioning briefly these commonly known facts, which have been described at great length in the extensive literature on peasant agriculture. The size of the landholdings outlined by us in no way corresponds to the scale of farming. In the purely Russian gubernias large-scale capitalist farming definitely drops into the background. Small-scale farming preponderates on large latifundia, comprising various forms of tenant farming based on servitude and bondage, labour service (corvée) farming, "winter hiring",¹⁰ bondage for cattle trespassing on the landlords' pastures, bondage for the cut-off lands, and so on without end. The mass of the peasants, crushed by feudal exploitation, are being ruined and some of them let their allotments to "thrifty" farmers. The small minority of well-to-do peasants develops into a peasant bourgeoisie, rents land for capitalist farming and exploits hundreds of thousands of farm-hands and day-labourers.

Bearing in mind all these facts, which have been fully established by Russian economic science, we must distinguish, in regard to the present struggle of the peasants for the land, *four basic groups* of landholdings: (1) a mass of peasant farms crushed by the feudal latifundia and directly

interested in the expropriation of these latifundia, an expropriation from which they stand to gain directly more than anyone else; (2) a small minority of middle peasants already possessing an approximately average amount of land, sufficient to conduct farming in a tolerable way; (3) a small minority of well-to-do peasants who are becoming transformed into a peasant bourgeoisie and who are connected by a number of intermediate stages with farming conducted on capitalist lines, and (4) feudal latifundia far exceeding in dimensions the capitalist farms of the present period in Russia and deriving their revenues chiefly from the exploitation of the peasants by means of bondage and the labour rent system.

Of course, the available data on landed property enable us to distinguish these basic groups only very approximately and sketchily. Nevertheless, we are obliged to distinguish them if we are to present a complete picture of the struggle for land in the Russian revolution. And we can safely say in advance that partial corrections of the figures, partial shifting of the boundary line between one group and another, *cannot* substantially alter the general picture. It is not partial corrections that are important; what is important is that a clear contrast be made between small landownership, which is striving for more land, and the feudal latifundia, which monopolise an enormous amount of land. The chief falsity of both the government's (Stolypin's) and the liberals' (the Cadets') economics lies in the fact that they conceal, or obscure, this clear contrast.

Let us assume the following sizes of landholdings for the four groups mentioned: (1) up to 15 dessiatins; (2) 15 to 20 dessiatins; (3) 20 to 500 dessiatins, and (4) over 500 dessiatins per holding. Of course, in order to present a complete picture of the struggle for land, we must, in each of these groups, combine the peasants' allotments with the private holdings. In our source of information the latter category is divided into groups: up to 10 dessiatins, and from 10 to 20 dessiatins, so that a group up to 15 dessiatins can be singled out only approximately. Any inaccuracy that may arise from this approximate calculation and from the round figures that we give, will be quite negligible (as

the reader will soon see) and will not affect the conclusions to be drawn.

Here is a table showing the present distribution of land among these groups in European Russia:

Group	Number of holdings (millions)	Total area of land (million dessiatins)	Average dess. per holding
(a) Ruined peasantry, crushed by feudal exploitation	10.5	75.0	7.0
(b) Middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
(c) Peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership	1.5	70.0	46.7
(d) Feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
<i>Total</i>	13.03	230.0	17.6
Not classified according to holdings	—	50	—
<i>Grand total*</i>	13.03	280.0	21.4

Such are the relations which give rise to the peasants' struggle for land. Such is the *starting-point* of the peasants' struggle (7-15 dessiatins per household plus renting on terms of bondage, etc.) against the very big landlords (2,333 dessiatins per estate). What is the objective tendency, the *ultimate* point of this struggle? Obviously, it is the abolition of large feudalist estates and the transfer of the land

* As already mentioned, this table is given in round figures. Here are the exact figures: allotment land: (a) 10,100,000 holdings and 72,900,000 dessiatins; (b) 874,000 holdings and 15,000,000 dessiatins. Private landed property up to 10 dessiatins, 410,000 holdings and 1,600,000 dessiatins; 10-20 dessiatins, 106,000 holdings and 1,600,000 dessiatins. Sum total a+b of both categories of land: 11,500,000 holdings and 91,200,000 dessiatins. For group (c) the exact figures are 1,500,000 holdings and 69,500,000 dessiatins. For group (d): 27,833 holdings and 81,990,000 dessiatins of land. To the latter are added, as already mentioned, 5,100,000 dessiatins of crown lands and 3,600,000 dessiatins owned by the very large industrial and commercial associations. The exact figure of land not classified according to holdings was given above as 48,500,000 dessiatins. From this the reader may see that all our approximate calculations and round figures involve quite negligible numerical changes and cannot affect our conclusions in the least.

(according to certain principles) to the peasants. This objective tendency inevitably arises from the predominance of small-scale *cultivation*, which is held in bondage by the feudal latifundia. To depict this tendency in the same graphic way in which we depicted the starting-point of the struggle, i. e., the present state of affairs, we must take the best conceivable eventuality, i. e., we must assume that all the feudalist latifundia, as well as all land not classified according to holdings, have passed into the hands of the ruined peasantry. It is this best eventuality which *all* the participants in the present agrarian struggle envisage more or less distinctly: the government talks about "allotting" land to the "needy", the liberal official (or Cadet) talks about supplementary allotments to those who have little land, the peasant Trudovik talks about increasing holdings to the "subsistence" or "labour" "norm", and the Social-Democrat, differing on the question of the form of land tenure, generally accepts the proposal of the Narodniks about allotting land to the poorest peasants. (In the Second Duma, 47th sitting, May 26, 1907, Tsereteli accepted the figure of the value of the 57,000,000 dessiatins of land to be alienated as given by the Narodnik Karavayev, namely, 6,500,000,000 rubles, of which the poorest peasants having up to 5 dessiatins account for 2,500,000,000 rubles. See Stenographic Record, p. 1221.) In short, however much the landlords, the officials, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the proletariat may differ in their view of the aims and terms of the reform, they all outline the same tendency, namely, the transfer of the large landed estates to the most needy peasants. With the fundamental differences of opinion among the classes concerning the extent and terms of such a transfer we shall deal separately elsewhere. At present we shall supplement our outline of the starting-point of the struggle with a similar outline of its possible ultimate point. We have already shown what the situation is *now*. We shall show what it may be *then*. Let us assume that 30,000 landlords will retain 100 dessiatins each, i. e., a total of 3,000,000 dessiatins, while the remaining 67,000,000 dessiatins and 50,000,000 dessiatins of unclassified land will be transferred to 10,500,000 poor households. We shall then get the following:

	Now			Then		
	Number of holdings (mill.)	Total area of land (mill. dess.)	Average dess. per holding	Number of holdings (mill.)	Total area of land (mill. dess.)	Average dess. per holding
(a) Small ruined peasants	10.5	75	7.0	—	—	—
(b) Middle peasants	1.0	15	15.0	11.5	207	18.0
(c) Wealthy peasants and bourgeoisie	1.5	70	46.7	1.53	73	47.7
(d) Feudal landlords	0.03	70	2,333.0	—	—	—
<i>Total</i>	13.03	230	17.6	13.03	280	21.4
Unclassified land	—	50	—	—	—	—
<i>Grand total</i>	13.03	280	21.4	—	—	—

Such is the economic basis of the struggle for land in the Russian revolution. Such is the starting-point of this struggle and its tendency, i.e., its ultimate point, its result in the best eventuality (from the standpoint of those engaged in the struggle).

Before proceeding to examine this economic basis and its ideological (and ideological-political) cloak, let us dwell on possible misunderstandings and objections as well.

First, it may be said that my picture presupposes the *division* of the land, whereas I have not yet examined the question of municipalisation, division, nationalisation, or socialisation.

That would be a misunderstanding. My picture leaves out altogether the *terms* of landownership; it does not deal at all with the *terms* of the transfer of the land to the peasants (whether in ownership or in one or another form of tenure). I have taken only the *transfer of the land in general* to the small peasants and there can be no doubt whatever that this is the trend of our agrarian struggle. The small peasants are fighting, fighting to have the land transferred to *themselves*. Small (bourgeois) cultivation is fighting large-scale (feudal) landownership.* At best, the revolution can have *no other* result than the one I have drawn.

* What I have put in brackets is either ignored or denied by the petty-bourgeois ideology of the Narodniks. I shall deal with this later on.

Secondly, it may be said that I had no right to assume that all the confiscated lands (or expropriated lands, for I have not yet said anything about the terms of expropriation) will be transferred to the peasants with little land. It may be said that owing to economic necessity the lands *must* be transferred to the wealthier peasants. But such an objection would be a misunderstanding. To demonstrate the bourgeois character of the revolution, I must take the best eventuality from the standpoint of the Narodniks, I must *assume* the achievement of the aim set themselves by those who are fighting. I must take an aspect that most closely approaches the so-called General Redistribution¹⁰⁰ and not the further consequences of the agrarian revolution. If the masses win the struggle, they will take the fruits of the victory for themselves. To whom these fruits will ultimately go is another matter.

Thirdly, it may be said that I have assumed an unusually favourable result for the poor peasantry (that the whole of the poor peasantry will be transformed into middle peasants with holdings up to 18 dessiatins per household) by *overestimating* the extent of the unoccupied land area. It may be said that I should have discounted forests, which, it is said, cannot be allotted to the peasants. Such objections may, and even inevitably will, be raised by the economists in the government and Cadet camp, but they will be wrong. First, one must be a bureaucrat who all his life grovels to the semi-feudal landlord to imagine that the peasants will not be able to manage forest land properly and derive an income from it for *themselves* and not for the landlords. The standpoint of the police official and of the Russian liberal is: how to provide the muzhik with an allotment? The standpoint of the class-conscious worker is: how to free the muzhik from feudal landlordism? How to break up the feudal latifundia? Secondly I have left out the *whole* of the northern region (the Arkhangelsk, Vologda, and Olonets gubernias), as well as parts of the Vyatka and Perm gubernias, i.e., areas in which it is difficult to imagine that the agricultural exploitation of land covered by forests is likely in the near future. Thirdly, a special calculation of the forest areas would greatly complicate the matter without much altering the results. For instance,

Mr. Kaufman, who is a Cadet, and, consequently, is very *cautious* when dealing with landlord estates, calculates that land with over 25 per cent of forest might go to cover the shortage of land, and he thus obtains an area of 101,700,000 dessiatins for 44 gubernias. For 47 gubernias I have estimated a land area of approximately 101,000,000 dessiatins, i. e., 67,000,000 out of the 70,000,000 dessiatins of the feudal latifundia, and 34,000,000 dessiatins owned by the state and by various institutions. Assuming that all landed estates of over 100 dessiatins are to be expropriated, these lands will be increased by another nine or ten million dessiatins.*

3. THE CADET WRITERS OBSCURE THE NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE

The data given here on the role of the large landlord estates in the struggle for land in Russia must be amplified in one respect. A characteristic feature of the agrarian programmes of our bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in them the question as to *which* class is the most powerful opponent of the peasantry, and *which holdings* form the bulk of the expropriable lands are obscured by arguments about "norms". They (both the Cadets and the Trudoviks) talk mainly about how much land the peasants need according to this or that "norm", instead of dealing with the more concrete and vital question: how much land is *available* for expropriation? The first way of presenting the question obscures the class struggle, conceals the *essence*

* The alienation limit of 500 dessiatins, which I have taken in the text, is purely hypothetical. If this limit is taken as 100 dessiatins, which is also purely hypothetical, the picture of the change will be as follows:

Now		Then		
Households (millions)	Total area of land (million dessiatins)	Households (millions)	Total area of land (million dessiatins)	Dess. per household
(a) 10.5	75	(a) —	—	—
(b) 1.0	15	(b) 11.5	217	18.8
(c) 1.4	50	(c) 1.53	63	41.1
(d) 0.13	90	(d) —	—	—
13.03	230	13.03	280	21.4
	+ 50			

The main conclusions about the character and essence of the change are identical in either case.

of the matter by hollow pretensions to a "state" point of view. The second places the chief emphasis on the class struggle, on the class interests of a definite landowning stratum which largely represents feudal tendencies.

We shall revert to the question of "norms" elsewhere. Here we want to mention one "happy" exception among the Trudoviks, and one typical Cadet writer.

In the Second Duma, the Popular Socialist Delarov referred to the percentage of landowners who would be affected by the alienation of land (47th sitting, May 26, 1907). Delarov spoke of *alienation* (compulsory), without raising the question of confiscation, and apparently accepted the same norm of alienation which I have taken hypothetically in my table, namely, 500 dessiatins. Unfortunately, in the stenographic records of the Second Duma this particular passage in Delarov's speech (p. 1217) is distorted, unless Mr. Delarov himself made a mistake. The record says that compulsory alienation would affect 32 per cent of the private estates and 96 per cent of their total area of land; the rest, 68 per cent of the landowners, it is claimed, have only 4 per cent of the private land. Actually, the figure should be not 32 per cent, but 3.7 per cent, because 27,833 out of 752,881 landowners constitute 3.7 per cent, whereas the area of land affected—62,000,000 dessiatins out of a total of 85,800,000 dessiatins—amounts to 72.3 per cent. It is not clear whether this was a slip on Mr. Delarov's part, or whether he got hold of the wrong figures. At all events, of the numerous speakers in the Duma, he, if we are not mistaken, was the only one who approached the real issue of the struggle in the most direct and concrete way.

A Cadet writer whose "works" one must mention when dealing with this question is Mr. S. Prokopovich. True, he is, strictly speaking, a member of the *Bez Zaglaviya* group, who, like the majority of the contributors to the bourgeois newspaper *Tovarishch*, at one moment poses as a Cadet and at another as a Menshevik Social-Democrat. He is a typical representative of the handful of consistent Bernsteinians among the Russian bourgeois intellectuals who waver between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, who (in most cases) join no party, and in the liberal press

pursue a line slightly to the right of Plekhanov. Mr. Prokopovich must be mentioned here because he was one of the first to quote in the press figures from the 1905 landed property statistics, and in so doing actually adopted the *Cadet* position on agrarian reform. In two articles which he wrote for *Tovarishch* (No. 214 of March 13, 1907, and No. 238 of April 10, 1907), Mr. Prokopovich argues against General Zolotaryov, the compiler of the official statistics, who tries to prove that the government can tackle the land reform quite easily without any compulsory alienation, and that 5 dessiatins per household are quite sufficient for the peasant to conduct his husbandry! Mr. Prokopovich is *more liberal*: he puts the figure at 8 dessiatins per household. He repeatedly makes the reservation, however, that this amount of land is "quite inadequate", that this is a "very modest" calculation, and so forth; nevertheless, he accepts this figure in order to determine the "degree of the land shortage" (the title of the first of Mr. Prokopovich's articles mentioned above). He explains that he takes this figure "*to avoid unnecessary disputes*"—presumably with the Zolotaryovs. Calculating thus the number of "obviously land-poor" peasant households at one half the total, Mr. Prokopovich correctly estimates that in order to bring the peasants' holdings up to 8 dessiatins, 18,600,000 dessiatins will be required, and since the government's total land reserve is alleged to be not more than 9,000,000 dessiatins, "it will be impossible to avoid compulsory alienation".

Both in his calculations and in his arguments, this Menshevik-minded Cadet, or Cadet-minded Menshevik, admirably expresses the spirit and meaning of the liberal agrarian programme. The questions of the semi-feudal latifundia, and of latifundia in general, is quite glossed over. Mr. Prokopovich quoted the figures only for private holdings of more than 50 dessiatins. Thus, the actual issue of this struggle is obscured. The class interests of a handful, literally a handful, of landlords are concealed behind a veil. Instead of an exposure of those interests, we are given the "state point of view": the state lands "*will not suffice*". Hence, if they did suffice, Mr. Prokopovich, to judge from his argument, would be quite willing to leave the feudal latifundia intact....

The peasant's allotment scale that he takes (8 dessiatins) is a starvation scale. The amount of land to be "compulsorily alienated" from the landlords that he allows for is insignificant ($18 - 9 = 9$ million dessiatins out of 62,000,000 in estates of over 500 dessiatins!). To carry out *that kind* of "compulsory alienation", the *landlords* will have to use compulsion on the peasants, as in 1861!

Whether he meant to or not, wittingly or unwittingly, Mr. Prokopovich has *correctly* expressed the *landlord* nature of the Cadet agrarian programme. But the Cadets are cautious and sly: they prefer to *say nothing at all* about *how much* land they are inclined to expropriate from the landlords.

4. THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL CLOAKS

We have seen that the essence of the revolution now in progress amounts to the break-up of the feudal latifundia and to the creation of a free and (as far as this is possible under present circumstances) well-to-do peasantry capable not only of toiling in misery on the land, but of developing the productive forces and promoting the progress of agriculture. This revolution does not and cannot in any way affect the system of small *production* in agriculture, the domination of the *market* over the producer and, consequently, the domination also of *commodity production*, since the struggle for the *redistribution* of the land cannot alter the relations of production in the farming of this land. And we have seen that a feature of this struggle is the strong development of small-scale farming on the feudal latifundia.

The ideological cloak of the struggle now in progress is furnished by the theories of the Narodniks. The fact that in the First and Second Dumas the peasant representatives from all over Russia openly came out with agrarian programmes has definitely proved that the theories and programmes of the Narodniks do indeed constitute the ideological cloak of the peasants' struggle for land.

We have shown that the basic and chief component of the distributable land for which the peasants are fighting

are the big feudal estates. We have taken a very high norm of expropriation—500 dessiatins. But it can easily be seen that our conclusions hold good however much this norm is reduced, let us say to 100 or to 50 dessiatins. Let us divide group (c)—20-500 dessiatins, into three subgroups: (aa) 20-50 dessiatins, (bb) 50-100, and (cc) 100-500, and see what the size of the peasant allotments and private holdings is within these subdivisions:

Allotment Land

Subdivisions		Number of holdings	Total area of land	Average per holding (dessiatins)
20-50	dess.	1,062,504	30,898,147	29.1
50-100	"	191,898	12,259,171	63.9
100-500	"	40,658	5,762,276	141.7

Private Land

Total in European Russia

Number of holdings	Total area of land	Average per holding (dessiatins)	Number of holdings	Total area of land	Average per holding (dessiatins)
103,237	3,301,004	32.0	1,165,741	34,199,151	29.3
44,877	3,229,858	71.9	236,775	15,489,029	65.4
61,188	14,096,637	230.4	101,846	19,858,913	194.9

Hence it follows, first, that the confiscation of estates of over 100 dessiatins will increase the distributable land, as already stated above, by nine to ten million dessiatins, whereas the confiscation of estates of over 50 dessiatins, as assumed by Chizhevsky, a member of the First Duma, will increase this land by eighteen and a half million dessiatins. Consequently, in this case also, the feudal latifundia will form the *basis* of the distributable land area. That is the crux of the present-day agrarian problem. Moreover, the connection that exists between these big estates and the higher bureaucracy is also quite well known: G. A. Alexinsky in the Second Duma quoted Mr. Rubakin's data on the size of the estates owned by higher officials in Russia. Secondly, it is seen from these data that even after deducting the peasant allotments and the estates of over 100 dessiatins, the size of the bigger allotments (and the small estates) still varies considerably. The revolution already finds the peasants differentiated in regard to size

of holdings, and still more in the amount of capital, number of livestock, the quantity and quality of implements, etc. That the differentiation in the sphere of non-allotment property, so to speak, is far more considerable than in the sphere of allotment landownership has been sufficiently proved in our economic literature.

What, then, is the significance of the Narodnik theories, which more or less accurately reflect the views of the peasants on their struggle for land? The substance of these Narodnik theories is contained in two "principles": the "labour principle" and "equalisation". The petty-bourgeois nature of those principles is so manifest and has been so often and so fully demonstrated in Marxist literature that there is no need to dwell on it here. It is important, however, to note a feature of these "principles" that has not yet been properly appreciated by Russian Social-Democrats. In a vague form those principles *do* express something real and *progressive* at the present historical moment. Namely, they express the struggle for the break-up of the feudal latifundia.

Look at the outline given above of the evolution of our agrarian system from the present stage to the "ultimate point" of the present, bourgeois revolution. You will clearly see that the future "then" is distinguished from the present "now" by an incomparably greater "equalisation" in ownership, that the *new* distribution of the land conforms far more to the "labour principle". And that is not accidental. It cannot be otherwise in a peasant country, the bourgeois development of which emancipates it from serfdom. In such a country, the break-up of the feudal latifundia is undoubtedly a condition for the development of capitalism. But as long as small-scale farming predominates in agriculture, the break-up of the feudal latifundia inevitably implies greater "equalisation" in landownership. In breaking up the medieval latifundia, capitalism *begins* with a more "equalised" landownership, and *out of that* creates large-scale farming on a new basis, on the basis of wage-labour, machinery and superior agricultural technique, and not on the basis of labour rent and bondage.

The mistake all the Narodniks make is that by confining themselves to the narrow outlook of the small husbandman,

they fail to perceive the bourgeois nature of the social relations into which the peasant enters on coming out of the fetters of serfdom. They convert the "labour principle" of *petty-bourgeois* agriculture and "equalisation", which are their slogans for breaking up the *feudal latifundia*, into something absolute, self-sufficing, into something implying a special, non-bourgeois order.

The mistake some Marxists make is that, while criticising the Narodnik *theory*, they overlook its historically real and historically legitimate *content in the struggle against serfdom*. They criticise, and rightly criticise, the "labour principle" and "equalisation" as backward, reactionary petty-bourgeois *socialism*; but they forget that these theories express progressive, revolutionary petty-bourgeois *democracy*, that they serve as the banner of the most determined struggle against the old, feudal Russia. The idea of equality is the most revolutionary idea in the struggle against the old system of absolutism in general, and against the old system of feudal landlordism in particular. The idea of *equality* is legitimate and progressive for the petty-bourgeois peasant insofar as it expresses the struggle against feudal, serf inequality. The idea of "equalised" landownership is legitimate and progressive insofar as it expresses the aspirations of ten million peasants, with allotments of seven dessiatins and ruined by the landlords, for a *division** of the 2,300-dessiatin feudal latifundia. And in the present historical situation that idea *really* expresses such strivings, it gives an impetus towards consistent *bourgeois* revolution, while mistakenly clothing this in vague, *quasi-socialist* phraseology. He would be a poor Marxist indeed who, while criticising the falsity of a socialist disguise for bourgeois slogans, failed to appreciate their historically progressive significance as the most decisive *bourgeois* slogans in the struggle *against serfdom*. The real content of the revolution which the Narodnik regards as "socialisation" will be that it will most consist-

* We speak here of division not as private property, but for economic use. Such a division is possible—and, with the predominance of small farming, inevitable for some time—both under municipalisation and under nationalisation.

ently clear the way for capitalism, will most resolutely eradicate serfdom. The outline which I have drawn above indicates precisely the maximum to be achieved in the abolition of serfdom and the maximum of "equalisation" to be attained thereby. The Narodnik imagines that this "equalisation" eliminates the bourgeois element, whereas, in reality, it *expresses* the aspirations of the most radical bourgeoisie. And whatever else there is in "equalisation" over and above that is nothing but ideological *smoke*, a petty-bourgeois illusion.

The short-sighted and unhistorical judgement of some Russian Marxists on the significance of Narodnik theories in the Russian bourgeois revolution is to be explained by the fact that they have not reflected on the significance of the "confiscation" of the landlord estates which the Narodniks advocate. One has only to visualise clearly the economic basis of this revolution under the present conditions of landownership in our country in order to grasp not only the illusory nature of the Narodnik theories, but also the truth of the struggle, restricted to a definite historical task, the truth of the struggle against serfdom, which represents the real content of those illusory theories.

5. TWO TYPES OF BOURGEOIS AGRARIAN EVOLUTION

To proceed. We have shown that the Narodnik theories, while absurd and reactionary from the standpoint of the struggle for socialism against the bourgeoisie, turn out to be "rational" (in the sense of being a specific historic task) and progressive in the bourgeois struggle against serfdom. The question now arises: when we say that serfdom must inevitably die out in Russian landownership and in the whole social system in Russia, when we say that a bourgeois-democratic agrarian revolution is inevitable, does that mean that this can take place only in one definite form? Or is it possible in various forms?

That question is of cardinal importance for arriving at correct views on our revolution and on the Social-Democratic agrarian programme. And solve this question we must, starting out from the data given above concerning the economic basis of the revolution.

The pivot of the struggle is the feudal latifundia which are the most conspicuous embodiment and the strongest mainstay of the survivals of serfdom in Russia. The development of commodity production and capitalism will certainly and inevitably put an end to those survivals. In that respect Russia has *only one* path before her, that of bourgeois development.

But there may be two forms of that development. The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord latifundia, i. e., either by reform or by revolution. Bourgeois development may proceed by having big landlord economies at the head, which will gradually become more and more bourgeois and gradually substitute bourgeois for feudal methods of exploitation. It may also proceed by having small peasant economies at the head, which in a revolutionary way, will remove the "excrescence" of the feudal latifundia from the social organism and then freely develop without them along the path of capitalist economy.

Those two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development we would call the Prussian path and the American path, respectively. In the first case feudal landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy, which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of *Grossbauern* ("big peasants") arises. In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it is broken up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer. In the first case the main content of the evolution is transformation of feudal bondage into servitude and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal landlords—Junkers. In the second case the main background is transformation of the patriarchal peasant into a bourgeois farmer.

In the economic history of Russia both these types of evolution are clearly in evidence. Take the epoch of the fall of serfdom. A struggle went on between the landlords and the peasants over the method of carrying out the reform.

Both stood for conditions of bourgeois economic development (without being aware of it), but the former wanted a development that would preserve to the utmost the landlord economies, the landlord revenues, and the landlord (bondage) methods of exploitation. The latter wanted a development that would secure for the peasants the greatest degree of prosperity possible with the existing level of agriculture, the abolition of the landlord latifundia, the abolition of all serf and bondage methods of exploitation, and the expansion of free peasant landownership. Needless to say, in the second case the development of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces would have been wider and *more rapid* than by peasant reform, carried out in the landlords' way.* Only caricature Marxists, as the Narodniks, the opponents of Marxism, tried to depict them, could have believed that the divorce of the peasantry from the land in 1861 guaranteed the development of capitalism. On the contrary, it would have been a guarantee—and so in fact it turned out to be—a guarantee of *bondage*, i. e., semi-serf tenant farming and labour rent, i. e., corvée economy, which exceedingly retarded the development of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces in Russian agriculture. The conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords was not a struggle waged by "people's production" or the "labour principle" against the bour-

* In the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* (May-June 1900), I wrote on this subject as follows: "... The more the land the peasants received when they were emancipated, and the lower the price they paid for it, the faster, wider, and freer would have been the development of capitalism in Russia, the higher would have been the standard of living of the population, the wider would have been the home market, the faster would have been the introduction of machinery into production; the more, in a word, would the economic development of Russia have resembled that of America. I shall confine myself to indicating two circumstances which, in my opinion, confirm the correctness of the latter view: (1) land-poverty and the burden of taxation have led to the development over a very considerable area of Russia of the labour-service system of private-landowner farming, i. e., a direct survival of serfdom, and not at all to the development of capitalism; (2) it is in our border regions, where serfdom was either entirely unknown, or was feeblest, and where the peasants suffer least from land shortage, labour-service, and the burden of taxation, that there has been the greatest development of capitalism in agriculture." (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 624-25.—*Ed.*)

geoisie (as our Narodniks have imagined it to be)—it was a struggle for the American type of bourgeois development as against the Prussian type of bourgeois development.

And in those localities of Russia where no serfdom had existed, where agriculture was undertaken entirely, or chiefly, by free peasants (for example, in the steppes of the Trans-Volga area, Novorossia, and the Northern Caucasus, which were colonised after the Reform), the growth of the productive forces and the development of capitalism proceeded far more rapidly than in the central provinces which were burdened by survivals of serfdom.*

While Russia's agricultural centre and agricultural borderlands show us, as it were, the spatial or geographical distribution of the localities in which one or the other type of agrarian evolution prevails, the fundamental features of both types of evolution are also clearly evident in *all* those localities where landlord and peasant farming exist side by side. A cardinal mistake of the Narodnik economists was that they believed that landlord farming was the only source of agrarian capitalism, while they regarded peasant farming from the point of view of "people's production" and the "labour principle" (that is the view taken even now by the Trudoviks, the "Popular Socialists", and the Socialist-Revolutionaries). We know that this is wrong. Landlord economy evolves in a capitalist way and gradually replaces the labour rent system by "free wage-labour", the three-field system by intensive cultivation, and the obsolete peasant implements by the improved machinery employed on the big private farms. Peasant farming *also evolves in a capitalist way* and gives rise to a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat. The better the condition of the "village commune" and the greater the prosperity of the peasantry in general, the *more rapid* is the process of differentiation among the peasantry into the antagonistic

* I have dealt in detail with the importance of the borderlands of Russia as colonisation lands during the development of capitalism in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. (St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 185, 444, et al.) Second edition issued, St. Petersburg, 1908. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 257, 561, 590-95.—Ed.) The question of the importance of the borderlands in regard to the Social-Democratic agrarian programme will be dealt with separately later on.

classes of capitalist agriculture. Consequently, we see two streams of agrarian evolution everywhere. The conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords which runs like a scarlet thread through the whole history of post-Reform Russia and constitutes the most important economic basis of our revolution, is a struggle for one or the other type of bourgeois agrarian evolution.

Only by clearly understanding the difference between these two types and the bourgeois character of *both*, can we correctly explain the agrarian question in the Russian revolution and grasp the class significance of the various agrarian programmes put forward by the different parties.* The pivot of the struggle, we repeat, is the feudal latifundia. The capitalist evolution of these is beyond all dispute, but it is possible in two forms: either they will be abolished, eliminated in a revolutionary manner by peasant farmers, or they will be gradually transformed into Junker estates (and correspondingly, the enthralled muzhik will be transformed into an enthralled Knecht).

* The amount of confusion that reigns at times in the minds of Russian Social-Democrats about the two paths of bourgeois agrarian evolution in Russia is demonstrated by P. Maslov. In *Obrazovaniye* (No. 3, 1907), he outlines two paths: (1) "capitalism in process of development" and (2) "a useless struggle against economic development". "The first path," if you please, "leads the working class and the whole of society towards socialism; the second path pushes [!] the working class into the arms [!] of the bourgeoisie, into a struggle between big and small proprietors, into a struggle from which the working class has nothing to gain but defeat" (p. 92). In the first place, the "second path" is an empty phrase, a dream and not a path; it is a false ideology, and not a real possibility of development. Secondly, Maslov fails to see that Stolypin and the bourgeoisie are also leading the peasantry along the capitalist road; consequently, the real struggle is not about capitalism as such, but about the type of capitalist development. Thirdly, it is sheer nonsense to talk as if there can be a path in Russia which will not "push" the working class under the domination of the bourgeoisie.... Fourthly, it is equally nonsensical to allege that there can be a "path" on which there will be no struggle between small and big proprietors. Fifthly, by the use of terms descriptive of general European categories (big and small proprietors), Maslov obscures the historical peculiarity of Russia which is of great significance in the present revolution: the struggle between petty-bourgeois and big feudal proprietors.

6. TWO LINES OF AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES IN THE REVOLUTION

If we now compare the agrarian programmes put forward by the different classes in the course of the revolution with the economic basis outlined above, we shall at once perceive two lines in these programmes, corresponding to the two types of agrarian evolution which we have indicated.

Let us take the Stolypin programme, which is supported by the Right landlords and the Octobrists. It is avowedly a landlords' programme. But can it be said that it is reactionary in the economic sense, i. e., that it precludes, or seeks to preclude, the development of capitalism, to prevent a bourgeois agrarian evolution? Not at all. On the contrary, the famous agrarian legislation introduced by Stolypin under Article 87 is permeated through and through with the purely bourgeois spirit. There can be no doubt that it follows the line of capitalist evolution, facilitates and pushes forward that evolution, hastens the expropriation of the peasantry, the break-up of the village commune, and the creation of a peasant bourgeoisie. Without a doubt, that legislation is progressive in the scientific-economic sense.

But does that mean that Social-Democrats should "support" it? It does not. Only vulgar Marxism can reason in that way, a Marxism whose seeds Plekhanov and the Mensheviks are so persistently sowing when they sing, shout, plead, and proclaim: we must support the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the old order of things. No. To facilitate the development of the productive forces (this highest criterion of social progress) we must support not bourgeois evolution of the landlord type, but bourgeois evolution of the peasant type. The former implies the utmost preservation of bondage and serfdom (remodelled on bourgeois lines), the least rapid development of the productive forces, and the retarded development of capitalism; it implies infinitely greater misery and suffering, exploitation and oppression for the broad mass of the peasantry and, consequently, also for the proletariat. The second type implies the most rapid development of the productive forces and

the best possible (under commodity production) conditions of existence for the mass of the peasantry. The tactics of Social-Democracy in the Russian bourgeois revolution are determined not by the task of supporting the liberal bourgeoisie, as the opportunists think, but by the task of supporting the fighting peasantry.

Let us take the programme of the liberal bourgeoisie, i. e., the Cadet programme. True to the motto: "at your service" (i. e., at the service of the landlords), they proposed one programme in the First Duma and another in the Second. They can change their programme as easily and imperceptibly as all the European unprincipled bourgeois careerists do. In the First Duma the revolution appeared to be strong, and so the liberal programme borrowed from it a bit of nationalisation (the "state land available for distribution"). In the Second Duma the counter-revolution appeared to be strong, and so the liberal programme threw the state land available for distribution overboard, swung round to the Stolypin idea of stable peasant property, strengthened and enlarged the scope of exemptions from the general rule of compulsory alienation of the landlords' land. But we note this two-faced attitude of the liberals only in passing. The important thing to note here is something else, viz., the principle which is *common to both "faces"* of the liberal agrarian programme. That common principle consists of: (1) redemption payments; (2) preservation of the landlords' estates; (3) preservation of the landlords' privileges when carrying out the reform.

Redemption payment is tribute imposed upon social development, tribute paid to the owners of the feudal latifundia. Redemption payment is the realisation, ensured by bureaucratic, police measures, of the feudal methods of exploitation in the shape of the bourgeois "universal equivalent". Further, preservation of the landlords' estates is seen *in one or another* degree in both Cadet programmes, no matter how the bourgeois politicians may try to conceal that fact from the people. The third point—the preservation of the landlords' privileges when carrying out the reform—is quite definitely expressed in the Cadets' attitude to the election of local land committees on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret bal-

lot. We cannot here go into details* which concern another part of our argument. All we need do here is to define the *line* of the Cadet agrarian programme. And in this connection we must say that the question of the composition of the local land committees is of *cardinal* importance. Only political infants could be taken in by the sound of the Cadet slogan of "*compulsory alienation*". The question is, who will compel whom? Will the landlords compel the peasants (to pay an exorbitant price for inferior land), or will the peasants compel the landlords? The Cadet talk "about equal representation of the conflicting interests" and about the undesirability of "*one-sided violence*" reveals as clear as clear can be the essence of the matter, namely, that the Cadet idea of compulsory alienation means that the landlords will compel the peasants!

The Cadet agrarian programme follows the line of Stolypin progress, i. e., landlord bourgeois progress. That is a fact. Failure to appreciate this fact is the fundamental mistake made by those Social-Democrats who, like some of

* See the records of the First Duma, 14th sitting, May 24, 1906, which show that the Cadets Kokoshkin and Kotlyarevsky, hand in hand with the (then) Octobrist Heyden, resorted to the basest sophistry to repudiate the idea of local land committees. In the Second Duma: the evasions by the Cadet Savelyev (16th sitting, March 26, 1907) and the open opposition to the idea of local committees by the Cadet Tatarinov (24th sitting, April 9, 1907, p. 1783 of Stenographic Record). The newspaper *Rech*, No. 82, for May 25, 1906, contained a noteworthy leading article which is reprinted in Milyukov's *A Year of Struggle*, No. 117, pp. 457-59. Here is the decisive passage from this Octobrist in disguise: "We believe that setting up these committees on the basis of universal suffrage would mean preparing them not for the peaceful solution of the land problem in the local areas, but for something entirely different. Control of the general direction of the reform ought to be left in the hands of the state.... The local commissions should consist as equally as possible [sic!] of representatives of the conflicting interests which can be reconciled without impairing the state importance of the proposed reform, and without turning it into an act of one-sided violence".... (p. 459). In the Cadet *Agrarian Question*, Vol. II, Mr. Kutler published the text of his Bill which ensures to the landlords, plus the officials, *preponderance* over the peasants in *all* the principal, gubernia and uyezd land commissions and committees (pp. 640-41), while Mr. A. Chuprov—a "liberal"!—defends on principle the same despicable plan of the landlords to swindle the peasants (p. 33).

the Mensheviks, regard the Cadet agrarian policy as being more progressive than the Narodnik policy.

As for the spokesmen of the peasantry, i. e., the Trudoviks, the Social-Narodniks, and partly the Socialist-Revolutionaries, we find that, *in spite of* considerable vacillation and wavering, they, in both Dumas, adopted a very clear line of defending the interests of the peasantry *against* the landlords. For instance, vacillation is observed in the programme of the Trudoviks on the question of redemption payments, but, in the first place, they frequently interpret that as something in the nature of public relief for disabled landlords *; secondly, in the records of the Second Duma one can find a number of exceedingly characteristic speeches by *peasants repudiating* redemption payments and proclaiming the slogan: all the land to all the people.** On the question of the local land committees—this all-important question as to who will compel whom—the peasant deputies are the originators and supporters of the idea of having them elected by universal suffrage.

We are not, for the time being, dealing with the content of the agrarian programmes of the Trudoviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the one hand, and the Social-Democrats, on the other. We must first of all note the incontrovertible fact that the agrarian programmes of *all* the parties and classes which came out openly in the Russian revolution can be clearly divided into *two* basic types, corresponding to the two types of bourgeois agrarian evolution. The dividing line between the "Right" and "Left" agrarian programmes does not run between the Octobrists

* See *Sbornik "Izvestii Krestyanskih Deputatov" i "Trudovoii Rossii"* (*The Symposium of "Peasant Deputies' News" and "Toiling Russia"*), St. Petersburg, 1906, a collection of newspaper articles by the Trudoviks in the First Duma; for instance, the article entitled "Grants, Not Redemption Payments" (pp. 44-49), et al.

** See the speech made by the *Right-wing* peasant deputy Petrochenko in the Second Duma (22nd sitting, April 5, 1907): Kutler, he said, proposed good conditions.... "Of course, being a wealthy man he has named a high figure, and we, poor peasants, cannot pay such a price" (p. 1616). Thus, the *Right-wing* peasant is *more to the left* than the bourgeois politician who is playing at being a liberal. See also the speech of the *non-party* peasant deputy Semyonov (April 12, 1907), which breathes the spirit of the spontaneous revolutionary struggle of the peasants, and many other speeches.

and the Cadets, as is frequently and mistakenly assumed by the Mensheviks (who allow themselves to be taken in by the sound of "constitutional-democratic" words and substitute analysis of the respective titles of the parties for a class analysis). The dividing line runs between the Cadets and the Trudoviks. That line is determined by *the interests of the two principal classes* in Russian society which are fighting for the land, viz., the landlords and the peasantry. The Cadets stand for the preservation of landlordism and for a civilised, European, but *landlord* bourgeois evolution of agriculture. The Trudoviks (and the Social-Democratic workers' deputies), i.e., the representatives of the peasantry and the representatives of the proletariat, advocate a *peasant* bourgeois evolution of agriculture.

A strict distinction must be drawn between the ideological cloak of the agrarian programmes, their different political details, etc., and the economic basis of those programmes. The present difficulty does not lie in understanding the bourgeois character of the agrarian demands and programmes of both the landlords *and the peasants*: that was already explained by the Marxists before the revolution, and the revolution has confirmed the correctness of their explanation. The difficulty lies in understanding fully the basis of the struggle between the two classes *within the framework* of bourgeois society and bourgeois evolution. The fact that this struggle is a normal social phenomenon will not be understood unless it is seen as part and parcel of the objective tendencies of the economic development of capitalist Russia.

Now, having shown the connection between the two types of agrarian programmes in the Russian revolution and the two types of bourgeois agrarian evolution, we must pass on to the examination of a new, extremely important aspect of the question.

7. RUSSIA'S LAND AREA. THE QUESTION OF THE COLONISATION

We have pointed out above that on the question of capitalism in Russia the economic analysis compels us to distinguish between the central agricultural provinces with

their plentiful survivals of serfdom, and the borderlands where those survivals are absent, or weak, and which bear the features of free-peasant capitalist evolution.

What do we mean by the borderlands? Obviously, lands which are unpopulated, or sparsely populated, and which have not been completely drawn into agriculture. And we must now pass from European Russia to the whole of the Russian Empire in order to form an exact idea of these "borderlands" and of their economic significance.

In the pamphlet written by Prokopovich and Mertvago, *How Much Land There Is in Russia and How We Use It* (Moscow, 1907), the latter of those authors tries to summarise all the statistical data available in our literature on the amount of land in the *whole* of Russia and the economic use to which the known amount of land is put. For the sake of clarity, we shall quote Mr. Mertvago's figures in the form of a table, and add the statistics of the population according to the census of 1897.

These figures plainly show how vast is the land area of Russia and how little we know about the borderlands and their economic importance. Of course, it would be absolutely wrong to regard those lands at the present time, and in their present state, as being suitable for satisfying the land needs of the Russian peasantry. All calculations of that kind, frequently made by reactionary writers,* are of no scientific value whatever. In this respect Mr. A. A. Kaufman is quite right when he ridicules the search for vacant lands for colonisation on the basis of statistics of square versts. Undoubtedly he is also right when he points out how little land is suitable for colonisation in the borderlands of Russia at the present time, and how wrong it is

* Also by reactionary deputies. In the Second Duma the Octobrist Teterevkin cited from Shcherbina's investigations figures of 65,000,000 dessiatins of land in the steppe region, and further figures of the amount of land in the Altai territory—39,000,000 dessiatins—to prove that there is no need for compulsory alienation in European Russia. Here is an example of a bourgeois joining hands with the feudal landlord for joint "progress" in the Stolypin spirit. (See Stenographic Record, Second Duma, 39th sitting, May 16, 1907, pp. 658-81.)

	Land area of the whole of Russia						Population according to census of 1887	
	Total land area Square versts (thou- sands)	Of which		Or which				
		Dessia- tins (millions)	No data avail- able	Registered land areas	Arable land	Mead- ows	For- ests	
								Millions of dessiatins
								Millions of dessiatins
10 gubernias of the Kingdom of Poland	111.6	11.6	—	11.6	7.4	0.9	2.5	10.8
38 gubernias west of the Volga	1,755.6	183.0	—	183.0	93.6	18.7	34.0	146.3
12 gubernias north and east of the Volga	2,474.9	258.0	—	258.0	22.3	7.1	132.0	161.4
Total for 50 gubernias of European Russia	4,230.5	441.0	—	441.0	145.9	25.8	166.0	307.7
Caucasus	411.7	42.9	22.1	20.8	6.5	2.2	2.5	11.2
Siberia	10,966.1	1,142.6	639.7	502.9	4.3	3.9	121.0	129.2
Central Asia	3,141.6	327.3	157.4	169.9	0.9	1.6	8.0	10.5
Total for Asiatic Russia	14,519.4	1,542.8	819.2	693.6	11.7	7.7	131.5	150.9
Total for Russian Empire*	18,861.5	1,965.4	819.2	1,446.2	135.0	34.4	300.0	469.4
								125,640.0
								6.7

* Exclusive of Finland.

to presume that the land hunger of the Russian peasantry can be satisfied by migration.*

These correct arguments of Mr. Kaufman, the liberal, contain, nevertheless, a very serious mistake. Mr. Kaufman argues in this way: "Considering the type of people who now migrate, their present degree of prosperity, and their present cultural level" (p. 129 of the book mentioned), the amount of land available for satisfying the needs of the Russian peasants by means of migration is absolutely insufficient. Consequently, he concludes in defence of the Cadet agrarian programme, compulsory alienation of private land in European Russia is essential.

That is the usual argument of our liberal and liberal-Narodnik economists. It is so constructed as to lead to the conclusion that if there were sufficient land suitable for migration, the feudal latifundia could be left intact! The Cadets and other politicians of the same kind are thoroughly permeated with the ideas of the well-meaning official; they claim to stand above classes and above the class struggle. The feudal latifundia must be done away with not because they imply the feudal exploitation and boudage of millions of the population and retard the development of the productive forces, but because millions of families cannot be immediately packed off to, say, Siberia or Turkestan! The stress is laid not upon the feudal class character of the latifundia in Russia, but upon the possibility of reconciling the classes, of satisfying the peasant without injuring the landlord; in short, upon the possibility of bringing about the notorious "social peace".

The arguments of Mr. Kaufman and his innumerable followers among the Russian intelligentsia have to be turned upside down to be put right. Since the Russian peasant is crushed by the feudal latifundia, for that reason both the free settlement of the population over the territory of Russia and the rational economic use of the bulk of her borderlands are incredibly retarded. Since the feudal lati-

* *The Agrarian Question*, published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. I, article by Mr. Kaufman: "Migration and Its Role in the Agrarian Programme". See also the work by the same author: *Migration and Colonisation*, St. Petersburg, 1905.

fundia are keeping the Russian peasantry in a downtrodden state, and perpetuate, through the labour-service system and bondage, the most backward forms and methods of land cultivation, *for that reason* both the technical progress and the mental development of the mass of the peasants are hindered, as also their activity, initiative, and education, which are essential for the economic utilisation of a far larger area of the Russian land reserves than is utilised today. For the feudal latifundia and the predominance of bondage in agriculture imply also a corresponding political superstructure—the predominance of the Black-Hundred landlord in the state, the disfranchisement of the population, the prevalence of Gurko-Lidval methods of administration,⁽¹⁾ and so on and so forth.

That the feudal latifundia in central agricultural Russia are having a disastrous effect upon the whole social system, upon social development as a whole, upon the entire condition of agriculture, and upon the whole standard of living of the masses of the peasantry, is a matter of common knowledge. I only have to refer here to the vast Russian economic literature which has proved the prevalence in Central Russia of labour-service, bondage, rack rent, "winter hiring", and other charming aspects of medievalism.*

The fall of serfdom created conditions which (as I pointed out in detail in *The Development of Capitalism*) caused the population to flee from those haunts of the last descendants of the serf-owners. The population fled from the central agricultural area to the industrial gubernias, to the capitals, and to the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia, and settled in hitherto uninhabited lands. In the pamphlet I have mentioned, Mr. Mervago quite truly remarks, by the way, that the conception of what sort of land is unsuitable for agriculture is liable to undergo rapid change.

"The Taurida steppes," he writes, "owing to the climate and the scarcity of water, will *always* be one of the poorest and least suitable regions for cultivation.' That

* See *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapter III, on the transition from corvée to capitalist economy and the spread of the labour-service system. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 191-251.—Ed.)

was the opinion expressed in 1845 by such authoritative observers of nature as Academicians Beer and Helmersen. At that time the population of Taurida Gubernia, a half of what it is now, produced 1,800,000 chetverts of grain of all kinds.... Now, after a lapse of 60 years, the population has doubled, and in 1903, it produced 17,600,000 chetverts, i. e., nearly ten times as much" (p. 24).

That is true not only of Taurida Gubernia, but of a number of other gubernias in the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia. The southern steppes, and also the gubernias on the left bank of the Volga, which in the sixties and seventies lagged behind the central black-earth gubernias in the output of grain, *outstripped* those provinces in the eighties (*The Development of Capitalism*, p. 186).* Between 1863 and 1897 the population of the whole of European Russia increased by 53 per cent—48 per cent in the case of the rural and 97 per cent in the case of the urban population—whereas in Novorossia, the Lower Volga, and eastern gubernias, the population increased during the same period by 92 per cent—87 per cent increase in the rural population and 134 per cent increase in the urban population (*ibid.*, p. 446).**

"We have no doubt," Mr. Mervago continues, "that the present bureaucratic estimate of the economic importance of our land reserves is not less mistaken than that of Beer and Helmersen concerning Taurida Gubernia in 1845" (*ibid.*).

That is correct. But Mr. Mervago fails to see the source of Beer's mistakes, and of the mistakes of all bureaucratic estimates. The source of those mistakes is that while taking into consideration the given level of technique and culture, no allowance is made for the advance of this level. Beer and Helmersen did not foresee the technical changes that became possible *after the fall of serfdom*. And there cannot be the least doubt now that a tremendous increase in the productive forces, a tremendous rise in the technical and cultural level will inevitably follow the break-up of the feudal latifundia in European Russia.

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 257.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 563.—*Ed.*

This aspect of the matter is overlooked by many students of the agrarian problem in Russia. The prerequisite for the wide utilisation of the vast Russian lands available for colonisation is the creation in European Russia of a really free peasantry, completely liberated from the oppression of feudal relations. A considerable portion of these lands is unsuitable at the present time, not so much because of the *natural* properties of this or that borderland, but because of the *social* conditions of agriculture in Russia proper, which doom technical methods to stagnation and the population to a rightless status, downtroddenness, ignorance, and helplessness.

It is this exceedingly important aspect of the matter that Mr. Kaufman overlooks when he declares: "I say in advance: I do not know whether it will be possible to settle one, three, or ten million on those lands" (*ibid.*, p. 128). He goes on to point out that the term unsuitable land is only relative: "The alkali soils, far from being absolutely hopeless, can, with the application of certain technical methods, be made very fertile" (*ibid.*, p. 129). In Turkestan, with a population density of 3.6 to the square verst, "vast areas are still uninhabited" (*ibid.*, p. 137). "The soil of many of the 'hungry deserts' of Turkestan consists of the famous Central Asiatic loess which becomes highly fertile if sufficiently irrigated.... The existence of irrigable lands is a question that is not even worth while discussing: it is sufficient to cross the country in any direction to see the ruins of numerous villages and towns, abandoned centuries ago, frequently surrounded for scores of square versts by networks of ancient irrigation canals and ditches. The total area of loess desert awaiting irrigation undoubtedly amounts to many millions of dessiatins" (*ibid.*, p. 137).

All these millions of dessiatins in Turkestan, as well as in many other parts of Russia, are "awaiting" not only irrigation and reclamation of every kind. They are also "awaiting" the emancipation of the Russian agricultural population from the survivals of serfdom, from the yoke of the nobility's latifundia, and from the Black-Hundred dictatorship in the state.

It is idle to speculate on the actual amount of land in Russia that could be converted from "unsuitable" into suit-

able land. But it is necessary clearly to appreciate the fact, which is demonstrated by the whole economic history of Russia, and which is an outstanding feature of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, viz., that Russia possesses a gigantic amount of land available for colonisation, which will be rendered accessible to the population and accessible to culture, not only by every technical advance of agriculture, but also by every advance in the emancipation of the Russian peasantry from the yoke of serfdom.

This forms the economic basis for the bourgeois evolution of Russian agriculture on the American model. In the countries of Western Europe, which our Marxists so often draw upon for thoughtless and stereotyped comparisons, all the land was already occupied in the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The only new thing brought about by every technical advance in agriculture was that it became possible to invest more labour and capital in the land. In Russia, the bourgeois-democratic revolution is taking place under conditions in which every technical advance in agriculture, and every advance in the development of real liberty for the population, not only creates the possibility for additional investment of labour and capital in old lands, but also the possibility for utilising "boundless" tracts of adjacent new lands.

8. SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC DEDUCTIONS OF CHAPTER I

Let us sum up the economic deductions which are to serve as an introduction to the re-examination of the question of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme.

We have seen that the "pivot" of the agrarian struggle in our revolution is the feudal latifundia. The peasants' struggle for the land is, first and foremost, a struggle for the abolition of these latifundia. Their abolition and their complete transfer to the peasantry undoubtedly coincide with the line of the capitalist evolution of Russian agriculture. Such a path of this evolution would mean the most rapid development of productive forces, the best conditions of labour for the mass of the population, and the most rapid development of capitalism, with the conversion of

the free peasants into farmers. But another path of bourgeois evolution of agriculture is possible, viz., the preservation of the landlord farms and latifundia and their slow conversion from farms based on serfdom and bondage into Junker farms. It is these two types of possible bourgeois evolution that form the basis of the two types of agrarian programmes proposed by different classes in the Russian revolution. Moreover, a special feature of Russia, a feature that is one of the economic foundations for the possibility of the "American" evolution, is the existence of vast lands available for colonisation. While entirely unsuitable for emancipating the Russian peasantry from the yoke of serfdom in European Russia, these lands will become more extensive and more accessible in proportion to the freedom enjoyed by the peasantry in Russia proper, and to the scope of development of the productive forces.

CHAPTER II

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND THEIR TEST IN THE FIRST REVOLUTION

Let us pass to an examination of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme. I outlined the chief historical stages in the evolution of the views of Russian Social-Democrats on the agrarian question in the first section of the pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*.* We must explain more fully the nature of the mistake contained in the previous agrarian programmes of Russian Social-Democracy, i. e., in the programmes of 1885 and 1903.

1. WHAT WAS THE MISTAKE IN THE PREVIOUS AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY?

In the draft issued by the Emancipation of Labour group in 1885, the agrarian programme was outlined as follows: "A radical revision of our agrarian relations, i. e., of the terms on which the land is to be redeemed and allotted to the peasant communities. The right to refuse their allot-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 169-74.—*Ed.*

ments and to leave the commune to be granted to those peasants who may find it advantageous to do so, etc."

That is all. The error of that programme is not that its principles or partial demands were wrong. No. Its principles are correct, while the only partial demand it puts forward (the right to refuse allotments) is so incontestable that it has now been carried out by Stolypin's peculiar legislation. The error of that programme is its abstract character, the absence of any concrete view of the subject. Properly speaking, it is not a programme, but a Marxist declaration in the most general terms. Of course, it would be absurd to put the blame for this mistake on the authors of the programme, who for the first time laid down certain principles long before the formation of a workers' party. On the contrary, it should be particularly emphasised that in that programme the inevitability of a "radical revision" of the Peasant Reform was recognised twenty years before the Russian revolution.

Theoretically that programme should have been developed by clarifying the economic basis of our agrarian programme, the facts upon which the demand for a *radical* revision, as distinct from a non-radical, reformist revision can and should be based, and finally, by concretely defining the nature of this revision from the standpoint of the proletariat (which differs essentially from the general radical standpoint). Practically the programme should have been developed by taking into account the *experience* of the peasant movement. Without the experience of a mass—indeed, more than that—of a nation-wide peasant movement, the programme of the Social-Democratic Labour Party *could not* become concrete; for it would have been too difficult, if not impossible, on the basis of theoretical reasoning alone, to define the degree to which capitalist disintegration had taken place among our peasantry, and to what extent the latter was capable of bringing about a revolutionary-democratic change.

In 1903, when the Second Congress of our Party adopted the first agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., we did not yet have such experience as would enable us to judge the character, breadth, and depth of the peasant movement. The peasant risings in South Russia in the spring of 1902 remained

sporadic outbursts. One can therefore understand the restraint shown by the Social-Democrats in drafting the agrarian programme: it is not the proletariat's business to "devise" such a programme for bourgeois society, and the extent to which the peasant movement against the survivals of serfdom, a movement worthy of proletarian support, was likely to develop was still unknown.

The 1903 programme attempts to define concretely the nature and terms of the "revision" about which the Social-Democrats in 1885 spoke only in a general way. That attempt—in the main item of the programme, dealing with the cut-off lands—was based upon a tentative distinction between lands which serve for exploitation by means of serfdom and bondage ("lands 'cut off' in 1861") and lands which are exploited in a capitalist manner. Such a tentative distinction was quite fallacious, because, in practice, the peasant mass movement could not be directed against particular categories of landlord estates, but only against landlordism in general. The programme of 1903 raised a question which had not yet been raised in 1885, namely, the question of the conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords at the moment of the revision of agrarian relations, which all Social-Democrats regarded as inevitable. But the solution given to this question in the programme of 1903 is not correct, for, instead of contraposing the consistently peasant to the consistently Junker method of carrying out the bourgeois revolution, the programme artificially sets up something intermediate. Here, too, we must make allowance for the fact that the absence of an open mass movement at that time made it impossible to solve this question on the basis of precise data, and not on the basis of phrases, or innocent wishes, or petty-bourgeois utopias, as the Socialist-Revolutionaries did. No one could say in advance with certainty to what extent disintegration among the peasantry had progressed as a result of the partial transition of the landlords from the labour-service system to wage-labour. No one could estimate how large was the stratum of agricultural labourers which had arisen after the Reform of 1861 and to what extent their interests had become separated from those of the ruined peasant masses.

At all events, the fundamental mistake in the agrarian programme of 1903 was the absence of a clear idea of the issue around which the agrarian struggle could and should develop in the process of the bourgeois revolution in Russia—a clear idea of the *types* of capitalist agrarian evolution that were objectively possible as the result of the victory of one or other of the social forces engaged in this struggle.

2. THE PRESENT AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The present agrarian programme of the Social-Democratic Party, which was adopted at the Stockholm Congress, marks a great step forward in comparison with the preceding one in one important respect, viz., by recognising confiscation of the landlords'* estates, the Social-Democratic Party resolutely took the path of recognising the *peasant* agrarian revolution. The words in the programme: "... supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including the confiscation of the landlords' estates", quite definitely express that idea. In the course of the discussion at the Stockholm Congress, one of the reporters, Plekhanov, who together with John¹⁰² sponsored that programme, spoke frankly about the necessity of ceasing to be afraid of a "*peasant agrarian revolution*". (See Plekhanov's report. Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, Moscow, 1907, p. 42.)

One would have thought that this admission—that our bourgeois revolution in the sphere of agrarian relations must be regarded as a "*peasant agrarian revolution*"—would have put an end to the major differences of opinion among Social-Democrats on the question of the agrarian programme. Actually, however, differences arose over the question whether Social-Democrats should support division of the landlords' estates among the peasants as private property, or municipalisation of the landlords' estates, or nationalisation of all the land. First of all, therefore, we must definitely establish the fact, all too often forgotten by Social-Democrats, that these questions can be correctly answered

* The text of the programme (Point 4) speaks of *privately owned* lands. The resolution appended to the programme (the second part of the agrarian programme) speaks of confiscation of the *landlords'* estates.

only from the standpoint of the *peasant* agrarian revolution in Russia. Of course, it is not a question of Social-Democracy refraining from independently defining the interests of the proletariat, as a separate class, in this peasant revolution. No. It is a question of having a clear idea of the character and significance of the peasant agrarian revolution as one of the forms of the bourgeois revolution in general. We cannot "invent" any particular reform "project". We must study the objective conditions of the peasant agrarian revolution in capitalistically developing Russia; on the basis of this objective analysis, we must separate the erroneous ideology of the different classes from the real content of the economic changes, and determine what, on the basis of those real economic changes, is required for the development of the productive forces and for the proletarian class struggle.

The present agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P. recognises (in a special form) the conversion of the confiscated lands into public property (nationalisation of forests, waters and lands for colonisation, and municipalisation of privately owned lands), at any rate in the event of the "victorious development of the revolution". In the event of "unfavourable conditions", the principle of *dividing* the landlords' lands among the peasants as private property is adopted. In all cases, the property rights of the peasants and small landowners generally to their present holdings are recognised. Consequently, the programme provides for a *dual* system of land tenure in a renovated bourgeois Russia: private ownership of land, and (at least in the event of the victorious development of the revolution) public ownership in the form of municipalisation and nationalisation.

How did the authors of the programme account for this duality? First of all, and above all, by the interests and demands of the peasantry, by the fear of drifting apart from the peasantry, the fear of setting the peasantry against the proletariat and against the revolution. By advancing such an argument the authors and the supporters of the programme took the stand of recognising the *peasant* agrarian revolution, the stand of proletarian support for definite peasant demands. And that argument was advanced by the most influential supporters of the programme, headed

by Comrade John! To become convinced of this, it is sufficient to glance at the Minutes of the Stockholm Congress.

That argument was directly and categorically advanced by Comrade John in his report. "If the revolution," he said, "were to lead to an attempt to nationalise the peasants' allotments, or to nationalise the lands confiscated from the landlords, as Comrade Lenin suggests, such a measure would lead to a counter-revolutionary movement, not only in the borderlands, but also in the central part of the country. We would have not one Vendée,¹⁰³ but a general revolt of the peasantry against attempts by the state to interfere with the peasants' *own* [John's *italics*] allotments, against attempts to nationalise the latter." (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 40.)

That seems clear, does it not? The nationalisation of the peasants' *own* lands would lead to a general revolt of the peasantry! That is the reason why Comrade X's original municipalisation scheme, which had proposed to transfer to the Zemstvos *not only* the private lands, but "if possible" all the lands (quoted by me in the pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party* *), was replaced by Maslov's municipalisation scheme, which proposed to *exempt* the peasants' lands. Indeed, how could they ignore the fact, discovered after 1903, about the inevitable peasant revolt against attempts at complete nationalisation? How could they refrain from adopting the standpoint of another noted Menshevik, Kostrov,¹⁰⁴ who exclaimed in Stockholm:

"To go to the peasants with it [nationalisation] means antagonising them. The peasant movement will go on apart from or against us, and we shall find ourselves thrown overboard in the revolution. Nationalisation deprives Social-Democracy of its strength, isolates it from the peasantry and thus also deprives the revolution of its strength" (p. 88).

One cannot deny the force of that argument. To try to nationalise the peasants' *own* land against their wishes in a peasant agrarian revolution! Since the Stockholm Congress believed John and Kostrov, it is not surprising that it rejected that idea.

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 172.—*Ed.*

But was not the Congress wrong in believing them? .
In view of the importance of the question of an all-Russian Vendée against nationalisation, a brief reference to history will not be out of place.

3. THE CHIEF ARGUMENT OF THE MUNICIPALISERS TESTED BY EVENTS

The above-quoted categorical assertions of John and Kostrov were made in April 1906, i. e., on the eve of the First Duma. I argued (see my pamphlet *Revision*, etc.*) that the peasantry was in favour of nationalisation, but I was told that the decisions of the congresses of the Peasant Union¹⁰⁵ did not prove anything, that they were inspired by the ideologists of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, that the masses of the peasants would never support such demands.

Since then this question has been documentarily answered by the First and Second Dumas. The representatives of the peasantry from all parts of Russia spoke in the First and particularly in the Second Duma. No one, with the possible exception of the publicists of *Rossiya*¹⁰⁶ and *Novoye Vremya*, could deny that the political and economic demands of the peasant *masses* found expression in both those Dumas. One would have thought that the idea of nationalising the peasants' lands should be finally buried now, after the independent declarations made by the peasant deputies in the presence of the other parties. One would have thought that the supporters of John and Kostrov could easily have got the peasant deputies to raise an outcry in the Duma against nationalisation. One would have thought that Social-Democracy, led by the Mensheviks, should really have "isolated" from the revolution the advocates of nationalisation who are rousing an all-Russian counter-revolutionary Vendée.

As a matter of fact, something different happened. In the First Duma it was Stishinsky and Gurko who showed concern for the peasants' *own* (John's italics) lands. In both Dumas it was the extreme Right-wingers who, jointly

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 165-95.—Ed.

with the spokesmen of the government, defended private ownership of the land and were opposed to any form of public ownership of land, whether by municipalisation, nationalisation, or socialisation. In both Dumas it was the peasant deputies from all parts of Russia who declared for *nationalisation*.

Comrade Maslov wrote in 1905: "Nationalisation of the land as a means of solving [?] the agrarian problem in Russia at the present time cannot be accepted, first of all [note this "first of all"] because it is hopelessly utopian. Nationalisation of the land presupposes the transfer of *all* the land to the state. But will the peasants, and particularly the homestead peasants, voluntarily agree to transfer their land to anyone?" (P. Maslov, *A Critique of Agrarian Programmes*, Moscow, 1905, p. 20.)

Thus, in 1905, nationalisation was "first of all" hopelessly utopian because the peasants would not agree to it.

In 1907, in March, the same Maslov wrote: "All the Narodnik groups [the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries] are advocating nationalisation of the land in one form or another." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 100.)

There's your new Vendée! There's your all-Russian revolt of the peasants against nationalisation!

But instead of pondering over the ridiculous position in which the people who spoke and wrote about a peasant Vendée against nationalisation now find themselves, in the light of the experience of the two Dumas, instead of trying to explain the mistake which he made in 1905, P. Maslov behaved like Ivan the Forgetful. He preferred to forget the words I have just quoted, and the speeches at the Stockholm Congress! Moreover, with the same light-heartedness with which he, in 1905, asserted that *the peasants would not agree*, he now asserts the opposite. Listen:

..."The Narodniks, reflecting the interests and hopes of the small proprietors [listen to this!], had to declare in favour of nationalisation" (*ibid.*).

There you have a sample of the scientific scrupulousness of our municipalisers! In solving a difficult problem before the elected representatives of the peasants from the whole of Russia made their political declarations, the

municipalisers, *on behalf of* the small proprietors, asserted one thing, and *after* those declarations in the two Dumas they assert, on behalf of the very same "small proprietors", the very opposite.

It should be mentioned, as a particular curiosity, that Maslov explains this tendency towards nationalisation on the part of the Russian peasants as being due not to any special conditions of the peasant agrarian revolution, but to the *general characteristics* of the small proprietor in capitalist society. That is incredible, but it is a fact:

"The small proprietor," Maslov announces, "is most of all afraid of the competition and domination of the big proprietor, of the domination of capital".... You are mixing things up, Mr. Maslov. To put the big (*feudal*) landowner on a par with the owner of capital means repeating the prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie. The peasant is fighting so energetically against the feudal latifundia precisely because at the present historical moment he represents the free, capitalist evolution of agriculture.

... "Being unable to contend with capital in the economic field, the small proprietor puts his faith in government authority, which should come to the aid of the small proprietor against the big one.... The reason the Russian peasant has hoped for centuries to be protected from the landlords and government officials by the central authority, the reason Napoleon in France, relying for support on the peasants, was able to crush the Republic, was the hope the peasants entertained of receiving aid from the central authority." (*Obrazovaniye*, p. 100.)

How magnificently Pyotr Maslov argues! In the first place, what has nationalisation of the land to do with the fact that at the present historical moment the Russian peasant is displaying the same characteristics as the French peasant under Napoleon? The French peasant under Napoleon was not and could not be in favour of nationalisation. You are rather incoherent, Mr. Maslov!

Secondly, what has the struggle against capital to do with it? We are comparing peasant ownership of land with the nationalisation of all the land, including that of the peasants. The French peasant under Napoleon clung fanatically to the small property as a barrier against capital, but the Russian peasant.... Once again, my dear fellow,

where is the connection between the beginning and the end of your argument?

Thirdly, in speaking about the hopes placed in government authority, Maslov makes it appear that the peasants do not understand the harmfulness of bureaucracy, do not understand the importance of local self-government, whereas he, the progressive Pyotr Maslov, does appreciate all this. This criticism of the Narodniks is much too simplified. A reference to the famous Land Bill (the Bill of the 104), which the Trudoviks introduced in the First and Second Dumas, will suffice to show the falsity of Maslov's argument (or hint?). The facts show, *on the contrary*, that the principles of local self-government and of hostility towards a bureaucratic solution of the land problem are *more clearly* expressed in the Trudovik Bill than in the programme of the Social-Democrats written according to Maslov! In our programme we speak only about "democratic principles" in electing local bodies, whereas the Trudovik Bill (Clause 16) distinctly and directly provides for the election of local self-governing bodies on the basis of "universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot". Moreover, the Bill provides for local land committees—which, as is known, the Social-Democrats support—to be elected in the same way, and which are to organise the discussion on the land reform and make preparations for carrying it out (Clauses 17-20). The bureaucratic method of carrying out the agrarian reform was advocated by the *Cadets*, and not by the Trudoviks, by the liberal bourgeoisie, and not by the peasants. Why did Maslov have to distort these well-known facts?

Fourthly, in his remarkable "explanation" of why the small proprietors "had to declare in favour of nationalisation", Maslov lays stress on the peasants' hope of receiving protection from the *central* authority. That is the point of distinction between municipalisation and nationalisation: in the one case there are local authorities, in the other case, the central authority. That is Maslov's pet idea, the economic and political implications of which we shall deal with in greater detail further on. Here we will point out that Maslov is *dodging* the question put to him by the history of our revolution, namely, why the peasants *are*

not afraid of the nationalisation of their own land. That is the crux of the question!

But that is not all. A particularly piquant feature of Maslov's attempt to explain the class roots of the Trudovik policy of nationalisation as against municipalisation is the following: Maslov *conceals from his readers* the fact that on the question of the actual disposal of the land the Narodniks were also in favour of local self-governing bodies! Maslov's talk about the peasants placing their "hopes" in the *central* authority is mere intellectualist tittle-tattle about the peasants. Read Clause 16 of the Land Bill that the Trudoviks introduced in both Dumas. Here is the text of this clause:

"The management of the national land fund must be entrusted to local self-governing bodies, elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, which shall act independently within the limits laid down by the law."

Compare this with the corresponding demand made in our programme: "...The R.S.D.L.P. demands: ...⁽⁴⁾ the confiscation of privately owned lands, except small holdings, which shall be placed at the disposal of large local self-governing bodies (comprising urban and rural districts, as per Point 3) to be elected on democratic principles"....

What is the difference here from the point of view of the comparative rights of central and local authorities? In what way does "management" differ from "disposal"?

Why, in speaking about the attitude of the Trudoviks towards nationalisation, did Maslov have to conceal from his readers—and perhaps from himself too—the contents of this Clause 16? Because it completely shatters the whole of his absurd "municipalisation" theory.

Examine the arguments in favour of this municipalisation that Maslov advanced before the Stockholm Congress, read the Minutes of that Congress; you will find innumerable allusions to the impossibility of suppressing nationalities, of oppressing the borderlands, of ignoring the differences of local interests, etc., etc. Even prior to the Stockholm Congress, I had pointed out to Maslov (see *Revision, etc.*, p. 18*) that all arguments of this kind are a "sheer mis-

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 182.—Ed.

understanding" because our programme—I said—already recognised the right of self-determination of nationalities as well as *wide local and regional* self-government. Consequently, from *that* aspect, there was no need, nor was it possible, to devise any additional "guarantees" against excessive centralisation, bureaucracy, and regulation, because that would be either devoid of content or would be interpreted in an anti-proletarian, federalist spirit.

The Trudoviks have demonstrated to the municipalisers that I was right.

Maslov must admit now that *all* the groups that voice the interests and the point of view of the peasantry have declared in favour of nationalisation *in a form* that will ensure the rights and powers of the local self-governing bodies no less than in Maslov's programme! The law defining the powers of the local self-governing bodies is to be passed by the central parliament. Maslov does not say that, but such ostrich-like tactics will be of no avail, because no other procedure is conceivable.

The words "placed at the *disposal*" introduce the utmost confusion. Nobody knows who are to be the *owners** of the lands confiscated from the landlords! That being the case, the owner can *only* be the state. What does "disposal" consist of? What are to be its limits, forms, and conditions? That, too, will have to be determined by the *central* parliament. That is self-evident, and, moreover, in our Party's programme special mention is made of "forests of national importance" and of "lands available for colonisation". Obviously, only the central state authority is in a position to *single out* the "forests of national importance" from the general mass of forest land, and, the "lands available for colonisation" from the total land area.

In short, the Maslov programme, which, in a particularly distorted form, has now become the programme of our Party, is *quite absurd* in comparison with the Trudovik pro-

* At the Stockholm Congress the Mensheviks rejected an amendment to substitute for the words "placed at the disposal", the words "made the private property" (Minutes, p. 152). Only in the *resolution on tactics* is it said, "in possession", in the event of the "victorious development of the revolution", but it does not define more precisely what that means.

gramme. No wonder Maslov found it necessary, in talking about nationalisation, to drag in even the Napoleonic peasant in order to conceal from the public the absurd position we have put ourselves in before the representatives of bourgeois democracy by our muddled "municipalisation"!

The only difference between the two—a real essential difference—is the attitude towards the peasants' allotment lands. Maslov singled these out only because he was afraid of a "Vendée". And it turned out that the peasant deputies who were sent to the First and Second Dumas laughed at the fears of the tail-ist Social-Democrats and declared in favour of the nationalisation of *their own* lands!

The municipalisers should now *oppose* the Trudovik peasants and *urge* them not to nationalise their lands. The irony of history has brought the arguments of Maslov, John, Kostrov, and Co. tumbling down upon their own heads.

4. THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE PEASANTRY

We shall try to analyse the question (as to why all the political groups which reflect the interests and hopes of the small proprietors should have spoken in favour of nationalisation) in regard to which P. Maslov flounders so helplessly.

First of all, let us see to what extent the Land Bill of the 104, i.e., of the Trudoviks in the First and Second Dumas, really expresses the demands of the peasantry of the whole of Russia. That it does is borne out by the nature of the representation in both Dumas, as well as by the nature of the political struggle on the agrarian question which developed in the "parliamentary" arena among the spokesmen of the different classes. The idea of landownership in general, and of peasant ownership in particular, far from being pushed into the background in the Duma, was, on the contrary, constantly brought to the fore by certain parties. The idea was supported by the government, in the shape of Stishinsky, Gurko, and all the ministers, as well as all the official press, addressing especially the peasant deputies. The political parties of the Right, too, beginning with the "famous" Svyatopolk-Mirsky in the Second Duma,

kept dinging into the peasants' ears about the blessings of peasant proprietorship. The actual alignment of forces on this question has been depicted by such a wealth of data that there can be no doubt as to its correctness (from the standpoint of class interests). The Cadet Party in the First Duma, when the liberals regarded the revolutionary people as a force and tried to woo them, was also swept along by the general current in the direction of land nationalisation. As is known, the Cadet Land Bill introduced in the First Duma contained a clause about a "state land reserve" to include all alienated land and from which land would be granted on long-term leases. Of course, the Cadets in the First Duma did not put that demand forward on any grounds of principle—it would be ridiculous to speak of the Cadet Party having principles. No. That demand of the liberals sprang up as a feeble echo of the demands of the peasant masses. Already in the First Duma the peasant deputies at once began to form a separate political group, and the Land Bill of the "104" served as the chief and basic platform of the whole of the Russian peasantry, which came forward as a conscious social force. The speeches of the peasant deputies in the First and Second Dumas and the articles in the Trudovik papers (*Izvestia Krestyanskih Deputatov*, *Trudovaya Rossiya*) showed that the Bill of the 104 faithfully expressed the interests and hopes of the peasants. That Bill must, therefore, be dealt with in somewhat greater detail.

It is interesting, by the way, to look at the composition of the group of deputies who signed the Bill. In the First Duma it was signed by 70 Trudoviks, 17 non-party deputies, 8 peasants who supplied no information as to their party affiliation, 5 Cadets,* 3 Social-Democrats,** and 1 Lithuanian Autonomist. In the Second Duma the Bill of the "104" had 99 signatures, and after deducting duplicates, 91 signatures, namely, 79 Trudoviks, 4 Popular Socialists, 2 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2 deputies from the Cossack

* G. Zubchenko, T. Volkov, M. Gerasimov, all peasants; S. Lozhkin, a physician, and Afanasyev, a priest.

** Antonov, a worker from Perm Gubernia, Yershov, a worker from Kazan Gubernia, and V. Churyukov, a worker from Moscow Gubernia.

group, 2 non-party deputies, 1 deputy more to the left than the Cadets (Peterson), and 1 Cadet (Odnokozov, a peasant). There was a preponderance of peasants among the signatories (no fewer than 54 out of 91 in the Second Duma, and no fewer than 52 out of 104 in the First). It is interesting that P. Maslov's *special* expectations regarding the homestead peasants (referred to above *) who, he said, could not agree to nationalisation, were also completely defeated by the attitude of the peasant deputies in both Dumas. For instance, in Podolsk Gubernia nearly all the peasants are *homestead* peasants (in 1905 there were 457,134 homestead peasants and only 1,630 members of village communes); nevertheless, 13 Podolsk deputies (mainly peasant farmers) signed the Land Bill of the "104" in the First Duma, and 10 in the Second Duma! Among other gubernias with homestead landownership we will mention Vilna, Kovno, Kiev, Poltava, Bessarabia, and Volhynia, deputies from which signed the Land Bill of the "104". The distinction between village commune members and homestead peasants as regards land nationalisation may appear important and material only to those who share Narodnik prejudices and those prejudices, by the way, were dealt a hard blow when the peasant deputies of the whole of Russia first came forward with a land programme. As a matter of fact, the demand for the nationalisation of the land is called forth not by any specific form of landownership, not by the "communal habits and instincts" of the peasants, but by the general conditions of the whole system of small peasant landownership (both communal and homestead) which is crushed by the feudal latifundia.

Among the deputies in the First and Second Dumas who sponsored the nationalisation Bill of the 104 we see representatives from all parts of Russia, not only from the central agricultural and the industrial non-black-earth gubernias, not only from the northern (Arkhangelsk and Vologda—in the Second Duma), eastern and southern borderlands (Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Kuban, Taurida, and Stavropol gubernias and regions), but also from the gubernias of Little Russia, the South-west, North-west,

* See pp. 261-62 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Poland (Suvalki) and Siberia (Tobolsk). Obviously, the plight of the small peasant under the oppression of feudal landlordism, which is most forcefully and clearly demonstrated in the purely Russian agricultural centre, is felt throughout Russia, and causes the small farmers everywhere to support the struggle for the nationalisation of the land.

The nature of that struggle bears all the earmarks of petty-bourgeois individualism. In this respect special stress must be laid on the fact, all too frequently ignored in our socialist press, that the greatest blow to the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was struck by the very first entry of the peasants into the open, all-Russian political arena with an independent land programme. The Socialist-Revolutionary Land Socialisation Bill (the Bill of the "33" in the First Duma) was supported by a *minority* of progressive peasant deputies. The great *majority* were found on the side of the Land Bill of the 104, drafted by the *Popular Socialists*, whose programme the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves describe as *individualistic*.

For instance, in the Socialist-Revolutionary *Collection of Articles* (published by *Nasha Mysl*, St. Petersburg, 1907, No. 1) we find an article by P. Vikhlyaev entitled "The Popular Socialist Party and the Agrarian Question". The writer criticises the Popular Socialist Peshekhanov, and quotes the latter's statement that "the Bill of the 104 reflected our [the P.S.] standpoint on the way in which the land may be taken" (p. 81 of the *Collection*). The Socialist-Revolutionaries declare bluntly that the Bill of the 104 "leads to the negation of the root principle of communal land tenure"—"*in the same way*" (*sic!*) as Stolypin's agrarian legislation, the law of November 9, 1906, does. (*Ibid.*, p. 86; we shall show presently how the Socialist-Revolutionaries were prevented by their own prejudices from appraising the real economic difference between the two ways, i. e., the Stolypin way and the Trudovik way.) The Socialist-Revolutionaries regard Peshekhanov's programmatic views as "the manifestation of selfish individualism" (p. 89), "the pollution of the wide ideological stream with the mud of individualism" (p. 91), and "the encouragement of individualistic and selfish tendencies among the masses of the people" (*ibid.*, p. 93).

All this is true. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries are wrong in believing that "strong" words can obscure the fact that the crux of the matter is not the opportunism of Peshekhonov and Co., but the individualism of the *small farmer*. The point is not that the Peshekhonovs are polluting the ideological stream of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but that *the majority of the progressive peasant deputies* have revealed the real economic content of Narodism, the real aspirations of the small farmers. What the Land Bills of the 104 in the First and Second Dumas * revealed was the bankruptcy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in face of the representatives of the broad, really all-Russian, peasant masses.

While declaring in favour of nationalisation of the land, the Trudoviks very clearly reveal in their Bill the "selfish and individualistic" aspirations of the small farmers. They propose to leave the allotments and the small private holdings in the possession of their present owners (Clause 3 of the Land Bill of the 104), provided legislative measures are taken to ensure that they "gradually become the property of the whole nation". Translated into the language of real economic relations, it means just this: we take as our starting-point the interests of the real *owners*, of the real, not the nominal, tillers of the soil, but we want their economic activity to develop quite freely on nationalised **

* From the Stenographic Records of the Second Duma it appears that the Socialist-Revolutionary Mushenko introduced a Land Bill signed by 105 deputies. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain a copy of that Bill. Among the Duma materials I had at my disposal there was only the Trudovik Bill of the 104 that was introduced in the Second Duma too. The existence of the Socialist-Revolutionary Bill of the 105 in addition to the two Trudovik Bills of the 104 (introduced in the First and Second Dumas) merely indicates, at best, that certain peasants wavered between the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but it does not disprove what I have said above.

** Incidentally, A. Finn-Yenotayevsky, in disputing the earnestness and consciousness of the nationalisation aspirations of the Peasant Union and of the peasantry in general, quoted the statement of V. Groman that the delegates to the peasants' congresses "do not anticipate having to make any payment for the land", and that they have no idea that differential rent must revert to society as a whole. (A. Finn, *The Agrarian Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 69.) Clauses 7 and 14 of the Bill of the 104 prove that this view is erroneous. In

land. Clause 9 of the Bill, which states that "priority is to be given to the local population before outsiders, and to the agricultural population before the non-agricultural", shows once more that the interests of the small proprietors come first with the Trudoviks. An "equal right to the land" is a mere phrase; state loans and grants "to persons without sufficient means to acquire the necessary agricultural equipment" (Clause 15 of the Land Bill of the "104") are pious wishes; those who will really and inevitably gain will be the ones who *can become* strong proprietors now, who can be transformed from enslaved tillers of the soil into free and well-to-do farmers. Of course, it is in the interests of the proletariat to support such measures as will most of all help agriculture in Russia to pass from the hands of feudal landlords and enslaved tillers of the soil, who are crushed by ignorance, poverty, and routine, into the hands of free farmers. And the Bill of the "104" is nothing but a platform of the struggle to turn the well-to-do section of the enslaved peasantry into free farmers.

5. MEDIEVAL LANDOWNERSHIP AND THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION.

The question now arises whether there are material grounds in the economic conditions of the agrarian, bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia compelling the small proprietors to demand the nationalisation of the land, or whether this demand as well is merely a phrase, merely the pious wish of the ignorant muzhik, the vain dream of the patriarchal tiller of the soil.

those clauses provision is made by the Trudoviks both for payment for the land (a land tax rising in accordance with the size of the allotment) and for the reversion of differential rent to the state ("limiting the right to appropriate the increase in the value" of the land, "insofar as it is not due to their, the owners' labour and *capital*—[N. B.! the Trudoviks are not opposed to *capital*!—but to social conditions"). It is true that in regard to urban and other lands, Clause 7 provides that: "until such property passes to the whole nation" the rights of occupiers, etc., shall be limited. But that is probably a slip of the pen, for otherwise it would mean that the Trudoviks take the rent from the proprietors and return it to the occupiers, the tenants of nationalised land!

To answer this question we must first try to envisage more concretely the conditions of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture, and then compare those conditions with the *two paths* of capitalist agrarian evolution that are possible in Russia, as we have outlined above.

The conditions of the bourgeois revolution in agriculture from the standpoint of agrarian relations have been very strikingly dealt with by Marx in the last volume of *Theories of Surplus Value* (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 2. Teil, Stuttgart, 1905).

After examining the views of Rodbertus, exposing the great limitations of the theory of this Pomeranian landlord, and enumerating in detail every single manifestation of his stupidity (II, 1. Teil, S. 256-58, *erster Blödsinn—sechster Blödsinn des Herrn Rodbertus* *), Marx turns to Ricardo's theory of rent (II, 2. Teil, § 3b, "The Historical Conditions of Ricardo's Theory").¹⁰⁷

Speaking of Ricardo and Anderson, Marx says: "Both start out from the view, regarded as very strange on the Continent: (1) that no landed property exists as an obstacle to any investment of capital in the land; (2) that there the tillers pass from better to worse soils. For Ricardo this premise is absolute—leaving out of account interruptions in development through the reaction of science and industry; for Anderson it is relative, since the worse soil is again transformed into better; (3) that capital, the mass of capital requisite for application to agriculture, is always available.

"Now, as far as points 1 and 2 are concerned, it must appear very peculiar to those on the Continent that in the country where, according to their notions, feudal landed property has been most strongly preserved, economists start out from the idea that landed property does not exist. Anderson does so as well as Ricardo. The explanation is as follows:

"first, the peculiarity of the English law of enclosures' [i.e., the law relating to the enclosure of the common lands] which has absolutely no analogy with the continental division of common land.

* Vol. II, Part I, pp. 256-58, first nonsense—sixth nonsense of Herr Rodbertus.—Ed.

"secondly, nowhere in the world has capitalist production, since Henry VII, dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture and so adequately moulded its conditions and made them subject to itself. England is in this respect the most revolutionary country in the world. All historically inherited relations—not only the position of the villages, but the very villages themselves, not only the habitations of the agricultural population, but this population itself, not only the ancient economic centres, but the very economy itself—have been ruthlessly swept away where they were in contradiction to the conditions of capitalist production in agriculture, or did not correspond to those conditions. The German, for example, finds economic relations determined by the traditional common land relations [*Feldmarken*], the position of economic centres, and particular conglomerations of the population. The Englishman finds that the historical conditions of agriculture have been progressively created by capital since the fifteenth century. The technical expression customary in the United Kingdom, the 'clearing of estates', does not occur in any continental country. But what does this 'clearing of estates' mean? It means that, without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted for example from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production, instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition, are historically *fashioned* in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, *no landed property exists*; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income. A Pomeranian landowner, his mind full of his ancestral [*angestammten*] common lands, economic centres, and the agricultural collegium, etc., is quite likely, therefore, to hold up his hands in horror at Ricardo's 'unhistorical' views on the development of agricultural relations. That only shows that he naïvely confuses Pomeranian and English conditions. But it cannot be said that Ricardo, who here starts out from English conditions, is just as narrow in his view as the

Pomeranian landowner who thinks within the limits of Pomeranian conditions. The English conditions are the only ones in which modern landed property, i.e., landed property *modified* by capitalist production, has developed adequately (in ideal perfection). Here the English theory is the classical one for the modern, i.e., capitalist mode of production. The Pomeranian theory, on the other hand, judges the developed relations according to a historically lower (inadequate) form, which has not taken full shape" (S. 5-7).

That is a remarkably profound argument by Marx. Have our "municipalisers" ever pondered over it?

In Volume III of *Capital* (2. Teil, S. 156) Marx had already pointed out that the form of landed property with which the incipient capitalist mode of production is confronted *does not suit* capitalism. Capitalism *creates for itself* the required forms of agrarian relationships out of the old forms, out of feudal landed property, peasants' commune property, clan property, etc.¹⁰⁸ In that chapter, Marx compares the *different methods* by which capital creates the required forms of landed property. In Germany the reshaping of the medieval forms of landed property proceeded in a reformative way, so to speak. It adapted itself to routine, to tradition, to the feudal estates that were slowly converted into Junker estates, to the routine of indolent peasants * who were undergoing the difficult transition from corvée to the condition of the Knecht and Grossbauer. In England this reshaping proceeded in a revolutionary, violent way; but the violence was practised for the benefit of the landlords, it was practised on the masses of the peasants, who were taxed to exhaustion, driven from the villages, evicted, and who died out, or emigrated. In America this reshaping went on in a violent way as regards the slave farms in the Southern States. There violence was applied against the slaveowning landlords. Their estates were broken up, and the large feudal estates were

* See *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 1. Teil, S. 280; the condition for the capitalist mode of production in agriculture is "the substitution of a businessman [*Geschäftsmann*] for the indolent peasant".¹⁰⁹

transformed into small bourgeois farms.* As regards the mass of "unappropriated" American lands, this role of creating the new agrarian relationships to suit the new mode of production (i.e., capitalism) was played by the "American General Redistribution", by the Anti-Rent movement (*Anti-Rent-Bewegung*) of the forties, the Homestead Act,¹¹⁰ etc. When, in 1846, Hermann Kriege, a German Communist, advocated the equal redistribution of the land in America, Marx ridiculed the Socialist-Revolutionary prejudices and the petty-bourgeois theory of this quasi-socialism, but he *appreciated* the historical importance of the American movement *against landed property*,** as a movement which in a progressive way expressed the interests of the development of the productive forces and the interests of capitalism in America.

6. WHY HAD THE SMALL PROPRIETORS IN RUSSIA TO DECLARE IN FAVOUR OF NATIONALISATION?

Look from this angle at the agrarian evolution of Russia since the second half of the nineteenth century.

What was our "great" Peasant Reform, the "cutting off" of the peasants' lands, the removal of the peasants to the "poor lands", the enforcement of the new land regulations

* See Kautsky's *Agrarian Question* (p. 132, et seq. of the German text) concerning the growth of the small farms in the American South as a result of the abolition of slavery.

** *Vperyod*, 1905, No. 15 (Geneva, April 7/20), article "Marx on the American 'General Redistribution'". (See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 323-29.—*Ed.*) (Second volume of Mehring's *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*.) "We fully recognise," wrote Marx in 1846, "the historical justification of the movement of the American National Reformers. We know that this movement strives for a result which, true, would give a temporary impetus to the industrialism of modern bourgeois society, but which, as a product of the proletarian movement, and as an attack on landed property in general, especially under the prevailing American conditions, must inevitably lead, by its own consequences, to communism. Kriege, who with the German Communists in New York joined the Anti-Rent-Bewegung (movement), clothes this simple fact in bombastic phrases, without entering into the content of the movement."¹¹¹

by military force, shootings, and floggings? It was the first act of mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture. It was the "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the landlords.

What is Stolypin's agrarian legislation under Article 87, that encouragement of the kulaks to plunder the village communes, that breaking-up of the old agrarian relationships for the benefit of a handful of well-to-do proprietors at the price of the rapid ruin of the masses? It was the second big step in mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of capitalism. It was the second "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the *landlords*.

And what does the Trudovik nationalisation of the land stand for in the Russian revolution?

It stands for "*clearing of estates*" for capitalism by the *peasantry*.

The main source of all the well-meant foolishness of our municipalisers is precisely their failure to understand the *economic* basis of the bourgeois agrarian revolution in Russia in its two possible types, i.e., the landlord-bourgeois revolution, and the peasant-bourgeois revolution. Without a "clearing" of the medieval agrarian relationships and regulations, partly feudal and partly Asiatic, there can be no bourgeois revolution in agriculture, because capital must—through economic necessity—create for itself new agrarian relationships, adapted to the new conditions of free commercial agriculture. That "clearing" of the medieval lumber in the sphere of agrarian relations in general, and of the old system of landownership first and foremost, must chiefly affect the landlords' estates and peasant allotments, since both kinds of landed property are now, in their present form, adapted to the labour-service system, to the corvée heritage, to bondage, and not to a free capitalistically developing economy. Stolypin's "clearing" undoubtedly follows the line of the progressive capitalist development of Russia; but it is adapted solely to the interests of the landlords: let the rich peasants pay the "Peasant" (read: Landlord) Bank an exorbitant price for the land; in return we shall give them freedom to plunder the village communes, to forcibly expropriate the masses, to round off their plots, to evict the poor peasants, to under-

mine the very foundations of the life of entire villages, and, at any price, in spite of everything, setting at naught the life and husbandry of any number of "old established" allotment peasants, to set up new *otrub*^{111a} holdings, as the basis for new capitalist agriculture. There is unquestionable economic sense in that line; it *faithfully* expresses the *real* course of development as it should be *under the rule of landlords* who are being transformed into Junkers.

What is the other line, the peasant line? Either it is economically impossible—in which case all talk about the peasants confiscating the landlords' estates, about the peasant agrarian revolution, etc., is either humbug or an empty dream. Or it is economically possible—provided one element of bourgeois society is victorious over the other element of bourgeois society—in which case we must form a clear idea of, and clearly show to the people, the concrete conditions for that development, the conditions under which the peasants can reshape the old agrarian relations on a new, capitalist basis.

Here there naturally arises the thought that this peasant line is precisely the *division* of the landlords' estates among the peasants for their private property. Very well. But if this division is to correspond to the really new, capitalist conditions of agriculture, it must be carried out in a new way and not in the old way. The division must be based not on the old allotment land distributed among the peasants a hundred years ago at the will of the landlords' bailiffs or of the officials of Asiatic despotism, but on the needs of free, commercial agriculture. To meet the requirements of capitalism, the division must be a division among *free farmers*, not among "indolent" peasants, the great majority of whom run their economies by routine and tradition in conformity with patriarchal, not with capitalist conditions. A division according to the old standards, i.e., in conformity with the old forms of landownership based on peasant allotments, will not be the *clearing* of the old landownership, but its *perpetuation*; not clearing the way for capitalism, but rather *encumbering* it with a mass of unadapted and unadaptable "indolents" who cannot become free farmers. To be progressive, the division must be based on a *new* sorting process among the peasant cultivators,

which will sift the farmers from the useless lumber. And this new sorting out is nationalisation of the land, i.e., the total abolition of private landownership, complete freedom to till the land, the unhampered transformation of the old peasantry into free farmers.

Picture to yourselves the present system of peasant farming and the character of the old peasant landownership based on allotments. "Although united by the village commune into tiny administrative, fiscal, and land-holding associations, the peasants are split up by a mass of diverse divisions into grades, into categories according to size of allotment, amount of payments, etc. Let us take, for example, the Zemstvo statistical returns for Saratov Gubernia; there the peasants are divided into the following grades: gift-land peasants, owners, full owners, state peasants, state peasants with communal holdings, state peasants with quarter holdings, state peasants that formerly belonged to landlords, crown-land peasants, state-land tenants and landless peasants, owners who were formerly landlords' peasants, peasants whose farmsteads have been redeemed, owners who are former crown-land peasants, colonist free-holders, settlers, gift-land peasants who formerly belonged to landlords, owners who are former state peasants, manumitted, those who do not pay quit-rent, free tillers, temporarily-bound, former factory-bound peasants, etc.; further there are registered peasants, migrant, etc."¹¹² All these grades differ in the history of their agrarian relations, in size of allotments, amount of payments, etc., etc. And within the grades there are innumerable differences of a similar kind: sometimes even the peasants of one and the same village are divided into two quite distinct categories: 'Mr. X's former peasants' and 'Mrs. Y's former peasants'. All this diversity was natural and necessary in the Middle Ages."* If the *new* division of the landlords' estates were carried out in conformity with this feudal system of landownership—whether by levelling to a uniform rate, i.e., equal division, or by fixing some kind of ratio between

* *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapters V, IX, "Some Remarks on the Pre-Capitalist Economy of Our Countryside". (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 381-82.—Ed.)

the new and the old, or in some other way—not only would it not guarantee that the new plots would meet the requirements of capitalist agriculture, but, on the contrary, it would *perpetuate* the obvious *lack of conformity*. Such a division would *impede* social evolution, would tie the new to the old instead of liberating the new *from* the old. Real liberation can *only* be achieved by nationalising the land, thus *creating the conditions for the rise of free farmers*, for the *development* of free farming without connection with the old, without any relation to medieval landownership in the form of peasant allotments.

Capitalist evolution on the medieval peasant allotments proceeded in post-Reform Russia in such a way that the progressive economic elements *freed themselves* from the determining influence of the allotments. On the one hand, proletarians emerged, who rented out their allotments, abandoned them, or let the land go to waste. On the other hand, *peasant owners* emerged, who purchased or rented land, built up a *new economy* out of *various fragments* of the old, medieval system of landownership. The land that is now cultivated by a more or less well-to-do Russian peasant, i. e., by one who, given a favourable outcome of the revolution, is really capable of becoming a free farmer, consists partly of his own allotment, partly of an allotment he has rented from a neighbour who is a village-commune member, partly, perhaps, of land rented on long-term lease from the state, land leased annually from the landlord, land purchased from the bank, and so forth. Capitalism requires the abolition of *all* these distinctions of category; it requires that all economy on the land be organised exclusively in accordance with the new conditions and demands of the market, the demands of agriculture. Nationalisation of the land fulfils this requirement by the revolutionary peasant method; at one stroke it completely divests the people of *all* the rotten rags of *all* forms of medieval landownership. There must be neither landlord **nor allotment** ownership, there must be only the new, free landownership—such is the slogan of the radical peasant. And that slogan expresses in the most faithful, in the most consistent and categorical manner the interests of capitalism (which the radical peasant in his simplicity tries to ward off by

making the sign of the cross), and expresses the need for the utmost development of the land's productive forces under commodity production.

One may judge from this how clever Pyotr Maslov is in thinking that the *only* difference between his agrarian programme and the peasant programme of the Trudoviks is the *perpetuation* of the old, medieval, allotment ownership! The peasant allotment land is a ghetto in which the peasantry is suffocating and from which it is straining to escape to free* land. Yet in spite of the peasants' demands for free, i. e., nationalised, land, Pyotr Maslov seeks to perpetuate this ghetto, to perpetuate the old system; he would subject the best lands, confiscated from the landlords and converted to public use, to the conditions of the old system of landownership and the old methods of farming. *In deeds*, the Trudovik peasant is a most determined bourgeois revolutionary, but in words he is a petty-bourgeois utopian who imagines that a "General Redistribution" is the starting-point of harmony and fraternity,** and not of capitalist farming. Pyotr Maslov is, in deeds, a reactionary who, fearing the Vendée of a future counter-revolution, seeks to consolidate the present anti-revolutionary elements of the old forms of landownership and to perpetuate the peasant ghetto, while in words he thoughtlessly repeats mechanically learnt phrases about bourgeois progress. What the real conditions are for real free-bourgeois progress and not for the Stolypin-bourgeois progress of Russian agriculture, Maslov and Co. absolutely fail to understand.

The difference between the vulgar Marxism of Pyotr Maslov and the methods of research that Marx really used

* The "Socialist-Revolutionary" Mr. Mushenko, the most consistent exponent of the views of his party in the Second Duma, bluntly declared: "*We raise the banner of the liberation of the land*" (47th sitting, May 26, 1907, p. 1174). One must be blind to fail to perceive not only the essential *capitalist* nature of this supposedly "socialist" banner (Pyotr Maslov sees this too), but also the progressive economic nature of such an agrarian revolution compared with the Stolypin-Cadet revolution (this Pyotr Maslov *does not see*).

** Cf. the naïve expression of this bourgeois-revolutionary point of view in the speech of the "Popular Socialist" Volk-Karachevsky about "equality, fraternity, and liberty". (Second Duma, 16th sitting, March 26, 1907, pp. 1077-80.)

can be seen most clearly in the latter's attitude towards the petty-bourgeois utopias of the Narodniks (including the Socialist-Revolutionaries). In 1846, Marx ruthlessly exposed the petty-bourgeois character of the American Socialist-Revolutionary Hermann Kriege, who proposed a veritable General Redistribution for America and called it "communism". Marx's dialectical and revolutionary criticism swept away the husks of petty-bourgeois doctrine and *picked out* the sound kernel of the "attacks on landed property" and of the "Anti-Rent movement". Our vulgar Marxists, however, in criticising "equalised redistribution", "socialisation of the land", and "equal right to the land", *confine themselves* to repudiating the doctrine, and thus reveal their own obtuse doctrinairism, which prevents them from seeing the vital life of the peasant revolution beneath the lifeless doctrine of Narodnik theory. Maslov and the Mensheviks have carried this obtuse doctrinairism—expressed in our "municipalisation" programme, which perpetuates the most backward and medieval form of land-ownership—to such lengths that in the Second Duma the following truly disgraceful things could be uttered in the name of the Social-Democratic Party: ..."While on the question of the method of land alienation we [Social-Democrats] stand much nearer to these [Narodnik] groups than to the People's Freedom group, on the question of the forms of land tenure we stand farther away from them" (47th sitting, May 26, 1907, p. 1230 of Stenographic Record).

Indeed, in the peasant agrarian revolution the Mensheviks stand farther away from revolutionary peasant nationalisation, and closer to liberal-landlord preservation of allotment (and not only allotment) ownership. The preservation of allotment ownership is the preservation of down-troddenness, backwardness, and bondage. It is natural for a liberal landlord, who dreams of redemption payments, to stand up for allotment ownership *... with the preservation

* Incidentally, the Mensheviks (including Comrade Tsereteli, whose speech I have quoted) are deeply mistaken in believing that the Cadets are at all consistent in their defence of *free* peasant ownership. They are *not*. Mr. Kutler, on behalf of the Cadet Party, spoke

of a goodly share of landlord ownership! But the Social-Democrat, led astray by the "municipalisers", does not understand that the sound of words vanishes but the deed remains. The sound of the words about equality, socialisation, etc., will vanish, because there *cannot* be equalisation under commodity production. But the *deed* will remain, i. e., the greatest break with the feudal past that can possibly be achieved under capitalism, the break with medieval allotment ownership and with all routine and tradition. When people say "nothing will come of equalised redistribution", the Marxist ought to understand that this "nothing" relates *exclusively* to the socialist aims, exclusively to the fact that this is not going to abolish capitalism. But from attempts to bring about such a redistribution, even from the very idea of such a redistribution, *very much* will come that will be of advantage to the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

For that revolution may take place either with the predominance of the landlords over the peasants—and that requires the preservation of the old form of ownership and the Stolypin reform of it exclusively by the power of the ruble; or it will take place as a result of the victory of the peasantry over the landlords—and that, in view of the objective conditions of capitalist economy, is impossible without the abolition of all forms of medieval landownership, both landlord and peasant. The choice is between the Stolypin agrarian reform and peasant revolutionary nationalisation. *Only* these solutions are economically real. Anything intermediate, from Menshevik municipalisation to Cadet redemption payments, is petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness, a stupid distortion of theory, a poor invention.

in the Second Duma in favour of ownership (as distinct from the Cadet Bill on state land reserve introduced in the First Duma), but at the same time he added: "*The Party proposes only [/] to limit their [the peasants'] right to alienate, and right to mortgage*, i. e., to prevent the selling and buying of land on a large scale in future" (12th sitting, March 19, 1907, p. 740 of Stenographic Record). That is the *archreactionary* programme of a *bureaucrat* disguised as a liberal.

7. THE PEASANTS AND THE NARODNIKS ON THE NATIONALISATION OF ALLOTMENT LAND

That the abolition of allotment ownership is a condition for the creation of free peasant farming in conformity with the new capitalist conditions is quite clearly realised by the peasants themselves. Mr. Groman, in his detailed and accurate description of the discussion at the peasant congresses,* cites the following remarkable opinion expressed by a peasant:

"During the discussion on redemption payment, one delegate, without meeting with any real opposition, said: 'It has been said that alienation without compensation would hit many peasants who had purchased land with their hard-earned money. There are few such peasants, and they have little land, *and they will get land in any case when it is distributed*'. That explains the readiness to relinquish property rights both in allotment and purchased land."

A little further on (p. 20) Mr. Groman repeats this as the general opinion of the peasants.

"They will get land in any case when it is distributed!" Is it not perfectly clear what economic necessity dictated this argument? The new distribution of all the land, both landlord and allotment land, cannot reduce the holdings of nine-tenths (or rather, ninety-nine hundredths) of the peasantry; there is nothing to fear from it. But the redistribution is necessary because it will enable the real, genuine farmers to arrange their land tenure in accordance with the new conditions, in accordance with the requirements of capitalism (the "dictates of the market" to individual producers), without submitting to the medieval relations which determined the size, location, and distribution of allotment land.

Mr. Peshekhonov, a practical and sober-minded "Popular Socialist" (read: Social-Cadet) who, as we have seen, has managed to adapt himself to the demands of the masses of small proprietors all over Russia, expresses this point of view even more definitely.

* *Material on the Peasant Question.* (A report of the Delegates' Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union, November 6-10, 1905, with an introduction by V. Groman. *Novy Mir* Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 12.)

"The allotment lands," he writes, "the part of the territory most important from the standpoint of production, are permanently assigned to a certain social-estate, and what is worse, to small groups of that estate, to separate households and villages. The result is that the peasantry, taken as a whole, cannot freely settle even within the area of the allotment land.... The population *is not properly distributed to suit the requirements of the market* [note this!]..... The ban on the state lands must be lifted, *allotment land must be freed from the fetters of property*, the fences around the private estates must be removed. The land must be returned to the Russian people, who will then settle upon it in a manner that will suit their economic requirements." (A. V. Peshekhonov, *The Agrarian Problem in Connection with the Peasant Movement*, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 83, 86, 88-89. Our italics.)

Is it not clear that the voice of this "Popular Socialist" is the voice of the free farmer who wants to stand up on his own feet? Is it not clear that it is really necessary for the farmer that the "allotment land" should be "freed from the fetters of property" in order that the population may distribute itself in a new way, in order that holdings may be redistributed in a manner to "suit the requirements of the market", i. e., the requirements of *capitalist agriculture*? Mr. Peshekhonov, we repeat, is so sober-minded that he rejects any kind of socialisation, rejects any kind of adaptation to communal law—it is not for nothing that the Socialist-Revolutionaries curse him for an individualist!—he *rejects any prohibition of hired labour on the peasant farm*.

In view of this kind of striving of the peasantry for nationalisation, the reactionary nature of support for peasant allotment ownership becomes quite obvious. A. Finn, who in his pamphlet cites some of Mr. Peshekhonov's arguments which we have quoted, criticises him as a Narodnik and tries to prove to him that the development of capitalism out of peasant farming, and within that system of farming, is inevitable (p. 14, et seq. in the pamphlet mentioned). That criticism is unsatisfactory because A. Finn has allowed the general question of the development of capitalism make him overlook the concrete question of the conditions for a freer development of capitalist agriculture on *allotment land*! A. Finn contents himself with merely posing the question of capitalism *in general*, thus scoring an easy victory over Narodism, which was vanquished long ago.

But we are dealing with a more concrete * question, viz., the landlord *versus* the peasant way of "removing the fences" (Mr. Peshekhanov's expression), of "clearing" the land for capitalism.

In winding up the debate on the agrarian question in the Second Duma, Mr. Mushenko, the official spokesman of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, revealed just as definitely as Mr. Peshekhanov the *capitalist* nature of the land nationalisation that the petty-bourgeois socialists choose to call "socialisation", the establishment of "equal right to the land", and so on.

"The population will be properly distributed," Mr. Mushenko said, "only when the land is unfenced, only when the fences imposed by the principle of private ownership of land are removed" (47th sitting, May 26, 1907, p. 1172 of Stenographic Record). Exactly! The "proper" distribution of the population is the very thing the market, capitalism, requires. But the "proper" distribution of "proper" farmers is hindered by both landlord *and allotment* ownership.

One more observation on the statements made by delegates of the Peasant Union merits our attention. Mr. Groman writes in the above-mentioned pamphlet:

"The notorious question of the 'village commune'—that cornerstone of the tenets of the old and new Narodism—was not raised at all and was tacitly rejected: the land must be placed at the disposal of individuals and associations, state the resolutions passed at both the First and Second Congresses" (p. 12).

* "What will this Peshekhanov labour economy lead to in the long run?" A. Finn asks, and answers quite rightly: "to capitalism" (p. 19 of his pamphlet). From that unquestionable truth, which it was certainly necessary to explain to a Narodnik, he should have taken a *further* step; he should have explained the specific forms of the manifestation of the demands of capitalism under the conditions of a peasant agrarian revolution. Instead, A. Finn took a step *backward*: "The question arises," he writes, "why should we go back to the past; why should we go by some roundabout way of our own only, in the long run, to find ourselves back again on the road we are already travelling? That is useless labour, Mr. Peshekhanov!" (*ibid.*) No, that is not useless labour, and it does not bring us to capitalism "in the long run"; *it is the straightest, freest, and quickest road to capitalism.* A. Finn did not ponder over the comparative features of the Stolypin capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia and a peasant-revolutionary capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia

Thus, the peasants have clearly and emphatically declared against the old village commune in favour of free associations and individual land tenure. That this was the real voice of the peasantry as a whole there can be no doubt, since there is *not a hint at the village commune* even in the Land Bill of the Trudovik Group (of the 104). Yet the village commune is an association for the ownership of allotment land!

Stolypin is forcibly abolishing the village commune for the benefit of a handful of rich persons. The peasantry wants to abolish it and replace it by free *associations* and tenure by "individuals" on the *nationalised* allotment land. But Maslov and Co., in the name of bourgeois progress, are challenging the fundamental requirement of this very progress and defending medieval landownership. God save us from that sort of "Marxism"!

8. THE MISTAKE MADE BY M. SHANIN AND OTHER ADVOCATES OF DIVISION

M. Shanin, approaching the question in his pamphlet* from a somewhat different angle, involuntarily provided another argument for the nationalisation which he detests so much. By citing the example of Ireland, by his analysis of the conditions of bourgeois *reform* in the domain of agriculture, M. Shanin has proved only one thing, viz., that the principles of private ownership of the land are incompatible with public or state ownership of the land (but that incompatibility has to be proved also by a general theoretical analysis, of which Shanin did not even think). If he has proved anything else it is that private ownership must be recognised wherever the state carries out any reforms in the sphere of agriculture developing on capitalist lines. But all these arguments of Shanin's are wide of the mark: of course, under the conditions of bourgeois reform *only* private ownership of land is conceivable; of course, the preservation of private ownership of the bulk of the land in the United Kingdom left no other way open for part

* M. Shanin, *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property*, Vilna, 1907.

of it than private ownership. But what has that to do with the "peasant agrarian revolution" in Russia? M. Shanin has pointed out the correct path, if you like, but it is the correct path of a Stolypin agrarian reform, and not of a peasant agrarian revolution.* The difference between the two ways is entirely lost upon M. Shanin, and yet unless this difference is clearly realised, it is ridiculous to talk about a Social-Democratic agrarian programme in the Russian revolution. And when M. Shanin, prompted, of course, by the very best motives, defends confiscation against redemption payments, he loses all sense of historical perspective. He forgets that in bourgeois society confiscation, i.e., expropriation without compensation, is as utterly incompatible with *reform* as land nationalisation. To speak of confiscation while admitting the possibility of a reformist and not a revolutionary solution of the agrarian question is like petitioning Stolypin to abolish landlordism.

Another aspect of Shanin's pamphlet is its heavy emphasis on the *agricultural* character of our agrarian crisis, on the absolute necessity of adopting higher forms of economy, of improving agricultural technique, which is so incredibly backward in Russia, and so forth. Shanin elaborates these correct theses in such an incredibly one-sided fashion, and he so completely ignores the abolition of the feudal latifundia and the changing of agrarian relationships as a condition for that technical revolution, that an utterly

* Shanin's reference to the example of Ireland, showing that private ownership preponderates over renting (and not over the nationalisation of the whole land), is not new either. *In exactly the same way*, the "liberal" Professor A. I. Chuprov cites Ireland to prove that peasant ownership of land is preferable. (*The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II, p. 11.) The real nature of this "liberal" and even "Constitutional-Democrat" is revealed on page 33 of his article. Here Mr. Chuprov, with incredible brazenness, the brazenness of a liberal that is possible only in Russia, proposes that on *all* the land-surveying commissions the peasants be subordinated to a *majority of landlords!* Five members representing the peasants and five representing the landlords, with a chairman "appointed by the Zemstvo Assembly", i. e., *by an assembly of landlords*. An allusion to Ireland was also made in the First Duma by the Right-wing deputy, Prince Drutsky-Lyubetsky, as proof of the necessity for private ownership of land and as an argument against the Cadet Bill. (Sitting of May 24, 1906, p. 626 of Stenographic Record.)

false perspective is drawn. For Stolypin's agrarian reform too leads to technical progress in agriculture, and does so in a correct way from the standpoint of the landlords' interests. The forcible break-up of the village communes by the laws of November 9, 1906, etc., the setting up of *khatars* and the subsidising of *otrubas*, are not a mirage, as frivolous, prattling democratic journalists sometimes declare them to be; they are the realities of economic progress based on the preservation of the power and interests of the landlords. It is an incredibly slow and incredibly painful road for the broad masses of the peasantry and for the proletariat, but it is the only possible road for capitalist Russia if the peasant agrarian revolution is not victorious.

Look at the question which Shanin raises from the standpoint of such a revolution. Modern agricultural technique demands that *all* the conditions of the ancient, conservative, barbarous, ignorant, and pauper methods of economy on peasant allotments be transformed. The three-field system, the primitive implements, the patriarchal impecuniosity of the tiller, the routine methods of stock-breeding and crass naïve ignorance of the conditions and requirements of the market must all be thrown overboard. Well, then, is such a revolutionising of agriculture possible if the old system of landownership is preserved? The division of the land among the present allotment owners would mean preserving half* of the medieval system of landownership. Division of the land might be progressive if it consolidated *modern* farming, *modern* agricultural methods, and scrapped the old. But division cannot give an impetus to modern agricultural methods if it is based on the old system of allotment ownership. Comrade Borisov,¹¹⁸ an advocate of division, said in Stockholm: "Our agrarian programme is a programme for the period of developing revolution, the period of the break-up of the old order and the organisation of a new social-political

* I have pointed out above that out of 280,000,000 dessiatins of the land available for distribution in European Russia, one half—138,800,000 dessiatins—consists of allotment land. (See p. 221 of this volume.—Ed.)

order. That is its fundamental idea. Social-Democracy must not bind itself by decisions which pledge it to support any particular form of economy. In this struggle of the new social forces against the foundations of the old order, it is necessary to cut the tangled knot with a decisive stroke" (p. 125 of the Minutes). All that is quite true and splendidly stated. And it all speaks in favour of nationalisation, because the latter alone really "breaks up" the old medieval system of landownership, really cuts the tangled knot, and allows full freedom for the new farms to develop on the nationalised land.

The question arises by what criterion are we to determine whether the new system of agriculture has already developed sufficiently to have the division of the land adapted to it, and not to have a division that will perpetuate the old obstacles to the new farming? There can be but one criterion, that of practice. No statistics in the world can assess whether the elements of a peasant bourgeoisie in a given country have "hardened" sufficiently to enable the system of landownership to be adapted to the system of farming. This can be assessed *only* by the mass of the farmers themselves. The impossibility of assessing this at the present moment has been proved by the fact that the mass of the peasants have come forward in our revolution with a programme of land nationalisation. The small farmer, at all times and throughout the world, becomes so attached to his farm (if it really is *his* farm and not a piece of the landlord's estate let out on labour-service, as is frequently the case in Russia) that his "fanatical" defence of private ownership of the land is inevitable at a certain historical period and for a certain space of time. If in the present epoch the mass of the Russian peasants are not displaying the fanaticism of private property owners (a fanaticism which is fostered by all the ruling classes, by all the liberal-bourgeois politicians), but are putting forward a widespread and firmly held demand for the nationalisation of the land, it would be childishness or stupid pedantry to attribute it to the influence of the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*¹⁴ or Mr. Chernov's pamphlets. It is due to the fact that the real conditions of life of the small cultivator, of the small farmer in the village, confront him with the economic prob-

lem, not of consolidating the new agriculture, which has already taken shape, by means of dividing the land as private property, but of *clearing* the ground for the creation of a new agriculture (out of the existing elements) upon "free", i. e., nationalised, land. The fanaticism of the private property owner can and should assert itself, in due time, as a demand of the *newly-hatched* free farmer for the assured possession of his farm. Nationalisation of the land had to become the demand of the peasant masses in the Russian revolution as the slogan of farmers who *want to break* the shell of medievalism. Therefore, for Social-Democrats *to preach* division of the land to the mass of the peasants, who are inclined towards nationalisation, and who are only just beginning to enter the conditions for the final "sorting out" that should produce free farmers capable of creating capitalist agriculture, is glaring historical tactlessness, and reveals inability to take stock of the concrete historical situation.

Our Social-Democratic "divisionists"—Comrades Finn, Borisov, and Shanin—are free from the theoretical dualism of the "municipalisers", including the latters' vulgar criticism of Marx's theory of rent (with this we shall deal later on), but they make a mistake of a different kind, a mistake of historical perspective. While taking a generally correct stand in theory (and in this they differ from the "municipalisers"), they repeat the mistake of our cut-off-lands programme of 1903. That mistake was due to the fact that while we correctly defined the *trend* of development, we did not correctly define the *moment* of that development. We assumed that the elements of capitalist agriculture had already taken full shape in Russia, both in landlord farming (minus the cut-off lands and their conditions of bondage—hence the demand that the cut-off lands be returned to the peasants) and in peasant farming, which seemed to have given rise to a strong peasant bourgeoisie and therefore to be incapable of bringing about a "peasant agrarian revolution". The erroneous programme was not the result of "fear" of the peasant agrarian revolution, but of *an over-estimation of the degree* of capitalist development in Russian agriculture. The survivals of serfdom appeared to us then to be a minor detail, whereas capitalist agricul-

ture on the peasant allotments and on the landlords' estates seemed to be quite mature and well-established.

The revolution has exposed that mistake; it has confirmed the trend of development as we had defined it. The Marxist analysis of the classes in Russian society has been so brilliantly confirmed by the whole course of events in general, and by the first two Dumas in particular, that non-Marxist socialism has been shattered completely. But the survivals of serfdom in the countryside have proved to be much stronger than we thought: they have given rise to a nation-wide peasant movement and they have made that movement the touchstone of the bourgeois revolution as a whole. Hegemony in the bourgeois liberation movement, which revolutionary Social-Democracy always assigned to the proletariat, had to be defined more precisely as leadership which rallied the *peasantry* behind it. But leading to what? To the bourgeois revolution in its most consistent and decisive form. We rectified the mistake by substituting for the partial aim of combating the *survivals of the old agrarian system*, the aim of combating *the old agrarian system as a whole*. Instead of purging landlord economy, we set the aim of *abolishing* it.

But this correction, made under the impact of the imposing course of events, did not make many of us think out to its logical conclusion our new evaluation of the degree of capitalist development in Russian agriculture. If the demand for the confiscation of all the landlord estates proved to be historically correct—and that undoubtedly was the case—it meant that the wide development of capitalism calls for new agrarian relationships, that the beginnings of capitalism in landlord economy can and must be sacrificed to the wide and free development of capitalism on the basis of renovated small farming. To accept the demand for the confiscation of the landlord estates means admitting the possibility and the necessity of the renovation of small farming under capitalism.

Is that admissible? Is it not a gamble to support small farming under capitalism? Is not the *renovation* of small farming a vain dream? Is it not a demagogic "trap for the peasants", a *Bauernfang*? That, undoubtedly, was what many comrades thought. But they were wrong. The re-

novation of small farming is possible even under capitalism if the historical aim is to fight the pre-capitalist order. That is the way small farming was renovated in America, where the slave plantations were broken up in a revolutionary manner and the conditions were created for the most rapid and free development of capitalism. In the Russian revolution the struggle for the land is nothing else than a struggle for the renovated path of capitalist development. The consistent slogan of such a renovation is—nationalisation of the land. To exclude allotment land from nationalisation is economically reactionary (we shall deal separately with the politically reactionary aspect of that exclusion). The "divisionists" are skipping the historical task of the present revolution; they assume that the objectives of the peasants' mass struggle have already been achieved, whereas that struggle has only just begun. Instead of stimulating the process of renovation, instead of explaining to the peasantry the conditions for consistent renovation, they are already designing a dressing-gown for the appeased, renovated farmer.*

"Everything in good season." Social-Democracy cannot undertake never to support division of the land. In a different historical situation, at a different stage of agrarian evolution, this division may prove unavoidable. But division of the land is an entirely wrong expression of the aims of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in 1907.

* The advocates of division frequently cite the words of Marx: "The free ownership of the self-managing peasant is evidently the most normal form of landed property for small-scale operation.... Ownership of the land is as necessary for full development of this mode of production as ownership of tools is for free development of handicraft production" (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 341).¹¹⁶ From this it merely follows that the complete triumph of free peasant agriculture may call for private ownership. But present-day small-scale farming is not free. State landownership is "an instrument in the hands of the landlord rather than of the peasant, an instrument for extracting labour rent rather than an instrument of free labour of the peasant". The destruction of all forms of feudal landownership and free settlement in all parts of the country are needed for the promotion of free small-scale farming.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF NATIONALISATION AND OF MUNICIPALISATION

A grave fault of almost the whole Social-Democratic press on the question of the agrarian programme in general, and a shortcoming of the debate at the Stockholm Congress in particular, is that practical considerations prevail over theoretical, and political considerations over economic.* Most of us, of course, have an excuse, namely, the conditions of intensive Party work under which we discussed the agrarian problem in the revolution: first, after January 9, 1905, a few months before the outbreak (the spring "Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P." of Bolsheviks in London in 1905 and the Conference of the Minority held at the same time in Geneva), and then on the day after the December uprising,^{**} and in Stockholm on the eve of the First Duma. But at all events this shortcoming must be corrected now, and an examination of the theoretical aspect of the question of nationalisation and municipalisation is particularly necessary.

* In my pamphlet *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, which I defended at Stockholm, there are very definite (although brief, as the pamphlet itself is) references to the *theoretical* premises of a Marxist agrarian programme. I pointed out in that pamphlet that "the bare repudiation of nationalisation" would be a "theoretical distortion of Marxism" (p. 16 of the old edition, p. 41 of this edition). (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 181.—*Ed.*) See also my Report on the Stockholm Congress, pp. 27-28 of the old edition (p. 63 of this edition). (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 346.—*Ed.*) "From the strictly scientific point of view, from the point of view of the conditions of development of capitalism in general, we must undoubtedly say—if we do not want to differ from Volume III of *Capital*—that the nationalisation of the land is possible in bourgeois society, that it promotes economic development, facilitates competition and the influx of capital into agriculture, reduces the price of grain, etc." See also the same report, p. 59 (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 378.—*Ed.*): "In spite of their promises, they [the Right wing of Social-Democracy] do not carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture to its 'logical' conclusion, for the only 'logical' (and economic) conclusion under capitalism is the nationalisation of the land, which abolishes absolute rent."

1. WHAT IS NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND?

Above we quoted the current formulation of the now generally recognised proposition. "All the Narodnik groups are advocating nationalisation of the land." As a matter of fact, this current formulation is very inexact and there is very little in it that is "generally recognised", if by this we mean a really identical conception of this "nationalisation" among the representatives of the various political trends. The mass of the peasantry demand the land spontaneously, for they are oppressed by the feudal latifundia and do not associate the transfer of the land to the people with any at all definite economic ideas. Among the peasantry there is only a very urgent demand, born, so to speak, from suffering and hardened by long years of oppression—a demand for the revival, strengthening, consolidation, and expansion of small farming; a demand that the latter be made predominant, and nothing more. All that the peasant visualises is the passing of the landlord latifundia into his own hands; in this struggle the peasant clothes his hazy idea of the unity of all peasants, as a mass, in the phrase: ownership of the land by the people. The peasant is guided by the instinct of the property owner, who is hindered by the endless fragmentation of the present forms of medieval landownership and by the impossibility of organising the cultivation of the soil in a manner that fully corresponds to "property owning" requirements if all this motley medieval system of landownership continues. The economic necessity of abolishing landlordism, of **abolishing also the "fetters" of allotment landownership**—such are the *negative* concepts which exhaust the *peasant* idea of nationalisation. What forms of landownership may eventually be necessary for renovated small farming, which will have digested, so to speak, the landlord latifundia, the peasant does not think about.

The negative aspects of the concept (or hazy idea) of nationalisation undoubtedly also predominate in Narodnik ideology, which expresses the demands and the hopes of the peasantry. The removal of the old obstacles, the clearing out of the landlord, the "unfencing" of the land, the removal of the fetters of allotment ownership, the

strengthening of small farming, the substitution of "equality, fraternity, and liberty" for "inequality" (i. e., the landlord latifundia)—that expresses nine-tenths of Narodnik ideology. Equal right to land, equalised land tenure, socialisation—all these are merely different forms of expression of the same ideas; and all are mainly negative concepts, for the Narodnik cannot conceive the new order as a definite system of social-economic relationships. The Narodnik regards the present agrarian revolution as a transition from serfdom, inequality, and oppression in general, to equality and liberty, and nothing more. That is the typical narrow-mindedness of the bourgeois revolutionary who fails to see the capitalist features of the new society he is creating.

In contrast to the naïve outlook of Narodism, Marxism investigates the new system that is arising. Even with the fullest freedom of peasant farming and with the fullest equality of small proprietors occupying the people's, or no man's, or "God's" land—we have before us a system of commodity production. Small producers are tied and subjected to the market. Out of the exchange of products arises the power of money; the conversion of agricultural produce into money is followed by the conversion of labour-power into money. Commodity production becomes capitalist production. And this theory is not a dogma, but a simple description, a generalisation of what is taking place in Russian peasant farming too. The freer that farming is from land congestion, landlord oppression, the pressure of medieval relations and system of landownership, bondage, and tyranny, the more strongly do capitalist relationships develop within that peasant farming. That is a fact to which the whole of the post-Reform history of Russia undoubtedly testifies.

Consequently, the concept of nationalisation of the land, in terms of *economic reality*, is a category of commodity and capitalist society. What is real in this concept is not what the peasants think, or what the Narodniks say, but what arises from the economic relations of present society. Nationalisation of the land under capitalist relations is neither more nor less than the transfer of rent to the state. What is rent in capitalist society? It is not income from the

land in general. It is that part of surplus value which remains after average profit on capital is deducted. Hence, rent presupposes wage-labour in agriculture, the transformation of the cultivator into a capitalist farmer, into an entrepreneur. Nationalisation (in its pure form) assumes that the state receives rent from the agricultural entrepreneur who pays wages to wage-workers and receives average profit on his capital—average for all enterprises, agricultural and non-agricultural, in the given country or group of countries.

Thus, the theoretical concept of nationalisation is inseparably bound up with the theory of rent, i. e., capitalist rent, as the special form of income of a special class (the landowning class) in capitalist society.

Marx's theory distinguishes two forms of rent: differential rent and absolute rent. The first springs from the limited nature of land, its occupation by capitalist economies, quite irrespective of whether private ownership of land exists, or what the form of landownership is. Between the individual farms there are inevitable differences arising out of differences in soil fertility, location in regard to markets, and the productivity of additional investments of capital in the land. Briefly, those differences may be summed up (without, however; forgetting that they spring from different causes) as the differences between better and worse soils. To proceed. The price of production of the agricultural product is determined by the conditions of production not on the average soil, but on the worst soil, because the produce from the best soil alone is insufficient to meet the demand. The difference between the individual price of production and the highest price of production is differential rent. (We remind the reader that by price of production Marx means the capital expended on the production of the product, plus average profit on capital.)

Differential rent inevitably arises in capitalist agriculture even if the private ownership of land is completely abolished. Under the private ownership of land, this rent is appropriated by the landowner, for competition between capitals compels the tenant farmer to be satisfied with the average profit on capital. When the private ownership of land is abolished, that rent will go to the state.

That rent cannot be abolished as long as the capitalist mode of production exists.

Absolute rent arises from the private ownership of land. That rent contains an element of monopoly, an element of monopoly price.* Private ownership of land hinders free competition, hinders the levelling of profit, the formation of average profit in agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. And as agriculture is on a lower technical level than industry, as the composition of capital is marked by a larger proportion of variable capital than of constant capital, *the individual value* of the agricultural product is above the average. Hence, by hindering the free levelling of profits in agricultural enterprises on a par with non-agricultural enterprises, the private ownership of land makes it possible to sell the agricultural product not at the highest price of production, but at the still higher individual value of the product (for the price of production is determined by the average profit on capital, while absolute rent prevents the formation of this "average" by monopolistically fixing the individual value at a level higher than the average).

Thus, differential rent is inevitably an inherent feature of every form of capitalist agriculture. Absolute rent is not; it arises only under the private ownership of land, only under the historically ** created backwardness of agriculture, a backwardness that becomes fixed by monopoly.

Kautsky compares these two forms of rent, particularly in their bearing on the nationalisation of the land, in the following propositions:

* In Part 2 of Volume II of *Theories of Surplus Value*, Marx reveals the "essence of different theories of rent": the theory of the monopoly price of agricultural produce and the theory of differential rent. He shows what is true in both those theories, *insofar* as absolute rent contains an element of monopoly. See p. 125 concerning Adam Smith's theory: "it is quite true" that rent is monopoly price, *insofar* as the private ownership of land prevents the levelling of profit by fixing profit at a level higher than the average.¹¹⁷

** See *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. II, Part 1 (German original), p. 259: "In agriculture, manual labour still predominates, while the capitalist mode of production develops industry more quickly than agriculture. However, that is a *historical* distinction which may disappear." (See also p. 275, and Vol. II, Part 2, p. 15.)¹¹⁸

"As differential rent, ground rent arises from competition. As absolute rent, it arises from monopoly.... In practice, ground rent does not present itself to us divided in parts; it is impossible to say which part is differential rent and which part is absolute rent. Moreover, it is usually mixed with the interest on capital expended by the landowner. Where the landowner is also the farmer, ground rent appears as a part of agricultural profit.

"Nevertheless, the distinction between the two forms of rent is extremely important.

"Differential rent arises from the capitalist character of production and not from the private ownership of land.

"That rent would continue to exist even under nationalisation of the land, as demanded [in Germany] by the advocates of land reform, who would nevertheless preserve the capitalist mode of agriculture. In that case, however, rent would no longer accrue to private persons, but to the state.

"Absolute rent arises out of the private ownership of land, out of the antagonism of interests between the landowner and the rest of society. *The nationalisation of the land would make possible the abolition of that rent and the reduction of the price of agricultural produce by an amount equal to that rent.* [Our italics.]

"To proceed: the second distinction between differential rent and absolute rent is that the former is not a constituent part affecting the price of agricultural produce, whereas the latter is. The former arises from the price of production; the latter arises from the excess of market price over price of production. The former arises from the surplus, from the super-profit, that is created by the more productive labour on better soil, or on a better located plot. The latter does not arise from the additional income of certain forms of agricultural labour; it is possible only as a deduction from the available quantity of values for the benefit of the landowner, a deduction from the mass of surplus value—therefore, it implies either a reduction of profits or a deduction from wages. If the price of foodstuffs rises, and wages rise also, the profit on capital diminishes. If the price of foodstuffs rises without an increase in wages, then the workers suffer the loss. Finally, the following may happen—and this may be regarded as the general rule—the loss caused by absolute rent is borne jointly by the workers and the capitalists."*

Thus, the question of the nationalisation of the land in capitalist society falls into two essentially distinct parts: the question of differential rent, and that of absolute rent. Nationalisation changes the owner of the former, and undermines the very existence of the latter. Hence, on the

* K. Kautsky, *The Agrarian Question*, German original, pp. 79-80.

one hand, nationalisation is a partial reform within the limits of capitalism (a change of owners of a part of surplus value), and, on the other hand, it abolishes the monopoly which hinders the development of capitalism as a whole.

Unless a distinction is made between these two sides, i. e., the nationalisation of differential rent and of absolute rent, it is impossible to understand the economic significance of the question of nationalisation in Russia. This brings us, however, to P. Maslov's repudiation of the theory of absolute rent.

2. PYOTR MASLOV CORRECTS KARL MARX'S ROUGH NOTES¹¹⁹

I already had occasion in 1901, in *Zarya* (published abroad), to refer to Maslov's wrong conception of the theory of rent in dealing with his articles in the magazine *Zhizn**.¹²⁰

The debates prior to and in Stockholm, as I have already said, were concentrated to an excessive degree on the political aspect of the question. But after Stockholm, M. Olenov, in an article entitled "The Theoretical Principles of the Municipalisation of the Land" (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 1), examined Maslov's book on the agrarian question in Russia and particularly emphasised the incorrectness of Maslov's *economic theory*, which repudiates absolute rent altogether.

Maslov replied to Olenov in an article in *Obrazovaniye*, Nos. 2 and 3. He reproached his opponent for being "impudent", "bumptious", "flippant", etc. As a matter of fact, in the sphere of *Marxist theory*, it is Pyotr Maslov who is impudent and stupidly bumptious, for it is difficult to imagine a greater display of ignorance than the smug "criticism" of Marx by Maslov, who persists in his old mistakes.

"The contradiction between the theory of absolute rent and the whole theory of distribution expounded in Volume III," writes Mr. Maslov, "is so glaring that one can only account for it by the fact that Volume III is a posthumous publication containing also the rough notes of the author." (*The Agrarian Question*, 3rd ed., p. 108, footnote.)

* See *The Agrarian Question*, Part 1, St. Petersburg, 1908, article "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", footnote to pp. 178-79. (See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 127.—Ed.)

Only a person who understands nothing about Marx's theory of rent could write a thing like that. But the patronising condescension with which the incomparable Pyotr Maslov treats the author of those rough notes is truly superb! This "Marxist" is too superior to think it necessary to familiarise himself with Marx before trying to teach other people, to study at least the *Theories of Surplus Value*, published in 1905, in which the theory of rent is made so plain that even the Maslovs should be able to grasp it!

Here is Maslov's argument against Marx:

"Absolute rent is said to arise from the low composition of agricultural capital.... As the composition of capital affects neither the price of the product, nor the rate of profit, nor the distribution of surplus value *among* the entrepreneurs in general, it cannot create any rent. If the composition of agricultural capital is lower than that of industrial capital, differential rent results from the surplus value obtained in agriculture; but that makes no difference as far as the *formation* of rent is concerned. Consequently, if the 'composition' of capital changed, it would not affect rent in the least. The amount of rent is not in the least determined by the character of its origin, but solely by the abovementioned difference in the productivity of labour under different conditions" (op. cit., pp. 108-09. Maslov's italics).

It would be interesting to know whether the bourgeois "critics of Marx" ever went to such lengths of frivolity in their refutations. Our incomparable Maslov is completely muddled; and he is muddled even when he *expounds* Marx (incidentally, that is also a habit of Mr. Bulgakov and all other bourgeois assailants of Marxism, who, however, differ from Maslov in that they are more honest, since they do not call themselves Marxists). It is not true to say that according to Marx absolute rent results from the low composition of agricultural capital. Absolute rent arises from the private ownership of land. This private ownership creates a special monopoly having nothing to do with the capitalist mode of production, which can exist on communal as well as on nationalised land.* The non-capitalist monopoly created by the private ownership of land prevents the levelling of profits in those branches of production

* See *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 208, where Marx shows that the landowner is an absolutely superfluous figure in capitalist production; that the purpose of the latter is "fully answered" if the land belongs to the state.¹²¹

which are sheltered by this monopoly. In order that "the composition of capital shall not affect the rate of profit" (there should be added: the composition of an individual capital, or of the capital of an individual branch of industry; here too Maslov expounds Marx in a muddled way), in order that the *average* rate of profit may be formed, the profits of all the separate enterprises and of all the separate spheres of industry must be *levelled*. The levelling takes place through free competition, through the free investment of capital in all branches of production without distinction. Can that freedom exist where there is non-capitalist monopoly? No, it cannot. The monopoly created by the private ownership of land *hinders* the free investment of capital, hinders free competition, hinders the levelling of the disproportionately high agricultural profit (arising from the low composition of agricultural capital). Maslov's objection reveals an utter lack of understanding, which is particularly obvious when, two pages further on, we come across a reference to... *brickmaking* (p. 111); here, too, the technical level is low, the organic composition of capital is below the average, as in the case of agriculture, and yet there is no rent!

There cannot be any rent in brickmaking, esteemed "theoretician", because absolute rent arises not from the low composition of agricultural capital, but from the monopoly created by the private ownership of land, which prevents competition from levelling the profits of "low composition" capital. To repudiate absolute rent means repudiating the economic significance of the private ownership of land.

Maslov's second argument against Marx is this:

"Rent from the 'last' investment of capital, Rodbertus's rent and Marx's absolute rent, will disappear because the tenant can always make the 'last' investment the 'last but one' if it produces anything besides the ordinary profit" (p. 112).

Pyotr Maslov muddles things, "impudently" muddles them.

In the first place, to put Rodbertus on a par with Marx on the question of rent is to display crass ignorance. Rodbertus's theory is based on the assumption that the erroneous calculations of the Pomeranian landlord ("not to

count" the raw product in agriculture!) are obligatory also for the capitalist farmer. There is not a grain of *historism* in Rodbertus's theory, not a grain of historical reality, for he takes agriculture in general, regardless of time and place, agriculture in any country and in any epoch. Marx takes a special historical period in which capitalism has promoted technical development in industry more quickly than in agriculture; Marx takes *capitalist* agriculture restricted by *non-capitalist* private ownership of land.

Secondly, the reference to the tenant who "can always" make the last investment of capital the last but one shows that our incomparable Pyotr Maslov has failed to understand, not only Marx's absolute rent, but *his differential rent as well!* That is incredible, but it is a fact. During the term of his lease the tenant "can always" appropriate, and *always does appropriate, all rent if he "makes the last investment the last but one"*, if—to put it more simply and (as we shall see in a moment) more correctly—he invests fresh capital in the land. During the term of the lease, private ownership of land ceases to exist for the tenant: by paying rent, he has "ransomed himself" from that monopoly and it can no longer hinder him.* That is why, when a fresh investment of capital in his land yields the tenant additional profit *and additional rent, it is the tenant, not the landowner, who appropriates that rent.* The landowner will begin to appropriate that additional rent only after the tenant's lease has expired, when a new lease is drawn up. What mechanism will then transfer the additional rent from the pocket of the tenant farmer to that of the landowner? The mechanism of free competition, since the fact that the tenant receives not only average profit but also super-profit (=rent) will attract capital to this unusually profitable enterprise. Hence it is clear, on the one hand, why, all other things being equal, a long lease is to the advantage of the tenant and a short lease to the advantage of the landlord. Hence it is clear, on the other hand, why, for example, after the repeal of the Corn Laws, the English

* Had Maslov read the "rough notes" in Volume III at all attentively he could not but have noticed how frequently Marx deals with this.

landlords introduced a clause in their leases compelling the farmers to spend not less than £12 (about 110 rubles) per acre on their farms, instead of £8, as formerly. The landlords thus took into account the progress in socially necessary agricultural technique which took place as a result of the repeal of the Corn Laws.

The question now arises: what form of additional rent does the tenant appropriate during the term of his lease? Is it only absolute rent, or is it also differential rent? It is both. For had Pyotr Maslov taken the trouble to understand Marx before "criticising the rough notes" so amusingly, he would have known that differential rent is obtained not only from different plots of land, but also from different outlays of capital *on the same plot*.*

Thirdly (we apologise to the reader for wearying him with this long list of blunders which Maslov commits in every sentence; but what else can we do if we have to deal with such a "prolific" *Konfusionsrat*—a "muddled counsellor", as the Germans say?)—thirdly, Maslov's argument about the last and last but one investment is based on the notorious "law of diminishing returns". Like the bourgeois economists, Maslov recognises that law (and, to make it look important, even calls this stupid invention a fact). Like the bourgeois economists, Maslov connects that law with the theory of rent, declaring with the audacity of one who is utterly ignorant of theory, that "if it were not for the fact that the productivity of the last outlays of capital diminishes, there would be no such thing as ground rent" (p. 114).

For a criticism of this vulgar bourgeois "law of diminishing returns" we refer the reader to what I said in 1901 in opposition to Mr. Bulgakov.** On that question there is no essential difference between Bulgakov and Maslov.

* Marx calls the differential rent obtained from the difference in various plots Differential Rent I; and that obtained from the difference in the productivity of additional outlays of capital on the same plot he calls Differential Rent II. In the "rough notes" in Volume III, that distinction is brought out in scrupulous detail (Part VI, Chapters 39-43), and one must be a "critic of Marx" after the manner of the Bulgakovs "not to notice" it.¹²²

** See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 107-19.—*Ed.*

To supplement what I said in opposition to Bulgakov I will quote just one more passage from the "rough notes" in Volume III, which reveals the Maslov-Bulgakov criticism in all its splendour.

"Rather than tracing to their origin the real natural causes leading to an exhaustion of the soil, which, incidentally, were unknown to all economists writing on differential rent, owing to the level of agricultural chemistry in their day, the shallow conception was seized upon that any amount of capital cannot be invested in a limited area of land; as the *Westminster Review*, for instance, argued against Richard Jones that all of England cannot be fed through the cultivation of Soho Square"....¹²²

This objection is the only argument that Maslov and all other advocates of the "law of diminishing returns" use. If that law did not operate, if succeeding outlays of capital could be as productive as preceding ones, there would then be no need, they argue, to extend the area of cultivation; it would be possible to obtain any quantity of agricultural produce from the smallest of plots by the investment of fresh capital in the land, i. e., it would then be possible for "all of England to be fed through the cultivation of Soho Square", or to "put the agriculture of the whole globe on one dessiatin",* etc. Consequently, Marx analyses the main argument in favour of the "law" of diminishing returns. He goes on to say:

... "If this be considered a special disadvantage of agriculture, precisely the opposite is true. It is possible to invest capital here successively with fruitful results, because the soil itself serves as an instrument of production, which is not the case with a factory, or holds only to a limited extent, since it serves only as a foundation, as a place and a space providing a basis of operations. It is true that, compared with scattered handicrafts, large-scale industry may concentrate much production in a small area. Nevertheless, a definite amount of space is always required at any given

* See "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" on the law of diminishing returns. Maslov utters the same nonsense: "The entrepreneur will successively spend all (!) his capital, for example, on one dessiatin, if the new outlays will produce the same profit" (p. 107), etc.

level of productivity, and the construction of tall buildings also has its practical limitations. Beyond this any expansion of production also demands an extension of land area. The fixed capital invested in machinery, etc., does not improve through use, but on the contrary, wears out. New inventions may indeed permit some improvement in this respect, but with any given development in productive power, machines will always deteriorate. If productivity is rapidly developed all of the old machinery must be replaced by the more advantageous; in other words, it is lost. The soil, however, if properly treated, improves all the time. The advantage of the soil, permitting successive investments of capital to bring gains without loss of previous investments, implies the possibility of differences in yield from these successive investments of capital." (*Das Kapital*, III. Band, 2. Teil, S. 314.)¹²⁴

Maslov preferred to repeat the threadbare fable of bourgeois economics about the law of diminishing returns rather than ponder over Marx's criticism. And yet Maslov has the audacity, while distorting Marx, to claim here, on these very questions, that he is expounding Marxism!

The degree to which Maslov mutilates the theory of rent from his purely bourgeois point of view of the "natural law" of diminishing returns can be seen from the following tirade, which he gives in italics: "If successive outlays of capital on the same plot of land, leading to intensive farming, were equally productive, the competition of new lands would immediately disappear; for the cost of transport affects the price of grain in addition to the cost of production" (page 107).

Thus, overseas competition can be explained only by means of the law of diminishing returns! Exactly what the bourgeois economists say! But if Maslov was unable to read or incapable of understanding Volume III, then at least he should have familiarised himself with Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question*, or with Parvus's pamphlet on the agricultural crisis. Perhaps the popular explanations given by those Marxists would have enabled Maslov to understand that capitalism *raises* rent and increases the industrial population. And the price of land (= capitalised rent) *keeps* that rent at its inflated level. This applies also to differ-

ential rent, so that we see a second time that Maslov failed to understand anything Marx wrote even about the simplest form of rent.

Bourgeois economics accounts for the "competition of new lands" by the "law of diminishing returns"; for the bourgeois, consciously or unconsciously, ignores the social-historical aspect of the matter. Socialist economics (i. e., Marxism) accounts for overseas competition by the fact that land for which no rent is paid undercuts the excessively high grain prices established by capitalism in the old European countries, which raised ground rent to an incredible degree. The bourgeois economist fails to understand (or conceals from himself and others) that the level of rent fixed by the private ownership of land is an *obstacle* to progress in agriculture, and he therefore throws the blame upon the "natural" obstacle, the "fact" of diminishing returns.

3. IS IT NECESSARY TO REFUTE MARX IN ORDER TO REFUTE THE NARODNIKS?

Pyotr Maslov thinks it is necessary. "Elaborating" his silly "theory", he tells us for our edification in *Obrazovaniye*:

"If it were not for the 'fact' that the productivity of successive expenditures of labour on the same plot of land diminishes, the idyll which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Narodniks depict could, perhaps, be realised: every peasant would use the patch of land he was entitled to and apply as much labour to it as he liked, and the land would 'reward' him for every 'application' with a corresponding quantity of products" (No. 2, 1907, p. 123).

Thus, if Marx had not been refuted by Pyotr Maslov, the Narodniks would, perhaps, be right! Such are the pearls of wisdom that drop from the lips of our "theoretician". And we, in our simple Marxist way, had thought that the idyll of perpetuating small production is refuted not by the bourgeois-stupid "law of diminishing returns", but by the fact of commodity production, the domination of the market, the advantages of large-scale capitalist farming over small farming, etc. Maslov has changed all this! Maslov has discovered that had it not been for the bourgeois law refuted by Marx, the Narodniks would have been right!

But that is not all. The revisionists, too, would have been right. Here is another argument advanced by our home-grown economist:

"If I am not mistaken, I [Pyotr Maslov] happened to be the first [that's the sort of fellow I am!] to lay special emphasis on the difference between the significance of the cultivation of the soil and of technical progress for the development of farming, and, in particular, for the struggle between large-scale and small production. Whereas the intensification of agriculture and the further expenditure of labour and capital are to an equal extent less productive both in large-scale and in small farming, technical progress, which increases the productivity of labour in agriculture as it does in industry, creates enormous and exceptional advantages for large-scale production. These advantages are determined almost entirely by technical conditions." ... You are muddling things up, my dear man: the advantages of large-scale production in commercial respects are of great importance.

... "On the other hand, cultivation of the soil can usually be applied equally in large-scale and in small farming".... Cultivation of the soil "can" be applied.

Evidently, our sagacious Maslov knows of a type of farming which can be conducted without the cultivation of the soil.... "For example, the substitution of multiple-crop rotation for the three-field system, an increase in the quantity of fertilisers, deeper ploughing, etc., can be equally applied in large-scale and small farming, and equally affect the productivity of labour. But the introduction of reaping-machines, for example, increases the productivity of labour only on the larger farms, because the small strips of grain field can be more conveniently reaped or mown by hand."...

Yes, undoubtedly Maslov was the "first" to succeed in introducing such endless confusion into the question! Just imagine: a steam plough (deeper ploughing) is "cultivation of the soil", a reaping-machine is a "technical implement". Thus, according to the doctrine of our incomparable Maslov, a steam plough is *not* a technical implement; a reaping-machine is *not* the further expenditure of labour and capital. Artificial fertilisers, the steam plough, grass cultivation

are "intensification". The reaping-machine and in general "most agricultural machines" represent "technical progress". Maslov "happened" to invent this nonsense because he had to find some way of wriggling out of the "law of diminishing returns", which technical progress has *refuted*. Bulgakov wriggled out of it by saying: technical progress is temporary, stagnation is constant. Maslov wriggles out of it by inventing a most amusing division of technical progress in agriculture into "intensification" and "technical implements".

What is intensification? It is the further expenditure of labour and capital. A reaping-machine, according to the discovery of our great Maslov, is *not* expenditure of capital. A seed-drill is *not* expenditure of capital! "The substitution of multiple-crop rotation for the three-field system" is *equally* applicable in large-scale and in small farming. That is not true. The introduction of multiple-crop rotation also calls for additional outlays of capital and it is *much more* applicable in large-scale farming. Incidentally, in this connection see the data on German agriculture quoted above ("The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'"*). Russian statistics, too, testify to the same thing. The slightest reflection would reveal to you that it could not be otherwise; that multiple-crop rotation cannot be applied *equally* in small and large-scale farming. Nor can increased quantities of fertilisers be "equally applicable", because big farms (1) have more cattle, which is of the greatest importance in this respect; (2) feed their cattle better and are not so "sparing" of straw, etc.; (3) have better facilities for storing fertilisers; (4) use larger quantities of artificial fertilisers. Maslov, in a really "impudent" way, distorts well-known data on modern agriculture. Finally, deep ploughing *cannot* be *equally* applicable in small and large-scale farming either. It is sufficient to point to two facts: first, the use of steam ploughs is increasing on the large farms (see above-quoted data on Germany; now, probably, electric ploughs too).** Perhaps even Maslov will realise that these cannot be "equally" applicable in large-scale and small farming. In the latter

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 181.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, p. 131.—*Ed.*

it is the employment of *cows* as draught animals that is developing. Just think, great Maslov, *can* this signify that deep ploughing is equally applicable? Secondly, even where large and small farms use the same types of draught animals, the latter are *feeblower* on the small farms, and therefore there cannot be equal conditions in regard to deep ploughing.

In short, there is hardly a sentence in all Maslov's vain attempts at "theoretical" thinking which does not reveal an inexhaustible amount of the most incredible confusion and the most astonishing ignorance. But Maslov, unper-
turbed, concludes:

"Whoever has clarified for himself the difference between these *two* aspects of the development of agriculture [improvement in cultivation and technical improvement] will easily upset all the arguments of revisionism, and of Narodism in Russia." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 2, p. 125.)

Well, well. Maslov is a non-Narodnik and a non-revisionist *only* because he succeeded in rising above Marx's rough notes to the point of "clarifying" for himself the decrepit prejudices of decrepit bourgeois political economy. It is the old song set to a new tune! Marx *versus* Marx—exclaimed Bernstein and Struve. It is impossible to demolish revisionism without demolishing Marx—announces Maslov.

In conclusion, a characteristic detail. If Marx, who created the theory of absolute rent, is wrong, if rent cannot exist without the "law of diminishing returns", if the Narodniks and revisionists might be right did that law not exist, then, it would seem, Maslov's "*corrections*" to Marxism should serve as the corner-stone of his, Maslov's, "theory". And so they do. But Maslov prefers to conceal them. Recently the German translation of his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, appeared. I was curious to see *in what form* Maslov had presented his incredible theoretical banalities to the European Social-Democrats. I found that he had *not presented them at all*. In facing Europeans, Maslov *kept the "whole" of his theory hidden in his pocket*. He omitted from his book all that he had written in repudiation of absolute rent, the law of diminishing returns, etc. I could not help recalling in this connection

the story about a stranger who was present for the first time at a discussion between ancient philosophers but remained silent all the time. One of the philosophers said to the stranger: "If you are wise, you are behaving foolishly; if you are a fool, you are behaving wisely."

4. IS THE REPUDIATION OF ABSOLUTE RENT CONNECTED WITH THE PROGRAMME OF MUNICIPALISATION?

Puffed up though Maslov may be with the importance of his remarkable discoveries in the sphere of political economic theory, he, evidently, has some doubts whether any such connection exists. At any rate, in the article quoted above (*Obrazovaniye*, No. 2, p. 120) he denies that there is any connection between municipalisation and the "fact" of diminishing returns. That is rather odd: the "law of diminishing returns" is connected with the repudiation of absolute rent, is connected also with the fight against Narodism, but it is not connected with Maslov's agrarian programme! The fallacy of this opinion that there is no connection between general agrarian theory and Maslov's Russian agrarian programme can, however, be easily proved by direct means.

The repudiation of absolute rent is the repudiation of the economic significance of private land ownership under capitalism. Whoever claims that only differential rent exists, inevitably arrives at the conclusion that it makes not the slightest difference to the conditions of capitalist farming and of capitalist development whether the land belongs to the state or to private persons. In both cases, from the standpoint of the theory which repudiates absolute rent, only differential rent exists. Clearly, such a theory *must* lead to the repudiation of the significance of nationalisation as a measure which accelerates the development of capitalism, clears the path for it, etc. For such a view of nationalisation follows from the recognition of two forms of rent: the capitalist form, i. e., the form which cannot be eliminated under capitalism even on nationalised land (differential rent), and the *non-capitalist* form connected with monopoly, a form which capitalism does not need and which hinders the full development of capitalism (absolute rent).

That is why, proceeding from his "theory", Maslov inevitably arrived at the conclusion that "it makes no difference whether it [ground rent] is called absolute or differential rent" (*Obrazovaniye*, No. 3, p. 103); that the *only* question is whether that rent is to be made over to the local or to the central authorities. But such a view is the result of theoretical ignorance. Quite apart from the question of whom the rent is paid to, and the political purposes for which it will be used, there is the far more fundamental question of the changes in the general conditions of capitalist farming and of capitalist development that are brought about by the abolition of private ownership of land.

Maslov has not even raised this purely economic question; it has not entered his mind, and it could not do so since he repudiates absolute rent. Hence the distorted one-sided, "*politician's*" approach, as I might call it, which reduces the question of confiscating the landlords' estates exclusively to that of who will receive the rent. Hence the distorted *dualism* in the programme based on the anticipation of "the victorious development of the revolution" (the expression used in the resolution on tactics which was added to Maslov's programme at the Stockholm Congress). The *victorious* development of the bourgeois revolution presupposes, first of all, fundamental *economic* changes that will really sweep away all the survivals of feudalism and medieval monopolies. In municipalisation, however, we see a real *agrarian bimetallism*: a combination of the oldest, most antiquated and obsolete, medieval allotment ownership with the absence of private landownership, i. e., with the most advanced, theoretically ideal system of agrarian relations in capitalist society. This agrarian bimetallism is a theoretical absurdity, an impossibility from the purely economic point of view. Here, the combination of private with public ownership of land is a purely mechanical combination "invented" by a man who sees no difference between the very system of capitalist farming under private landownership and without private landownership. The only question such a "theoretician" is concerned with is: how is the rent, "no matter what you call it, absolute or differential", to be shuffled around?

Indeed, in a capitalist country it is impossible to leave half the land (138,000,000 dessiatins out of 280,000,000) in private hands. There are two alternatives. Either private landownership is really needed at a given stage of economic development, really corresponds to the fundamental interests of the capitalist farmer class—in which case it is inevitable everywhere as the *basis* of bourgeois society which has taken shape according to a given type.

Or private landownership is not essential for the given stage of capitalist development, does not follow inevitably from the interests of the farmer class, and even contradicts those interests—in which case the preservation of that obsolete form of ownership is impossible.

The preservation of monopoly in one half of the land area under cultivation, the creation of privileges for one category of small farmers, the perpetuation in a free capitalist society of the "*pale of settlement*", which divides landowners from tenants of public land, is an absurdity inseparably bound up with the absurdity of Maslov's economic theory.

Therefore, we must now proceed to examine the *economic* significance of nationalisation, which has been pushed into the background by Maslov and his supporters.*

5. CRITICISM OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERSHIP FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

The erroneous repudiation of absolute rent, of the form in which private landed property is realised in capitalist incomes, led to an important defect in Social-Democratic literature and in the whole of the Social-Democratic position on the agrarian question in the Russian revolution. Instead of taking the criticism of private landownership into their own hands, instead of basing this criticism on an economic analysis, an analysis of definite economic evolution, our Social-Democrats, following Maslov, surrendered this criticism to the Narodniks. The result was an extreme theoretical vulgarisation of Marxism and the dis-

* At Stockholm one of these was Plekhanov. By the irony of history, this supposedly stern guardian of orthodoxy *failed to notice, or did not want to notice*, Maslov's distortion of Marx's economic theory.

tortion of its propagandist tasks in the revolution. The criticism of private landownership in speeches in the Duma, in propaganda and agitational literature, etc., was made *only* from the Narodnik, i.e., from the petty-bourgeois, quasi-socialist, point of view. The Marxists were unable to pick out the real core of this petty-bourgeois ideology, having failed to understand that their task was to introduce the historical element into the examination of the question, and to replace the point of view of the petty bourgeois (the abstract idea of equalisation, justice, etc.) by the point of view of the proletariat on the real roots of the struggle against private ownership of land in developing capitalist society. The Narodnik thinks that repudiation of private landownership is repudiation of capitalism. That is wrong. The repudiation of private landownership expresses the demands for the purest capitalist development. And we have to revive in the minds of Marxists the "forgotten words" of Marx, who criticised private landownership from the point of view of the conditions of capitalist economy.

Marx directed such criticism not only against big landownership, but also against small landownership. The free ownership of land by the small peasant is a necessary concomitant of small production in agriculture under certain historical conditions. A. Finn was quite right in emphasising this in opposition to Maslov. But the recognition of this historical necessity, which has been proved by *experience*, does not relieve the Marxist of the duty of making an all-round appraisal of small landownership. Real freedom of such landownership is inconceivable without the free purchase and sale of land. Private ownership of land implies the necessity of spending capital on purchasing land. On this point Marx, in Volume III of *Capital*, wrote: "One of the specific evils of small-scale agriculture, where it is combined with free landownership, arises from the cultivator's investing capital in the purchase of land" (III, 2, 342). "The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation" (*ibid.*, 341).¹²

"The expenditure of money-capital for the purchase of land, then, is not an investment of agricultural capital. It is a decrease *pro tanto* in the capital which small peasants can employ in their own sphere of production. It

reduces *pro tanto* the size of their means of production and thereby narrows the economic basis of reproduction. It subjects the small peasant to the money-lender, since credit proper occurs but rarely in this sphere in general. It is a hindrance to agriculture, even where such purchase takes place in the case of large landed estates. It contradicts in fact the capitalist mode of production, which is on the whole indifferent to whether the landowner is in debt, no matter whether he has inherited or purchased his estate" (344-45).¹²⁶

Thus, both mortgage and usury are, so to speak, forms of capital's *evasion* of the difficulties which private land-ownership creates for the free penetration of capital into agriculture. In commodity production society it is impossible to conduct economy without capital. The peasant, and his ideologist the Narodnik, cannot help realising this. Hence, the question boils down to whether capital can be freely invested in agriculture directly, or through the medium of the usurer and the credit institutions. The peasant and the Narodnik, who, partly, are not aware of the complete domination of capital in modern society, and, partly, pull the cap of illusions and dreams over their eyes in order to shut out the unpleasant reality, turn their thoughts towards outside financial aid. Clause 15 of the Land Bill of the 104 reads as follows: "Persons receiving land from the national fund and lacking sufficient means to acquire the necessary agricultural equipment must be given state assistance in the form of loans and grants." Without a doubt, such financial assistance would be necessary if Russian agriculture were reorganised by a victorious peasant revolution. Kautsky, in his book *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, quite rightly emphasises this. But what we are discussing now is the social-economic significance of all these "loans and grants", which the Narodnik overlooks. The state can only be an intermediary in transferring the money from the capitalists; but the state itself can obtain this money only from the capitalists. Consequently, even under the best possible organisation of state assistance, the domination of capital is not removed in the least, and the old question remains: what are the possible forms of investment of capital in agriculture?

And that question inevitably leads to the Marxist criticism of the private ownership of land. That form of ownership is a *hindrance* to the free investment of capital in the land. Either complete freedom for this investment—in which case: abolition of private landownership, i.e., the nationalisation of the land; or the preservation of private landownership—in which case: penetration of capital by *roundabout* ways, namely, the mortgaging of land by landlords and peasants, the enslavement of the peasant by the usurer, the renting of land to tenants who own capital.

Marx says: "Here, in small-scale agriculture, the price of land, a form and result of private landownership, appears as a barrier to production itself. In large-scale agriculture, and large estates operating on a capitalist basis, ownership likewise acts as a barrier, because it limits the tenant farmer in his productive investment of capital, which in the final analysis benefits not him, but the landlord." (*Das Kapital*, III. Band, 2. Teil, S. 346-47.)¹²⁷

Consequently, the abolition of private landownership is the maximum that can be done in bourgeois society for the removal of all obstacles to the free investment of capital in agriculture and to the free flow of capital from one branch of production to another. The free, wide, and rapid development of capitalism, complete freedom for the class struggle, the disappearance of all superfluous intermediaries who make agriculture something like the "sweated" industries—that is what nationalisation of the land implies under the capitalist system of production.

6. THE NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND AND "MONEY" RENT

An interesting economic argument against nationalisation was advanced by A. Finn, an advocate of division of the land. Both nationalisation and municipalisation, he says, mean transferring rent to a public body. The question is: what kind of rent? Not capitalist rent, for "usually the peasants do not obtain rent in the capitalist sense from their land" (*The Agrarian Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 77, cf. p. 63), but pre-capitalist money rent.

By money rent Marx means the payment by the peasant to the landlord of the whole of the surplus product in the form of money. The original form of the peasant's economic dependence upon the landlord under the pre-capitalist modes of production was labour rent (*Arbeitsrente*), i. e., corvée; then came rent in the form of produce, or rent in kind, and finally came money rent. That rent, says A. Finn, "is the most widespread form in our country even today" (p. 63).

Undoubtedly, tenant farming based on servitude and bondage is extremely widespread in Russia, and, according to Marx's theory, the payment which the peasant makes under such a system of tenancy is largely money rent. What power makes it possible to extort *that* rent from the peasantry? The power of the bourgeoisie and of developing capitalism? Not at all. It is the power of the feudal latifundia. Since the latter will be broken up—and that is the starting-point and fundamental condition of the peasant agrarian revolution—there is no reason to speak of "money rent" in the pre-capitalist sense. Hence, the only significance of Finn's argument is that he emphasises once more the absurdity of *separating* the peasant allotment land from the rest of the land in the event of an agrarian revolution; since allotment lands are often surrounded by landlords' lands, and since the *present* conditions of demarcation of the peasant lands from the landlords' lands give rise to bondage, the preservation of this demarcation is *reactionary*. *Unlike either division of the land or nationalisation, municipalisation preserves this demarcation.*

Of course, the existence of small landed property, or, more correctly, of small farming, introduces certain changes in the general propositions of the theory of capitalist rent, but it does not destroy that theory. For example, Marx points out that absolute rent as such does not usually exist under small farming, which is carried on mainly to meet the needs of the farmer himself (Vol. III, 2. Teil, S. 339, 344).¹¹⁰ But the more *all* the propositions of economic theory become applicable to peasant farming also, since it has come under the conditions of the capitalist world. It must not be for-

gotten that no land nationalisation, no equalised land tenure, will abolish the now fully established fact that the well-to-do peasants in Russia are already farming on capitalist lines. In my *Development of Capitalism* I showed that, according to the statistics of the eighties and nineties of the last century, about one-fifth of the peasant households account for *up to half* of peasant agricultural production and a much larger share of *rented land*; that the farms of these peasants are now commodity-producing farms rather than natural-economy farms, and that, finally, *these* peasants cannot exist without a vast army of farm-hands and day-labourers.* Among *these* peasants the elements of *capitalist rent* are taken for granted. *These* peasants express their interests through the mouths of the Peshekhonovs, who "soberly" reject the prohibition of hired labour as well as "socialisation of the land", who soberly champion the point of view of the peasant economic individualism which is asserting itself. If, in the utopias of the Narodniks, we carefully separate the real economic factor from the false ideology, we shall see at once that it is precisely the bourgeois peasantry which stands to gain most from the break-up of the feudal latifundia, irrespective of whether that is carried out by division, nationalisation, or municipalisation. "Loans and grants" from the state, too, are bound to benefit the bourgeois peasantry in the first place. The "peasant agrarian revolution" is nothing but the subordination of the whole system of land-ownership to the conditions of progress and prosperity of precisely these capitalist farms.

Money rent is the moribund yesterday, which cannot but die out. Capitalist rent is the nascent tomorrow, which cannot but develop under the Stolypin expropriation of the poor peasants ("under Article 87"), as well as under the peasant expropriation of the richest landlords.

7. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS CAN NATIONALISATION BE BROUGHT ABOUT?

The view is often met with among Marxists that nationalisation is feasible only at a high stage of development of capitalism, when it will have fully prepared the con-

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 136-39.—*Ed.*

ditions for "divorcing the landowners from agriculture" (by means of renting and mortgages). It is assumed that large-scale capitalist farming must have *already* established itself before nationalisation of the land, which cuts out rent without affecting the economic organism, can be brought about.*

Is this view correct? Theoretically it cannot be substantiated; it cannot be supported by direct references to Marx; the facts of experience speak against it rather than for it.

Theoretically, nationalisation is the "ideally" pure development of capitalism in agriculture. The question whether such a combination of conditions and such a relation of forces as would permit of nationalisation in capitalist society often occur in history is another matter. But nationalisation is not only an effect of, but also a condition for, the rapid development of capitalism. To think that nationalisation is possible only at a very high stage of development of capitalism in agriculture means, if anything, the repudiation of nationalisation as a measure of *bourgeois* progress; for everywhere the high development of agricultural capitalism has already placed on the order of the day (and will in time inevitably place on the order of the day in other countries) the "socialisation of agricultural production", i. e., the socialist revolution. No measure of bourgeois progress, as a bourgeois measure, is conceivable when the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is very acute. Such a measure is more likely in a "young" bourgeois society, which has not yet developed its strength, has not yet developed its contradictions to the full, and has not yet created a proletariat strong enough to strive directly towards the socialist revolution. And Marx allowed the possibility of, and sometimes directly advocated, the nationalisation of the land, not only in the epoch of the bourgeois revolution in Ger-

* Here is one of the most exact expressions of this view uttered by Comrade Borisov, an advocate of the division of the land: "... Eventually, it [the demand for the nationalisation of the land] will be put forward by history; it will be put forward when petty-bourgeois farming has degenerated, when capitalism has gained strong positions in agriculture, and when Russia will no longer be a peasant country" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 127).

many in 1848, but also in 1846 for America, which, as he most accurately pointed out at that time, was only *just starting* its "industrial" development. The experience of various capitalist countries gives us no example of the nationalisation of the land in anything like its pure form. We see something similar to it in New Zealand, a young capitalist democracy, where there is no evidence of highly developed agricultural capitalism. Something similar to it existed in America when the government passed the Homestead Act and distributed plots of land to small farmers at a nominal rent.

No. To associate nationalisation with the epoch of highly developed capitalism means repudiating it as a measure of bourgeois progress; and such a repudiation directly contradicts economic theory. It seems to me that in the following argument in *Theories of Surplus Value*, Marx outlines conditions for the achievement of nationalisation *other than* those usually presumed.

After pointing out that the landowner is an absolutely superfluous figure in capitalist production, that the purpose of the latter is "fully answered" if the land belongs to the state, Marx goes on to say:

"That is why in theory the radical bourgeois arrives at the repudiation of private landed property.... In practice, however, he lacks courage, since the attack on one form of property, private property in relation to the conditions of labour, would be very dangerous for the other form. Moreover, the bourgeois has territorialised himself." (*Theorie über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 1. Teil, S. 208.)¹²⁸

Marx does not mention here, as an obstacle to the achievement of nationalisation, the undeveloped state of capitalism in agriculture. He mentions two other obstacles, which speak much more strongly in favour of the idea of achieving nationalisation in the epoch of *bourgeois revolution*.

First obstacle: the radical bourgeois *lacks the courage* to attack private landed property owing to the danger of a socialist attack on all private property, i.e., the danger of a socialist revolution.

Second obstacle: "The bourgeois has territorialised himself". Evidently, what Marx has in mind is that the bour-

geois mode of production has already entrenched itself in private landed property, i. e., that this private property has become far more bourgeois than feudal. When the bourgeoisie, as a class, *has already* become bound up with landed property on a broad, predominating scale, *has already* "territorialised itself", "settled on the land", fully subordinated landed property to itself, then a genuine *social* movement of the bourgeoisie in favour of nationalisation is *impossible*. It is impossible for the simple reason that no class ever goes against itself.

Broadly speaking, these two obstacles are removable *only* in the epoch of rising and not of declining capitalism, in the epoch of the *bourgeois* revolution, and not on the eve of the socialist revolution. The view that nationalisation is feasible only at a high stage of development of capitalism cannot be called Marxist. It contradicts both the general premises of Marx's theory and his words as quoted above. It *oversimplifies* the question of the historically concrete conditions under which nationalisation is brought about by such-and-such forces and classes, and reduces it to a schematic and bare abstraction.

The "radical bourgeois" *cannot* be *courageous* in the epoch of strongly developed capitalism. In such an epoch this bourgeoisie, in the mass, is inevitably counter-revolutionary. In such an epoch the almost complete "territorialisation" of the bourgeoisie is already inevitable. In the epoch of bourgeois revolution, however, the *objective* conditions compel the "radical bourgeois" to be courageous; for, in solving the historical problem of the given period, the bourgeoisie, as a class, cannot yet fear the *proletarian* revolution. In the epoch of bourgeois revolution the bourgeoisie *has not yet territorialised itself*: landownership is still too much steeped in feudalism in such an epoch. The phenomenon of the *mass* of the bourgeois farmers fighting against the *principal* forms of landownership and therefore arriving at the practical achievement of the *complete* bourgeois "liberation of the land", i. e., *nationalisation*, becomes possible.

In all these respects the Russian bourgeois revolution finds itself in particularly favourable conditions. Arguing from the purely economic point of view, we must certainly

admit the existence of a maximum of survivals of feudalism in the Russian system of landownership, in both landlord estates and peasant allotments. Under such circumstances, the contradiction between relatively developed capitalism in industry and the appalling backwardness of the countryside becomes glaring and, owing to objective causes, makes the bourgeois revolution extremely far-reaching and creates conditions for the most rapid agricultural progress. The nationalisation of the land is precisely a condition for the most rapid capitalist progress in our agriculture. We have a "radical bourgeois" in Russia who has not yet "territorialised" himself, who cannot, at present, fear a proletarian "attack". That radical bourgeois is the Russian peasant.

From this point of view the difference between the attitude of the mass of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie and that of the mass of Russian peasants towards the nationalisation of the land becomes quite intelligible. The liberal landlord, lawyer, big manufacturer and merchant have all sufficiently "territorialised" themselves. They cannot but fear a proletarian attack. They cannot but prefer the Stolypin-Cadet road. Think what a golden river is now flowing towards the landlords, government officials, lawyers, and merchants in the form of the millions which the "Peasant" Bank is handing out to the terrified landlords! Under the Cadet system of "redemption payments" this golden river would have a slightly different direction, would, perhaps, be slightly less abundant, but it would still consist of hundreds of millions, and would flow into the same hands.

Out of the revolutionary overthrow of *all* the old forms of landownership neither the government official nor the lawyer can derive a single kopek. And the merchants, in the mass, are not far-sighted enough to prefer the future expansion of the home, peasant, market to the immediate possibility of snatching something from the gentry. Only the peasant, who is being driven into his grave by the old Russia, is capable of striving for the complete renovation of the system of landownership.

8. DOES NATIONALISATION MEAN TRANSITION TO DIVISION?

If nationalisation is regarded as a measure most likely to be achieved in the epoch of bourgeois revolution, such a view must inevitably lead to the admission that nationalisation may turn out to be a mere transition to division. The real economic need which compels the mass of the peasantry to strive for nationalisation is the need for the thorough renovation of all the old agrarian relationships, for "clearing" all the land, for readapting it to the new system of farming. That being the case, it is clear that the farmers who have adapted themselves, who have renovated the *whole* system of landownership, may demand that the *new* agrarian system be *consolidated*, i.e., that the holdings they have rented from the state be converted into their property.

Yes, that is indisputable. We arrive at nationalisation not from abstract arguments, but from a concrete calculation of the concrete interests of a concrete epoch. And, of course, it would be ridiculous to regard the mass of small farmers as "idealists"; it would be ridiculous to think that they will stop at division if their interests demand it. Consequently, we must inquire: (1) whether their interests can demand division; (2) under what circumstances; and (3) how this will affect the proletarian agrarian programme.

We have already answered the first question in the affirmative. To the second question no definite reply can yet be given. After the period of revolutionary nationalisation the demand for division may be evoked by the desire to consolidate to the greatest possible degree the new agrarian relations, which meet the requirements of capitalism. It may be evoked by the desire of the *given* owners of land to increase their incomes at the expense of the rest of society. Finally, it may be evoked by the desire to "quieten" (or, plainly speaking, to put down) the proletariat and the semi-proletarian strata, for whom nationalisation of the land will be an element that will "whet the appetite" for the socialisation of the whole of social production. All these three possibilities reduce themselves to a single economic basis, since the consolidation of the new system of capital-

ist landownership of the new farmers automatically creates anti-proletarian sentiments and a striving on the part of these farmers to create new privileges *for themselves* in the shape of right of ownership. Hence, the question reduces itself precisely to this economic consolidation. The constant factor counteracting this will be the development of capitalism, which increases the superiority of large-scale agriculture and demands constant facility for the "consolidation" of small farms into large ones. A temporary factor counteracting it will be the land available for colonisation in Russia: consolidating the new economy means raising the technical level of agriculture. And we have already shown that every step forward in agricultural technique "opens up" for Russia more and more new areas of land available for colonisation.

Our examination of the second question leads to the following deduction: the circumstances under which the new farmers' demands for the division of the land will overcome *all* counteracting influences cannot be predicted with accuracy. Allowance, however, must be made for the fact that capitalist development after the bourgeois revolution will inevitably give rise to such circumstances.

As regards the last question, that concerning the attitude of the workers' party towards the possible demand of the new farmers for the division of the land, a very definite reply can be given. The proletariat can and must support the militant bourgeoisie when the latter wages a really revolutionary struggle against feudalism. But it is not for the proletariat to support the bourgeoisie when the latter is becoming quiescent. If it is certain that a victorious bourgeois revolution in Russia is impossible without the nationalisation of the land, then it is still more certain that a subsequent turn towards the division of the land is impossible without a certain amount of "restoration", without the peasantry (or rather, from the point of view of the presumed relations: farmers) turning towards counter-revolution. The proletariat will uphold the revolutionary tradition against all such strivings and will not assist them.

In any case, it would be a great mistake to think that, in the event of the new farmer class turning towards division of the land, nationalisation would be a transient phe-

nomenon of no serious significance. In any case, it would have tremendous material and moral significance. Material significance, in that nothing is capable of so thoroughly sweeping away the survivals of medievalism in Russia, of so thoroughly renovating the rural districts, which are in a state of Asiatic semi-decay, of so rapidly promoting agricultural progress, as nationalisation. Any other solution of the agrarian question in the revolution would create less favourable starting-points for further economic development.

The moral significance of nationalisation in the revolutionary epoch is that the proletariat helps to strike a blow at "one form of private property" which must inevitably have its repercussions all over the world. The proletariat stands for the most consistent and most determined bourgeois revolution and the most favourable conditions for capitalist development, thereby most effectively counteracting all half-heartedness, flabbiness, spinelessness and passivity—qualities which the bourgeoisie cannot help displaying.

CHAPTER IV POLITICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN QUESTIONS OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

As already pointed out, it is considerations of this kind that occupy a disproportionately large place in our Party discussion on the agrarian programme. Our task is to examine these considerations as systematically and briefly as possible and to show the relation between the various political measures (and points of view) and the economic basis of the agrarian revolution.

1. "A GUARANTEE AGAINST RESTORATION"

In my Report on the Stockholm Congress I dealt with this argument, citing the debate from memory. Now, we have before us the authentic text of the Minutes.

"The key to my position," exclaimed Plekhanov at the Stockholm Congress, "is that I draw attention to the possi-

bility of restoration" (p. 115). Let us examine this key a little more closely. Here is the first reference to it in Plekhanov's first speech:

"Lenin says, 'we shall make nationalisation harmless', but to make nationalisation harmless we must find a guarantee against restoration; and there is not, nor can there be, any such guarantee. Recall the history of France; recall the history of England; in each of these countries, the wide sweep of the revolution was followed by restoration. The same may happen in our country; and our programme must be such that in the event of its application, the harm that may be caused by restoration may be reduced to a minimum. Our programme must eliminate the economic basis of tsarism; but nationalisation of the land effected during the revolutionary period does not eliminate that basis. Therefore, I consider that the demand for nationalisation is an anti-revolutionary demand" (p. 44). What the "economic basis of tsarism" is, Plekhanov tells in the same speech: "The situation in our country was such that the land, together with its cultivators, was held in servitude by the state, and on the basis of that servitude Russian despotism developed. To overthrow despotism, it is necessary to do away with its economic basis. Therefore, I am opposed to nationalisation at present" (p. 44).

First of all, let us examine the *logic* of this argument about *restoration*. First: "there is not, nor can there be, any guarantee against restoration!" Second: "the harm that may be caused by restoration must be reduced to a minimum". That is to say, we *must invent* a guarantee against restoration, although there cannot be any such guarantee! And on the very next page, 45 (in the same speech), Plekhanov finally invents a guarantee: "In the event of restoration," he plainly says, "it [municipalisation] will not surrender the land [listen!] to the political representatives of the old order." Thus, although "there cannot be" any such guarantee, a guarantee against restoration has been found. A very clever conjuring trick, and the Menshevik press is filled with rapture over the conjurer's skill.

When Plekhanov speaks he is brilliant and witty, he crackles, twirls, and sparkles like a Catherine-wheel. The

trouble starts when the speech is taken down verbatim and later subjected to a logical examination.

What is restoration? It is the reversion of state power to the political representatives of the old order. Can there be any guarantee against such a restoration? No, there cannot. *Therefore*, we invent *such* a guarantee: municipalisation, which "will not surrender the land".... But we ask: what obstacles does municipalisation raise to the "surrender of the land"? The only obstacle is the law passed by the revolutionary parliament declaring such and such lands (former landlord estates, etc.) to be the *property* of the Regional Diets. But what is a law? The expression of the will of the classes which have emerged victorious and hold the power of the state.

Can you see now why such a law "will not surrender the land" to "the representatives of the old order" when *the latter* will have recaptured state power?

And after the Stockholm Congress this unmitigated nonsense was preached by Social-Democrats even from the rostrum of the Duma! *

As to the substance of this famous question of "guarantees against restoration", we must make the following observation. Since we can have no guarantees against restoration, to raise that question in connection with the agrarian programme means *diverting* the attention of the audience, *clogging their minds*, and introducing confusion into the discussion. We are not in a position to call forth at our own will a socialist revolution in the West, which is the only absolute guarantee against restoration in Russia. But a relative and conditional "guarantee", i.e., one that would raise the greatest possible *obstacles* to restoration, lies in carrying out the revolution in Russia in the most far-reaching, consistent, and determined manner possible. The more far-reaching the revolution is, the more difficult will it be to restore the old order and the more gains will remain even if restoration does take place. The more deeply the old soil is ploughed up by revolution, the more difficult will it be to restore the old order. In

* Tsereteli's speech on May 26, 1907. Stenographic Record of the Second Duma, p. 1234.

the political sphere, a democratic republic represents a more profound change than democratic local self-government; the former presupposes (and calls forth) greater revolutionary energy, intelligence, and organisation on the part of the large masses of the people; it creates traditions which it will be far more difficult to eradicate. That is why, for instance, present-day Social-Democrats attach so much value to the great fruits of the French Revolution in spite of all the restorations that have taken place, and in this they differ from the Cadets (and from Cadet-minded Social-Democrats?) who prefer democratic Zemstvos under a monarchy as a "guarantee against restoration".

In the economic sphere, nationalisation in a bourgeois agrarian revolution is more far-reaching than anything else, because it breaks up *all* the medieval forms of landownership. *At the present time* the peasant farms his own strip of allotment land, a strip of rented allotment land, a strip of rented landlord's land, and so on. Nationalisation makes it possible to tear down *all* the fences of landownership to the utmost degree, and to "clear" all the land for the *new system of economy* suitable to the requirements of capitalism. Of course, even such a clearing affords no guarantee against a return to the old order; to promise the people such a "guarantee against restoration" would be a swindle. But such a clearing of the old *system of landownership* will enable the *new system of economy* to become so firmly rooted that a return to the old forms of landownership would be extremely difficult, because *no* power on earth *can* arrest the development of capitalism. Under municipalisation, however, a return to the old form of landownership is *easier*, because municipalisation *perpetuates* the "pale of settlement", the boundary that separates medieval landownership from the new, municipalised form. After nationalisation, restoration will have to break up millions of new, capitalist farms in order to restore the old system of landownership. After municipalisation, restoration will not have to break up any farms or to set up any new land boundaries; all it will have to do will be literally to sign a paper *transferring* the lands owned by the municipality X to the noble landlords Y, Z, etc., or to hand over to the landlords the rent from the "municipalised" lands.

We must now pass from Plekhanov's logical error on the question of restoration, from the confusion of political concepts, to the economic essence of restoration. The Minutes of the Stockholm Congress fully confirm the statement made in my Report that Plekhanov impermissibly confuses the restoration which took place in France on the basis of capitalism with the restoration of "our old, semi-Asiatic order". (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 116.) Therefore, there is no need for me to add anything to what I have already said on this question in the Report. I shall only deal with the "elimination of the economic basis of despotism". The following is the most important passage in Plekhanov's speech pertaining to this:

"It is true that the restoration [in France] did not restore the survivals of feudalism; but the equivalent of these survivals in our own country is our old system of feudal attachment of both land and cultivator to the state, our old peculiar nationalisation of the land. It will be all the more easy for our restoration to return to that [*sic!*] nationalisation because you yourselves demand the nationalisation of the land, because you leave that legacy of our old semi-Asiatic order intact" (p. 116).

So, after the restoration, the return to *that*, i. e., semi-Asiatic, nationalisation "will be easier" because Lenin (and the peasantry) are *now* demanding nationalisation. What is this? A historico-materialistic analysis, or a purely rationalistic "wordplay"?* Is it the *word* "nationalisation" or certain *economic changes* that facilitate the restoration of the semi-Asiatic conditions? Had Plekhanov thought this matter over he would have realised that municipalisation and division eliminate *one* basis of the Asiatic order, i.e., medieval landlord ownership, but leave another, i.e., medieval allotment ownership. Consequently, in *essence*, in the *economic essence* of the revolution (and not in virtue of the term by which one might designate it), it is nationalisation that *far more radically* eliminates the *economic basis* of Asiatic despotism. Plekhanov's "conjuring trick" lies in that he described medieval *landownership* with its dependence, its imposts, and its servitude as "peculiar na-

* Comrade Schmidt in Stockholm. Minutes, p. 122.

tionalisation" and skipped the *two* forms of *that* system of landownership: allotments and landlordism. As a result of this juggling with words the real historical question as to what forms of medieval landownership are abolished by one or another agrarian measure is *distorted*. Plekhanov's fireworks display was very crude after all.

Plekhanov's almost incredible muddle on the question of restoration is to be explained by two circumstances. First, in speaking about the "peasant agrarian revolution", Plekhanov completely failed to grasp its peculiar character as *capitalist* evolution. He confuses Narodism, the theory of the possibility of *non-capitalist* evolution, with the Marxist view that *two* types of *capitalist* agrarian evolution are possible. Plekhanov constantly betrays a vague "fear of the peasant revolution" (as I told him in Stockholm; see pp. 106-07 of the Minutes*), a fear that it may turn out to be economically reactionary and lead, not to the American farmer system, but to medieval servitude. Actually, that is economically impossible. Proof—the Peasant Reform and the subsequent course of evolution. In the Peasant Reform the shell of feudalism (both landlord feudalism and "state feudalism", which Plekhanov, followed by Martynov, referred to at Stockholm) was very strong. But economic evolution proved *stronger*, and it filled this feudal shell with a *capitalist* content. Despite the obstacles presented by medieval landownership, both peasant and landlord economy developed, although incredibly slowly, *along the bourgeois path*. If there had been any real grounds for Plekhanov's fears of a return to Asiatic despotism, the system of landownership among the state peasants (up to the eighties) and among the former state peasants (after the eighties) should have turned out to be the purest type of "state feudalism". Actually, it proved to be freer than the landlord system, because feudal exploitation had already become impossible in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There was less bondage and a more rapid development of a peasant bourgeoisie among the state peasants with "large landholdings".** Either a slow and painful

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 283.—Ed.

** Of course, our former state peasants can be described as possessing "large landholdings" only in comparison with the former land-

bourgeois evolution of the Prussian, Junker type, or a rapid, free evolution of the American type is possible in Russia now. Anything else is an illusion.

The second reason for the "restoration muddle" in the heads of some of our comrades was the uncertain situation in the spring of 1906. The peasantry, as a mass, had not yet definitely shown itself. It was still possible to assume that the peasant movement and the Peasant Union were not the final expressions of the real aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the peasantry. The autocratic bureaucracy and Witte had not yet finally given up hope that "the muzhik will help us out" (a classic phrase used by Witte's organ *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* in the spring of 1906), i. e., that the peasants would go to the Right. Hence the strong representation allowed to the peasantry under the Law of December 11, 1905. Even at that time many Social-Democrats still thought the autocracy capable of playing some trick with the peasants' idea: "Better all the land be the tsar's than the gentry's". But the two Dumas, the Law of June 3, 1907, and Stolypin's agrarian legislation were enough to open everybody's eyes. To save what it could, the autocracy had to introduce the policy of forcibly breaking up the village communes in favour of private ownership of land, i. e., to base the counter-revolution, not on the peasants' vague talk about nationalisation (the land belongs to the "commune", and so on), but on the *only* possible economic basis upon which the power of the landlords could be retained, i.e., *capitalist* evolution on the Prussian model.

The situation has now become quite clear, and it is high time to put away forever the vague fear of "Asiatic" restoration roused by the peasant movement against the private ownership of land.*

lords' peasants. According to the returns for 1905, the former held an average of 12.5 dessiatins of allotted land per household, whereas the latter held only 6.7 dessiatins.

* I say nothing here about the fact that the bogey of restoration is a political weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, since everything essential on this subject has been said already in my Report. (See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 339.—Ed.)

2. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AS A "BULWARK AGAINST REACTION"

... "In the shape of local self-government bodies which will possess the land," said Plekhanov at Stockholm, "it [municipalisation] will create a bulwark against reaction. And a very powerful bulwark it will be. Take our Cossacks for example" (p. 45). Well, we shall "take our Cossacks" and see what the reference to them is worth. But first of all, let us examine the general grounds for this opinion that local self-government is capable of being a bulwark against reaction. That view has been propounded by our municipalisers on innumerable occasions, and it will be sufficient to quote a passage from John's speech to supplement Plekhanov's formula. "What is the difference between nationalisation and municipalisation of the land if we admit that both are feasible and equally bound up with the democratisation of the political system? The difference is that municipalisation is better able to consolidate the gains of the revolution, the democratic system, and will serve as the basis for its further development, whereas nationalisation will merely consolidate the power of the state" (p. 112).

The Mensheviks actually deny the possibility of guarantees against restoration, and in the very same breath produce "guarantees" and "bulwarks" like conjurers doing a trick in front of an audience. Just think a little, gentlemen! How can local self-government be a bulwark against reaction, or consolidate the gains of the revolution? There can be only one bulwark against reaction and one means of consolidating the gains of the revolution, namely, the class-consciousness and organisation of the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. And in a capitalist state which is centralised, not by the arbitrary will of the bureaucracy, but by the inexorable demands of economic development, that organisation must find expression in a single force welded together throughout the state. Without a centralised peasant movement, without a centralised nationwide political struggle of the peasantry led by a centralised proletariat, *there can be no serious "revolutionary gains" worthy of "consolidation"; there can be no "bulwark against reaction".*

Local self-government that is at all really democratic is *impossible* unless landlord rule is completely overthrown and landlordism is abolished. While admitting this in words, the Mensheviks, with amazing light-mindedness, refuse to consider what it implies in deeds. In deeds, it cannot be attained unless the revolutionary classes conquer political power throughout the state; and one would have thought that two years of revolution would have taught even the most obdurate "man in the muffler" that these classes in Russia can only be the proletariat and the peasantry. To be victorious, the "peasant agrarian revolution" of which you gentlemen speak must, as such, as a peasant revolution, become the central authority throughout the state.

The democratic self-governing bodies can be only *particles* of such a central authority of the democratic peasantry. Only by *combating* the local and regional disunity of the peasantry, only by advocating, preparing, and organising a nation-wide, all-Russian, centralised movement, can real service be rendered to the cause of "peasant agrarian revolution", and not to the encouragement of parochial backwardness and local provincial stupefaction of the peasantry. It is precisely this stupefaction that you, Mr. Plekhanov and Mr. John, are serving when you advocate the preposterous and arch-reactionary idea that local self-government can become a "bulwark against reaction", or that it can "consolidate the gains of the revolution". For the experience of the two years of the Russian revolution has plainly demonstrated that it was precisely this local and regional disunity of the peasant movement (the soldiers' movement is part of the peasant movement) that was most of all responsible for the defeat.

To present a programme of a "peasant agrarian revolution and associate it *only* with the democratisation of local self-government and not of the central government, to hold the former up as a genuine "bulwark" and "consolidation", is in reality nothing but a Cadet *deal with reaction*.* The

* I have dealt more fully with this in the Report. (See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 337-38.—*Ed.*) Here I shall add an extract from a speech by the Menshevik Novosedsky, which I did not hear (see the Report) at the Congress, but which corroborates this most strikingly.

Cadets lay stress on local "democratic" self-government because they do not want, or dare, to touch upon *more important* questions. The Mensheviks did not realise what a big word they uttered when they admitted that the "peasant agrarian revolution" is the task of the day, and in their political commentary to this agrarian programme they displayed the acme of provincial narrow-mindedness.

Here is a sample of John's reasoning, if you please:

"Comrade Lenin is afraid that the reaction will wrest the confiscated lands from the local self-government bodies; if that can be said of the lands which may pass into the hands of the state, it cannot possibly be said of municipalised lands. Even the autocratic Russian Government could not take away the land from the local government bodies of Armenia, as that called forth strong resistance on the part of the population" (p. 113).

Superb, is it not? The whole history of the autocracy is one of wholesale grabbing of local, regional, and national lands; and our wiseacres try to reassure the people who are becoming stupefied in their provincial isolation by arguing that "even the autocracy" did not take away the land from the Armenian *churches*, although it had begun to do so, and was in fact prevented from doing so *only* by the all-Russian revolution.... In the centre autocracy, and in the provinces "Armenian lands" which "it dares not take away".... How has so much philistine stupidity penetrated our Social-Democratic movement?

And here are Plekhanov's Cossacks:

"Take our Cossacks. They behave like downright reactionaries; yet if the [autocratic] government dared to lay hands on their land, they would rise against it to a man. Consequently, the merit of municipalisation lies precisely in that it will prove of use even in the event of restoration (p. 45).

Opposing the amendment to substitute the words "democratic republic" for "democratic state", Novosedsky said: ... "In the event of truly democratic local self-government being established, the programme now adopted may be carried into effect *even with a degree of democratisation of the central government which cannot be described as the highest degree of its democratisation. Even under democratisation of a comparative degree, so to speak, municipalisation will not be harmful, but useful.*" (p. 138. Our italics.) That is as clear as clear can be. A peasant agrarian revolution *without* the overthrow of the autocracy—such is the highly reactionary idea the Mensheviks advocate.

"Consequently", indeed! If the autocracy rose against the defenders of the autocracy, then the defenders of the autocracy would rise against the autocracy. What profundity! Cossack landownership, however, is of use not only in the event of restoration, but also as a means of upholding what must be overthrown before it can be restored. Speaking in opposition to Plekhanov, Schmidt called attention to this interesting aspect of municipalisation. He said:

"Let me remind you that the autocracy had granted certain privileges to the Cossacks a month ago. Consequently, it is not afraid of municipalisation, for the Cossacks' lands even now are managed in a manner which greatly resembles municipalisation.... It [municipalisation] is going to play a counter-revolutionary role" (pp. 123-24).

Plekhanov became so excited over that speech that he interrupted the speaker (on quite an unimportant point, to ask him whether he was speaking about the Orenburg Cossacks) and tried to upset the standing orders by demanding the floor out of his turn to make a statement. Subsequently he submitted the following written statement:

"Comrade Schmidt misquoted my reference to the Cossacks. I made no reference to the Orenburg Cossacks at all. I said: look at the Cossacks; they are behaving like archi-reactionaries; nevertheless, if the government tried to lay hands on their land, they would rise against it to a man. And so would, more or less, all the regional bodies to whom the confiscated landlords' land would be transferred by the revolution, if any such attempt were made. And such behaviour on their part would be one of the guarantees against reaction in the event of restoration" (p. 127).

It is a brilliant plan, of course, to overthrow the autocracy without touching the autocracy: to take certain regions away from it and leave it to regain them if it can! It is almost as brilliant as the idea of expropriating capitalism through the savings-banks. But that is not the point just now. The point is that regional municipalisation, which "should" play a wonderful role after the victorious revolution, is now playing a counter-revolutionary role. And that is the point that Plekhanov evaded!

At the present time the Cossack lands represent real municipalisation. Large regions belong to separate Cossack troops—the Orenburg, Don, and others. The Cossacks possess an average of 52 dessiatins per household, the peasants an average of 11 dessiatins. In addition, the Orenburg Cossacks own 1,500,000 dessiatins of "army lands"; the Don Cossacks, 1,900,000 dessiatins, etc. This "municipalisation" is the breeding-ground of purely feudal relations. This actually existing municipalisation involves the caste and regional isolation of the peasants, who are split up by differences in the size of holdings, amount of taxes paid, and terms of medieval land tenure as a reward for service, and so forth. "Municipalisation" does not assist the general democratic movement, it serves to disintegrate it, to split up into regions and thus weaken what can be victorious only as a centralised force; it serves to alienate one region from another.

And in the Second Duma we find the *Right Cossack* Karaulov speaking in support of Stolypin (asserting that Stolypin in his declaration also agreed to the compulsory shifting of land boundaries), denouncing nationalisation no less strongly than Plekhanov, and openly declaring in favour of municipalisation by regions (18th session, March 29, 1907, Stenographic Record, p.1366).

The Right-wing Cossack Karaulov grasped the crux of the matter a thousand times more correctly than Maslov and Plekhanov. The division into regions is a guarantee against revolution. If the Russian peasantry (with the aid of a centralised, not "regional", proletarian movement) fails to break the bounds of its regional isolation and organise an all-Russian movement, the revolution will always be beaten by the representatives of the various privileged regions which the centralised authority of the old regime will use in the struggle as necessity requires.

Municipalisation is a reactionary slogan, which idealises the medieval isolation of the regions, and dulls the peasantry's consciousness of the need for a centralised agrarian revolution.

8. THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BOURGEOIS STATE

It is the central state authority that the municipalisers dislike above all else. Before we proceed to examine their arguments, we must first ascertain what nationalisation means from the political and legal standpoint (its economic content we have ascertained above).

Nationalisation is the transfer of all the land to the *ownership* of the state. State ownership means that the state is entitled to draw the rent from the land and to lay down *general* rules governing the possession and use of the land for the whole country. Under nationalisation such general rules certainly include prohibition of any sort of intermediary, i.e., the prohibition of sub-letting, or the transfer of land to anyone except the direct tiller, and so on. Furthermore, if the state in question is really democratic (not in the Menshevik sense *à la* Novosedsky), its ownership of the land does not at all preclude, but, on the contrary, *requires* that the land be placed at the *disposal* of the local and regional self-governing bodies within the limits of the laws of the country. As I have already pointed out in my pamphlet *Revision, etc.*,* our minimum programme *directly demands* this when it calls for the self-determination of nationalities, for wide regional self-government, and so on. Hence the detailed regulations, corresponding to local differences, the practical allotment, or distribution of land among individuals, associations, etc.—all this *inevitably* passes into the hands of the *local* organs of the state, i. e., to the local self-governing bodies.

Any misunderstandings on this score, if they could arise, would be due either to a failure to understand the difference between the concepts of ownership, possession, disposal, and use, or to demagogical flirting with provincialism and federalism.** The basis of the difference between

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 181-83.—*Ed.*

** We see that kind of flirting on the part of Maslov. ... "Perhaps," he writes in an article in *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 104, "in some places, the peasants would agree to share their lands; but the refusal of the peasants in a single large area (e.g., Poland) to share their lands would be enough to make the proposal to nationalise all the land an absurdity." That is a sample of vulgar argumentation in which there is no trace of *thought*, but a mere jumble of words. The "refusal" of

municipalisation and nationalisation is not in the apportionment of rights as between the central and provincial authorities, and still less in the "bureaucracy" of the central authority—only utter ignoramus can think and talk like that—the essential difference is that under municipalisation, private ownership is retained for one category of land, whereas under nationalisation it is completely abolished. The essential difference lies in the "agrarian bimetallism", which is implied in the first programme, and eliminated in the second.

If, however, you approach the *present* programme from the standpoint of possible *arbitrary action* by the central authority, etc. (a standpoint which the vulgar advocates of municipalisation often fall back upon), you will see that the present programme is confused and vague in the extreme. It suffices to point out that the present programme transfers "to the possession of the democratic state" both the "lands required for colonisation", and "forest and water areas of national importance". Obviously, these terms are very indefinite and provide an abundant source for conflicts. Take, for instance, Mr. Kaufman's latest contribution in Volume II of *The Agrarian Question*, published by the Cadets ("On Norms of Supplementary Allotments"), in which a computation is made of the land reserves available in 44 gubernias for the purpose of additional allotments for the peasants at the highest norms of 1861. The "non-allotment distributable land" is first estimated without forest land and then with forest land (over 25 per cent of forest). Who is to determine which of these forests are of "national importance"? Only the central state authority, of course. Hence, it is in the hands of this central state authority that the Menshevik programme places a gigantic

an area that occupies an exceptional position cannot alter the general programme, nor make it absurd; some areas may also "refuse" to municipalise the land. That is not the point. What is important is the fact that in a united capitalist state, the private ownership of land and nationalisation on a large scale cannot exist side by side as two separate systems. One of them will have to get the upper hand. It is up to the workers' party to advocate the superior system, the one that facilitates the rapid development of the productive forces and freedom to wage the class struggle.

area of 57,000,000 dessiatins in 44 gubernias (according to Kaufman). Who is to determine what the lands available for "colonisation" are? Only the bourgeois central authority, of course. It alone will determine, for instance, whether the 1,500,000 dessiatins of "army lands" of the Orenburg Cossacks, or the 2,000,000 dessiatins of the Don Cossack lands can or cannot serve as "colonisation lands" *for the whole country* (because the Cossacks have 52.7 dessiatins per household). Clearly, the question is not as it is put by Maslov, Plekhanov, and Co. It is not a question of protecting the local regional self-governing bodies from the encroachments of the central government by means of paper resolutions; that cannot be done either with paper, or even with guns; for the trend of capitalist development is towards centralisation, towards the concentration of such a force in the hands of the central bourgeois government as the "regions" *will never be able* to stand up against. The point is that *one and the same class* should have political power both centrally and locally, that democracy should be quite consistently applied in both cases to an absolutely equal degree, a degree sufficient to ensure the *complete supremacy* of, let us say, the majority of the population, i. e., the peasantry. That alone can serve as a *real guarantee* against "excessive" encroachments of the centre, against infringements of the "lawful" rights of the regions. All other guarantees invented by the Mensheviks are downright foolishness; they are foolscaps donned by provincial philistines to protect themselves from the power of the central authority which has been concentrated by capitalism. That is exactly the kind of philistine foolishness that Novosedsky is guilty of, as also the whole of the present programme, which *conceives the possibility* of complete democracy in local self-government and a "lower" degree of democracy at the centre. Incomplete democracy means that power at the centre is *not* in the hands of the majority of the population, *not* in the hands of those elements which predominate in the local self-governing bodies; and that means not only the possibility but the *inevitability of conflicts*, out of which, by virtue of the laws of economic development, the *non-democratic central authority must emerge victorious!*

"Municipalisation" from this angle, regarded as a means of "securing" something for the regions against the central authority, is sheer philistine nonsense. If that can be called a "fight" against the centralised bourgeois authority, it is the sort of "fight" that the *anti-Semites* are waging against capitalism, that is, the same extravagant promises, which attract the dull and ignorant masses and *the same economic and political impossibility of fulfilling* these promises.

Take the stock argument of the advocates of municipalisation against nationalisation, namely, nationalisation will strengthen the bourgeois state (or as John so admirably put it: "will strengthen *only* the state power"), and will increase the revenues of the anti-proletarian, bourgeois government; *whereas*—this is exactly what they say—*whereas* municipalisation will yield revenues for the needs of the population, for the needs of the proletariat. This kind of argument makes one blush for Social-Democracy, for it is *sheer anti-Semitic stupidity and anti-Semitic demagogic*. We shall not quote the "small fry" who have been led astray by Plekhanov and Maslov; we shall quote Maslov "himself":

"Social-Democracy," he instructs the readers of *Obrazovaniye*, "always makes its calculations in such a way that its plans and aims will be vindicated even under the worst circumstances.... We must assume that the bourgeois system with all its negative features will predominate in all spheres of social life. Self-government will have the same bourgeois character as the whole state system; the same acute class struggle will go on in it as in the municipalities of Western Europe."

"What is the difference, then, between local self-government and the state authority? Why does Social-Democracy seek to transfer the land not to the state, but to the local self-governing bodies?

"To define the functions of the state and of local self-government, let us compare their budgets." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 102.)

Then follows a comparison: in one of the most democratic republics—the United States of America—42 per cent of the budget is spent on the army and navy. The same applies to France, England, etc. The "landlord Zemstvos" in Russia spend 27.5 per cent of their budgets on public health, 17.4 per cent on education, 11.9 per cent on roads.

"This comparison of the respective budgets of the most democratic states with the least democratic local self-governing bodies shows that the former, by their functions, serve the interests of the ruling classes, that the state funds are spent on *means of oppression*, on means of suppressing democracy; on the other hand, we find that the most undemocratic, the very worst type of local self-government is compelled, however badly, to serve democracy, to satisfy local requirements" (p. 103).

"Social-Democrats must not be so naïve as to accept nationalisation of the land on the grounds, for instance, that the revenues from nationalised lands would go towards the maintenance of *republican* troops.... It will be a very naïve reader who believes Olenov when he says that Marx's theory 'permits' the inclusion in the programme only of the demand for the nationalisation of the land, i. e., the expenditure of ground rent [irrespective of whether it is called absolute or differential rent?] on the army and navy, and that this theory does not permit the inclusion of municipalisation of the land, i. e., the expenditure of rent on the needs of the population" (p. 103).

Clear enough, one would think. Nationalisation—for the army and navy; municipalisation—for the needs of the people! A Jew is a capitalist; down with the Jews means down with the capitalists!

Good Maslov fails to see that the high percentage of expenditure on cultural needs in the budgets of local self-governing bodies is a high percentage of secondary items of expenditure. Why is that? Because the jurisdiction and financial powers of local self-governing bodies are determined by the central authority and determined in such a manner that it takes vast sums for the army, etc., and gives only farthings for "culture". Is such a division unavoidable in bourgeois society? Yes, it is; for in bourgeois society the bourgeoisie could not rule if it did not spend vast sums on making its class rule secure and thus leave only farthings for cultural purposes. One must be a Maslov to conceive this brilliant idea: if I declare this *new source of vast sums* to be the property of the Zemstvos, I *get round* the rule of the bourgeoisie! How easy the task of the proletarians would be if they reasoned like Maslov: all we have to do is to demand that the revenues from the railways, post, telegraph, and the liquor monopoly should not be "nationalised", but "municipalised", and all those revenues will be spent not on the army and navy, but for cultural purposes. There is no need whatever to

overthrow the central authority, or to change it radically; all we have to do is simply to secure the "municipalisation" of all the big items of revenue, and the trick is done. Oh, wiseacres!

In Europe, and in every bourgeois country, municipal revenues are those revenues—and let the good Maslov remember this!—which the bourgeois central authority is willing to sacrifice for cultural purposes, *because they are secondary items of revenue*, because it is inconvenient for the central authority to collect them, and because the principal, cardinal, fundamental needs of the bourgeoisie and of its rule have already been met by the *vast sums of revenue*. Therefore, to advise the people to secure new vast sums, hundreds of millions from the municipalised lands, and to make sure the money is spent for cultural purposes by handing it over to the Zemstvos and not to the central authority, is the advice of a charlatan. The bourgeoisie in a bourgeois state can give *nothing but farthings* for real cultural purposes, for it requires the large sums to secure its rule as a class. Why does the central authority appropriate nine-tenths of the revenues from taxes on land, commercial bodies, etc., and allow the Zemstvos to keep only one-tenth? Why does it make it a law that any additional taxes imposed by the Zemstvos shall not exceed a certain low percentage? Because the large sums are needed to ensure the class rule of the bourgeoisie, which by its very bourgeois nature cannot allow more than farthings to be spent for cultural purposes.*

* A study of R. Kaufmann's highly comprehensive work, *Die Kommunalfinanzen*, 2 Bände, Lpz. 1906, II. Abt., 5. Band des Hand- und Lehrbuches der Staatswissenschaften, begr. von Frankenstein, fortges. von Heckel, will show that the division of local and central state expenditures in England is *more in favour* of the local government bodies than it is in Prussia and France. Thus, in England, 3,000 million marks are expended by the local authorities, and 3,600 million by the central government; in France, the respective figures are 1,100 million as against 2,900; in Prussia, 1,100 and 3,500. Let us now take the *cultural* expenditure, for instance, the expenditure on education in the country most favourably situated (from the standpoint of the advocates of municipalisation), i. e., England. We find that out of the total local expenditure of £ 151,600,000 (in 1902-03) £ 16,500,000 were spent on education, i. e., slightly over one-tenth. The central government, under

The European socialists take this distribution of the large sums and the farthings for granted; they know quite well that it cannot be otherwise in bourgeois society. Taking this distribution for granted, they say: we cannot participate in the central government because it is an instrument of oppression; but we may participate in municipal governments because there the farthings are spent for cultural purposes. But what would these socialists think of a man who advised the workers' party to agitate in favour of the European municipalities being given property rights in the really large revenues, the total rent from local land, the whole revenue from the local post offices, local railways, and so on? They would certainly think that such a man was either crazy or a "Christian Socialist" who had found his way into the ranks of Social-Democracy by mistake.

Those who, in discussing the tasks of the present (i. e., bourgeois) revolution in Russia, argue that we must not strengthen the central authority of the bourgeois state, reveal a complete inability to think. The Germans may and should argue in that way because they have before them only a Junker-bourgeois Germany; there can be no other Germany until socialism is established. In our country, on the other hand, the whole content of the revolutionary mass struggle at the present stage is whether Russia is to be a Junker-bourgeois state (as Stolypin and the Cadets desire), or a peasant-bourgeois state (as the peasants and the workers desire). One cannot take part in such a revolution without supporting one section of the bourgeoisie, one type of bourgeois evolution, against the other. Owing to objective economic causes, there is not and cannot be any other "choice" for us in this revolution than that between a bourgeois centralised republic of peasant-farmers and a bourgeois centralised monarchy of Junker-landlords. To

the 1908 Budget (see *Almanach de Gotha*) spent for educational purposes £ 16,900,000 out of a total of £ 198,600,000, i. e., less than one-tenth. Army and navy expenditure for the same year amounted to £ 59,200,000; add to this the expenditure of £ 28,500,000 on the national debt, £ 3,800,000 on law courts and police, £ 1,900,000 on foreign affairs and £ 19,800,000 on cost of tax collection, and you will see that the bourgeoisie spends only *farthings* on education, and *vast sums* on the maintenance of its rule as a class.

avoid that difficult "choice" by fixing the attention of the masses on the plea: "if only we could make the Zemstvos a little more democratic", is the most vulgar philistinism.

4. THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL AND OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTIONS

A difficult "choice", we said, meaning of course not the subjective choice (which is the more desirable), but the objective outcome of the struggle of the social forces that are deciding the historical issue. Those who say that my agrarian programme, which links the republic with nationalisation, is optimistic, have never thought out what the "difficulty" involved in a favourable outcome for the peasantry really is. Here is Plekhanov's argument on the subject:

"Lenin evades the difficulty of the question by means of optimistic assumptions. That is the usual method of utopian thinking. The anarchists, for instance, say: 'there is no need for any coercive organisation', and when we retort that the absence of coercive organisation would enable individual members of the community to injure the community if they so desired, the anarchists reply: 'that cannot be'. In my opinion, that means evading the difficulty of the question by means of optimistic assumptions. And that is what Lenin does. He raises a whole series of optimistic 'ifs' around the possible consequences of the measure he proposes. To prove this, I shall quote the reproach which Lenin levelled at Maslov. On page 23 of his pamphlet * he says: 'Maslov's draft tacitly assumes a situation in which the demands of our political minimum programme have not been carried out in full, the sovereignty of the people has not been ensured, the standing army has not been abolished, officials are not elected, and so forth. In other words, it assumes that our democratic revolution, like most of the democratic revolutions in Europe, has not reached its complete fulfilment and that it has been curtailed, distorted, "rolled back", like all the others. Maslov's draft is especially intended for a half-way, inconsistent, incomplete, or curtailed democratic revolution, "made innocuous" by reaction.' Assuming that the reproach Lenin levelled at Maslov is justified, the passage quoted still shows that Lenin's own draft programme will be good only in the event of all his 'ifs' coming true. But if those 'ifs' are not realised, the implementation of his draft ** will prove harmful. But we have no need of such drafts. Our draft programme must be armed at all points, i. e., ready to meet unfavourable 'ifs'." (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, pp. 44-45.)

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 187.—Ed.

** In that case it would not be *my* draft! Plekhanov is illogical!

I have quoted this argument in full because it clearly indicates Plekhanov's mistake. He has completely failed to understand the optimism which scares him. The "optimism" is not in assuming the election of officials by the people, etc., but in assuming the victory of the peasant agrarian revolution. The real "difficulty" lies in securing the victory of the peasant agrarian revolution in a country which, at least since 1861, has been developing along Junker-bourgeois lines; and since you admit the possibility of this fundamental *economic* difficulty, it is ridiculous to regard the difficulties of political democracy as all but anarchism. It is ridiculous to forget that the scope of the agrarian and of the political changes cannot fail to correspond, that the *economic* revolution presupposes a corresponding political superstructure. Plekhanov's cardinal mistake on this question lies in this very failure to understand the root of the "optimism" of our common, Menshevik and Bolshevik, agrarian programme.

Indeed, picture to yourselves concretely what a "*peasant agrarian revolution*", involving *confiscation* of the landlords' estates, means in contemporary Russia. There can be no doubt that during the past half-century capitalism has paved the way for itself *through* landlord farming, which now, on the whole, is unquestionably superior to peasant farming, not only as regards yields (which can be partly ascribed to the better quality of the land owned by the landlords), but also as regards the wide use of improved implements and crop rotation (fodder grass cultivation).* There is no doubt that landlord farming is bound by a thousand ties not only to the bureaucracy, but also to the bourgeoisie. Confiscation undermines a great many of the interests of the big bourgeoisie, while the peasant revolution, as Kautsky has rightly pointed out, leads also to the bankruptcy of the state, i.e., it damages the interests not only of the Russian, but of the whole international bourgeoisie. It stands to reason that under such conditions the victory of the peasant revolution, the victory of the petty

* See the new and comprehensive data on the superiority of landlord over peasant farming because of the more extensive cultivation of grass in Kaufman's *The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II.

bourgeoisie over both the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, requires an exceptionally favourable combination of circumstances; it requires what, from the standpoint of the philistine, or of the philistine historian, are very unusual "optimistic" assumptions; it requires tremendous peasant initiative, revolutionary energy, class-consciousness, organisation, and rich *narodnoye tvorchestvo* (the creative activity of the people). All that is beyond dispute, and Plekhanov's philistine jokes at the expense of that last phrase are only a cheap way of dodging a serious * issue. And since commodity production does not unite or centralise the peasants, but disintegrates and disunites them, a peasant revolution in a bourgeois country is possible only under the leadership of the proletariat—a fact which is more than ever rousing the opposition of the most powerful bourgeoisie in the world to such a revolution.

Does that mean that Marxists must abandon the idea of a peasant agrarian revolution altogether? No. Such a deduction would be worthy only of those whose philosophy is nothing but a liberal parody of Marxism. What it does mean is only, first, that Marxism cannot link the destiny of socialism in Russia with the outcome of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; second, that Marxism must reckon with the two possibilities in the capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia and clearly show the people the conditions and significance of each possibility, and third, that Marxism must resolutely combat the view that a radical agrarian revolution is possible in Russia without a radical political revolution.

(1) The Socialist-Revolutionaries, in common with all the Narodniks who are at all consistent, fail to understand the bourgeois nature of the peasant revolution and link

* *Narodnoye tvorchestvo* is *narodovolchestvo*,^{120a} Plekhanov said mockingly at Stockholm. It is the sort of criticism with which *The Adventures of Chichikov* is criticised, by making fun of the hero's name: "Chichikov.... Chi... chi... how funny!"¹²⁰ Only those who think that the mere admission of the possibility of a peasant revolution against the bourgeoisie and the landlords is *narodovolchestvo* can seriously regard as *narodovolchestvo* the idea that it is necessary to rouse the "creative activity of the people", that it is necessary to find new forms of struggle and new ways of organising the peasantry in the Russian revolution.

with it the whole of their own quasi-socialism. A favourable outcome of the peasant revolution, in the opinion of the Narodniks, would mean the triumph of Narodnik socialism in Russia. Actually, such an outcome would be the quickest and most decisive bankruptcy of Narodnik (peasant) socialism. The fuller and the more decisive the victory of the peasant revolution, the sooner will the peasantry be converted into free, bourgeois farmers, who will "give the sack" to Narodnik "socialism". On the other hand, an unfavourable outcome would prolong the agony of Narodnik socialism for some time, making it possible to some extent to maintain the illusion that criticism of the landlord-bourgeois variety of capitalism is criticism of capitalism in general.

Social-Democracy, the party of the proletariat, does not in any way link the destiny of socialism with either of the possible outcomes of the bourgeois revolution. Either outcome implies the development of capitalism and the oppression of the proletariat, whether under a landlord monarchy with private ownership of land, or under a farmers' republic, even with the nationalisation of the land. Therefore, only an absolutely independent and purely proletarian party is able to defend the cause of socialism "whatever the situation of democratic agrarian reforms" * may be, as the concluding part of my agrarian programme declares (that part was incorporated in the resolution on tactics of the Stockholm Congress).

(2) But the bourgeois nature of *both* possible outcomes of the agrarian revolution by no means implies that Social-Democrats can be indifferent to the struggle for one or the other outcome. It is undoubtedly in the interests of the working class to give the most vigorous support to the peasant revolution. More than that: it must play the leading part in that revolution. In fighting for a favourable outcome of the revolution we must spread among the masses a very clear understanding of what keeping to the landlord path of agrarian evolution means, what incalculable hardships (arising not from capitalism, but from the inadequate development of capitalism) it has in store for all

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 195.—*Ed.*

the toiling masses. On the other hand, we must also explain the petty-bourgeois nature of the peasant revolution, and the fallacy of placing any "socialist" hopes in it.

Moreover, since we do not link the destiny of socialism with either of the possible outcomes of the bourgeois revolution, our programme cannot be identical for both a favourable and "unfavourable case". When Plekhanov said that we do not need drafts specially providing for both the one and the other case (that is, drafts built upon "ifs"), he said it simply without thinking; for it is precisely from his standpoint, from the standpoint of the probability of the worst outcome, or of the necessity of reckoning with it, that it is particularly necessary to divide the programme into two parts, as I did. It needs to be said that on the present path of landlord-bourgeois development the workers' party stands for such and such measures, while at the same time it helps the peasantry with all its might to abolish landlordism entirely and thus create the possibility for broader and freer conditions of development. I dealt with this aspect of the matter in detail in my Report (the point about rent, the necessity of including that point in the programme in the "worst case"; and its omission in Maslov's draft).* I shall merely add that Plekhanov's mistake is more obvious than ever at the present moment, when the actual conditions for Social-Democratic activity give least grounds for optimistic assumptions. The Third Duma can in no way induce us to give up the struggle for the peasant agrarian revolution; but for a certain space of time we shall have to work on the basis of agrarian relations which entail the most brutal exploitation by the landlords. Plekhanov, who was particularly concerned about the worst case, now finds himself with no programme to meet it.

(3) Since we set ourselves the task of assisting the peasant revolution, we must clearly see the difficulty of the task and realise that the political and agrarian changes must *correspond*. Otherwise we shall get a scientifically unsound and, in practice, reactionary combination of agrarian "optimism" (confiscation plus municipalisation or

division) with political "pessimism" (Novosedsky's democratisation "of a comparative degree" at the centre).

The Mensheviks, as if in spite of themselves, accept the peasant revolution, but do not want to give the people a clear and definite picture of it. One can detect in what they say the opinion expressed with such inimitable naïveté by the Menshevik Ptitsyn at Stockholm: "The revolutionary turmoil will pass away, bourgeois life will resume its usual course, and unless a workers' revolution takes place in the West, the bourgeoisie will inevitably come to power in our country. Comrade Lenin will not and cannot deny that" (Minutes, p. 91). Thus, a superficial, abstract conception of the bourgeois revolution has obscured the question of one of its varieties, namely, the peasant revolution! All of this last is mere "turmoil", and the only thing that is real is the "usual course". The philistine point of view and failure to understand what the struggle is about in our bourgeois revolution could hardly be expressed in clearer terms.

The peasantry cannot carry out an agrarian revolution without abolishing the old regime, the standing army and the bureaucracy, because all these are the most reliable mainstays of landlordism, bound to it by thousands of ties. That is why the idea of achieving a peasant revolution by democratising only the local institutions without completely breaking up the central institutions is scientifically unsound. In practice it is reactionary because it plays into the hands of petty-bourgeois obtuseness and petty-bourgeois opportunism, which sees the thing in a very "simple" way: we want the land; as to politics, God will take care of that! The peasant agrees that all the land must be taken; but whether all political power has to be taken as well, whether all political power can be taken, and how it should be taken, are things he does not bother about (or did not bother until the dissolution of two Dumas made him wiser). Hence, the extremely reactionary standpoint of the "peasant Cadet" Mr. Peshekhonov, who already in his *Agrarian Problem* wrote: "Just now it is far more necessary to give a definite answer on the agrarian question than, for instance, on the question of a republic" (p. 114).

And that standpoint of political imbecility (the legacy of the arch-reactionary Mr. V. V.) has, as we know, left its mark on the whole programme and tactics of the "Popular-Socialist" Party. Instead of combating the short-sightedness of the peasant who fails to see the connection between agrarian radicalism and political radicalism, the P.S.'s ("Popular Socialists") *adapt themselves* to that short-sightedness. They believe it is "more practical that way", but in reality it is the very thing which dooms the agrarian programme of the peasantry to utter failure. Needless to say, a radical political revolution is difficult, but so is an agrarian revolution; the latter is impossible apart from the former, and it is the duty of socialists not to conceal this from the peasants, not to throw a veil over it (by using rather vague, semi-Cadet phrases about the "democratic state", as is done in our agrarian programme), but to speak out, to teach the peasants that unless they go the whole way in politics it is no use thinking seriously of confiscating the landlords' land.

It is not the "ifs" that are important here in the programme. The important thing is to point out in it that the agrarian and the political changes must *correspond*. Instead of using the word "if", the same idea can be put differently: "The Party explains that the best method of taking possession of the land in bourgeois society is by abolishing private ownership of land, nationalising the land, and transferring it to the state, and that such a measure can neither be carried out nor bear real fruit without complete democratisation not only of the local institutions, but of the whole structure of the state, including the establishment of a republic, the abolition of the standing army, election of officials by the people, etc."

By failing to include that explanation in our agrarian programme we have given the people the *false* idea that confiscation of the landlords' estates is possible without the complete democratisation of the central government. We have sunk to the level of the opportunist petty bourgeoisie, i.e., the "Popular Socialists"; for in both Dumas it so happened that their programme (the Bill of the 104) as well as ours linked agrarian changes with democratisation *only of the local* institutions. Such a view is philistine

obtuseness, of which the events of June 3, 1907, and the Third Duma should have cured many people, the Social-Democrats above all.

5. A PEASANT REVOLUTION WITHOUT THE CONQUEST OF POWER BY THE PEASANTRY?

The agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy is a proletarian programme in a peasant revolution that is directed against the survivals of serfdom, against all that is medieval in our agrarian system. Theoretically, as we have seen, this thesis is accepted by the Mensheviks as well (Plekhanov's speech at Stockholm). But the Mensheviks have failed to think out that proposition and to perceive its indissoluble connection with the general principles of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian bourgeois revolution. And it is in Plekhanov's writings that this shallow thinking is most clearly revealed.

Every peasant revolution directed against medievalism, when the whole of the social economy is of a capitalist nature, is a bourgeois revolution. But not every bourgeois revolution is a peasant revolution. If, in a country where agriculture is organised on fully capitalist lines, the capitalist farmers, with the aid of the hired labourers, were to carry out an agrarian revolution by abolishing the private ownership of land, for instance, that would be a bourgeois revolution, but by no means a peasant revolution. Or if a revolution took place in a country where the agrarian system had become so integrated with the capitalist economy in general that that system could not be abolished without abolishing capitalism, and if, say, that revolution put the industrial bourgeoisie in power in place of the autocratic bureaucracy—that would be a bourgeois revolution, but by no means a peasant revolution. In other words, there can be a bourgeois country without a peasantry, and there can be a bourgeois revolution in such a country without a peasantry. A bourgeois revolution may take place in a country with a considerable peasant population and yet not be a peasant revolution; that is to say, it is a revolution which does not revolutionise the agrarian relations that especially affect the peasantry, and does not bring the peasantry to the fore as a social force that is at all

active in creating the revolution. Consequently, the general Marxist concept of "bourgeois revolution" contains certain propositions that are definitely applicable to any peasant revolution that takes place in a country of rising capitalism, but that general concept says nothing at all about whether or not a bourgeois revolution in a given country must (in the sense of objective necessity) become a peasant revolution in order to be completely victorious.

The principal source of the error in the tactical line pursued by Plekhanov and his Menshevik followers during the first period of the Russian revolution (i.e., during 1905-07) is their complete failure to understand this correlation between bourgeois revolution in general, and a peasant bourgeois revolution. The furious outcry * usually raised in Menshevik literature over the Bolsheviks' alleged failure to grasp the bourgeois character of the present revolution is merely a screen to cover the Mensheviks' own shallow thinking. As a matter of fact, not a single Social-Democrat of either group, either before or during the revolution, has ever departed from the Marxist views concerning the bourgeois nature of the revolution; only "simplifiers", those who vulgarise disagreements between the groups, could affirm the contrary. But some Marxists, namely, the Right wing, have all the time made shift with a general, abstract, stereotyped conception of the bourgeois revolution, and failed to perceive the *special feature* of the present bourgeois revolution, namely, that it is a peasant revolution. It was quite natural and inevitable for that wing of Social-Democracy to fail to understand the source of the counter-revolutionary nature of our bourgeoisie in the Russian revolution, to determine clearly which classes are capable of achieving complete victory in this revolution, and to fall into the view that in a bourgeois revolution the proletariat must support the bourgeoisie, that the bourgeoisie must be the chief actor in the bourgeois revolution, that the sweep of the revolution would be weakened if the bourgeoisie deserted it, and so on and so forth.

* In Plekhanov's *New Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness* (published by Glagolev, St. Petersburg), that outcry is positively comical. There is any amount of furious language, abuse of the Bolsheviks and posturing, but not a grain of thought.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, ever since the beginning of the revolution in the spring and summer of 1905, when the confusion of Bolshevism with boycottism, boyevism, etc., that is now so prevalent among the ignorant or stupid, was still out of the question, clearly pointed to the *source* of our tactical differences by singling out the concept of peasant revolution as one of the varieties of bourgeois revolution, and by defining the victory of the peasant revolution as "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". Since then Bolshevism won its greatest *ideological* victory in international Social-Democracy with the publication of Kautsky's article on the driving forces of the Russian revolution ("The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution", Russian translation edited and with a preface by N. Lenin, published by *Novaya Epokha* Publishers, Moscow, 1907). As is known, at the beginning of the split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in 1903, Kautsky sided with the latter. In 1907, having watched the course of the Russian revolution, on the subject of which he wrote repeatedly, he at once saw the mistake made by Plekhanov, who had sent him his famous questionnaire. In that questionnaire, Plekhanov inquired *only* about the bourgeois nature of the Russian revolution, without specifying the concept of peasant bourgeois revolution, without going beyond general formulas such as "bourgeois democracy", "bourgeois opposition parties". In answering Plekhanov Kautsky rectified that mistake by pointing out that the bourgeoisie was not the driving force of the Russian revolution, that in *that* sense the days of bourgeois revolutions had passed, that "a lasting community of interests during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle exists only between the proletariat and the peasantry" (op. cit., pp. 30-31), and that "it [this lasting community of interests] should be made the basis of the whole of the revolutionary tactics of Russian Social-Democracy" (ibid., p. 31). The *underlying principles* of Bolshevik tactics as *against* those of the Mensheviks are here clearly expressed. Plekhanov is terribly angry about this in his *New Letters*, etc. But his annoyance only makes the impotence of his argument more obvious. The crisis through which we are passing is "a bourgeois crisis for all

that", Plekhanov keeps on repeating and he calls the Bolsheviks "ignoramuses" (p. 127). That abuse is an expression of his impotent rage. Plekhanov has failed to grasp the difference between a peasant bourgeois revolution and a non-peasant bourgeois revolution. By saying that Kautsky "exaggerates the speed of development of our peasant" (p. 131), and that "the difference of opinion between us [between Plekhanov and Kautsky] can only be one of nuances" (p. 131), etc., Plekhanov resorts to the most miserable and cowardly shuffling, for anyone at all capable of thinking can see that the very opposite is the case. It is not a question of "nuances" or of the speed of development, or of the "seizure" of power that Plekhanov shouts about, but of the *basic* view as to which *classes* are capable of being the driving force of the Russian revolution. Voluntarily or involuntarily, Plekhanov and the Mensheviks are *inevitably* falling into a position of opportunist support to the bourgeoisie, for they fail to grasp the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie in a peasant bourgeois revolution. The Bolsheviks from the outset defined the general and the basic class conditions for the victory of this revolution as the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Kautsky arrived at substantially the same view in his article, "The Driving Forces", etc., and he repeated it in the *second* edition of his *Social Revolution*, in which he says: "It [the victory of Russian Social-Democracy in the near future] can only come as the result of a coalition [*einer Koalition*] between the proletariat and the peasantry." (*Die soziale Revolution*, von K. Kautsky, Zweite Auflage. Berlin, 1907, S. 62.) (Space does not permit us to deal with another addition Kautsky made to the second edition, in which he sums up the lessons of December 1905, a summing up which differs *radically* from Menshevism.)

Thus we see that Plekhanov completely evaded the question of the *underlying principles* of the general Social-Democratic tactics in a bourgeois revolution that can be victorious only as a peasant revolution. What I said at Stockholm (April 1906) * about Plekhanov having reduced Menshevism to absurdity by repudiating the conquest of power

* See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 283.—*Ed.*

by the peasantry in a peasant revolution has been completely borne out in subsequent literature. And that fundamental error in the tactical line was bound to affect the Mensheviks' agrarian programme. As I have repeatedly pointed out above, municipalisation does not in either the economic or the political sphere fully express the conditions of a real victory of the peasant revolution, for the real conquest of power by the proletariat and the peasantry. In the economic sphere, such a victory is incompatible with the perpetuation of the old system of allotment landownership; in the political sphere, it is incompatible with mere regional democracy and incomplete democracy in the central government.

6. IS LAND NATIONALISATION A SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE METHOD?

Comrade John said at Stockholm (p. 111 of the Minutes) that the "draft providing for land municipalisation is more acceptable, because it is more flexible: it takes into account the diversity of economic conditions, and it can be carried out in the process of the revolution itself". I have already pointed out the cardinal defect of municipalisation in this respect: it rivets allotment ownership to the property form. Nationalisation is incomparably more flexible in this respect, because it makes it much easier to organise new farms on the "unfenced" land. Here it is also necessary to refer briefly to other, minor arguments that John raised.

"The division of the land," says John, "would in some places revive the old agrarian relations. In some regions the distribution would be as much as 200 dessiatins per household, so that in the Urals, for instance, we would create a class of new landlords." That is a sample of an argument which denounces its own system! And it was that kind of argument that decided the issue at the Menshevik Congress! It is municipalisation, and it alone, that is guilty of the sin referred to here, for it alone rivets the land to individual regions. It is not the division of land that is to blame, as John thinks, thus falling into a ridiculous logical error, but the provincialism of the municipalisers. In any case, according to the Menshevik programme, the mu-

nicipalised lands in the Urals would remain the "property" of the people of the Urals. That would mean the creation of a *new*, reactionary, Cossack stratum—reactionary because privileged small farmers having ten times more land than all the rest of the farmers could not but resist the peasant revolution, and could not but defend the privileges of private landownership. It only remains for us to assume that on the basis of that same programme, the "democratic state" might declare the tens of millions of dessiatins of Ural forests to be "forests of national importance", or "colonisation lands" (does not the Cadet Kaufman apply that term to the forest land in the Urals, within the 25 per cent limit, which means 21,000,000 dessiatins in the Vyatka, Ufa, and Perm gubernias?), and on that ground become their "owner". Not flexibility, but confusion, pure and simple, is the distinguishing feature of municipalisation.

Now let us see what carrying out municipalisation in the very process of the revolution means. Here we meet with attacks on my "revolutionary peasant committees" as a class institution. "We are for non-class institutions," the Mensheviks argued at Stockholm, playing at liberalism. Cheap liberalism! It did not occur to our Mensheviks that in order to introduce local self-government of a non-class character it is necessary to defeat the privileged class against which the struggle is being waged and to wrest the power from it. It is just "in the very process of the revolution", as John puts it, i. e., in the course of the struggle to drive out the landlords, in the course of those "*revolutionary actions of the peasantry*" that are mentioned also in the Mensheviks' resolution on tactics, that peasant committees can be set up. The introduction of local self-government of a non-class character is provided for in our political programme; it is bound to be established as the organisation of *administration* after the victory, when the whole of the population will have been compelled to accept the new order. If the words of our programme about "supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including the confiscation of the landlords' lands" is not mere phrase-mongering, then we must think about organising the masses *for those "actions"*! Yet that is entirely overlooked in the Menshevik programme. That programme is so

drawn up as to be easily and wholly converted into a parliamentary Bill, like the Bills proposed by the bourgeois parties, which either (like the Cadets) hate all "actions", or opportunistically shirk the task of systematically assisting and organising such actions (like the Popular Socialists). But a programme built on such lines is unworthy of a workers' party which speaks of a peasant agrarian revolution, a party which pursues the aim not of reassuring the big bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (like the Cadets), not of reassuring the petty bourgeoisie (like the Popular Socialists), but exclusively of developing the consciousness and initiative of the broad masses in the course of their struggle against feudal Russia.

Recall, if only in general outline, the innumerable "revolutionary actions" of the peasantry which took place in Russia in the spring of 1905, in the autumn of 1905, and in the spring of 1906. Do we pledge our support to such actions or not? If not, then our programme would not be telling the truth. If we do, then obviously our programme *fails to give* directives about the organisation of *such* actions. Such actions can be organised only on the spot where the struggle is going on; the organisation can be created only by the masses who are directly taking part in the struggle, i. e., the organisation must definitely be of the peasant committee type. To wait for big, regional self-governing bodies to be set up during such actions would be ridiculous. The extension of the power and influence of the victorious local committees to adjacent villages, uyezds, gubernias, towns, areas, *and to the entire country* is, of course, desirable and essential. There can be no objection to the need for such an extension being indicated in the programme, but that should certainly not be confined to regions, it should embrace the central government as well. That in the first place. Secondly, in that case we must not speak about *local self-governing bodies*, since that term points to the *dependence* of the local governing organisations upon the *structure* of the state. "Local self-government" operates according to the rules laid down by the central authority, and within the limits set by the latter. The organisations of the fighting people of which we are speaking must be quite independent of all the institutions of the old regime, they

must fight for a new state structure, they must serve as the instrument of the full power of the people (or the sovereignty of the people), and as the means for securing it.

In short, from the standpoint of the "very process of the revolution", the Menshevik programme is unsatisfactory in all respects. It reflects the confusion of Menshevik ideas on the question of the provisional government, etc.

7. MUNICIPALISATION OF THE LAND AND MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM

These two terms were made equivalent by the Mensheviks themselves, who secured the adoption of the agrarian programme at Stockholm. We need only mention the names of two prominent Mensheviks, Kostrov and Larin. "Some comrades," said Kostrov at Stockholm, "seem to be hearing about municipal ownership for the first time. Let me remind them that in Western Europe there is a whole political trend [!precisely!] called 'municipal socialism' [England], which advocates the extension of ownership by urban and rural municipalities, and which is also supported by our comrades. Many municipalities own real estate, and that does not contradict our programme. We now have the possibility of acquiring [!] real estate for the municipalities gratis [!!] and we should take advantage of it. Of course, the confiscated land should be municipalised" (p. 88).

The naïve idea about "the possibility of acquiring property gratis" is magnificently expressed here. But in citing the example of this municipal socialism "trend" as a special trend mainly characteristic of England, the speaker did not stop to think why this is an *extremely opportunist* trend. Why did Engels, in his letters to Sorge describing this extreme intellectual opportunism of the English Fabians, emphasise the petty-bourgeois nature of their "municipalisation" schemes?"

Larin, in unison with Kostrov, says in his comments on the Menshevik programme: "Perhaps in some areas the people's local self-governing bodies will themselves be able to run these large estates, as the horse tramways or slaughter-houses are run by municipal councils, and then all [!!] the profits obtained from them will be placed at the disposal

of the whole [!] population" *—and not of the local bourgeoisie, my dear Larin?

The philistine illusions of the philistine heroes of West-European municipal socialism are already making themselves felt. The fact that the bourgeoisie is in power is forgotten; so also is the fact that only in towns with a high percentage of *proletarian* population is it possible to obtain for the working people some crumbs of benefit from municipal government! But all this is by the way. The principal fallacy of the "municipal socialism" idea of municipalising the land lies in the following.

The bourgeois intelligentsia of the West, like the English Fabians, elevate municipal socialism to a special "trend" precisely because it dreams of social peace, of class conciliation, and seeks to divert public attention away from the fundamental questions of the economic system as a whole, and of the state *structure* as a whole, to minor questions of *local self-government*. In the sphere of questions in the first category, the class antagonisms stand out most sharply; that is the sphere which, as we have shown, affects the very foundations of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Hence it is in that sphere that the philistine, reactionary utopia of bringing about socialism piecemeal is particularly hopeless. Attention is diverted to the sphere of minor local questions, being directed not to the question of the class rule of the bourgeoisie, nor to the question of the chief instruments of that rule, but to the question of distributing the *crumbs* thrown by the rich bourgeoisie for the "*needs of the population*". Naturally, since attention is focused on such questions as the spending of paltry sums (in comparison with the total surplus value and total state expenditure of the bourgeoisie), which the *bourgeoisie itself is willing* to set aside for public health (Engels pointed out in *The Housing Question* that the bourgeoisie itself is afraid of the spread of epidemic diseases in the towns¹¹²), or for education (the bourgeoisie must have trained workers able to adapt themselves to a high technical level!), and so on, it is possible, in the sphere of *such minor* questions, to hold

* *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 66.

forth about "social peace", about the harmfulness of the class struggle, and so on. What class struggle can there be if the bourgeoisie itself is spending money on the "needs of the population", on public health, on education? What need is there for a social revolution if it is possible through the local self-governing bodies, gradually, step by step, to extend "collective ownership", and "socialise" production: the horse tramways, the slaughter-houses referred to so relevantly by the worthy Y. Larin?

The philistine opportunism of that "trend" lies in the fact that people forget the *narrow limits* of so-called "municipal socialism" (in reality, municipal capitalism, as the English Social-Democrats properly point out in their controversies with the Fabians). They forget that so long as the bourgeoisie rules as a class it cannot allow any encroachment, even from the "municipal" point of view, upon the real *foundations* of its rule; that if the bourgeoisie allows, tolerates, "municipal socialism", it is because the latter does not touch the *foundations* of its rule, does not interfere with the *important* sources of its wealth, but extends only to the narrow sphere of local expenditure, which the bourgeoisie itself *allows* the "population" to manage. It does not need more than a slight acquaintance with "municipal socialism" in the West to know that any attempt on the part of *socialist* municipalities to go a little beyond the boundaries of their normal, i. e., minor, potty activities, which give no *substantial* relief to the workers, any attempt to meddle with *capital*, is invariably vetoed in the most emphatic manner by the central authorities of the bourgeois state.

And it is this fundamental mistake, this philistine opportunism of the West-European Fabians, Possibilists, and Bernsteinians that is taken over by our advocates of municipalisation.

"Municipal socialism" means socialism in matters of *local government*. Anything that goes beyond the limits of *local* interests, beyond the limits of state *administration*, i. e., anything that affects the main sources of revenue of the ruling classes and the principal means of securing their rule, anything that affects not the administration of the state, but the *structure* of the state, *thereby goes beyond*

the sphere of "municipal socialism". But our wiseacres evade this acute national issue, this question of the land, which affects the vital interests of the ruling classes in the most direct way, by *relegating* it to the sphere of "local government questions". In the West they municipalise horse trams and slaughter-houses, so why should we not municipalise the best half of all the land?—argues the Russian petty intellectual. That would serve both in the event of restoration and in the event of incomplete democratisation of the central government!

And so we get agrarian socialism in a bourgeois revolution, a socialism of the most petty-bourgeois kind, one that counts on *blunting* the class struggle on *vital* issues by *relegating* the latter to the domain of petty questions affecting only local government. In fact, the question of the disposal of one half of the best land in the country is neither a local question nor a question of administration. It is a question that affects the whole state, a question of the structure, not only of the landlord, but of the bourgeois state. And to try to entice the people with the idea that "municipal socialism" can be developed in agriculture before the socialist revolution is accomplished is to practise the most inadmissible kind of demagogery. Marxism permits nationalisation to be included in the programme of a bourgeois revolution because nationalisation is a bourgeois measure, because absolute rent hinders the development of capitalism; private ownership of the land is a hindrance to capitalism. But to include the municipalisation of the big estates in the programme of the bourgeois revolution, Marxism must be remodelled into Fabian intellectualist opportunism.

It is here that we see the difference between petty-bourgeois and proletarian methods in the bourgeois revolution. The petty bourgeoisie, even the most radical—our Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries included—anticipates that *after* the bourgeois revolution there will be no class struggle, but universal prosperity and peace. Therefore, it "builds its nest" in advance, it introduces plans for petty-bourgeois reforms in the bourgeois revolution, talks about various "norms" and "regulations" with regard to landownership, about strengthening the labour principle and small farming,

etc. The petty-bourgeois method is the method of building up relations making for the greatest possible degree of social peace. The proletarian method is *exclusively* that of clearing the path of all that is medieval, clearing it for the *class struggle*. Therefore, the proletarian can leave it to the small proprietors to discuss "norms" of landownership; the proletarian is interested only in the abolition of the landlord latifundia, the abolition of private ownership of land, that *last* barrier to the class struggle in agriculture. In the bourgeois revolution we are interested not in petty-bourgeois reformism, not in a future "nest" of tranquillised small farmers, but in the conditions for the proletarian struggle against all petty-bourgeois tranquillity on a bourgeois basis.

It is this anti-proletarian spirit that municipalisation introduces into the programme of the *bourgeois* agrarian revolution; for, despite the deeply fallacious opinion of the Mensheviks, municipalisation does not extend and sharpen the class struggle, but, on the contrary, *blunts* it. It blunts it, too, by assuming that local democracy is possible without the complete democratisation of the centre. It also blunts it with the idea of "municipal socialism", because the latter is *conceivable* in bourgeois society only *away from* the high road of the struggle, only in minor, local, unimportant questions on which *even* the bourgeoisie may yield, may reconcile itself to without losing the possibility of preserving its class rule.

The working class must give bourgeois society the purest, most consistent and most thorough-going programme of bourgeois revolution, including the bourgeois nationalisation of the land. The proletariat scornfully rejects petty-bourgeois reformism in the bourgeois revolution; we are interested in freedom for the struggle, not in freedom for philistine bliss.

Naturally, the opportunism of the intelligentsia in the workers' party takes a different line. Instead of the broad revolutionary programme of bourgeois revolution, attention is focused on a petty-bourgeois utopia: to secure local democracy with incomplete democratisation at the centre, to secure for petty reformism a little corner of municipal activity away from great "turmoil", and to evade the extra-

ordinarily acute conflict over the land by following the recipe of the anti-Semites, i. e., by relegating an important national issue to the domain of petty, local questions.

8. SOME EXAMPLES OF THE MUDDLE CAUSED BY MUNICIPALISATION

What confusion the "municipalisation" programme has created in the minds of Social-Democrats and to what a helpless position it has reduced our propagandists and agitators can be seen from the following curious cases.

Y. Larin is undoubtedly a prominent and well-known figure in Menshevik literature. In Stockholm, as can be seen from the Minutes, he took a most active part in securing the adoption of the programme. His pamphlet, *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*, which was included in the series of pamphlets published by *Novy Mir*, is almost an official commentary on the Menshevik programme. And here is what this commentator writes. In the concluding pages of his pamphlet he sums up the question of agrarian reform. He foresees three kinds of outcome of these reforms: (1) additional allotments to the peasants as their private property, subject to compensation—"the most unfavourable outcome for the working class, for the lower strata of the peasantry and for the whole development of the national economy" (p. 103). The second outcome is the best, and the third, although unlikely, is "a paper declaration of compulsory equalised land tenure". One would have thought that we had the right to expect that an advocate of the municipalisation programme would have made municipalisation the second outcome. But no! Listen to this:

"Perhaps all the confiscated land, or even all the land in general, will be declared the property of the state as a whole and will be turned over to the local self-governing bodies to be distributed gratis [??] for the use of all who are actually cultivating it, without, of course, the compulsory introduction throughout the whole of Russia of equalised land tenure, and without prohibiting the employment of hired labour. Such a solution of the problem, as we have seen, best secures the immediate interests of the proletariat as well as the general interests of the socialist movement, and will help to increase the productivity of labour, which is the fundamental, vital question for Russia. Therefore, the Social-Democrats should advocate and carry out an

agrarian reform [?] precisely of that character. It will be achieved when, at the highest point of development of the revolution, the conscious elements of social development are strong" (p. 103. Our italics).

If Y. Larin or other Mensheviks believe this to be an exposition of the municipalisation programme, they are labouring under a tragicomical illusion. The transfer of *all* the land to state ownership is *nationalisation of the land*, and we cannot conceive of the land being disposed of otherwise than through local self-governing bodies acting within the limits of a general state law. To such a programme—not of "reform", of course, but of revolution—I wholeheartedly subscribe, except for the point about distributing the land "gratis" even to those farmers who employ hired labour. To promise such a thing on behalf of bourgeois society is more fitting for an anti-Semite than for a Social-Democrat. No Marxist can assume the possibility of such an outcome within the framework of capitalist development; nor is there any reason for considering it desirable to transfer rent to capitalist farmers. Nevertheless, except for this point, which was probably a slip of the pen, it remains an indubitable fact that in a popular Menshevik pamphlet the *nationalisation of the land* is advocated as the best outcome at the highest point of development of the revolution.

On the question of what is to be done with the privately owned lands, Larin has this to say:

"As regards the privately owned lands occupied by big, efficient capitalist farms, Social-Democrats do not propose the confiscation of such lands for the purpose of dividing them among the small farmers. While the average yield of small peasant farming, either on privately owned or rented land, does not reach 30 poods per dessiatin, the average yield of capitalist agriculture in Russia is over 50 poods" (p. 64).

In saying this, Larin in effect throws overboard the idea of a *peasant agrarian revolution*, for his average figures of crop yields appertain to *all* the landlord lands. If we do not believe in the possibility of achieving a wider and more rapid increase in the productivity of labour on small farms after they have been freed from the yoke of serfdom, then all talk about "supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, including the confiscation of the land from the landlords", is meaningless. Besides, Larin forgets

that on the question of "the purpose for which Social-Democrats propose the confiscation of capitalist estates", there is the decision of the Stockholm Congress.

It was Comrade Strumilin who, at the Stockholm Congress, moved an amendment to insert after the words: economic development (in the resolution), the following: "insisting, therefore, that the confiscated big capitalist farms should continue to be exploited on capitalist lines in the interests of the whole of the people, and under conditions that best meet the needs of the agricultural proletariat" (p. 157). This amendment was rejected *almost unanimously*, it received only *one* vote (*ibid.*).

Nevertheless, propaganda is being carried on among the masses that ignores the decision of the Congress! The retention of private ownership of allotment land makes municipalisation such a confusing thing, that commentaries on the programme cannot help running counter to the decision of the Congress.

Kautsky, who has been so frequently and unfairly quoted in favour of one or the other programme (unfairly because he has categorically declined to express a definite view on the question and has confined himself to explaining certain general truths), Kautsky, who, curiously enough, was even cited as being in favour of municipalisation, wrote, it turns out, to M. Shanin in April 1906 as follows:

"Evidently, by municipalisation I meant something different from what you, and perhaps Maslov, mean. What I meant was the following: the big landed estates will be confiscated and large-scale agriculture will be continued upon such land, either by the municipalities [!] or by larger organisations, or else the land will be rented out to producers' associations. I do not know whether that is possible in Russia or whether it would be acceptable to the peasants. Nor do I say that we should demand it, but if the demand is raised by others, I think we could easily agree to it. It would be an interesting experiment."*

* M. Shanin, *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property*, Vilna, 1907, p. 4. M. Shanin rightly expresses doubt whether Kautsky may be counted among the supporters of municipalisation and protests against the Mensheviks' self-advertisement (in the Menshevik *Pravda*, *** 1906) in regard to Kautsky. Kautsky himself, in a letter published by Maslov, bluntly says: "We may leave it to the peasants to decide the forms of property to be adopted on the land confiscated from the big landowners. I would consider it a mistake to impose any-

These quotations should suffice to show how those who were, or are, fully in sympathy with the Stockholm programme, are *destroying* it by the way they interpret it. The fault here lies in the hopeless muddle in the programme; in theory it is bound up with the repudiation of Marx's theory of rent, in practice it is an adaptation to the impossible "middle" event of local democracy under a non-democratic central government, and in economics it amounts to introducing petty-bourgeois, quasi-socialist reformism into the programme of the bourgeois revolution.

CHAPTER V

CLASSES AND PARTIES IN THE DEBATE ON THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE SECOND DUMA

We think it will be useful to approach the question of the workers' party's agrarian programme in the Russian bourgeois revolution from another and somewhat different angle. The analysis of the economic conditions for the revolution and of the political arguments in favour of this or that programme should be supplemented by a picture of the struggle between the different classes and parties that will as far as possible embrace all the interests and place them in direct contrast to one another. Only such a picture can give us an idea of the thing we are discussing (the struggle for the land in the Russian revolution) *as a whole*, excluding the one-sided and accidental character of individual opinions, and testing theoretical conclusions by the practical intuition of the persons concerned. As individuals, any representatives of parties and classes may err, but when they come out in the public arena, before the entire population, the individual errors are inevitably rectified by the corresponding groups or classes that are interested in the struggle. Classes do not err; on the whole, they decide their interests and political aims in conformity

thing on them in that respect" (p. 16, *The Question of the Agrarian Programme*, by Maslov and Kautsky. *Novy Mir* Publishers, Moscow, 1906). This quite definite statement by Kautsky certainly excludes municipalisation of the land, which the Mensheviks want to impose on the peasants.

with the conditions of the struggle and with the conditions of social evolution.

Excellent material for drawing such a picture is provided by the Stenographic Records of the two Dumas. We shall take the Second Duma because it undoubtedly reflects the struggle of classes in the Russian revolution more fully and with greater maturity: the Second Duma elections were not boycotted by any influential party. The political grouping of the deputies in the Second Duma was much more definite, the various Duma groups were more united and more closely connected with their respective parties. The experience of the First Duma had already provided considerable material which helped all the parties to elaborate a more thought-out policy. For all these reasons it is preferable to take the Second Duma. We shall refer to the debate in the First Duma only in order to supplement, or clarify, statements made in the Second Duma.

To obtain a full and accurate picture of the struggle between the different classes and parties during the debate in the Second Duma we shall have to deal separately with each important and specific Duma group and characterise it with the aid of excerpts from the principal speeches delivered on the chief points of the agrarian question. As it is impossible and unnecessary to quote all the minor speakers, we shall mention only those who contributed something new, or threw noteworthy light on some aspect of the question.

The main groups of Duma deputies that stood out clearly in the debates on the agrarian question were the following: (1) the Rights and the Octobrists—as we shall see, no essential difference between them was shown in the Second Duma; (2) the Cadets; (3) the Right and Octobrist peasants, standing, as we shall see, to the Left of the Cadets; (4) the non-party peasants; (5) the Narodniks, or Trudovik intellectuals, standing somewhat to the Right of (6) the Trudovik peasants; then come (7) the Socialist-Revolutionaries; (8) the “nationals”, representing the non-Russian nationalities, and (9) the Social-Democrats. We shall mention the government's position in connection with the Duma group with which the government is essentially in agreement.

I. THE RIGHTS AND THE OCTOBRISTS

The stand taken by the Rights on the agrarian question was undoubtedly best expressed by Count Bobrinsky in the speech he delivered on March 29, 1907 (18th session of the Second Duma). In a dispute with the Left-wing priest Tikhvinsky about the Holy Scriptures and their commandments to obey the powers that be, and recalling "the cleanest and brightest page in Russian history" (1289) *—the emancipation of the serfs (we shall deal with this later on)—the count approached the agrarian question "with open visor". "About 100 or 150 years ago the peasants, nearly everywhere in Western Europe, were as poverty-stricken, degraded, and ignorant as our peasants are today. They had the same village communes as we have in Russia, with division of land per head, that typical survival of the feudal system" (1293). Today, continued the speaker, the peasants in Western Europe are well off. The question is, what miracle transformed "the poverty-stricken, degraded peasant into a prosperous and useful citizen who has respect for himself and for others"? "There can be only one answer: that miracle was performed by individual peasant ownership, the form of ownership that is so detested here, on the Left, but which we, on the Right, will defend with all the strength of our minds, with all the strength of our earnest convictions, for we know that in ownership lie the strength and future of Russia" (1294). "Since the middle of last century agronomic chemistry has made wonderful... discoveries in plant nutrition, and the peasants abroad—small owners equally [??] with big ones—have succeeded in utilising these scientific discoveries, and by employing artificial fertilisers have achieved a still further increase in crop yield; and today, when our splendid black earth yields only 30 to 35 poods of grain, and sometimes not even enough for seed, the peasants abroad, year after year, get an average yield ranging from 70 to 120 poods, depending on the country and climatic conditions. Here you have the solution of the agrarian problem. This is no dream, no

*. Here and elsewhere the figures indicate the pages of Stenographic Record.

fantasy. It is an instructive historical example. And the Russian peasant will not follow in the footsteps of Pugachov and Stenka Razin¹²⁴ with the cry '*saryn na kichku!*'¹²⁵ [Don't be too sure of that, Count!] He will follow the only true road, the road that was taken by all the civilised nations, the road taken by his neighbours in Western Europe, and, lastly, the road taken by our Polish brothers, by the West-Russian peasants, who have already realised how disastrous is the commune and homestead strip system of ownership, and in some places have already begun to introduce the *khutor* system" (1296). Count Bobrinsky goes on to say, and rightly, that "this road was indicated in 1861, when the peasants were freed from serf dependence". He advises the government not to grudge "tens of millions" for the purpose of "creating a well-to-do class of peasant-proprietors". He declares: "This, gentlemen, in general outline, is our agrarian programme. It is not a programme of election and propaganda promises. It is not a programme for breaking up the existing social and juridical norms [it is a programme for forcibly getting rid of millions of peasants]; it is not a programme of dangerous fantasies, it is a quite practicable programme [that is still open to question] and one that has been well-tried [what is true is true]. And it is high time to abandon dreams about some sort of economic exceptionalism of the Russian nation.... But how are we to explain the fact that quite impracticable Bills, like that of the Trudovik Group and that of the Party of People's Freedom, have been introduced in a serious legislative assembly? No parliament in the world has ever heard of all the land being taken over by the state, or of the land being taken from Paul and given to Peter.... The appearance of these Bills is the result of bewilderment" (a fine explanation!).... "And so, Russian peasants, you have to choose between two roads: one road is broad and looks easy—that is the road of usurpation and compulsory alienation, for which calls have been made here. That road is attractive at first, it runs downhill, but it ends in a precipice [for the landlords?], and spells ruin to the peasantry and the entire state. The other road is narrow and thorny, and runs uphill, but it leads to the summits of truth, right, and lasting prosperity" (1299).

As the reader sees, this is the government's programme. This is exactly what Stolypin is accomplishing with his famous agrarian legislation under Article 87. Purishkevich formulated the same programme in his agrarian theses (20th session, April 2, 1907, pp. 1532-33). The same programme was advocated, part by part, by the Octobrists, beginning with Svyatopolk-Mirsky on the first day of the debates on the agrarian question (March 19), and ending with Kapustin ("the peasants need landownership and not land tenure, as is proposed"—24th session, April 9, 1907, p. 1805, speech by Kapustin, applauded by the Right "and part of the Centre").

In the programme of the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists there is not even a hint about defending pre-capitalist forms of farming, as, for example, by vaunting patriarchal agriculture, and so forth. Defence of the village commune, which until quite recently had ardent champions among the higher bureaucracy and the landlords, has given place to bitter hostility towards it. The Black Hundreds fully take the stand of capitalist development and definitely depict a programme that is economically progressive, European; this needs to be specially emphasised, because a vulgar and simplified view of the nature of the reactionary policy of the landlords is very widespread among us. The liberals often depict the Black Hundreds as clowns and fools, but it must be said that this description is far more applicable to the Cadets. Our reactionaries, however, are distinguished by their extremely pronounced class-consciousness. They know perfectly well what they want, where they are going, and on what forces they can count. They do not betray a shadow of half-heartedness or irresolution (at all events in the Second Duma; in the First there was "bewilderment"—among the Bobrinskys!). They are clearly seen to be connected with a very definite class, which is accustomed to command, which *correctly* judges the conditions necessary for preserving its rule in a *capitalist* environment, and brazenly defends its interests even if that entails the rapid extinction, degradation, and eviction of millions of peasants. The Black-Hundred programme is reactionary not because it seeks to perpetuate any pre-capitalist relations or system (in that respect all the par-

ties of the period of the Second Duma already, in essence, take the stand of recognising capitalism, of taking it for granted), but because it stands for the *Junker* type of capitalist development *in order* to strengthen the power and to increase the incomes of the landlords, in order to place the edifice of autocracy upon a new and stronger foundation. There is no contradiction between what these gentlemen say and what they do; our reactionaries, too, are "businessmen", as Lassalle said of the German reactionaries in contrast to the liberals.

What is the attitude of these people towards the idea of nationalising the land? Towards, say, the partial nationalisation with compensation demanded by the Cadets in the First Duma, leaving, like the Mensheviks, private ownership of small holdings and creating a state land reserve out of the rest of the land? Did they not perceive in the nationalisation idea the possibility of strengthening the bureaucracy, of consolidating the central bourgeois government against the proletariat, of restoring "state feudalism" and the "Chinese experiment"?

On the contrary, every hint at nationalisation of the land infuriates them, and they fight it in such a way that one would think they had borrowed their arguments from Plekhanov. Take the nobleman Vetchinin, a Right landlord. "I think," he said at the 39th session on May 16, 1907, "that the question of compulsory alienation must be decided in the negative sense from the point of view of the law. The advocates of that opinion forget that the violation of the rights of private owners is characteristic of states that are at a low stage of social and political development. It is sufficient to recall the Muscovy period, when the tsar often took land away from private owners and later granted it to his favourites and to the monasteries. What did that attitude of the government lead to? The consequences were frightful" (619).

Such was the use made of Plekhanov's "restoration of Muscovy Rus"! Nor is Vetchinin the only one to harp on this string. In the First Duma, the landlord N. Lvov, who was elected as a Cadet and then went over to the Right, and after the dissolution of the First Duma negotiated with Stolypin for a place in the Ministry—that personage

put the question in exactly the same way. "The astonishing thing about the Bill of the 42," he said concerning the Bill that the Cadets introduced in the First Duma, "is that it bears the impress of the same old bureaucratic despotism which seeks to put everything on an equal level" (12th session, May 19, 1906, pp. 479-80). He, quite in the spirit of Maslov, "stood up for" the non-Russian nationalities: "How are we to subordinate to it [equalisation] the whole of Russia, including Little Russia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Baltic region?" (479.) "In St. Petersburg," he warned, "you will have to set up a gigantic Land Office... and maintain a staff of officials in every corner of the country" (480).

These outcries about bureaucracy and serfdom in connection with nationalisation—these outcries of our municipalisers, inappropriately copied from the German model—are the dominant note in all the speeches of the Right. The Octobrist Shidlovsky, for example, opposing compulsory alienation, accuses the Cadets of advocating "attachment to the land" (12th session of the Second Duma, March 19, 1907, p. 752). Shulgin howls about property being inviolate, about compulsory alienation being "the grave of culture and civilisation" (16th session, March 26, 1907, p. 1133). Shulgin refers—he might have been quoting from Plekhanov's *Diary*,¹⁵⁶ though he does not say so—to twelfth-century China, to the deplorable result of the Chinese experiment in nationalisation (p. 1137). Here is Skirmunt in the First Duma: The state will be the owner! "A blessing, an El Dorado for the bureaucracy" (10th session, May 16, 1906, p. 410). Here is the Octobrist Tantsov, exclaiming in the Second Duma: "With far greater justification, these reproaches [about serfdom] can be flung back to the Left and to the Centre. What do these Bills hold out for the peasants in reality if not the prospect of being tied to the land, if not the old serfdom, only in a different form, in which the place of the landlord will be taken by usurers and government officials" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 653).

Of course, the hypocrisy of these outcries about bureaucracy is most glaring, for the excellent idea of setting up local land committees to be elected by universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot was advanced by the very

peasants who are demanding nationalisation. But the Black-Hundred landlords are *compelled* to seize on every possible argument against nationalisation. Their class instinct tells them that nationalisation in twentieth-century Russia is inseparably bound up with a peasant republic. In other countries, where, owing to objective conditions, there cannot be a peasant agrarian revolution, the situation is, of course, different—for example, in Germany, where the Kauitzes can sympathise with plans for nationalisation, where the socialists will not even hear of nationalisation, where the bourgeois movement for nationalisation is limited to intellectualist sectarianism. To combat the peasant revolution the *Rights* had to come before the peasants in the role of champions of *peasant ownership* as against nationalisation. We have seen one example in the case of Bobrinsky. Here is another—Vetchinin: “This question [of nationalising the land] must, of course, be settled in the negative sense, for it finds no sympathy even among the peasants; they want to have land by right of ownership and not by right of tenancy” (39th session, p. 621). Only landlords and cabinet ministers could speak *for* the peasants in *that* manner. This fact is so well known that I regard it as superfluous to quote the speeches of the Gurkos, Stolypins, and other such heroes, who ardently champion private ownership.

The only exception among the Rights is the Terek Cossack Karaulov, whom we have already mentioned.* Agreeing partly also with the Cadet Shingaryov, Karaulov said that the Cossack troops are a “huge agrarian commune” (1363), that “it is better to abolish private ownership of the land” than to abolish the village communes, and he advocated the “extensive municipalisation of the land, to be converted into the property of the respective regions” (1367). At the same time he complained about the pinpricks of the bureaucracy. “We are not the masters of our own property,” he said (1368). With the significance of these Cossack sympathies for municipalisation we have already dealt above.

* See p. 336 of this volume.—*Ed.*

2. THE CADETS

Like all the parties, the Cadets came out in their true colours in the Second Duma. They "found themselves" by occupying the Centre and criticising the Rights and the Lefts from the "state point of view". They revealed their counter-revolutionary nature by an obvious turn to the Right. How did they mark that turn on the agrarian question? They marked it by finally throwing overboard the last remnants of the idea of land nationalisation, by completely abandoning the plan for a "state land reserve" and by supporting the idea of making the land the peasants' *property*. Yes, conditions in the Russian revolution have become such that turning to the Right means turning towards the private ownership of land!

Ex-minister Kutler, the Cadet Party's official spokesman on the agrarian question, at once proceeded to criticise the Left (12th session, March 19, 1907). "Since nobody proposes to abolish property in general," exclaimed that worthy colleague of Witte and Durnovo, "it is necessary with all emphasis to recognise the existence of landed property" (737). This argument fully coincides with that of the Black Hundreds. The Black-Hundred spokesman, Krupensky, like the Cadet Kutler, shouted: "If you are going to divide, divide everything" (784).

Like a true bureaucrat, Kutler dealt in particular detail with the question of different norms of "allotment" to the peasants. Not backed by any compact class, this liberal intellectual and bureaucrat playing at liberalism *evades* the question of *how much* land the landlords have and how much *can* be taken. He prefers to talk about "norms" in order, on the pretext of raising the question to the state level, *to obscure the issue*, to conceal the fact that the Cadets propose that landlord economy be *retained*. "Even the government," said Mr. Kutler, "has taken the path of extending peasant land tenure" (734), so there is nothing infeasible about the Cadets' proposal, which is of the same bureaucratic type! By insisting on what is practical and feasible, this Cadet, of course, throws a veil over the fact that his criterion is whether it is possible to secure the landlords' consent, in other words, to adapt his plan

to their interests, *to pander to the Black Hundreds* under the guise of a lofty striving for the conciliation of classes. "I think, gentlemen," said Kutler, "that it is possible to envisage the political conditions under which a Bill for the nationalisation of the land could acquire the force of law, but I cannot envisage in the immediate future the political conditions under which that law could really be put into effect" (733). To put it bluntly, it is possible to envisage the overthrow of the rule of the Black-Hundred landlords, but I cannot envisage that and, therefore, I adapt myself to this rule.

Urging that peasant ownership of land is preferable to the Trudoviks' plan in general, and to "equalised tenure" in particular, Mr. Kutler argued as follows: "If for this purpose [equalising holdings] special officials are appointed, it will mean the introduction of an incredible despotism, an interference in the lives of the people such as we have never known before. Of course, it is proposed to place this matter in the hands of local self-governing bodies, in the hands of persons elected by the people themselves; but can it be taken that the people will be fully guaranteed against the tyranny of these persons, that these persons will always act in the interests of the people, and that the latter will suffer no hardship? I think that the peasants who are present here know that very often their own elected representatives, their volost and village elders, oppress the people as much as the government officials do" (740). Can one conceive of hypocrisy more revolting than that? The Cadets themselves propose the setting up of land committees on which the landlords will predominate (equal representation for landlords and peasants, the chairman to be a government official or a landlord), but the peasants are warned of the danger of despotism and tyranny on the part of those whom they themselves elect! Only shameless political charlatans can argue *like this* against equalised holdings, for they have neither the principles of socialism (adhered to by the Social-Democrats, who maintain that equalisation is impossible, but wholly support the election of local committees), nor the principles of the landlords who maintain that private property is the only salvation (adhered to by the Bobrinskys).

Unlike either the Right or the Left, the plan of the Cadets is characterised not by what they say, but what they keep quiet about, viz., their proposal for the composition of the land committees, which are to *compel* the peasants to accept a "second emancipation", i.e., to take poor plots at an exorbitant price. To obscure the *crux* of the matter, the Cadets in the Second Duma (as in the First) resort to downright chicanery. Take Mr. Shingaryov. He poses as a progressive, repeats the current liberal catchwords against the Right and, as is the fashion, bewails violence and anarchy, for which France "paid with a century of severe upheavals" (1355). But see how he dodges the question of the land-surveying committees:

"On the question of the land-surveying committees," he says, "we were opposed by Deputy Yevreinov.* I do not know [sic!!] what his objections are based on; up to now we have not said anything about this [*a lie!*]; I do not know what Bill he is speaking about, or why he talks about not trusting the people. No such Bill has yet been introduced in the State Duma; evidently, his objections are based on a misunderstanding. I wholly associate myself with those deputies on the Left, Uspensky and Volk-Karachevsky, who spoke of provisional rules, of the necessity of setting up local bodies to carry out land surveying on the spot. I think such bodies will be set up, and probably, within the next

* Yevreinov, a Socialist-Revolutionary, had said at the same session (18th session, March 29, 1907): "These [land] committees, according to the assumption of the Party of People's Freedom, are to consist of equal numbers of landowners and peasants, with government officials acting as conciliators, which, of course, will undoubtedly give preponderance to the non-peasants. Why does the party which calls itself the party of the 'people's freedom' distrust committees elected not in a bureaucratic, but in a democratic way? Probably because, if the committees are elected in that way, the vast majority of those elected will be peasants, i. e., representatives of the peasants' interests. That being the case, I ask, does the Party of People's Freedom trust the peasants? It will be remembered that in 1858, in connection with the agrarian reform, the government had this matter transferred to local bodies, to committees. True, those committees consisted of members of the nobility, but the government is not a party of the people's freedom, it is a government that represents the rich and the propertied classes generally. It relies on the nobility and trusts them. The Party of People's Freedom, however, wants to rely on the people, but does not trust the people" (1326).

few days, the Party of People's Freedom will introduce a Bill to that effect and we shall discuss it" (1356).

Now, is that not fraud? Are we really to believe that this person knew nothing about the debates in the First Duma on the question of local committees, or about the article in *Rech* at that time? Could he really have failed to understand Yevreinov's perfectly plain statement?

But he promised to introduce a Bill "within the next few days", you will say. In the first place, a promise to restore what has been obtained by fraudulent means does not cancel the fact of fraud. Secondly, what happened "within the next few days", was this. Mr. Shingaryov spoke on March 29, 1907. On April 9, 1907, the Cadet Tatarinov spoke and said: "I will now, gentlemen, deal with one more question which, I think [he only "thinks"!], is creating considerable controversy, namely, the question that has been raised by all the parties on our Left: the question of local land committees. All these parties urge the necessity of setting up local land committees on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot with the object of settling the land question in the localities. We quite categorically expressed our opposition to such committees last year, and we categorically express it now" (1783).

Thus, on the *extremely important* question of the *actual* terms of the Cadet proposal for "compulsory alienation", two Cadets say different things, swing from one side to another under the blows of the Left parties which bring to light what the Cadets wanted to keep secret! First, Mr. Shingaryov says: "I do not know"; then: "I agree with the Left"; and then: "a Bill within the next few days". Mr. Tatarinov says: "Now, as before, we are categorically opposed". And he adds arguments to the effect that the Duma must not be split up into a thousand Dumas, that the settlement of the agrarian question must not be postponed until political reforms are carried out, until universal, etc., suffrage is introduced. But that is just another evasion. The point at issue is not the moment when a particular measure is to be carried out: the Left members of the Second Duma could have no doubts whatever on that score. The point is: what are the Cadets' *real plans*? Who is to compel whom in their scheme for "compulsory alienation"? Are the landlords to

compel the peasants, or are the peasants to compel the landlords? This question can be answered only by the composition of the land committees. The Cadets' view of what this composition should be was set forth in Milyukov's leading article in *Rech*, in Kutler's Bill, and in Chuprov's article (quoted above) *; but in the Duma, the Cadets kept silent about it, they did not answer the question bluntly put by Yevreinov.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that this conduct of the party's representatives in parliament is nothing more than *deception of the people by the liberals*. Scarcely anybody is deceived by the Bobrinskys and Stolypins; but very many of those who do not want to analyse, or who are incapable of understanding, the real meaning of political slogans and phrases are deceived by the Cadets.

Thus, the Cadets are opposed to any form of socialised land tenure in any form,** they are opposed to alienation without compensation, opposed to local land committees in which the peasants will predominate, opposed to revolution in general and to a peasant agrarian revolution in particular. Light is thrown on their manoeuvring between the Left and Right (to betray the peasants to the landlords) by their attitude towards the Peasant "Reform" of 1861. The Left, as we shall see later on, speak of it with disgust and indignation as of a noose put round the peasants' necks by the landlords. The Cadets are at one with the Right in their affection for this reform.

* See p. 245 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the debate in the First Duma on the question of sending the Land Bill of the 33 (for the abolition of the private ownership of land) to committee. The Cadets (Petrunkevich, Mukhanov, Shakhovskoi, Frenkel, Ovchinnikov, Dolgorukov, and Kokoshkin) fiercely opposed the sending of such a Bill to committee, and in this they were fully supported by Heyden. Their reasons were a disgrace to any self-respecting liberal—they were simply police excuses used by lackeys of the reactionary government. To refer the Bill to committee, said Mr. Petrunkevich, means recognising that, to a certain degree, the standpoint of such a Bill is "possible". Mr. Zhilkin put the Cadets to shame (23rd session, June 8, 1906) by saying that he would send to committee both this Bill and the Bill of the extreme Right. But the Cadets and the Right defeated the motion to send the Bill to committee by 140 votes to 78!

Count Bobrinsky said: "Dirt has been thrown here at the cleanest and brightest page in Russian history.... The emancipation of the peasants is a matter beyond all reproach... the great and glorious day, February 19, 1861" (March 29, pp. 1289, 1299).

Kutler said: "the great Reform of 1861... the government, in the person of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, is renouncing Russian history, renouncing its best and brightest pages" (May 26, pp. 1198-99).

This appraisal of compulsory alienation as it was actually carried out throws more light on the Cadet agrarian programme than all their Bills and speeches, the object of which was to conceal their thoughts. If people regard the dispossession of the peasants of their land by the landlords, triple redemption payments for poor plots, and the implementation of the charters¹⁸⁷ by brute military force as the brightest page, then it becomes obvious that what they are after is a "second emancipation", a second enthralment of the peasants by means of redemption payments. Bobrinsky and Kutler are at one in their estimation of the Reform of 1861. But Bobrinsky's estimation directly and truly expresses the rightly understood interests of the landlords—and therefore it clarifies the class-consciousness of the broad masses. Praise from the Bobrinskys means that the landlords got the best of it. Kutler's estimation, expressing the poverty of intellect of a petty official who all his life has cringed to the landlords, is sheer hypocrisy and befogs the consciousness of the masses.

In this connection, one more aspect of the Cadets' policy on the agrarian question must be noted. All the Left deputies openly side with the peasants as a fighting force, explain the need for a struggle, and show the landlord character of the government. The Cadets, together with the Right deputies, take the "state point of view" and repudiate the class struggle.

Kutler declares that there is no need "radically to reconstruct agrarian relations" (732). Savyelyev warns against "touching a mass of interests" and says: "The principle of completely rejecting ownership would scarcely be expedient, and its application may give rise to very big and grave complications, particularly if we bear in mind that

the big owners with over 50 dessiatins have very much land, namely, 79,440,000 dessiatins" (March 26, 1907, p. 1088—the peasant points to the latifundia to prove the necessity of doing away with them; the liberal does so to prove that it is necessary to cringe). Shingaryov thinks it would be "an immense disaster" if the people themselves took the land (1355). Rodichev warbles: "We do not foment class enmity. We would like to forget the past" (632, May 16, 1907). Kapustin follows suit: "Our task is to sow everywhere peace and justice and not to sow and foment class enmity" (1810, April 9). Krupensky is indignant at the speech of the Socialist-Revolutionary Zimin because it was "full of hatred towards the propertied classes" (783, March 19). In short, in condemning the class struggle, the Cadets and the Rights are at one. But the Rights know what they are doing. The preaching of class struggle cannot but be harmful and dangerous to the class against which the struggle is directed. The Rights are faithfully guarding the interests of the feudal landlords. And what of the Cadets? They are *waging a struggle*—they say they are waging a struggle!—they want to "compel" the landlords who are in power, and yet they condemn the class struggle! Did the bourgeoisie that really fought instead of acting as lackeys of the landlords behave in that way, for instance in France? Did not that bourgeoisie call upon the people to fight; did it not foment class enmity? Did it not create a theory of the class struggle?

3. THE RIGHT PEASANTS

Actual Right peasants are to be found in the Second Duma only by way of exception—Remenchik (Minsk Gubernia) is one, perhaps the only one, who will not hear of any village communes or "land funds" and stoutly defends private ownership (in the First Duma there were many Polish and West-Russian peasants who stood for ownership). But even Remenchik is in favour of alienation "at a fair price" (648), i. e., he in effect turns out to be a Cadet. We place the other "Right peasants" in the Second Duma in a special group because they are undoubtedly more Left than the Cadets. Take Petrochenko (Vitebsk Gubernia). He begins by saying that he "will defend tsar and country unto death"

(1614). The Rights applaud. But then he passes on to the question of "land hunger". "You can hold all the debates you like," he says, "but you will never create another world. Therefore you will have to give us this land. One speaker said here that our peasants are backward and ignorant and, therefore, it is useless giving them a lot of land, because it won't be any good to them all the same. To be sure, the land has not been of much good to us up to now, that is to those who have not had any. As for our being ignorant, well, all we are asking for is some land in order, in our stupidity, to grub about in. Personally, I don't think it's dignified for a nobleman to busy himself with the land. It has been said here that private landed property must not be touched because it is against the law. Of course, I agree that the law must be upheld, but to do away with land hunger a law must be passed to make all that lawful. And so that nobody should have any grievance, Deputy Kutler proposed that good terms be offered. Of course, being a wealthy man, he has named a high figure, and we, poor peasants, cannot pay such a price. As for how we should live—in communes, on separate holdings, or on *khutors*—I, for my part, think that everybody should be allowed to live as he finds convenient" (1616).

There is a wide gulf between this Right peasant and the Russian liberal. The former vows devotion to the old regime, but actually he is out to get land, he is fighting the landlords and will not agree to pay the amount of compensation the Cadets propose. The latter says that he is fighting for the people's freedom, but actually he is engineering a second enthralment of the peasants by the landlords and the old regime. The latter can move only to the Right, from the First Duma to the Second, from the Second to the Third. The former, finding that there is no hope of the landlords "giving up" the land, will move the other way. The "Right" peasant will, perhaps, be found going our way more than the "liberal", "democratic" Cadet....

Take the peasant Shimansky (Minsk Gubernia). "I have come here to defend our faith, tsar, and country, and to demand land ... not by robbery, of course, but in a peaceful way, at a fair value.... Therefore, in the name of all the peasants I call upon the landlord members of the Duma to

come on to this rostrum and say that they are willing to cede land to the peasants at a fair valuation, and then our peasants will, of course, say thank you, and I think our Father the Tsar, will also say thank you. As for those landlords who refuse to do this, I propose that the Duma impose a progressive tax on their land, and undoubtedly they too will yield in time, because they will learn that they have bitten off more than they can chew" (1617).

By compulsory alienation and fair valuation this Right peasant means something entirely different from what the Cadets have in mind. The Cadets are deceiving not only the Left peasants but *also the Right*. What the Right peasants' attitude towards the Cadet plans for setting up the land committees (according to Kutler, or according to Chuprov: see *The Agrarian Question*, Vol. II) would have been, had they studied them, is evident from the following proposal made by the peasant Melnik (Octobrist, Minsk Gubernia). "I consider it a duty," he said, "that 60 per cent of the members of the committee [agrarian] should be peasants who have practical acquaintance with want [!] and are familiar with the conditions of the peasant class, and not peasants who, perhaps, are peasants only in name. This is a question of the peasants' welfare and of the poor people generally, and has no political significance whatever. People must be chosen who can settle the question practically and not politically for the good of the people" (1285). These Right peasants will go a long way to the Left when the counter-revolution reveals to them the political significance of "the questions that concern the welfare of the poor people"!

To show how infinitely wide apart are the representatives of the monarchist peasantry and the representatives of the monarchist bourgeoisie, I shall quote passages from the speech delivered by the "Progressist" Rev. Tikhvinsky, who sometimes spoke in the name of the Peasant Union and Trudovik Group. "Our peasants, in the mass, love the tsar," he said. "How I wish I had the cap of invisibility and could fly on a magic carpet to the foot of the throne and say: Sire, your chief enemy, the chief enemy of the people, is the irresponsible ministry.... All that the toiling peasantry demands is the strict application of the principle: 'All

the land to all the people.'... [on the question of redemption payments:]... Have no fear, gentlemen of the Right, you can rely on our people not to treat you unfairly." (*Voice from the Right*: "Thank you! Thank you!") "I now address myself to the spokesman from the Party of People's Freedom. He says that the programme of the Party of People's Freedom is close to that of the peasantry and of the Trudovik Group. No, gentlemen, it is remote from that programme. We heard the speaker say: 'Our Bill may be less just, but it is more practical'. Gentlemen, justice is sacrificed to practical expediency!" (789.)

In political outlook, this deputy is on the level of a Cadet. But what a difference there is between his rural simplicity and the "business men" of the bar, the bureaucracy, and liberal journalism!

4. THE NON-PARTY PEASANTS

The non-party peasants are of special interest as the spokesmen of the least politically conscious and least organised rural masses. We shall, therefore, quote passages from the speeches of all the non-party peasants,* especially as there are not many of them: Sakhno, Semyonov, Moroz, and Afanasyev.

"Gentlemen, people's representatives," said Sakhno (Kiev Gubernia), "it is difficult for peasants' deputies to get up on this rostrum and oppose the rich landed gentry. At the present time the peasants are living very poorly because they have no land.... The peasant has a lot to put up with at the hands of the landlord; he suffers because the landlord sorely oppresses him.... Why can a landlord own a lot of land, while the peasant has only the kingdom of heaven?... And so, gentlemen, when the peasants sent me here they instructed me to champion their needs, to demand land and freedom for them, to demand that all state, crown, private, and monastery lands be compulsorily alienated without compensation.... I want you to know, gentlemen, people's representatives, that a hungry man cannot keep quiet when he sees that, in spite of his suffering, the government is

* In determining the group or party to which the deputies in the Second Duma belong we have consulted the official publication of the State Duma: list of deputies according to parties and groups. Some deputies passed from one party to another, but it is impossible to keep track of these changes from newspaper reports. Moreover, to consult different sources on this matter would only cause confusion.

on the side of the landed gentry. He cannot help demanding land, even if it is against the law; want compels him to demand it. A hungry man is capable of anything, for want makes him reckless, being hungry and poor" (1482-86).

Just as artless, and just as powerful in its simplicity was the speech of the non-party peasant Semyonov (Podolsk Gubernia, peasant deputy):

... "Bitter is the lot of those peasants who have been suffering for ages without land. For two hundred years they have been waiting for fortune to drop from the skies, but it has not come. Fortune is in the pockets of the big landed gentry who obtained this land together with our grandfathers and fathers; but the earth is the Lord's, not the landlords'.... I know perfectly well that the land belongs to the whole of the working people who till the land.... Deputy Purishkevich says: 'Revolution! Help!' What does that mean? Yes, if the land is taken from them by compulsory alienation, they will be the revolution, but not we, we shall all be fighters, the kindest of people.... Have we got 150 dessiatins like the priest? And what about the monasteries and the churches? What do they want it for? No, gentlemen, it is time to stop collecting treasure and keeping it in your pockets; it is time to live reasonably. The country will understand, gentlemen, I understand perfectly, we are honest citizens, we do not engage in politics, as one of the preceding speakers said.... They [the landlords] only go about and grow fat on our sweat and blood. We shall not forget them, we shall do them no harm, we shall even give them land. If you figure it out, we shall get 16 dessiatins per household, but the big landed gentry will still have 50 dessiatins each.... Thousands, millions of people are suffering, but the gentry are feasting.... When it comes to military service we know what happens: if a man falls sick they say: 'He has land at home'. But where is his home? He has no home! He has a home only in the roster which says where he was born, where he is registered, what his religion is—but he has no land. Now I say: the people asked me to demand that the church, monastery, state, and crown lands, and the land compulsorily alienated from the landlords, should be handed over to the working people who will till the land; and it should be handed over locally: they will know what to do. I tell you that the people sent me here to demand land and freedom and all civil liberties; and we shall live, and we shall not point and say, these are gentry and those are peasants; we shall all be human, and each will be a gentleman in his place" (1930-34).

When one reads this speech of a peasant who "does not engage in politics" it becomes palpably clear that the implementation not only of Stolypin's but also of the Cadets' agrarian programme requires decades of systematic violence against the peasant masses, of systematic flogging, exter-

mination by torture, imprisonment, and exile of all peasants who think and try to act freely. Stolypin is aware of this and is acting accordingly. The Cadets, with the obtuseness characteristic of liberal bureaucrats and professors, are either unaware of it or else hypocritically conceal it, "shame-facedly remain silent" about it, just as they do about the punitive expeditions of 1861 and of subsequent years. If this systematic and unchecked violence is shattered by some internal or external obstacle, the honest non-party peasant who "does not engage in politics" will convert Russia into a peasant republic.

The peasant Moroz, in a short speech, simply said: "The land must be taken away from the clergy and the landlords" (1955), and then quoted the Gospel (this is not the first time in history that bourgeois revolutionaries have taken their slogans from the Gospel).... "Unless you bring the priest some bread and a half bottle of vodka he won't baptise a child for you.... And yet they talk about Holy Gospel and read: 'Ask and it shall be given you; knock and it will be opened unto you.' We ask and ask, but it is not given us; and we knock, but still it is not given us. Must we break down the door and take it? Gentlemen, don't wait until the door is broken down; give voluntarily, and then there will be freedom, liberty, and it will be good for you and for us" (1955).

Take the non-party peasant Afanasyev, who appraises Cossack "municipalisation" not from the Cossack point of view, but from that of "almost a newcomer". "In the first place, gentlemen, I must say that I represent the peasants of the Don region, numbering over a million, and yet I was the only one elected. That alone shows that we are almost newcomers there.... I am infinitely surprised: does St. Petersburg feed the countryside? No, on the contrary. In the past I worked in St. Petersburg for twenty odd years, and I noticed even then that it was not St. Petersburg that fed the countryside, but the countryside that fed St. Petersburg. And I notice the same thing now. All this beautiful architecture, all these edifices and buildings, all these fine houses, they are all built by peasants, as they were twenty-five years ago.... Purishkevich gave the example of a Cossack who has over twenty dessiatins of land, and he

is also starving.... Why didn't he tell us where that land is? There is land, there is land in Russia, too, but who owns it? If he knew there is so much land there, but did not say where, it shows that he is an unjust man; but if he didn't know, he should not have started talking about it. And if he really didn't know, then permit me, gentlemen, to tell him where that land is, how much there is of it, and who owns it. If you reckon it up you will find that in the Don Cossack Region there are 753,546 dessiatins used as private stud-farms. I will also mention the Kalmyk stud-farms, what are called nomad camps; they take up in all 165,708 dessiatins. Then there are 1,055,919 dessiatins temporarily leased by rich people. All that land belongs not to the people Purishkevich mentioned, but to kulaks, to the rich, who oppress us; when they get cattle—they skin us of half, we have to pay a ruble per dessiatin, another ruble for the animal we plough with, but we have to feed our children, and the Cossack wives and children as well. That is why we are starving." He went on to say that leaseholders get 2,700 dessiatins each for supplying eight horses "for the cavalry"; the peasants could supply more. "I will tell you that I wanted to convince the government that it was making a great mistake in not doing this. I wrote a letter to *Selsky Vestnik* and asked them to publish it, but they answered that it was not our business to teach the government." Thus, on "municipalised" land transferred to the ownership of a region, the "central undemocratic government" is *de facto* creating new landlords: municipalisation is, as Plekhanov revealed, a guarantee against restoration....

"The government opened the doors wide for us to acquire land through the Peasant Bank—that is the yoke that was put on us in 1861. It wants to make us settle in Siberia ... but would it not be better to send there the man who owns thousands of dessiatins? Look how many people could live off the land he would leave behind!" (*Applause on the Left; voices from the Right:* "That's stale, that's stale.") ... "During the Japanese war I led my recruits through those [landlords'] lands that I have mentioned here. It took us over forty-eight hours to get to the assembly place. The men asked me: 'Where are you taking us?' I answered: 'Against Japan.' 'What for?' 'To defend our country.' Being a soldier myself, I felt it was our duty to defend our country, but the men said: 'This is not our country—the land belongs to the Lisetskys, Bezulovs, and Podkopailovs. There is nothing here that is ours!' They said things to me that I have been

unable to wipe out from my heart for more than two years.... Consequently, gentlemen ... to sum up, I must say that as regards all those rights that exist in our Russia, from the princes to the nobles, Cossacks, burghers, not mentioning the word peasant, all must be Russian citizens and have the use of land, all those who till the land, who put their labour into it, who cherish and love it. Work, sweat, and benefit from it. But if you do not want to live on the land, if you do not want to till it, if you do not want to put your labour into it, you have no right to benefit from it" (1974) (26th session, 12.IV.1907).

"Not mentioning the word peasant!" That splendid utterance "from the depths of the heart" burst from a peasant who wants to do away with the social estate character of landownership ("all those rights that exist in our Russia"), who wants to abolish the very name of the lowest estate, the peasantry. "Let all be citizens." Equal right to land for the toilers is nothing else than the *farmer's* point of view applied with the utmost consistency to the land. There must be *no other basis* for the ownership of land (like that "for service" among the Cossacks, etc.), no other reasons, no other relations, except the right of the *farmer* to the land, except the reason that he "cherishes" it, except the relation that he "puts his labour" into it. That must be the point of view of the farmer who stands for free farming on free land, for the removal of everything that is extraneous, obstructive, and obsolete, the removal of *all the old forms of landownership*. Would it not be the stupid application of a thoughtless doctrine if Marxists were to dissuade such a farmer from nationalisation and teach him the benefits of private ownership of allotment land?

In the First Duma, the peasant Merkulov (Kursk Gubерния) expressed the same idea about the nationalisation of peasant allotment land as that which we quoted above from the reports of the congresses of the Peasant Union. "They try to scare us," said Merkulov, "by saying that the peasants themselves will refuse to part with the patch of land they now possess. To that I say: Who is going to take it from them? Even with complete nationalisation, only that part of the land will be taken which the owner does not cultivate by himself, but with hired labour" (18th session, May 30, 1906, p. 822).

That was said by a peasant who, as he himself admitted, owns 60 dessiatins of land. Of course, the idea of abolish-

ing or of prohibiting wage-labour in capitalist society is childish, but we must scotch wrong ideas at the point where they begin to go wrong, namely, beginning with "socialisation" and the prohibition of wage-labour,* and not with nationalisation.

This same peasant Merkulov opposed the Cadet Bill of the 42, which coincides with municipalisation in that allotment land is to remain private property and landlords' land is to be given out in tenure. This is "a kind of transitional stage from one system to the other"... "instead of one we have two forms of ownership: private ownership and renting, i.e., two forms of landownership that not only do not hang together, but are the very opposite of each other" (823).

5. THE NARODNIK INTELLECTUALS

In the speeches of the Narodnik intellectuals, particularly those of the Popular Socialists, i.e., the Narodnik opportunists, two currents must be noted: on the one hand, sincere defence of the interests of the peasant masses—in that respect their speeches, for understandable reasons, are much less impressive than those of the peasants who "do not engage in politics"; on the other hand, a certain Cadet savour, a touch of intellectualist philistinism, an attempt to adopt the state point of view. It goes without saying that, *in contrast to the peasants*, their commitment to a *doctrine* is evident: they are fighting not on account of directly felt needs and hardships, but to vindicate a certain theory, a system of views which distorts the real issue of the struggle.

"Land for the toilers," proclaims Mr. Karavayev in his first speech, and he characterises Stolypin's agrarian legislation under Article 87 as "the destruction of the village commune", as pursuing a "political aim", namely, "the formation of a special class of rural bourgeois".

"We know that these peasants are really the major props of reaction, a reliable prop of the bureaucracy; but in counting on this, the government has made a grave mistake: besides this there will be

* There is no need for us to "scotch" this wrong idea, for the "sober-minded" Trudoviks, headed by the "sober-minded" Peshekhonovs, have already scotched it.

the peasant proletariat. I do not know which is better, a peasant proletariat, or the present land-hungry peasantry which, if certain measures were taken, could obtain a sufficient amount of land" (722).

This smacks of the reactionary Narodism of Mr. V. V.: "Better" for whom? For the state? For the landlord state, or for the bourgeois state? And why is the proletariat not "better"? Because the land-hungry peasantry "could obtain", i.e., could more easily be appeased, more easily brought into the camp of order, than the proletariat? That is what *it amounts to*, according to Mr. Karavayev: it is as if he were offering Stolypin and Co. a more reliable "guarantee" *against* a social revolution!

If Mr. Karavayev were right in essentials, the Marxists could not support the confiscation of the landlords' land in Russia. But Mr. Karavayev is wrong, because the Stolypin "way", by slowing down the development of capitalism—in comparison with the peasant revolution—is creating more paupers than proletarians. Karavayev himself said, and rightly, that the Stolypin policy was enriching (not the new, bourgeois elements, not the capitalist farmers, but) the *present* landlords, half of whose economies were run on feudal lines. In 1895, the price of land sold through the "Peasant" Bank was 51 rubles per dessiatin; but in 1906, the price was 126 rubles. (Karavayev at the 47th session, May 26, 1907, p. 1189.) And Mr. Karavayev's party colleagues, Volk-Karachevsky and Delarov, brought out even more vividly the significance of those figures. Delarov showed that "up to 1905, during the twenty odd years of its existence, the Peasant Bank bought up only 7,500,000 dessiatins"; but between November 3, 1905 and April 1, 1907, it bought up 3,800,000 dessiatins. The price of land was 80 rubles per dessiatin in 1900, 108 rubles in 1902, rising to 109 rubles in 1903, before the agrarian movement, and before the Russian revolution. Now it is 126 rubles. "While the whole of Russia was suffering heavy loss as a consequence of the Russian revolution, the Russian big landowners were *amassing fortunes*. During that period they pocketed over 60,000,000 rubles of the people's money" (1220—counting 109 rubles as a "fair" price). But Mr. Volk-Karachevsky reckons far more correctly in refusing to regard any price as "fair", simply noting that after November

3, 1905, the government paid out to the landlords 52,000,000 rubles on account of land purchased by peasants, and 242,000,000 rubles on its own account; in all, "295,000,000 rubles of the people's money were paid to the landed nobility" (1080. All italics ours). This, of course, is only a fraction of what Junker-bourgeois agrarian evolution is costing Russia; such is the *tribute* imposed on the growing productive forces for the benefit of the feudal landlords and the bureaucracy! The Cadets too want to preserve this tribute to the landlords for the liberation of Russia's development (redemption payments). The bourgeois farmers' republic, on the other hand, would be compelled to use those sums for developing the productive forces of agriculture under the new system.*

Lastly, we must certainly place to the credit of the Narodnik intellectuals the fact that, unlike the Bobrinskys and Kuttlers, they are aware of the fraud that was perpetrated on the people in 1861 and call that notorious reform not the great reform, but one "carried out in the interests of the landlords" (Karavayev, 1193). Reality, justly observed Mr. Karavayev concerning the post-Reform period, "has exceeded the gloomiest forecasts" of those who championed the interests of the peasantry in 1861.

On the question of peasant ownership of the land, Mr. Karavayev openly challenged the government's concern for it by putting the question to the peasants: "Gentlemen, peasant deputies, you are the representatives of the people. Your life is the peasants' life, your mind is their mind. When you were leaving, did your constituents complain that they

* See Kautsky's *The Agrarian Question in Russia* on the necessity of spending enormous amounts of capital for the promotion of peasant agriculture. Here the "municipalisers" may protest that the bourgeois republic will spend money on the republic's armed forces, whereas the democratic Zemstvo ... will have the money taken away from it by the undemocratic central government, most highly esteemed municipalisers! Besides, the very rise of such a Zemstvo is impossible under an undemocratic central government; this is but the pious wish of a petty bourgeois. The only true comparison is that between a bourgeois republic (which spends more than other states on the development of productive forces: North America, for example), and a bourgeois monarchy (which for decades pays *tribute* to the Junkers: Germany, for example).

were uncertain about the ownership of land? Did they make it your first duty in the Duma, your first demand: 'Mind you ensure private ownership of the land, otherwise you will not be carrying out our mandate'? No. You will say that you were not given such a mandate" (1185).

Far from repudiating that statement, the peasant deputies confirmed it by the entire content of their speeches. And that, of course, was not because the Russian peasant is devoted to the "village commune", is an "opponent of private ownership", but because economic conditions now dictate to him the task of abolishing all the old forms of landownership in order to create a new system of economy.

To the debit side of the account of the Narodnik intellectuals we must place their loudly voiced arguments about "norms" of peasant landownership. "I think everybody will agree that in order to settle the agrarian question properly," declared Mr. Karavayev, "the following data are needed: first, the amount of land necessary for subsistence, the subsistence norm; and the amount necessary to absorb all the labour of the household, the labour norm. We must know exactly how much land the peasants possess; that will enable us to calculate how much they are short of. Then we must know how much land can be given" (1186).

We emphatically disagree with that opinion. And we assert *on the basis of the statements made by the peasants in the Duma* that it contains an element of intellectualist bureaucracy that is *alien to the peasants*. The peasants do not talk about "norms". Norms are a bureaucratic invention, a hang-over of the feudal Reform of 1861 of accursed memory. Guided by their true class instinct, the peasants place the weight of emphasis on the abolition of landlordism and not on "norms". It is not a question of how much land is "needed". "You will not create another world", as the above-mentioned non-party peasant so aptly expressed it. It is a question of doing away with the *oppressive* feudal latifundia, which ought to be done away with even if the "norms" are reached without it. The Narodnik intellectual slips into this position: if the "norm" is reached, then, perhaps, there will be no need to touch the landlords. The peasants' line of reasoning is different: "peasants, *throw them off your backs*" (meaning the landlords), said the peasant Pyanykh

(S.R.) in the Second Duma (16th session, March 26, 1907, p. 1101). The landlords must be thrown off not because there are not enough "norms" to go round, but because the farmer does not want to be burdened with donkeys and leeches. There is a "big difference" between these two arguments.

The peasant does not talk about norms, but with remarkable practical intuition he "takes the bull by the horns". The question is: *Who* is to fix the norms? This was excellently put by the clergyman Poyarkov in the First Duma. "It is proposed to fix a norm of land per head," he said. "*Who is to fix this norm?* If it is to be fixed by the peasants themselves, then, of course, they will not neglect their own interests; but if the landlords as well as the peasants are to do so, then it is a question as to who will gain the upper hand in working out the norm" (12th session, May 19, 1906, p. 488).

That exactly hits the mark in regard to all the talk about norms.

In the case of the Cadets it is not mere talk, but downright *betrayal* of the peasants to the landlords. And that kindly village priest Mr. Poyarkov, who has evidently seen liberal landlords in action in his part of the countryside, instinctively perceived where the falsity lay.

"Another thing people are afraid of," said the same Poyarkov, "is that there will be a multitude of officials. The peasants will distribute the land themselves!" (488-89.) That is the crux of the matter. "Norms" do, indeed, smack of officialdom. It is different when the peasant speaks: We shall distribute the land on the spot. Hence the idea of setting up local land committees, which expresses the true interests of the peasantry in the revolution and naturally rouses the hatred of the liberal scoundrels.* Under such a plan of *nationalisation* all that is left to the state is to

* Workers' governments in the towns, peasant committees in the villages (which at a certain moment will be transformed into bodies elected by universal, etc., suffrage)—such is the only possible form of organisation of the victorious revolution, i. e., the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is not surprising that the liberals hate these forms of organisation of the classes that are fighting for freedom!

determine what lands can serve for *colonisation* or may require special intervention ("forests and waters of national importance", as our present programme puts it), i.e., *all that is left is what even the "municipalisers" deem necessary to put in the hands of the "democratic state"* (they should have said: republic).

Comparing the talk about norms with the economic facts, we see at once that the peasants are men of deeds, whereas the Narodnik intellectuals are men of words. The "labour" norm would be of *real* importance if attempts were made to prohibit hired labour. The majority of the peasants have turned down these attempts, and the Popular Socialists have admitted that they are impracticable. That being the case, the question of "norms" does not arise, and there remains division among a given number of farmers. The "subsistence" norm is a poverty norm, and in capitalist society the peasants will always flee from such a "norm" to the towns (we shall deal with this separately later on). Here too, then, it is not at all a matter of a "norm" (which, moreover, changes with every change in the crop and technical methods), but a matter of dividing the land among a given number of farmers, of "sorting out" the real farmers who are capable of "cherishing" the land (with both labour and capital) from the inefficient farmers who must not be retained in agriculture—and to attempt to retain them in it would be reactionary.

As a curiosity, showing what the Narodnik *theories* lead to, we shall quote Mr. Karavayev's reference to *Denmark*. Europe, you see, "was handicapped by private ownership", whereas our village communes "help to solve the problem of co-operation". "In this respect, Denmark provides a splendid example." It is indeed a *splendid* example that tells against the Narodniks. In Denmark we see the most typical *bourgeois* peasantry, which concentrates both dairy cattle (see *The Agrarian Question and the "Critics of Marx"*, Chapter X *) and the land. Of the total number of crop farms in Denmark, 68.3 per cent occupy up to 1 hartkorn, i.e., up to about 9 dessiatins each. They account for 11.1 per cent of all the land. At the other pole are 12.6 per cent

* See pp. 171-82 of this volume.—*Ed.*

of the farms with 4 hartkorns and over (*36 dessiatins and over*) each; they account for 62 per cent of all the land. (N. S., *Agrarian Programmes*, Novy Mir Publishers, p. 7.) Comment is superfluous.

It is interesting to note that in the First Duma Denmark was put forward as a trump card by the liberal Herzenstein, to which the Right deputies (in both Dumas) retorted: in Denmark there is peasant ownership. We need nationalisation in our country in order to create freedom for the old farms to reorganise "on Danish lines" on the "unfenced" land. As for converting tenancy into ownership, there will be no obstacle to that if the peasants themselves demand it, *in such a matter* the entire bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy will always support the peasantry. What is more, under nationalisation the development of capitalism (a development "on Danish lines") will be *more rapid* as a consequence of the abolition of private ownership of land.

6. THE TRUDOVIK PEASANTS (NARODNIKS)

The Trudovik peasants and the Socialist-Revolutionary peasants *do not differ* essentially from the non-party peasants. A comparison of their speeches clearly reveals the same needs, the same demands, and the same outlook. The party peasants are merely more politically conscious, they express themselves more clearly, and grasp more fully the connection between the different aspects of the question.

The best speech of all, perhaps, was that of the peasant Kiselyov, a Trudovik, at the 26th session of the Second Duma (April 12, 1907). In contrast to the "state point of view" of the liberal petty bureaucrat, he emphasised the fact that "our government's entire domestic policy, which is *actually* controlled by the landlords, is directed to keeping the land in the possession of its present owners" (1943). The speaker showed that that was the reason why the people were kept "in abysmal ignorance", and then he went on to deal with the speech delivered by the Octobrist, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky. "You have, of course, not forgotten the horrible things he said: 'Abandon all idea of increasing the area of peasant landownership. Preserve and support the private owners. Without landlords, our backward and

ignorant peasant mass would be a flock without a shepherd'. Fellow-peasants, need anything be added to this to make you understand what these gentlemen, our benefactors, are hankering after? Is it not clear to you that they are still longing and sighing for serfdom? No, shepherd gentlemen, enough.... The only thing I would like is that the words of the noble Rurikovich¹⁸⁸ should be well remembered by the whole backward peasantry of Russia, by the whole of the land of Russia; that these words should burn within the heart of every peasant and light up more brightly than the sun the gulf that lies between us and these uninvited benefactors. Enough, shepherd gentlemen.... Enough. What we need is not shepherds, but leaders; and we shall find them without you, and with them we shall find the road to light and truth, the road to the promised land" (1947).

The Trudovik has exactly the same standpoint as the revolutionary bourgeois who is under the delusion that the nationalisation of the land will bring him to the "promised land", but who is fighting devotedly for the *present* revolution and detests the idea of limiting its scope: "The Party of People's Freedom rejects the just settlement of the agrarian question.... Gentlemen, representatives of the people, can a legislative institution like the State Duma, in its actions, sacrifice justice to expediency? Can you pass laws knowing in advance that they are unjust?... Are the unjust laws our bureaucracy has bestowed upon us not enough that we ourselves should make still more?... You know perfectly well that, for reasons of expediency—the need to pacify Russia—punitive expeditions have been sent out and the whole of Russia has been proclaimed in a state of emergency; for reasons of expediency summary military tribunals have been instituted. But tell me please, who among us goes into raptures over this expediency? Have you not all been cursing it? Do not ask, as some here have done: 'What is justice?' [The speaker is evidently referring to the Cadet landlord Tatarinov who, at the 24th session, on April 9, said: "Justice, gentlemen, is a rather relative term," "justice is an ideal towards which we are all striving, but this ideal remains" (for the Cadet) "only an ideal, and whether it will be possible to achieve it is still an open question for me." 1779.] Man is justice. When a

man is born—it is just that he should live, and to live it is just that he should have the opportunity to earn his bread by his labour."....

You see: this ideologist of the peasantry adopts the typical standpoint of the French eighteenth-century enlightener. He does not understand the historical limitedness, the historically-determined content of *his* justice. But for the sake of this abstract justice he *wants to*, and the class he represents *is able to completely sweep away* all the vestiges of medievalism. That is the *real* historical content of the demand that justice must not be sacrificed to "expediency". It means: no concessions to medievalism, to the landlords, to the old regime. It is the language of the members of the Convention. For the liberal Tatarinov, however, the "ideal" of bourgeois freedom "remains only an ideal", for which he does not fight in earnest, does not sacrifice everything for its realisation, but makes a deal with the landlords. The Kiselyovs can lead the people to a victorious bourgeois revolution, the Tatarinovs can only betray them.

..."For the sake of expediency, the Party of People's Freedom proposes that no right to land be created. It is afraid that such a right will draw masses of people from the towns into the countryside, and in that case each will get very little. I would like, first of all, to ask: What is the right to land? The right to land is the right to work, the right to bread, the right to live—it is the inalienable right of every man. How can we deprive anybody of that right? The Party of People's Freedom says that if all citizens are granted that right, and if the land is divided among them, each will get very little. But a right and the exercise of that right in practice are by no means the same thing. Every one of you here has the right to live in, say, Chukh-loma, but you live here; on the other hand, those who live in Chukh-loma have the same right to live in St. Petersburg, but they stick in their lair. Therefore, the fear that to grant the right to land to all those who are willing to till it will draw masses of people away from the towns is totally groundless. Only those who have not broken their ties with the countryside, only those who have left the countryside recently, will leave the towns.... The people who have assured means of livelihood in the towns will not go into the countryside.... I think that only the complete and irrevocable abolition of private ownership of the land ... etc. ... only such a solution can be regarded as satisfactory" (1950).

This tirade, so typical of the Trudovik, raises an interesting question: Is there any difference between *such* speeches

about the right to work and the speeches about the right to work delivered by the French petty-bourgeois democrats of 1848? Both are certainly declamations of a bourgeois democrat *vaguely* expressing the real historical content of the struggle. The declamations of the Trudovik, however, *vaguely* express the actual *aims of the bourgeois revolution* which objective conditions make possible (i. e., make possible a peasant agrarian revolution in twentieth-century Russia), whereas the declamations of the French *Kleinbürger** in 1848 vaguely expressed the aims of the *socialist revolution*, which was impossible in France in the middle of the last century. In other words: the right to work demanded by the French workers in the middle of the nineteenth century expressed a desire to remodel the *whole* of small production on the lines of co-operation, socialism, and so forth, and that was *economically* impossible. The right to work demanded by the Russian peasants in the twentieth century expresses the desire to remodel small *agricultural production* on *nationalised* land, and that is *economically* quite possible. The twentieth century Russian peasants' "right to work" has a real bourgeois content in addition to its unsound socialistic theory. The right to work demanded by the French petty bourgeois and worker in the middle of the nineteenth century contained *nothing* but an unsound socialistic theory. That is the difference that many of our Marxists overlook.

But the Trudovik himself reveals the *real* content of his theory: *not everybody* will go on the land, although everybody "has an equal right". Clearly, *only farmers* will go on the land, or establish themselves there. Doing away with private ownership of the land means doing away with all obstacles to the *farmers* establishing themselves on the land.

It is not surprising that Kiselyov, imbued with deep faith in the peasant revolution and with a desire to serve it, speaks scornfully about the Cadets, about their wish to alienate not all, but only a part of the land, to make the peasants pay for the land, to transfer the matter to "unnamed land institutions", in short, about "the plucked bird which the Party of People's Freedom is offering the peas-

Kleinbürger—petty bourgeois.—*Ed.*

ants" (1950-51). Neither is it surprising that Struve and those like him were *bound* to hate the Trudoviks, especially after the Second Duma: the Cadets' plans cannot succeed as long as the Russian peasant remains a Trudovik. But when the Russian peasant ceases to be a Trudovik, the difference between the Cadet and the Octobrist will completely disappear!

We shall briefly mention the other speakers. The peasant Nechitailo says: "The people who have drunk the blood and sucked the brains of the peasants call them ignorant" (779). Golovin interrupted: The landlord can insult the peasant, but the peasant insulting the landlord?... "These lands that belong to the people—we are told: buy them. Are we foreigners, who have arrived from England, France, and so forth? This is our country, why should we have to buy our own land? We have already paid for it ten times over with blood, sweat, and money" (780).

Here is what the peasant Kirnosov (Saratov Gubernia) says: "Nowadays we talk of nothing but the land; again we are told: it is sacred, inviolable. In my opinion it cannot be inviolable; if the people wish it, nothing can be inviolable.* (*A voice from the Right:* "Oh-ho!") Yes, oh-ho! (*Applause on the Left.*) Gentlemen of the nobility, do you think we do not know when you used us as stakes in your card games, when you bartered us for dogs? We do. It was all your sacred, inviolable property.... You stole the land from us.... The peasants who sent me here said this: The land is ours. We have come here not to buy it, but to take it" (1144).**

* A characteristic expression by a simple peasant of the revolutionary idea of the sovereignty of the people. In our revolution there is no bourgeoisie other than the peasantry to carry out this demand of the proletarian programme.

** The Trudovik peasant Nazarenko (Kharkov Gubernia) said in the First Duma: "If you want to judge how the peasant looks on the land, I will tell you that to us peasants land is as essential as its mother's breast is to an infant. That is the only standpoint from which we regard the land. You probably know that not so very long ago the gentry compelled our mothers to suckle pups. The same is happening now. The only difference now is that it is not the mothers who bore us who are suckling the gentry's pups, but the mother that feeds us—the land" (495).

Here is what the peasant Vasyutin (Kharkov Gubernia) says: "We see here in the person of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers not the minister of the whole country, but the minister of 130,000 landlords. Ninety million peasants are nothing to him.... You [addressing the Right] are exploiters, you lease your land out at exorbitant rents and skin the peasants alive.... Know that if the government fails to meet the people's needs, the people will not ask for your consent, they will take the land.... I am a Ukrainian [he relates that Catherine made Potemkin a gift of a little estate of 27,000 dessiatins with 2,000 serfs].... Formerly land was sold at 25 to 50 rubles per dessiatin, but now the rent is 15 to 30 rubles per dessiatin, and the rent of hay-land is 35 to 50 rubles. I call that fleecery. (*A voice from the Right: "What? Fleecery?" Laughter.*) Yes, don't get excited (*applause on the Left*); I call it skinning the peasants alive" (643, 39th session, May 16).

The Trudovik peasants and the peasant intellectuals have in common a vivid recollection of serfdom. They are all united by burning hatred for the landlords and the landlord state. They are all animated with an intense revolutionary passion. Some spontaneously exert their efforts to "throw them off our backs", without thinking of the future system they are to create. Others paint that future in utopian colours. But all of them detest compromise with the old Russia, all are fighting to shatter to bits accursed medievalism.

Comparing the speeches of the revolutionary peasants in the Second Duma with those of the revolutionary workers, one is struck by the following difference. The former are imbued with a far more spontaneous revolutionary spirit, a passionate desire to destroy the landlord regime immediately, and immediately to create a new system. The peasant is eager to fling himself upon the enemy at once and to strangle him. Among the workers this revolutionary spirit is more abstract, aimed, as it were, at a remoter goal. This difference is quite understandable and legitimate. The peasant is making *his*, bourgeois, revolution now, at this moment, and does not see its inherent contradictions, he is not even aware that there are such contradictions. The Social-Democratic worker does see them and because he

sets himself aims of world socialism, *cannot* make the fate of the working-class movement hinge on the outcome of a bourgeois revolution. Only we must not conclude from this that the worker must support the liberals in the bourgeois revolution. The conclusion to be drawn from it is that, while merging *with no other* class, the worker must *with all his energy* help the peasant to carry through this bourgeois revolution to the end.

7. THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES

The speeches of the Socialist-Revolutionary intellectuals (we dealt with the S.R. peasants above when dealing with the Trudoviks) are full of the same scathing criticism of the Cadets and bitter enmity towards the landlords. Not to repeat what we have said above, we shall merely point out a *new* feature that this group of deputies possesses. Unlike the Popular Socialists who, instead of the ideal of socialism, are inclined to paint the ideal of ... Denmark, and unlike the peasants, who are strangers to all doctrine and directly express the sentiments of the oppressed person who just as directly idealises emancipation from the existing form of exploitation, the Socialist-Revolutionaries introduce into their speeches the doctrine of *their own* "socialism". Thus, Uspensky and Sagatelyan (a member of "Dashnachtsutyun"—which stands very close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the "young ones" of which even belong to the S. R. Party) raise the question of the *village commune*. The latter speaker rather naïvely observes: "It must be noted with regret that in developing the wide theory of nationalisation of the land, no special emphasis is laid on the living, surviving institution, on the basis of which alone progress can be made.... The safeguard against all these horrors [the horrors of Europe, the destruction of small farming, etc.] is the *village commune*" (1122).

The "regret" of this worthy knight of the *village commune* will be understood if we bear in mind that he was the *twenty-sixth* speaker on the agrarian question.

He was preceded by not less than fourteen Left members, Trudoviks, and others, and "no special emphasis was laid on the living, surviving institution" by any one of them!

There is reason for "regret" when one sees among the peasants in the Duma the same indifference towards the village commune as was displayed by the congresses of the Peasant Union. Sagatelyan and Uspensky took up the cause of the village commune like true sectarians in the midst of the peasant revolution, which does not want to hear of the *old* agrarian associations. "I sense a certain danger to the village commune," mourned Sagatelyan (1123). "Now is just the time at which the village commune must be saved at all costs" (1124). "This form [i. e., the village commune] may develop into a world movement, capable of offering a solution to all economic problems" (1126). Apparently, Mr. Sagatelyan gave vent to all these arguments about the village commune "sadly and irrelevantly". And his colleague Uspensky, criticising Stolypin's legislation against the village communes, expressed the desire that "the mobilisation of landed property be reduced to the utmost limits, to the last degree" (1115).

This Narodnik's wish is undoubtedly reactionary. Curiously enough, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, in whose name this wish was expressed in the Duma, advocates the abolition of private ownership of land, without realising that this involves the *utmost* mobilisation of the land, that it creates the freest and easiest conditions for the land to pass from farmer to farmer, the freest and easiest conditions for the penetration of capital into agriculture! Confusing private ownership of land with the domination of capital in agriculture is a characteristic mistake of the bourgeois land nationalisers (including Henry George, and many others). In their endeavour to "reduce mobilisation", the Socialist-Revolutionaries are at one with the Cadets, whose representative Kutler openly stated in his speech: "The Party of People's Freedom proposes to limit their [the peasants'] rights only in respect of alienation and mortgage, i. e., to prevent, in the future, the wide development of the sale and purchase of land" (12th session, March 19, 1907, p. 740).

The Cadets link this reactionary aim with methods of solving the agrarian problem (domination of the landlords and the bureaucracy) that make possible stupid bureaucratic restrictions and red-tape that will help to enthrall the peas-

ants. The Socialist-Revolutionaries link the reactionary aim with measures that preclude the possibility of bureaucratic restraints (local land committees elected on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage). In the case of the former, what is reactionary is their entire (bureaucratic-landlord) policy in the bourgeois revolution. In the case of the latter, what is reactionary is their petty-bourgeois "socialism", which they mistakenly want to force upon the consistent bourgeois revolution.

On the question of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' economic theories, it is interesting to note the arguments of their Duma representatives about the influence of agrarian reforms upon the development of industry. The naïve point of view of bourgeois revolutionaries, barely concealed by a veneer of Narodnik doctrine, stands out very strikingly. Take, for example, the Socialist-Revolutionary Kabakov (Perm Gubernia), known in the Urals as the organiser of the Peasant Union, as "the President of the Alapayevsk Republic",¹³⁹ and also as "Pugachov".* In the purely peasant manner he bases the peasants' right to the land on the grounds, among other things, that the peasants have never refused to defend Russia against her enemies (1953). "Why allot the land?" he exclaims. "We bluntly declare that the land must be the common property of the toiling peasantry, and the peasants will be able to divide the land among themselves in the local areas without the interference of any government officials, who, we have long known, have never been of any use to the peasantry" (1954). "In our region, the Urals, entire factories have come to a standstill because there is no sale for sheet iron, yet in Russia all the peasants' huts have straw-thatched roofs. Those huts should have been roofed with sheet iron long ago.... There is a market, but there are no buyers. Who constitute the mass of buyers in our country? The hundred million toiling peasants—that is the foundation of the mass of buyers" (1952).

Yes, that correctly expresses the conditions for real capitalist production in the Urals in place of the age-old,

* See *List of Members of the Second State Duma*, privately published by an anonymous author, St. Petersburg, 1907.

semi-feudal stagnation of "possessorial" production.^{1***} Neither the Stolypin nor the Cadet agrarian policy can bring about any appreciable improvement in the conditions of life of the *masses*, and unless these conditions are improved, really "free" industry will not develop in the Urals. Only a peasant revolution could quickly transform wooden Russia into iron Russia. The Socialist-Revolutionary peasant has a truer and broader conception of the conditions necessary for the development of capitalism than have the sworn servants of capital.

Another Socialist-Revolutionary, the peasant Khvorostukhin (Saratov Gubernia), said: "Yes, gentlemen, of course, many spokesmen of the Party of People's Freedom have accused the Trudovik Group of wanting to transfer the land to those who wish to till it. They say that then a lot of people will leave the towns, and this will make things worse. But I think, gentlemen, that only those who have nothing to do will leave the towns, but those who have work are used to work, and since they have work they will not leave the towns. Indeed, why should land be given to those who do not want to cultivate it?"... (774.) Is it not obvious that this "S.R." does not in the least want universal, equalised land tenure, but the creation of free and equal farming on free land?... "It is necessary, at all costs, to release economic freedom for the whole people, particularly for the people who have suffered and starved for so many years" (777).

Do not think that this *correct* formulation of the *real* content of S.R.-ism ("release economic freedom") is due *only* to the clumsy, peasant way of expression. It is more than that. The S.R. leader Mushenko, an intellectual, who replied to the debate on the agrarian question on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, was far more naïve in expressing his economic views than the peasants Kabakov and Khvorostukhin.

"We say," declared Mushenko, "that proper resettlement, proper dispersion, will be possible only when the land is unfenced, when all the barriers erected by the principle of private ownership of the land are removed. Further, the Minister spoke about the increase in the population of our country.... It turned out that for this increase alone [1,600,000] about 3,500,000 dessiatins of land will be needed. He says: Thus, if you have equalised the land, where will you get land

for such an increase in the population? But I ask: Where, in what state [sic!] is the whole increase in the population absorbed in agriculture? *The law that regulates the distribution of the population according to social-estates, according to occupations, operates in the reverse direction* [our italics]. If a state, if a country is not degenerating, but is developing industrially, it shows that on the foundation of agriculture, which is satisfying the elementary needs in food and raw materials, more and more economic storeys are being erected. Demand grows, new industrial products appear, new branches of industry spring up; the manufacturing industry attracts larger and larger numbers of workers. The urban population grows faster than the agricultural and absorbs the major part of the population increase. It sometimes happens, gentlemen, that the agricultural population diminishes not only relatively, but even absolutely. If this [!] process is slow in our country, it is because there is nothing on which to build those new economic storeys. Peasant economy is too shaky a foundation; the market for industry is too small. Create a healthy, numerous, and vigorous agricultural population by putting the land at the disposal of the people, and you will see what a demand there will be for industrial products, and what a mass of workers will be needed for the factories and mills in the towns" (1173).

Now, isn't he delightful, this "Socialist-Revolutionary" who calls the programme for the development of capitalism a programme for the socialisation of the land? He has no inkling that the law of the more rapid increase in the urban population is exclusively a law of the *capitalist* mode of production. It never occurs to him that this "law" does not and cannot operate otherwise than through the disintegration of the peasantry into a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, through the "sorting out" among the cultivators, i. e., the ousting of the "pauper" by the "real farmer". The economic harmony which this S.R. depicts on the basis of a capitalist law is pathetically naïve. But it is not the harmony preached by the vulgar bourgeois economist who wants to conceal the struggle between labour and capital. It is the harmony of the unconscious bourgeois revolutionary who wants to make a clean sweep of the survivals of autocracy, serfdom, medievalism.

The *victorious* bourgeois revolution of which our present agrarian programme dreams cannot proceed except by means of *such* a bourgeois revolutionary. And the class-conscious worker must *support him* for the sake of social development, without allowing himself for a moment to be taken in by the childish prattle of the Narodnik "economists".

8. THE "NATIONALS"

Among the representatives of the non-Russian nationalities in the Duma who spoke on the agrarian question were Poles, Byelorussians, Letts and Ests, Lithuanians, Tatars, Armenians, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, and Ukrainians. Here is how they expounded their points of view.

The National-Democrat¹⁴⁰ Dmowski said in the Second Duma "on behalf of the Poles—the representatives of the Kingdom of Poland and of the adjacent western part of the country" (742): "Although our agrarian relations are already in the stage of transition to West-European relations, nevertheless, the agrarian question exists for us too, and land hunger is the curse of our life. One of the chief points of our social programme is: increase in the area of peasant landownership" (743).

"The big agrarian disturbances that occurred in the Kingdom of Poland in the form of the seizure of landlord estates were confined to the eastern areas, namely, Włodawa Uyezd, where the peasants were told that they, as members of the Orthodox Church, would receive allotments of landlords' land. Those disturbances occurred only among the population belonging to the Orthodox Church" (745).

... "Here [in the Kingdom of Poland] agrarian affairs, like all other social reforms, ... can be settled in conformity with the requirements of life only by an assembly of representatives of the region—only by an autonomous Sejm" (747).

This speech by a Polish National-Democrat provoked violent attacks against the Polish landlords on the part of the Right Byelorussian peasants (Gavrilchik, Minsk Gubornia, Szymański, and Grudziński); and Bishop Eulogius, of course, seized the opportunity to deliver a jesuitical police-minded speech in the spirit of the Russian politicians of 1863 about the Polish landlords oppressing the Russian peasants (26th session, April 12).

"What a simple plan!" answered the National-Democrat Grabski (32nd session, May 3). "The peasants will receive land; the Russian landlords will keep their estates; the peasants, as in the good old days, will support the old regime, and the Poles will be duly punished for raising the question of a Polish Sejm" (62). And the speaker, vehemently exposing the shameless demagogery of the Russian Government, demanded that "the settlement of the agrarian reform in our region be transferred to a Polish Sejm" (75).

To this we will add that the above-mentioned peasants demanded additional allotments *with right of ownership* (see, for example, p. 1811). In the First Duma, too, the Polish and Western peasants, in demanding land, spoke in favour of private ownership. "I am a peasant with little land from Lublin Gubernia," said Nakonieczny on June 1, 1906. "Compulsory alienation is needed in Poland as well. One dessiatin forever is better than five dessiatins for an indefinite period" (881-82). The same was said by Poniatowski (Volhynia Gubernia) in the name of the Western Region (May 19, p. 501), and by Trasun from Vitebsk Gubernia (418, May 16, 1906). Girnius (Suvalki Gubernia) opposed the idea of an imperial stock of distributable land and demanded local distributable lands (June 1, 1906, p. 879). During the same debate, Count Tyszkiewiez stated that he regarded the idea of forming a national stock of distributable land as "impracticable and risky" (874). Stecki also spoke (May 24, 1906, pp. 613-14) in favour of private ownership as against renting.

A speaker from the Baltic Region in the Second Duma was Juraszewski (Courland Gubernia), who demanded the abolition of the feudal privileges of the big landowners (May 16, 1907, p. 670) and the alienation of all landlords' land over and above a definite norm. "While admitting that present-day agriculture in the Baltic Region developed on the principle of private ownership, or hereditary lease, that was practised there, one must come to the conclusion, however, that for the future regulation of agricultural relations it is necessary immediately to introduce in the Baltic Region local self-government on broad democratic lines which could correctly solve this problem" (672).

The representative of Estland Gubernia, the Progressist Jurine, introduced a separate Bill for this gubernia (47th session, May 26, 1907, p. 1210). He spoke in favour of a "compromise" (1213), in favour of "hereditary or perpetual leasing" (1214). "The one who cultivates the land, who makes the best use of it, shall have possession of the land" (*ibid.*). While demanding compulsory alienation for this purpose, he rejects confiscation of the land (1215). In the First Duma, Cakste (Courland Gubernia) demanded the

transfer to the peasants of church (parish) land as well as landlords' land (4th session, May 4, 1906, p. 195). Tenison (Livland Gubernia) agreed to vote for the address, i.e., for compulsory alienation, and expressed the opinion that "all the supporters of the individualisation of the land" (*ibid.*, p. 209) could do this. Kreuzberg (Courland Gubernia), on behalf of the Courland peasants, demanded the "expropriation of the latifundia" and the allotment of land to peasants with little or no land, and, of course, "with right of ownership" (12th session, May 19, 1906, p. 500). Rütli (Livland Gubernia) demanded compulsory alienation, etc. "As regards converting the land into a state stock of distributable land," he said, "our peasants are fully aware that this is a new form of serfdom. Therefore, we must defend small peasant farming and productivity of labour, and protect them from the encroachments of capitalism. Thus, if we convert the land into a state stock of distributable land we shall create capitalism on the largest scale" (497, *ibid.*). Ozolīns (Livland Gubernia), on behalf of the Lettish peasants, spoke in favour of compulsory alienation and private ownership; he was emphatically opposed to the creation of a reserve of state distributable land and was in favour only of local, regional distributable lands (13th session, May 23, 1906, p. 564).

Leonas, "representative of Suvalki Gubernia, namely, of the Lithuanian nationality" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 654), spoke in favour of the plan proposed by the Constitutional-Democratic Party, to which he belongs. Bulat, another Lithuanian autonomist from the same gubernia, associated himself with the Trudoviks, but proposed that a decision on the question of redemption payments and so forth, be postponed until the matter was discussed by the local land committees (p. 651, *ibid.*). Povilius (Kovno Gubernia), in the name of the "Duma group of Lithuanian Social-Democrats" (*ibid.*, p. 681, supplement) put forward this group's precisely-formulated agrarian programme, which coincides with our R.S.D.L.P. programme, *with this difference*, however, that "the local distributable land *within the borders of Lithuania*" is to be placed at the disposal of "the Lithuanian organ of autonomous self-government" (*ibid.*, Point 2).

On behalf of the Moslem group in the Second Duma Khan Khoisky (Elisavetpol Gubernia) said: "We Moslems, who number over 20,000,000 in the total population of the Russian state, are following the debate on the agrarian question with the same keen interest and are looking forward to its satisfactory settlement with the same impatience" (20th session, April 2, 1907, p. 1499). In the name of the Moslem group the speaker agreed with Kutler and supported compulsory alienation based on a fair valuation (1502). "But to whom are these alienated lands to go? On this matter the Moslem group is of the opinion that the alienated lands should form not a state stock, but regional stocks of distributable land, each within the borders of the given region" (1503). Deputy Mediev (Taurida Gubernia), the "representative of the Crimean Tatars", in an ardent revolutionary speech, demanded "land and liberty". "The longer the debate goes on the clearer we hear the demand of the people that the land must go to those who till it" (24th session, April 9, 1907, p. 1789). The speaker showed "how sacred landed property was established in our border regions" (1792), how the land of the Bashkirs was plundered, how ministers, councillors of state, and chiefs of the gendarmerie received tracts ranging from two to six thousand dessiatins. He cited the mandate of his "Tatar brethren", complaining of the way the wakf lands¹⁴¹ were plundered. He also quoted the answer, dated December 15, 1906, which the Governor-General of Turkestan gave a certain Tatar to the effect that only persons of the Christian faith could settle on state land. "Do not those documents smell of decay, of the Arakcheyev regime¹⁴² of the last century?" (1794.)

The spokesman for the Caucasian peasants—besides our Party Social-Democrats, whom we shall speak of later on—was the above-mentioned Sagatelyan (Eriwan Gubernia) who shares the Socialist-Revolutionary standpoint. Ter-Avetikyants (Elisavetpol Gubernia), another representative of the "Dashnaktsutyun" Party, spoke in the same strain: "The land must belong to the toilers, i.e., the working people, and to nobody else, on the basis of village commune ownership" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 644). "On behalf of all the Caucasian peasants I declare... at the de-

cisive moment, all the Caucasian peasants will go hand in hand with their elder brothers—the Russian peasants—and win for themselves land and liberty" (646). Eldarkhanov "on behalf of his constituents—the natives of the Terek Region—requests that plunder of the natural wealth be stopped pending the settlement of the agrarian question" (32nd session, May 3, 1907, p. 78). It was the government that was stealing the land, taking the best part of the highland zone, robbing the land of the Kumyk people and laying claim to its minerals (this must have been before the Stockholm lectures of Plekhanov and John on municipalised land being out of the reach of the undemocratic state power).

Speaking on behalf of the Bashkirs, Deputy Khasanov (Ufa Gubernia) mentioned the stealing by the government of two million dessiatins of land, and demanded that this land "be taken back" (39th session, May 16, 1907, p. 641). Deputy Syrtlanov from Ufa made the same demand in the First Duma (20th session, June 2, 1906, p. 923). The spokesman for the Kirghiz-Kaisak people in the Second Duma was Deputy Karatayev (Urals Region) who said: "We Kirghiz-Kaisaks... deeply understand and sympathise with the land hunger of our brother-peasants, we are ready and willing to make room for them" (39th session, p. 673), but "there is very little surplus land", and "re-settlement at the present time entails the eviction of the Kirghiz-Kaisak people".... "The Kirghiz are evicted not from the land, but from their dwellings" (675). "The Kirghiz-Kaisaks always sympathise with all the opposition groups" (675).

The spokesman for the Ukrainian group in the Second Duma was the Cossack Saiko, from Poltava Gubernia. Speaking on March 29, 1907, he quoted the Cossack song: "Hey, Tsarina Catherine, look what you have done! Boundless steppe and happy land to the landlords you have flung. Hey, Tsarina Catherine, pity us and give us land, happy land and shady woods...", and supported the Trudoviks, demanding only that the words "national stock of distributable land" in § 2 of the Bill of the 104 be amended to "regional national [sic!] stock of distributable land to serve as the beginning of socialist organisation". "The Ukrainian

group is of the opinion that the greatest injustice in the world is the private ownership of the land" (1318).

In the First Duma, Deputy Chizhevsky from Poltava said: "As an ardent advocate of the autonomy idea, as an ardent advocate of Ukrainian autonomy in particular, I should very much like the agrarian question to be settled by my people, by individual autonomous bodies, in that autonomous system of our state that I regard as the ideal" (14th session, May 24, 1906, p. 618). At the same time, this Ukrainian autonomist deems state distributable lands to be absolutely essential, and he clarifies an issue which our "municipalisers" have muddled up. "We must firmly and positively establish the principle," said Chizhevsky, "that the state distributable lands must be managed exclusively by local self-governing Zemstvo or autonomous bodies when these are set up. It may be asked: What sense is there in the term 'state distributable lands' if in every particular case they will be managed by local government bodies? I think there is very much sense.... First of all ... part of the state lands should be at the disposal of the central government... our state colonisation lands.... Secondly, the sense of establishing a state stock of distributable land, and the sense of calling it such, is this: although the local bodies will be free to dispose of that land in their respective areas, they will be able to do so only within certain limits" (620). This petty-bourgeois autonomist understands the significance of state power in a society centralised by economic development far better than our Menshevik Social-Democrats.

By the way, in dealing with Chizhevsky's speech, we cannot leave unmentioned his criticism of "norms". "Labour norm is an empty sound," he says bluntly, pointing out the diversity of agricultural conditions, and on the same grounds he also rejects the "subsistence" norm. "I think land should be allotted to the peasants not according to a norm, but according to the amount of land available.... The peasants should be given all that can be given in the particular locality," —for example, in Poltava Gubernia "land should be taken away from all the landowners, who should be left with an average of 50 dessiatins each at the most" (621). Is it surprising that the Cadets chatter about norms in order to conceal their plans regarding the actual

amount of land to be alienated? Although criticising the Cadets, Chizhevsky does not yet realise this.*

The conclusion to be drawn from our review of the Duma speeches on the agrarian question delivered by the "nationals" is obvious. Those speeches fully confirm what I said in opposition to Maslov in the pamphlet *Revision, etc.*, on p. 18 (first edition) ** on the question of the relation between municipalisation and the rights of the nationalities, namely, that it is a *political* question, which is *fully dealt with* in the political section of our programme, and is dragged into the agrarian programme merely because of philistine provincialism.

In Stockholm, the Mensheviks worked with comical zeal to "purge municipalisation of nationalisation" (the words of the Menshevik Novosedsky, Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 146). "Some historical regions, such as Poland and Lithuania," said Novosedsky, "coincide with national territories, and the transfer of land to these regions may serve as the basis for the successful development of nationalist-federalist tendencies, which will again, in effect, transform municipalisation into nationalisation piecemeal." And so Novosedsky and Dan proposed and secured the adoption of an amendment: for the words, "self-governing large *regional* organisations" in Maslov's draft substitute the words: "large *local* self-governing bodies that will unite urban and rural districts".

An ingenious way of "purging municipalisation of nationalisation", I must say. To substitute one word for another

* Chizhevsky also brings out very strikingly the thesis of the unconsciously-bourgeois Trudoviks, with which we are already familiar, namely, growth of industry and a *decrease* in the movement to the land in the event of a consistent peasant revolution. "The peasants in our district, the very electors who sent us here, have made, for example, the following calculation: 'If we were a little richer and if each of our families could spend five or six rubles on sugar every year, several sugar refineries would arise in each of the uyezds where it is possible to grow sugar beet, in addition to those that are already there'. Naturally, if those refineries were to arise, what a mass of hands would be required for intensified farming! The output of the sugar refineries would increase," etc. (622). That is precisely the programme of "American" farming and of the "American" development of capitalism in Russia.

** See present edition, Vol. 10, p. 182.—*Ed.*

—is it not obvious that this will automatically lead to the reshuffling of the “historical regions”?

No, gentlemen, no substitution of words will help you to rid municipalisation of its inherent “nationalist-federalist” nonsense. The Second Duma showed that what the “municipalisation” idea did *in fact* was *only to promote* the nationalist tendencies of various groups of the bourgeoisie. *It was these groups alone*, not counting the Right Cossack Karaulov, that “took upon themselves” the protection of various “territorial” and “regional” distributable lands. In so doing these nationals *threw out the agrarian* content of provincialisation (for actually Maslov “gives” the land to provinces and not to “municipalities”, so the word provincialisation is more exact): nothing is to be decided beforehand, *everything*—the question of redemption payment, the question of ownership, and so forth—is to be left to the autonomous Sejms, or to regional, etc., self-governing bodies. The result is the fullest confirmation of my statement that “just the same, the law transferring the Transcaucasian lands to the Zemstvo will have to be passed by a constituent assembly in St. Petersburg, because, surely, Maslov does not want to give any region freedom to retain landlordism” (*Revision, etc.*, p. 18).*

Thus, events have confirmed that to argue the case for municipalisation on the basis of the nationalities’ agreement or disagreement is a poor argument. The municipalisation in our programme turns out to be in conflict with the definitely expressed opinion of very diverse nationalities.

Events have confirmed, in fact, that municipalisation serves not as a guide for the mass, nation-wide peasant movement, but as a means of breaking this movement up into provincial and national streams. The *only* thing that *life* absorbed from Maslov’s *idea* of regional stocks of distributable land is national-autonomist “regionalism”.

The “nationals” stand somewhat aloof from *our* agrarian question. Many non-Russian nationalities have no independent peasant movement at the heart of the revolution, such as we have. It is quite natural, therefore, that in their

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 182-83.—*Ed.*

programmes the "nationals" often keep somewhat aloof from the *Russian* agrarian question, as much as to say: it has nothing to do with us, we have our own problem. For the nationalist bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie such a standpoint is inevitable.

For the proletariat, however, such a standpoint is impermissible; but it is precisely into this impermissible bourgeois nationalism that our programme *actually* falls. Just as the "nationals", at best, only associate themselves with the all-Russian movement, without the intention of strengthening it tenfold by uniting and concentrating the movement, so the Mensheviks draft a programme which *associates itself* with the peasant revolution instead of presenting a programme to guide the revolution, to unite it, and advance it. Municipalisation is not a slogan of the peasant revolution, but an artificial plan of petty-bourgeois reformism added on from outside in a backwater of the revolution.

The Social-Democratic proletariat cannot alter its programme in order to win the "agreement" of this or that nationality. Our task is to unite and concentrate the movement by advocating the best path, the best agrarian system possible in bourgeois society, by combating the force of tradition, prejudice, and conservative provincialism. "Disagreement" with the socialisation of the land on the part of the small peasants cannot alter our programme of the socialist revolution; it can only cause us to prefer action *by example*. The same applies to the nationalisation of the land in a bourgeois revolution. No "disagreement" with it on the part of a nationality or several nationalities can make us alter the doctrine that it is in the interest of the entire people that they should be freed to the utmost extent from medieval landownership and that private ownership of the land should be abolished. The "disagreement" of considerable sections of the toiling masses of this or that nationality will make us prefer influence by example to every other form of influence. The nationalisation of the land available for colonisation, the nationalisation of forest land, the nationalisation of all the land in central Russia, cannot exist for long side by side with private ownership of the land in some other part of the country (once the unification

of this country is due to the really main current of economic evolution). One or the other system must gain the upper hand. Experience will decide that. Our task is to explain to the people what conditions are most favourable for the proletariat and for the toiling masses in a capitalistically developing country.

9. THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

Of the eight Social-Democratic speeches on the agrarian question in the Second Duma only two contained a *defence* of municipalisation and not merely a reference to it. One was that of Ozol, and the other the second speech of Tsereteli. The rest of the speeches consisted mainly, almost exclusively, of attacks on landlordism in general, and of explanations of the political aspect of the agrarian question. Highly characteristic in this respect was the artless speech delivered by the Right peasant Petrochenko (22nd session, April 5, 1907), which expressed the general impression made on a rural deputy by the spokesmen of the different parties. "I will not waste your time by going over what has been said here; permit me to put it in simple words. Deputy Svyatopolk-Mirsky made a long speech here. Evidently, that speech was meant to prepare us for something. Briefly, it amounts to this: you have no right to take the land which belongs to me, or which I possess, and I will not give it up. In answer to this Deputy Kutler said: 'Those times have gone, you must give it up, do so and you will be paid for it'. Deputy Dmowski says: 'Do what you like with the land, but we must have autonomy, without fail'. At the same time Deputy Karavayev says: 'We need both, but throw everything in one heap and later on we'll share it out'. Tsereteli says: 'No, gentlemen, we cannot share it out because the old government still exists and it will not permit it. Better for us to try to seize power and then we can share out as we please'" (p. 1615).

Thus, this peasant grasped what he found to be the only distinction between the speech of the Social-Democrat and that of the Trudovik, namely, that the former explained the necessity of fighting for power in the state, of "seizing power". He failed to grasp the other distinctions—they

did not seem important to him! In his first speech Tsereteli did, indeed, expose the fact that "our bureaucratic aristocracy is also a landed aristocracy" (725). The speaker showed that "for several centuries the state authority handed out into private ownership land that belonged to the whole state, land that was the property of the whole people" (724). The statement he made at the end of his speech on behalf of the Social-Democratic group, which was a recapitulation of our agrarian programme, was not backed by any argument, and was not contrasted to the programmes of the other "Left" parties. We are saying this not in order to blame anybody; on the contrary, we think that Tsereteli's first speech, a short, lucid speech which concentrated on explaining the class character of the landlord government, was a very good one. We are saying this in order to explain why the Right peasant (and probably all the peasants) failed to see the specifically Social-Democratic features of our programme.

The second Social-Democratic speech on the agrarian question was delivered at the next "agrarian session" of the Duma (16th session, March 26, 1907) by a worker Fomichov (Taurida Gubernia), who often used the words: "we peasants". Fomichov made a stinging retort to Svyatopolk-Mirsky, whose famous phrase that the peasants without the landlords are "a flock without a shepherd" did more to stir up the peasant deputies than a number of other Left speeches. "Deputy Kutler, in a lengthy speech, expounded the idea of compulsory alienation, but with compensation. We, the representatives of the peasants, cannot agree to compensation because it will be another noose round the necks of the peasants" (1113). Fomichov ended up by demanding that "all the land be handed over to the working people on the terms proposed by Deputy Tsereteli" (1114).

The next speech was delivered by Izmailov, also a worker, who was elected by the peasant curia in Novgorod Gubernia (18th session, March 29, 1907). He replied to the peasant Bogatov, his fellow-deputy from Novgorod, who, in the name of the Novgorod peasants, had agreed to compensation. Izmailov indignantly opposed compensation. He spoke of the terms of the "emancipation" of the Novgorod peasants who, out of ten million dessiatins of arable land,

had received two million dessiatins, and out of six million dessiatins of forest land had received only one million dessiatins. He described the poverty of the peasants who have been reduced to such a state that not only "have they used the fences round their huts for decades to heat their stoves", but "saw off the corners of their own huts"; "out of big old huts they build small ones in order, when rebuilding, to save a log or two for firewood" (1344). "In face of these conditions, under which our peasants live, the gentlemen on the Right sigh for culture. In their opinion, culture has been killed by the muzhik, you see. But can a cold and hungry peasant think of culture? Instead of land they want to offer him this culture; but I don't trust them here either, I think they, too, will be glad to sell their land, only they will bargain to make the peasant pay dearly for it. That's why they agree. In my opinion—and the peasants particularly should know this—it is not a question of the land, gentlemen. I think I shall not be mistaken in saying that there is something else behind this land, some other kind of power, which the feudal nobility are afraid to hand over to the people, are afraid to lose together with the land. I mean political power, gentlemen. They are willing to give up the land, and they will do so, but in such a way that we remain their slaves as of old. If we fall into debt we shall never free ourselves from the power of the feudal landlords" (1345). It is difficult to imagine anything more striking and apt than this exposure by a worker of the essence of the Cadets' plans!

The Social-Democrat Serov, during the 20th session, April 2, 1907, mainly criticised the views of the Cadets, as the "representatives of capital" (1492), "representatives of capitalist landownership". He quoted detailed figures showing what redemption meant in 1861 and rejected the "elastic principle" of a fair valuation. Serov, from the Marxist standpoint, gave a faultlessly correct answer to Kutler's argument that it was impossible to confiscate the land without confiscating capital. "We do not at all put forward the argument that the land is nobody's, that the land is not the creation of human hands" (1497). "Having achieved self-consciousness, the proletariat, represented here by the Social-Democratic Party, rejects all forms of exploitation,

both feudal and bourgeois. As far as the proletariat is concerned, the question which of these two forms of exploitation is more just does not exist; the question always before it is: are the historical conditions ripe for emancipation from exploitation?" (1499.) "According to the calculations of the statisticians, if the land is confiscated, up to 500,000,000 rubles, representing the unearned incomes of the landlords, will pass to the people. The peasants will, of course, use this income to improve their farms, to expand production, and to increase consumption" (1498).

At the 22nd session of the Duma (April 5, 1907), speeches on the agrarian question were delivered by Anikin and Alexinsky. The former stressed the connection between "the higher bureaucracy and big landownership" and argued that the struggle for freedom could not be separated from the struggle for land. The latter, in a lengthy speech, explained the feudal character of the labour-service system of farming that predominates in Russia. The speaker thus expounded the basis of the Marxist view of the peasants' struggle against landlordism, and then showed the dual role played by the village commune (a "survival of olden times" and an "apparatus for influencing the landlords' estates"), and the purpose of the laws of November 9 and 15, 1906 (to align the kulaks with the landlords as a "main-stay"). The speaker gave figures showing that "the peasants' land hunger means the nobility's land surfeit" and explained that the Cadets' scheme for "compulsory" alienation meant "coercing the people for the benefit of the landlords" (1635). Alexinsky quoted the "Cadet organ *Rech*" (1639), which had admitted the Cadet truth that it wanted the landlords to predominate on the proposed land committees. The Cadet Tatarinov, who spoke at the next session but one after Alexinsky, was thus driven into a corner, as we have already seen.

Ozol's speech at the 39th session (May 16, 1907) is an example of the arguments, unworthy of Marxists, to which some of our Social-Democrats have been driven by Maslov's famous "criticism" of Marx's theory of rent and by his corresponding distortion of the concept of nationalisation of the land. Ozol argued against the S.R.'s as follows: Their "Bill is hopeless, in my opinion, for it proposes to

abolish private ownership of the means of production, in this case of the land, while preserving private ownership of factory buildings, and not only of factory buildings, but also of the dwellings and structures. On page 2 of the Bill we read that all the buildings erected on the land, and exploited on capitalist lines, are to remain private property; but every private owner will say: Be so good as to pay all the expenses for the nationalised lands, for paving the streets, and so forth, and I will receive rent from these houses. This is not nationalisation, but simply an easier means of receiving capitalist income in the most developed capitalist form" (667).

So there it is, this Maslovism! First, it repeats the banal argument of the Rights and the Cadets that it is impossible to abolish feudal exploitation without affecting bourgeois exploitation as well. Secondly, it reveals amazing ignorance of political economy: the "rent" from urban houses, etc., contains the lion's share of *ground rent*. Thirdly, our "Marxist", following Maslov, entirely forgets about (or denies?) absolute rent. Fourthly, it appears as though a Marxist rejects the desirability of "the most developed capitalist form" advocated by a Socialist-Revolutionary! Pearls of Maslov's municipalisation....

Tsereteli, in a lengthy concluding speech (47th session, May 26, 1907), defended municipalisation more thoughtfully, of course, than Ozol did; but it was Tsereteli's painstaking, thoughtful, and lucid defence that most glaringly revealed the utter fallacy of the municipalisers' chief arguments.

Tsereteli's criticism of the Right deputies at the beginning of his speech was quite correct from the political angle. His remarks about the charlatans of liberalism, who were trying to scare the people with the bogey of upheavals like the French Revolution, were magnificent. "He [Shingaryov] forgets that it was after the confiscation of the landlords' estates and because of it that France was regenerated for a new and vigorous life" (1228). Quite correct too was Tsereteli's chief slogan: "the complete abolition of landlordism and the complete liquidation of the landlord bureaucratic regime" (1224). But as soon as he proceeded to deal with the Cadets, the erroneous position of Menshevism,

made itself felt. "The principle of compulsory alienation of the land," said Tsereteli, "is, objectively, the principle of the movement for liberation, but not all those who stand for this principle are aware of, or want to admit, all the necessary implications of this principle" (1225). That is the fundamental view of Menshevism, namely, that the "watershed" of the major political divisions in our revolution runs right of the Cadets and not left, as we believe. That this view is wrong is abundantly made clear by Tsereteli's lucid formula, for after the experience of 1861 it is beyond dispute that compulsory alienation is possible together with the predominance of the landlords' interests, with the preservation of their *rule*, with the imposition of a new form of bondage. Still more fallacious was Tsereteli's statement that "on the question of the forms of land tenure, we [Social-Democrats] are farther removed from them" (the Narodniks) than from the Cadets (1230). The speaker then went on to criticise labour and subsistence "norms". In this he was a thousand times right, but the stand taken by the Cadets *on this question* is *not a bit better* than that of the Trudoviks, for the Cadets misuse "norms" far more. That is not all. The fuss the Cadets are making about the stupid "norms" is a result of their bureaucratic outlook and of their tendency *to betray* the peasants. As for the peasants, "norms" were brought to them from outside by the Narodnik intellectuals; and we have seen above, from the example of the deputies in the First Duma, Chizhevsky and Poyarkov, how trenchantly the practical people from the rural districts criticise all "norms". Had the Social-Democrats explained *this* to the peasant deputies, had they moved an amendment to the Trudovik Bill repudiating norms, had they theoretically explained the significance of nationalisation, which has nothing in common with "norms", they, the Social-Democrats, would have become the leaders of the peasant revolution as against the liberals. The stand taken by Menshevism, however, is that of subordinating the proletariat to liberal influence. It was particularly strange to say in the Second Duma that we Social-Democrats are farther removed from the Narodniks, since the Cadets declared *in favour* of restricting the sale and mortgaging of land!

Proceeding to criticise nationalisation, Tsereteli adduced three arguments: (1) "an army of officials", (2) "gross injustice to the small nationalities", (3) "in the event of restoration" "a weapon would be placed in the hands of the enemy of the people" (1232). That is a conscientious exposition of the views of those who secured the adoption of our Party programme, and as a Party man, Tsereteli had to expound those views. We have shown above how untenable those views are and how superficial this exclusively political criticism is.

In support of municipalisation Tsereteli adduced six arguments: (1) under municipalisation "the actual expenditure of these resources [i.e., rent] to meet the people's [...] needs will be ensured" (*sic!* p. 1233)—an optimistic assertion; (2) "the municipalities will strive to improve the conditions of the unemployed"—as, for example, in democratic and decentralised America (?); (3) "the municipalities can take over these [big] farms and organise model farms", and (4) "during an agrarian crisis ... will lease land free of charge to landless, propertyless peasants" (*sic!* p. 1234). This is demagogy worse than that of the S.R.'s; it is a programme of petty-bourgeois socialism in a bourgeois revolution. (5) "A bulwark of democracy"—like Cossack local self-government; (6) "the alienation of allotment land ... may give rise to a frightful counter-revolutionary movement"—probably against the will of all the peasants who declared for nationalisation.

Sum and substance of the speeches of the Social-Democrats in the Second Duma: leading role on the question of compensation and of the connection between landlordism and the present state power, and an agrarian programme that slips into Cadetism, betraying failure to understand the economic and political conditions of the peasant revolution.

Sum and substance of the entire debate on the agrarian question in the Second Duma: the Right landlords displayed the clearest understanding of their class interests, the most distinct conception of both the economic and political conditions needed for the preservation of their class rule in bourgeois Russia. In effect, the liberals aligned themselves with these landlords and sought to betray the

peasants to them by the most despicable and hypocritical methods. The Narodnik intellectuals introduced in the peasant programmes a touch of bureaucracy and philistine moralising. The peasants, in the most vigorous and forth-right manner, expressed the spontaneous revolutionariness of their struggle against all the survivals of medievalism, and against all forms of medieval landownership, although they lacked a sufficiently clear conception of the political conditions of this struggle and naïvely idealised the "promised land" of bourgeois freedom. The bourgeois nationalists aligned themselves with the peasants' struggle more or less timidly, being greatly imbued with the narrow views and prejudices that are engendered by the insularity of the small nationalities. The Social-Democrats resolutely championed the cause of the peasant revolution and explained the class character of the present state power, but they were unable to lead the peasant revolution consistently owing to the erroneous character of the Party's agrarian programme.

CONCLUSION

The agrarian question is the basis of the bourgeois revolution in Russia and determines the specific national character of this revolution.

The essence of this question is the struggle of the peasantry to abolish landlordism and the survivals of serfdom in the agricultural system of Russia, and, consequently, also in all her social and political institutions.

Ten and a half million peasant households in European Russia own 75,000,000 dessiatins of land. Thirty thousand, chiefly noble, but partly also upstart, landlords each own over 500 dessiatins—altogether 70,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the picture. Such are the main reasons for the predominance of feudal landlords in the agricultural system of Russia and, consequently, in the Russian state generally, and in the whole of Russian life. The owners of the latifundia are feudal landlords in the economic sense of the term: the basis of their landownership was created by the history of serfdom, by the history of land-grabbing by the nobility through the centuries. The basis of their present methods of farming is the labour-

service system, i. e., a direct survival of the corvée, cultivation of the land with the implements of the peasants and by the virtual enslavement of the small tillers in an endless variety of ways: winter hiring, annual leases, half-share métayage, leases based on labour rent, bondage for debt, bondage for cut-off lands, for the use of forests, meadows, water, and so on and so forth, *ad infinitum*. Capitalist development in Russia has made such strides during the last half-century that the preservation of serfdom in agriculture has become *absolutely* impossible, and its abolition has assumed the forms of a violent crisis, of a nation-wide revolution. But the abolition of serfdom in a bourgeois country is possible in two ways.

Serfdom may be abolished by the feudal-landlord economies slowly evolving into Junker-bourgeois economies, by the mass of the peasants being turned into landless husbandmen and Knechts, by forcibly keeping the masses down to a pauper standard of living, by the rise of small groups of Grossbauern, of rich bourgeois peasants, who inevitably spring up under capitalism from among the peasantry. That is the path that the Black-Hundred landlords, and Stolypin, their minister, have chosen. They have realised that the path for the development of Russia *cannot* be cleared unless the rusty medieval forms of landownership are forcibly broken up. And they have boldly set out to break them up *in the interests of the landlords*. They have thrown overboard the sympathy for the semi-feudal village commune which until recently was widespread among the bureaucracy and the landlords. They have evaded all the "constitutional" laws in order to break up the village communes by force. They have given the kulaks *carte blanche* to rob the peasant masses, to break up the old system of landownership, to ruin thousands of peasant farms; they have handed over the medieval village to be "sacked and plundered" by the possessors of money. They *cannot* act otherwise if they are to preserve their class rule, for they have realised the necessity of adapting themselves to capitalist development and not fighting against it. And in order to preserve their rule they can find no other allies *against* the mass of the peasants than the "upstarts", the Razuvayevs and Kolupayevs.¹⁴³ They have no alternative but to shout to these

Kolupayevs: *Enrichissez-vous!*—enrich yourselves! We shall make it possible for you to gain a hundred rubles for every ruble, if you will help us to save the basis of our rule under the new conditions. That path of development, if it is to be pursued successfully, calls for wholesale, systematic, unbridled *violence* against the peasant masses and against the proletariat. And the landlord counter-revolution is hastening to organise that violence all along the line.

The other path of development we have called the American path of development of capitalism, in contrast to the former, the Prussian path. It, too, involves the forcible break-up of the old system of landownership; only the obtuse philistines of Russian liberalism can dream of the possibility of a painless, peaceful outcome of the exceedingly acute crisis in Russia.

But this essential and inevitable break-up may be carried out in the interests of the peasant masses and not of the landlord gang. A mass of free farmers may serve as a basis for the development of capitalism without any landlord economy whatsoever, since, *taken as a whole*, the latter form of economy is economically reactionary, whereas the elements of free farming have been *created* among the peasantry by the preceding economic history of the country. Capitalist development along such a path *should* proceed far more broadly, freely, and swiftly owing to the tremendous growth of the home market and of the rise in the standard of living, the energy, initiative, and culture of the *entire* population. And Russia's vast lands available for colonisation, the utilisation of which is greatly hampered by the feudal oppression of the mass of the peasantry in Russia proper, as well as by the feudal-bureaucratic handling of the agrarian policy—these lands will provide the economic foundation for a huge expansion of agriculture and for increased production in both depth and breadth.

Such a path of development requires not only the abolition of landlordism. For the rule of the feudal landlords through the centuries has left its imprint on *all* forms of landownership in the country, on the peasant allotments as well as upon the holdings of the settlers in the relatively free borderlands: the whole colonisation policy of the autocracy is permeated with the Asiatic interference of a hide-

bound bureaucracy, which hindered the settlers from establishing themselves freely, introduced terrible confusion into the new agrarian relationships, and infected the border regions with the poison of the feudal bureaucracy of central Russia.* Not only is landlordism in Russia medieval, but so also is the peasant allotment system. The latter is incredibly complicated. It splits the peasantry up into thousands of small units, medieval groups, social categories. It reflects the age-old history of arrogant interference in the peasants' agrarian relationships both by the central government and the local authorities. It drives the peasants, as into a ghetto, into petty medieval associations of a fiscal, tax-levying nature, into associations for the ownership of allotment land, i. e., into the village communes. And Russia's economic development is *in actual fact* tearing the peasantry out of this medieval environment—on the one hand, by causing allotments to be rented out and abandoned, and, on the other hand, by creating a system of farming by the free farmers of the future (or by the future Grossbauern of a Junker Russia) *out of the fragments* of the most diverse forms of landownership: privately owned allotments, rented allotments, purchased property, land rented from the landlord, land rented from the state, and so on.

In order to establish *really* free farming in Russia, it is necessary to "unfence" *all* the land, landlord as well as allotment land. The *whole* system of medieval landownership must be broken up and all lands must be made equal for free farmers upon a free soil. The greatest possible facilities must be created for the exchange of holdings, for the free choice of settlements, for rounding off holdings, for the creation of new, free associations, instead of the rusty, tax-levying village communes. The whole land must be "cleared" of all medieval lumber.

The expression of this economic necessity is the nationalisation of the land, the abolition of private ownership of the land, and the transfer of *all* the land to the state,

* Mr. A. Kaufman, in his *Migration and Colonisation* (St. Petersburg, 1905), gives an outline of the history of Russian colonisation policy. Like a good "liberal", he is excessively deferent to the feudal landlord bureaucracy.

which will mark a complete break with the feudal relations in the countryside. It is this economic necessity that has turned the *mass* of Russian peasants into supporters of land nationalisation. The mass of small owner cultivators declared in favour of nationalisation at the congresses of the Peasant Union in 1905, in the First Duma in 1906, and in the Second Duma in 1907, i. e., during the whole of the first period of the revolution. They did so not because the "village commune" had imbued them with certain special "rudiments", certain special, non-bourgeois "labour principles". On the contrary, they did so because life required of them that they should seek *emancipation* from the medieval village commune and from the medieval allotment system. They did so not because they wanted or were able to build a socialist agriculture, but because they have been wanting and have been able to build a really bourgeois small-scale farming, i. e., farming freed as much as possible from *all* the traditions of serfdom.

Thus, it was neither chance nor the influence of this or that doctrine (as some short-sighted people think) that determined this peculiar attitude towards private ownership of the land on the part of the classes that are fighting in the Russian revolution. This peculiar attitude is to be explained by the conditions of the development of capitalism in Russia and by the requirements of capitalism at this stage of its development. All the Black-Hundred landlords, all the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie (including the Octobrists *and the Cadets*) stand for private ownership of the land. The whole of the peasantry and the proletariat are opposed to the private ownership of the land. The reformative path of creating a Junker-bourgeois Russia presupposes the preservation of the foundations of the old system of landownership and their slow adaptation to capitalism, which would be painful for the mass of the population. The revolutionary path of really overthrowing the old order inevitably requires, as its economic basis, the destruction of all the old forms of landownership, together with all the old political institutions of Russia. The experience of the first period of the Russian revolution has conclusively proved that it can be victorious only as a peasant agrarian revolution, and that the latter cannot

completely fulfil its historical mission unless the land is nationalised.

Social-Democracy, as the party of the international proletariat, the party which has set itself world-wide socialist aims, cannot, of course, identify itself with any epoch of any bourgeois revolution, nor can it tie its destiny to this or that outcome of this or that bourgeois revolution. Whatever the outcome, we must remain an independent, purely proletarian party, which steadfastly leads the working masses to their great socialist goal. We cannot, therefore, undertake to guarantee that any of the gains of the bourgeois revolution will be permanent, because impermanence and inherent contradiction are immanent features of *all* the gains of the bourgeois revolution as such. The "invention" of "guarantees against restoration" can only be the fruit of shallow thinking. We have but one task: to rally the proletariat for the socialist revolution, to support every fight against the old order in the most resolute way, to fight for the best possible conditions for the proletariat in the developing bourgeois society. From this it inevitably follows that our Social-Democratic programme in the Russian bourgeois revolution can *only* be nationalisation of the land. Like every other part of our programme, we must connect it with definite forms and a definite stage of political reform, because the scope of the political revolution and that of the agrarian revolution cannot but be the same. Like every other part of our programme, we must keep it strictly free from petty-bourgeois illusions, from intellectualist-bureaucratic chatter about "norms", from reactionary talk about strengthening the village communes, or about equalised land tenure. The interests of the proletariat do not demand that a special slogan, a special "plan" or "system" shall be invented for this or that bourgeois revolution, they only demand that the objective conditions for this revolution shall be *consistently* expressed and that these objective, economically unavoidable conditions be stripped of illusions and utopias. Nationalisation of the land is not only the sole means for completely eliminating mediævalism in agriculture, but also the best form of agrarian relationships conceivable under capitalism.

Three circumstances have temporarily deflected the


Russian Social-Democrats from this correct agrarian programme. First, P. Maslov, the initiator of "municipalisation" in Russia, "revised" the theory of Marx, repudiated the theory of absolute rent, and revived the semi-decayed bourgeois doctrines about the law of diminishing returns, its connection with the theory of rent, etc. To repudiate absolute rent is to deny that private landownership has any economic significance under capitalism, and, consequently, this inevitably led to the distortion of Marxist views on nationalisation. Secondly, not having before them visible evidence that the peasant revolution had *begun*, Russian Social-Democrats could not but regard its possibility with caution, because the possible victory of the revolution requires a number of especially favourable conditions and an especially favourable development of revolutionary consciousness, energy, and initiative on the part of the masses. Having no *experience* to go on, and holding that it is impossible to invent bourgeois movements, the Russian Marxists naturally could not, *before the revolution*, present a correct agrarian programme. But even *after* the revolution had begun, they committed the following mistake: instead of applying the theory of Marx to the special conditions prevailing in Russia (Marx and Engels always taught that their theory was not a dogma, but a *guide to action*), they uncritically repeated the conclusions drawn from the application of Marx's theory to foreign conditions, to a *different epoch*. The German Social-Democrats, for instance, have quite naturally abandoned all the old programmes of Marx containing the demand for the nationalisation of the land, because Germany has taken final shape as a Junker-bourgeois country, and all movements there based on the bourgeois order have become completely obsolete, and there is not, nor can there be, any people's movement for nationalisation. The preponderance of Junker-bourgeois elements has *actually transformed* the plans for nationalisation into a plaything, or even into an instrument of the Junkers for robbing the masses. The Germans are right in refusing even to talk about nationalisation. But to apply this conclusion to Russia (as is done in effect by those of our Mensheviks who do not see the connection between municipalisation and Maslov's revision of the theory of

Marx) is to reveal an inability to think of the tasks each Social-Democratic party has to perform in special periods of its historical development.

Thirdly, the municipalisation programme obviously reflects the erroneous tactical line of Menshevism in the Russian bourgeois revolution, namely, a failure to understand that only "an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry" * can ensure the victory of this revolution, a failure to understand the leading role the proletariat plays in the bourgeois revolution, a striving to push the proletariat aside, to adapt it to a half-way outcome of the revolution, to convert it from a leader into an auxiliary (actually into a drudge and servant) of the liberal bourgeoisie. "Never enthusing, adaptation using, forward then slowly, ye workers so lowly"—these words of Nartsis Tuporylov¹⁴⁴ against the "Economists" (=the first opportunists in the R.S.D.L.P.), fully express the *spirit* of our present agrarian programme.

Combating the "enthusiasm" of petty-bourgeois socialism should lead not to the contraction, but to the expansion of the scope of the revolution and its aims as determined by the proletariat. It is not "regionalism" that we should encourage, no matter how strong it may be among the backward strata of the petty bourgeoisie or the privileged peasantry (Cossacks), not the exclusiveness of various nationalities—no, we should make the peasantry see how important unity is if victory is to be achieved, we should advance slogans that will widen the movement, not narrow it, and that will place the responsibility for the *incomplete* bourgeois revolution on the backwardness of the bourgeoisie and not on the lack of understanding of the proletariat. We should not "adapt" our programme to "local" democracy; we should not invent a rural "municipal socialism", which is absurd and impossible under an undemocratic central government; we should not adjust petty-bourgeois socialist reformism to the bourgeois revolution, but concentrate the attention of the masses on the actual conditions for the victory of the revolution as a bourgeois revolution, on the

* That is how Kautsky expressed it in the second edition of his pamphlet *Social Revolution*.

... олько в начале этого года
составлены и опубликованы
западные мысли об аграрной
реформе в России. Правда, в
конце 60-х годов были опублико-
ваны некоторые предварительные
мысли, в том числе А. С. Пушкин
и А. С. Грибоедов, но эти мысли
были не вполне законченными
полемиками, в то время как
западные мысли об аграрной ре-
форме в России были уже
окончательно сформулированы.

Март 1907 г.

The last page of Lenin's manuscript
The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy
in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907.
November-December 1907
Reduced

need for achieving not only local, but "central" democracy, i.e., the democratisation of the central government of the state—and not merely democracy in general, but the absolutely fullest, highest forms of democracy, for otherwise the peasant agrarian revolution in Russia will become *utopian* in the scientific sense of the term.

And let it not be thought that at the present moment of history, when the Black-Hundred die-hards are howling and raging in the Third Duma, when the *nec plus ultra* of rampant counter-revolution has been reached and reaction is perpetrating savage acts of political vengeance upon the revolutionaries in general and the Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma in particular—let it not be thought that this moment is "unsuitable" for "broad" agrarian programmes. Such a thought would be akin to the backsliding, despondency, disintegration, and decadence which have spread among wide sections of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals who belong to the Social-Democratic Party, or sympathise with this Party in Russia. The proletariat can only gain by having this rubbish swept clean out of the ranks of the workers' party. Yes, the more savagely reaction rages, the more does it actually retard the inevitable economic development, the more successfully does it prepare the wider upsurge of the democratic movement. And we must take advantage of the temporary lulls in mass action in order critically to study the experience of the great revolution, verify this experience, purge it of dross, and pass it on to the masses as a guide for the impending struggle.

November-December 1907

POSTSCRIPT¹⁴⁵

The present work was written at the end of 1907. It was printed in St. Petersburg in 1908, but was seized and destroyed by the tsarist censor. Only one copy was saved, but the end of it was missing (after page 269 of that edition). This has now been added.

At the present time the revolution poses the agrarian question in Russia in an immeasurably broader, deeper, and sharper form than it did in 1905-07. Knowledge of the history of our Party programme in the first revolution will, I hope, contribute to a more correct understanding of the aims of the present revolution.

It is particularly necessary to emphasise the following. The war has caused such untold calamities to the belligerent countries and has at the same time accelerated the development of capitalism to such a tremendous degree, converting monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism, that *neither* the proletariat *nor* the revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats *can* keep within the limits of capitalism.

Life has already overstepped those limits and has placed on the order of the day the regulation of production and distribution on a national scale, universal labour service, compulsory syndication (uniting in unions), etc.

Under these circumstances, the question of the nationalisation of the land must inevitably be presented in a new way in the agrarian programme, namely: nationalisation of the land is not only "the last word" of the bourgeois revolution, but also *a step towards socialism*. The calamities due to the war cannot be combated unless such steps are taken.

The proletariat, leading the poorest section of the peasantry, is compelled, on the one hand, to shift the weight of emphasis from the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies to the Soviets of Agricultural Workers' Deputies, and on the other hand, to demand the nationalisation of farm implements in the landlords' estates and also the conversion of those estates into model farms under the control of these latter Soviets.

I cannot, of course, deal with these extremely important questions in greater detail here; I must refer the readers who are interested in them to the current Bolshevik literature and to my pamphlets: *Letters on Tactics* and *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution (Draft of a Platform for the Proletarian Party)*.

September 28, 1917

The Author

Published according
to the book text

THE DEBATE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE DUMA'S BUDGETARY POWERS¹⁴⁶

The question of extending the budgetary powers of the Duma was debated at three sessions held on January 12, 15, and 17. The Cadet Party brought in a Bill for that purpose signed by forty Duma members. Representatives of all the parties spoke on the subject and the Minister of Finance made two long speeches on behalf of the government. A representative of the Social-Democratic Labour Party also spoke. And the debate concluded with the *unanimous* (so says *Stolichnaya Pochta*¹⁴⁷ for January 18) adoption of the Octobrists' motion that the Bill for the extension of the Duma's budgetary powers be referred to committee "without going into the extent of these changes", i.e., the changes to the Rules of March 8, which considerably restricted the budgetary powers of the Duma.

How could such a strange thing happen? How could the Third Duma, a parliament of Black-Hundred die-hards, *unanimously* adopt a motion of the Octobrists, which virtually falls in with the government's wishes and was presented *after* the first speech of the Minister of Finance, who anticipated just such an outcome. In substance, the Cadets' Bill is unacceptable; on particular points—why not modify the law. So declared the Black-Hundred Minister. And the Octobrists worded their proposal accordingly, stressing the fact that they *did not go into the extent of those changes in the law*.

That the Octobrists saw eye to eye with the Black-Hundred Minister is not surprising. Nor, to anyone familiar with the nature of the Constitutional-Democratic Party,

was it surprising that the Cadets withdrew their wording (in which, of course, nothing was mentioned about their *not going into* the extent of the changes which they themselves had outlined!). But that the Social-Democrats could be a party to this kind of *unanimity* is incredible, and we should like to believe that *Stolichnaya Pochta* did not tell the truth, and that the Social-Democrats did not vote for the Octobrists' motion.

However, there is a more important issue here than the question whether the Social-Democrats voted for or against the Octobrists. And that is the question of the *mistake* undoubtedly committed by the Social-Democratic deputy Pokrovsky 2nd. It is to this mistake and to the real political significance of the debate of January 12, 15, and 17, that we wish to draw the attention of our readers.

The Russian Duma has no budgetary powers, for "*by law*" the rejection of a budget does not prevent it from being put into execution. That law, promulgated by the counter-revolutionary government after the defeat of the December uprising (February 20, 1906, the notorious "Fundamental Laws"), makes a *mockery* of popular representation at the hands of the Black Hundreds, the tsar, and the landlords. And the "Rules" of March 8, 1906, further *emphasise* this mockery by imposing a multitude of petty restraints on an *examination* of the budget in the Duma and by even laying it down (Article 9) that "during the discussion of the draft state budget, items of revenue and expenditure which have been inserted in the draft on the basis of existing laws, civil lists, and schedules, as well as royal commands issued by way of supreme governance, cannot be excluded or modified". Is this not a mockery? Nothing that conforms to the laws, to the civil lists, to schedules, or simply to the royal *commands*, can be *modified*! Is it not ridiculous, after this, to talk about the budgetary powers of the Russian Duma?

The question now arises—what *were* the tasks of the bourgeois democrats, if they are really fighting for freedom, in the face of such a situation? What were the tasks of the workers' party?—in *this* article we are speaking only of the tasks of parliamentary struggle and of the parliamentary representatives of the respective parties.

Obviously, the question of the Duma's budgetary powers *had* to be raised in the Duma *in order to make quite clear* to both the Russian people and to Europe the Black-Hundred contemptuous attitude of tsarism and to show the *complete powerlessness* of the Duma. The immediate practical object of such clarification (not to mention the basic task of *every* democrat—that of revealing the truth to the people, making them see the light) was further determined by the question of the loan. The Black-Hundred government of the tsar could not have held out after December 1905, and could not hold out even now, without the *help of world capital of the international bourgeoisie* in the shape of loans. And the world bourgeoisie is giving billions in loans to an obviously bankrupt tsar, not only because it is lured, like all moneylenders, by the prospect of big profits, but because it realises its own vested interest in the victory of the old regime over the revolution in Russia, for it is the proletariat that is marching at the head of this revolution.

Thus, the *only* object of raising and debating this question in the Duma could be that of exposing the whole truth. Practical reform activity could *not*, at this time and in this situation, be the aim of a *democrat*, because, first, the impossibility of reforms on the basis of the existing Fundamental Laws of the Duma's budgetary powers is obvious, and secondly, it would be absurd, in a Duma composed of Black-Hundred die-hards and Moscow merchants, to propose that *its* powers, the powers of such a Duma, should be extended. The Russian Cadets (whom only ignoramuses or simpletons can regard as democrats) did not grasp this task, of course. In raising the issue, they *forthwith placed it* on a false basis—that of a *partial* reform. We do not, of course, deny the possibility and necessity of a democrat or a Social-Democrat sometimes raising the question of a partial reform. But in such a Duma as the Third Duma, at such a moment as the present, on such a question as budgetary powers, already hopelessly crippled by *inviolable* Fundamental Laws, this was absurd. The Cadets could raise the question as a matter of partial reform—we are willing to concede them even that—but democrats could not treat this question *in the way* that the Cadets have done.

They stressed the so-called *business* aspect of the matter, the *inconvenience* of the Rules of March 8, their disadvantage even to the government, and the story of the way various idiotic laws against the Duma were drafted in the idiotic government offices of Bulygin, Witte, and others of that gang. The *spirit* of the Cadets' presentation of the issue is most saliently conveyed in the following words of Mr. Shingaryov: "In the Bill we have introduced there are no encroachments [on the prerogatives of the monarch], no ulterior motives [!!] whatever. All it seeks to do is done *for the sake of convenience of the Duma's work*, for the sake of its dignity, for the sake of completing the work *we have been called upon to do*" (our italics; p. 1263 of the official Stenographic Record of the session of January 15, 1908).

Such a person *befogs* people's minds instead of enlightening them, because what he says is nonsense and a bare-faced lie. We cannot alter this inescapable conclusion, even if this Mr. Shingaryov and his whole fraternity of Cadet politicians sincerely believed in the "value" of their "diplomacy". A democrat should reveal to the people the *gulf* that lies between the powers of parliament and the prerogatives of the monarch, and not deaden the public mind, not distort the *political struggle* by reducing it to *an office-routine correction* of the laws. In *thus* presenting the issue, the Cadets show *in fact* that they are rivals of the tsar's bureaucrats and the Octobrists, and not champions of freedom, not even freedom for the big bourgeoisie. Only bureaucrats vulgarly flirting with liberalism, and not representatives of *a parliamentary opposition*, can talk *like that*.

The speech by the representative of the Social-Democrats, Pokrovsky 2nd, we gladly acknowledge, reveals a quite *different* spirit, presenting the issue in a *fundamentally* different way. The Social-Democrat stated bluntly and clearly that he considered popular representation in the Third Duma *falsified* (we are quoting *Stolichnaya Pochta* for January 18, since the verbatim reports of this session are not yet available). He stressed not minor points, not the official derivation of the law, but the ruined and oppressed state of the masses, of the vast millions of the people. He rightly declared that "one cannot speak of the budgetary powers of the Duma without irony", that we were demanding not

only the right to recast the whole budget (Kokovtsev, a government official with a lucrative post, argued in the Duma mainly against Shingaryov and Adzhemov, government officials without lucrative posts, over the question whether "recasting" was permissible and to what *extent*), but to "re-model the whole financial system" and "reject the government's budget". He concluded with a no less correct and, for a member of the workers' party, obligatory demand for "full power of the people". On all these points Pokrovsky conscientiously and correctly upheld the Social-Democratic point of view.

But in doing so, he committed an unfortunate mistake—judging by newspaper reports, the *whole* Social-Democratic group committed that mistake in giving such instructions to its spokesman. Pokrovsky declared: "*We support the proposal of the 40 because it tends towards an extension of the budgetary powers of a popular representative assembly.*"

What was the object of this declaration of support for a proposal that was plainly lacking in principle, that was plainly inadequate, plainly signed by unprincipled people who were incapable of showing the slightest firmness—a proposal that was plainly and for all practical purposes worthless? This was not support for the militant bourgeoisie (a formula which many people like to use to justify their political spinelessness), but support for the wavering liberal-Octobrist bourgeoisie. That this was so, was proved immediately by the *facts*. The Cadets themselves proved it by *withdrawing* their proposal and *joining with* the Octobrists in the motion to have the Bill "referred to committee without going into the extent of the changes in the law" (!). For the hundredth and thousandth time "support" given to the Cadets led to those who supported them being deceived. For the hundredth and thousandth time the *facts* have revealed how shoddy and impermissible are the tactics of supporting liberal, Cadet proposals that follow the *line*, etc.*

* The "Bezgolovy" ^{147a} newspaper *Stolichnaya Pochta*, through the mouth of a Mr. Saturin, announces that "the opposition, very sensibly [!] voted for it [for the Octobrist motion]. As a result the amendment [that is, the motion to abstain from determining the extent of the changes] was adopted unanimously" (January 18, p. 4, "From the As-

If the Cadets, instead of joining with the Octobrists, had *put to the vote* a declaration stating clearly and precisely that the Duma was powerless in financial matters, that popular representation was falsified, that the country had been ruined by the autocracy and a financial débâcle was unavoidable, and that under such circumstances the democratic representatives would not give their support to any loans—that would have been an honest act on the part of the bourgeois democrats, an act of struggle and not an act of dull-witted flunkeyism. It would have been our duty to support such an act, while not forgetting to stipulate our own independent Social-Democratic objectives. Such an act would have contributed to the enlightenment of the people and the exposure of the autocracy.

The defeat of such a declaration in the Duma and the violent opposition such a proposal would have raised among the Black Hundreds would have been a historical service rendered by the democrats and probably a new phase in the struggle for freedom. But now the Cadets have once again *proved bankrupt*. Social-Democratic comrades in the Duma, protect the honour of the socialist workers' party! Do not allow yourselves to suffer failure by giving support to such liberalism!

One violent member of the Right in the Duma departed from the Octobrists' tactics, which aimed at glossing over differences and coaxing the Cadets into an agreement. The Black-Hundred Kovalenko bluntly declared in the Duma on January 12 that he was against introducing the Cadets' Bill in the Committee (p. 1192 of Stenographic Record). But apparently he voted, did this hero, with the Octobrists; he was brave only in words. He *admirably* illustrated the *real* state of affairs by referring in his speech to the following example as proof of the need for emergency measures: "Take, for instance, the insurrection in Moscow, the dispatch of punitive detachments. Could the government have had

sembly Hall"). Long live the unanimity between the Russian "Bez-golovy" liberals and the Octobrists and ministers of the Black-Hundred tsar!

time to follow the ordinary course?"... (p. 1193). It is a pity that Social-Democrats do not *catch* these sparks of truth that come from the Black Hundreds. You are right, deputy colleague—he should have been told. There is no place here for the ordinary course. Let us drop hypocrisy and admit that we are living through not "an ordinary course", but *civil war*; that the government is not ruling, but fighting, that the state of things in Russia is one of barely restrained insurrection. That would be the truth, and it would do the people good to be reminded of it more often!

Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 1,
February 1908

Published according
to the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

POSTSCRIPT TO THE ARTICLE "THE DEBATE ON THE EXTENSION OF THE DUMA'S BUDGETARY POWERS"

At the present time the Duma has started discussing the budget. The bloc of reactionaries with the betrayers of the people's freedom forming the pseudo-opposition showed its face during the very first day of the debates. We find the same picture in the legal press—the *Novoye Vremya* people hail the unity of *all*, except the "Left fanatics" (read: the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviks...). *Nasha Gazeta*¹⁴⁸ of the "Bezgolovy" fraternity goes into ecstasies. It was a "business" day that "made up" for "the drawback of having the budget scrutinised by separate estimates"....

The "opposition" trails in the wake of overt reaction. It is just here that responsibility and the honourable role of true representatives of the plundered people devolves upon the deputies of the working class and democracy. Unfortunately, the first budgetary speeches of our Duma comrades are very lame and deeply mistaken. In the next issue of *Proletary* we shall deal in detail with these mistakes and indicate what we believe to be the necessary line of action for Social-Democrats in the budgetary debates and voting.¹⁴⁹

POLITICAL NOTES

The chauvinists are hard at work. Rumours are increasingly being spread that the Japanese are arming, that they have concentrated 600 battalions in Manchuria for an attack on Russia. Turkey is reported to be vigorously arming with the intention of declaring war on Russia in the spring of this year. It is said that a revolt is being prepared in the Caucasus with the object of seceding from Russia (all that is lacking is a clamour about the plans of the Poles!). Feeling against Finland is being worked up by tales that she is arming. A bitter campaign is being conducted against Austria over the building of a railway in Bosnia. The attacks of the Russian press on Germany, which is alleged to be inciting Turkey against Russia, are becoming more violent. The campaign is being conducted not only in the Russian but also in the French press, whose bribery by the Russian Government was recently so opportunely mentioned in the Duma by a Social-Democrat.

The serious bourgeois press of the West declines to regard this campaign as a figment of the imagination of newspapermen or the speculation of sensation-mongers. Obviously, "ruling circles"—meaning the Black-Hundred tsarist government, or a secret court cabal like the notorious "Star Chamber"—have given a very definite cue; some systematic "line" is being pursued, some "new course" has been adopted. The foreign press traces a direct connection between this chauvinistic campaign and the fact that the doors of the Duma Committee of State Defence have been closed to all members of the Duma not belonging to that Committee, i.e., not only to the revolutionary parties but also to the Cadets; it is even said that the Russian Government, as a

crowning token of its contempt for "constitutionalism", intends to apply for credits for frontier military reinforcements not to the whole Duma, but only to the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Committee.

Here are some quotations from European newspapers, newspapers which are anything but socialist and which cannot be suspected of optimism with regard to the Russian revolution:

"The German victories over France (in 1870), as Bismarck once remarked, fired the ambition of the Russian military, and they too reached out for martial laurels. For political, religious, and historical reasons, Turkey seemed a most suitable object for this purpose (the war with Turkey of 1877-78). Evidently, the same views are held today by certain Russian circles who have forgotten the lessons of the Japanese war and who do not understand the true needs of the country. As there are no more 'brothers' to be liberated in the Balkans, they have to devise other methods of influencing Russian public opinion. And these methods, to tell the truth, are even more clumsy than the others: it is being made out that Russia is surrounded by internal and external enemies.

"Russia's ruling circles seek to bolster up their position by the old methods of forcibly suppressing the internal movement for emancipation and diverting public attention from the deplorable internal situation by arousing nationalist sentiments and stirring up diplomatic conflicts, of which nobody knows what the outcome will be."

What is the significance of this new chauvinistic line in the policy of the counter-revolutionary autocracy? After Tsushima and Mukden, only people from under whose feet the ground is definitely slipping can embark on such a policy. Notwithstanding all the efforts that have been made, the experience of two years of reaction *has not created* any reliable support within the country for the Black-Hundred autocracy, nor any new class elements capable of rejuvenating the autocracy *economically*. And *without this* no atrocities, no frenzy of the counter-revolution can save the present political system in Russia.

Stolypin, the Black-Hundred landlords, and the Octobrists all understand that unless they create new class supports for themselves they cannot remain in power. Hence their policy of utterly ruining the peasants and forcibly breaking up the village communes in order to clear the way

for capitalism in agriculture *at all costs*. The Russian liberals, the most learned, the most educated, and the most "humane" of them—like the professors of *Russkiye Vedomosti*—prove to be incomparably more stupid in this respect than the Stolypins. "It would not be surprising," says the editorial in the February 1st issue of this newspaper, "if in deciding, for instance, the fate of the November provisional regulations, the formerly Slavophile advocates of the village commune support the attempt of the Ministry to destroy the village communes by assigning land to individual householders as their private property.... It may even be assumed that the defensive aims common to the conservative majority in the Duma and to the Ministry will suggest to both measures even more aggressive than the famous ukases of 1906.... We get an amazing picture: the conservative government, with the support of representatives of the conservative parties, are preparing to carry out a radical reform of agrarian relations—which are the least amenable to drastic changes—and are deciding upon so radical a measure from abstract considerations about the preferability of one form of ownership to another."

Wake up, mister professor! Shake off the archive dust of old-fashioned Narodism; look at what two years of revolution have done. Stolypin defeated you not only by physical force, but also because he correctly understood the most practical need of economic development, namely, the forcible break-up of the old form of landownership. The great "advance" which has already been irrevocably effected by the revolution consists in the fact that formerly the Black-Hundred autocracy *could* base itself on medieval forms of landownership, whereas now it is *compelled*, wholly and irrevocably compelled, to work for their destruction with feverish speed. For it has understood that *without the break-up* of the old agrarian order *there can be no escape* from the contradiction which most profoundly of all explains the Russian revolution, namely, the most backward system of landownership and the most ignorant peasantry on the one hand, and the most advanced industrial and finance capitalism on the other!

So you are for the Stolypin agrarian legislation? the Narodniks will ask us in horror.

Oh, no. Calm yourselves! We are unreservedly opposed to *all* the forms of the old landownership in Russia—both landlordism and peasant allotment ownership. We are unreservedly in favour of a forcible break-up of this rotten and decaying antiquity which is poisoning everything new. We are in favour of bourgeois *nationalisation* of the land, as the only consistent slogan of the bourgeois revolution, and as the only practical measure that will direct the spearhead of the historically necessary break-up against the landlords by contributing towards the emergence of free farmers from among the mass of the peasantry.

A feature of the Russian bourgeois revolution is that a revolutionary policy on the key issue of the revolution—the agrarian question—is being pursued by the Black Hundreds and by the peasants together with the workers. The liberal lawyers and professors, on the other hand, are advocating something that is absolutely lifeless, absurd, and utopian—namely, a reconciliation of the two antithetical and mutually exclusive methods of *breaking up* what is obsolescent; a reconciliation, moreover, which will mean no break-up at all. Either a victory for the peasant revolt and the complete break-up of the old landowning system in favour of a peasantry that has been remoulded by the revolution—in other words, confiscation of the landed estates and a republic; or a Stolypin break-up which also remoulds—in fact, remoulds and adapts the old landowning system to capitalist relationships—but wholly in the interests of the landlords and at the price of the utter ruin of the peasant masses, their forcible ejection from the countryside, the eviction, starvation, and the extermination of the flower of the peasant youth with the help of jails, exile, shooting, and torture. For a minority to enforce such a policy against the majority would not be easy, but economically it is not impossible. We must help the people to realise this. But the attempt by means of a neat reform, peacefully and without violence, to escape from that utterly tangled skein of medieval contradictions, which has been created by centuries of Russian history, is the stupidest dream of hidebound “men in mufflers”. Economic necessity will certainly call for, and will certainly bring about a most “drastic change” in Russia’s agrarian system. The historical question is whether

it will be carried out by the landlords, led by the tsar and Stolypin, or by the peasant masses, led by the proletariat.

"Union of the opposition"—such is the topic of the day in the Russian political press. Stolypin's police-minded *Rossiya* is jubilant: "Union?—that means the Cadets too are revolutionaries! At the Cadets, at 'em!" The Cadet *Rech*, thoroughly imbued with the desire of the loyal government official to prove that the Constitutional-Democrats can be no less moderate than the Octobrists, primly purses its lips, pours forth a flood of "moral" indignation at the unscrupulous attempts to accuse it of being revolutionary, and declares: We, of course, would welcome the union of the opposition, but that union must be a movement "*from Left to Right*" (editorial of February 2). "We have had experience of political mistakes and disillusionments. When an opposition unites, it naturally unites on the minimum programme of the most moderate of the parties which form it."

This programme is perfectly clear: the hegemony of bourgeois liberalism—those are my terms, say the Cadets, just as Falloux in 1871 said to Thiers, when the latter appealed to him for support: The monarchy—those are my terms.

Stolichnaya Pochta realised that it is shameful, disgraceful to say such things outright, and it therefore "does not agree" with *Rech* and confines itself to vague hints at the "pre-October mood" (the accursed censorship prevents a clearly stated political programme!) and, in substance, calls for a deal. *Rech*, it as much as says, wants to lead, and the revolutionaries want to lead (the new union), but what about me—am I not entitled to a commission for acting as an honest broker?

"Union"—we warmly sympathise with that slogan, especially when there is a hint—although only a hint!—of "pre-October moods". Only, history does not repeat itself, my dear political intriguers! And no power on earth can erase from the minds of the various classes the lessons that were taught by the "history of the three years". Those lessons are exceedingly rich both in positive content (the forms, nature, and conditions of the victory of the *mass* struggle of the workers and peasants in 1905) and in negative content

(the failure of the two Dumas, in other words, the shattering of constitutional illusions and of Cadet hegemony).

Anyone who wants systematically to study, ponder over, understand, and teach the masses *these* lessons is welcome to do so—we are wholly in favour of “union”, union for a relentless struggle against the renegades of the revolution. You don’t like that? Well, then our paths diverge.

The old “pre-October” slogan (“constituent assembly”) is a good one and (we hope that this will not rouse the ire of M-d-m of the *Our Thought* symposium¹⁵⁰) we shall not discard it. But it is inadequate. It is too formal. It contains no recognition of the acute practical issues that life is raising. We shall reinforce it with the great lesson of the three great years. Our “minimum programme”, “our programme of union”, is simple and clear: (1) confiscation of all landlords’ estates; (2) a republic. The *kind* of constituent assembly we need is one that can achieve this.

The history of the two Dumas, the Cadet Dumas, showed with striking clarity that the real struggle of social forces—the struggle which was not always a conscious one, which did not always break into the open, but which always exercised a decisive influence upon every big political issue and which always swept away like dust the conjuring tricks of the naïve and knavishly astute “constitutionalist” ignoramuses—was waged wholly and completely for the sake of the two above-mentioned “objects”. Not abstract theories, but the real experience of the struggle of our popular masses under the real conditions of Russia’s landlord autocracy, has demonstrated to us in practice the inevitability of precisely these slogans. To those who are capable of grasping them we propose that we “march separately” but “strike together”, strike at the enemy who is devastating Russia and killing off thousands of her finest people.

“With such a programme of union you will remain isolated.” That is not true.

Read the speeches of the non-party peasants in the first two Dumas, and you will see that our programme of union only formulates their wishes, their needs, and the elementarily necessary conclusions to be drawn from these needs. Against those who do not understand these needs—from the Cadets to Peshekhonov (he too has preached “union” in

Moscow, as we are informed from there)—we shall wage war in the name of “union”.

It will be a stubborn war. We knew how to work during the long years preceding the revolution. Not for nothing do they say we are as hard as rock. The Social-Democrats have built a proletarian party which will not be disheartened by the failure of the first armed onslaught, will not lose its head, nor be carried away by adventures. That party is marching to socialism, without tying itself or its future to the outcome of any particular period of bourgeois revolutions. That is precisely why it is also free of the weaker aspects of bourgeois revolution. And this proletarian party is marching to victory.

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STATEMENT OF THE EDITORS OF *PROLETARY*

In *Neue Zeit*, No. 20, in the foreword by an unknown translator of A. Bogdanov's article on Ernst Mach, we read the following: "Russian Social-Democracy, unfortunately, reveals a strong tendency to making this or that attitude towards Mach a question of factional division within the party. Grave tactical differences of opinion between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks are aggravated by a controversy on a question, which, in our opinion, has no bearing whatever on these differences, namely, whether Marxism, from the point of view of theory, is compatible with the teaching of Spinoza and Holbach, or of Mach and Avenarius."

In this connection the Editorial Board of *Proletary*, as the ideological spokesman of the Bolshevik trend, deems it necessary to state the following. Actually, this philosophical controversy is not a factional one and, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, should not be so; any attempt to represent these differences of opinion as factional is radically erroneous. Both factions contain adherents of the two philosophical trends.

A LETTER TO A. M. GORKY

25.II.1908

Dear A. M.,

I did not answer your letter immediately because, strange as it may seem at first glance, we had quite a serious fight on the editorial board with Al. Al.¹⁵¹ over your article, or rather in a certain connection with it. Ahem, ahem... I spoke *not in that place* and not on that subject which you thought!

It happened like this.

The book, *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism*,¹⁵² has considerably sharpened the old differences among the Bolsheviks on questions of philosophy. I do not consider myself sufficiently competent on these questions to rush into print. But I have always followed our *Party* debates on philosophy very closely, beginning with Plekhanov's struggle against Mikhailovsky and Co. in the late eighties and up to 1895, then his struggle against the Kantians from 1898 onwards (here I not only followed it, but participated in it to some extent, as a member of the *Zarya* editorial board since 1900), and, finally, his struggle against the empirio-critics and Co.

I have been following Bogdanov's writings on philosophy since his energeticist book, *The Historical View of Nature*, which I studied during my stay in Siberia. For Bogdanov, this position was merely a transition to other philosophical views. I became personally acquainted with him in 1904, when we immediately gave each other presents—I, my *Steps*,¹⁵³ he, one of his *current* philosophical works.¹⁵⁴ And I at once (in the spring or the early summer of 1904) wrote to him in Paris from Geneva that his writings strongly convinced

me that his views were wrong and as strongly convinced me that those of Plekhanov were correct.

When we worked together, Plekhanov and I often discussed Bogdanov. Plekhanov explained the fallacy of Bogdanov's views to me, but he did not think the deviation a terribly serious one. I remember perfectly well that in the summer of 1903 Plekhanov and I, as representatives of the *Zarya* editorial board, had a conversation in Geneva with a delegate from the editors of the symposium *Outlines of a Realistic World Outlook*,¹⁵⁵ at which we agreed to contribute—I, on the agrarian question, Plekhanov on anti-Machist philosophy. Plekhanov made it a condition of his collaboration that he would write against Mach, a condition that the symposium delegate readily accepted. Plekhanov at that time regarded Bogdanov as an ally in the fight against revisionism, but an ally who erred in following Ostwald and, later on, Mach.

In the summer and autumn of 1904, Bogdanov and I reached a complete agreement, as Bolsheviks, and formed the tacit bloc, which tacitly ruled out philosophy as a neutral field, that existed all through the revolution and enabled us in that revolution to carry out together the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy (=Bolshevism), which, I am profoundly convinced, were the only correct tactics.

There was little opportunity to engage in philosophy in the heat of the revolution. Bogdanov wrote another piece in prison at the beginning of 1906—the third issue of *Empirio-monism*, I believe. He presented it to me in the summer of 1906, and I sat down to study it. After reading it I was furious. It became clearer to me than ever that he was on an absolutely wrong track, not the Marxist track. I thereupon wrote him a "declaration of love", a letter on philosophy taking up three notebooks. I explained to him that I was just an ordinary Marxist in philosophy, but that it was precisely his lucid, popular, and splendidly written works that had finally convinced me that he was essentially wrong and that Plekhanov was right. I showed these notebooks to some friends (including Lunacharsky) and thought of publishing them under the title "Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy", but I never got round to it. I am sorry now that I did not have them published at the moment.

I wrote to St. Petersburg the other day to have these notebooks hunted out and forwarded to me.¹⁵⁶

Now the *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* have appeared. I have read all the articles except Suvorov's (I am reading it now), and every article made me furiously indignant. No, no, this is not Marxism! Our empirio-critics, empirio-monists, and empirio-symbolists are floundering in a bog. To try to persuade the reader that "belief" in the reality of the external world is "mysticism" (Bazarov); to confuse in the most disgraceful manner materialism with Kantianism (Bazarov and Bogdanov); to preach a variety of agnosticism (empirio-criticism) and idealism (empirio-monism); to teach the workers "religious atheism" and "worship" of the higher human potentialities (Lunacharsky); to declare Engels's teaching on dialectics to be mysticism (Berman); to draw from the stinking well of some French "positivists" or other, of agnostics or metaphysicians, the devil take them, with their "symbolic theory of cognition" (Yushkevich)! No, really, it's too much. To be sure, we ordinary Marxists are not well up in philosophy, but why insult us by serving this stuff up to us as the philosophy of Marxism! I would rather let myself be drawn and quartered than consent to collaborate in an organ or body that preaches such things.

I felt a renewed interest in my "Notes of an Ordinary Marxist on Philosophy" and I began to write them,¹⁵⁷ but to Al. Al., in the process of reading the *Studies*, I gave my impressions bluntly and sharply, of course.

But what has your article got to do with it, you will ask? It has this to do with it: just at a time when these differences of opinion among the Bolsheviks threaten to become particularly acute, you are obviously beginning to expound the views of one trend in your article for *Proletary*. I do not know, of course, what you would have made of it, taken as a whole. Besides, I believe that an artist can glean much that is useful to him from philosophy of all kinds. Finally, I absolutely agree with the view that in matters that concern the art of writing you are the best judge, and that in deriving this kind of views both from your artistic experience and from philosophy, even if idealistic philosophy, you can arrive at conclusions that will be of tremendous benefit to the workers' party. All that is true; nevertheless *Proletary*

(1)

25.2.08.

Уважаеми А. М.! На измѣненъе яко
всѣхъ наимѣній, ито во всѣхъ наимѣніяхъ
и въ всѣхъ членъ съ мною бывалъ яко
и то и ~~членъ~~ ^{членъ въ то время} членъ,
ибо и ~~я~~ ^{членъ въ то время} членъ,
занесъ въ А. М. въ предаваніи... то, то... и
зъвѣрѣлъ и въ то время и и въ то время
нobody, ибо это дѣло!

Съвсемъ яко.

Когда "Будни пролетари" и "Город"
съмѣшились въ одинъ патріотізмъ, то
то было не въ интересахъ пролетариевъ. И
не изъ какъ заслугъ коммунистовъ
и заслугъ большевиковъ, что убогий раб.
съмѣшился съ зажиточными рабами въ ф.
Большевиками, — къ какимъ въсякимъ
представамъ итакъ большевики въ то
время 20-хъ и до 1895 года, писали письма
и письма въ редакции "Лирика" и "Народы"
(когда) яко и въ письмахъ общихъ, то какъ въ
гражданской, то въ рабочей Лирике и Народахъ
(когда), начиная съ 1898 и до 1900
года), начиная съ 1898 и до 1900

The first page of V. I. Lenin's
letter to A. M. Gorky dated February 25, 1908
Reduced

must remain absolutely neutral towards all our divergencies in philosophy and not give the reader *the slightest grounds* for associating the Bolsheviks, as a trend, as a tactical line of the revolutionary wing of the Russian Social-Democrats, with empirio-criticism or empirio-monism.

When, after reading and re-reading your article, I told A. A. that I was against its publication, he grew as black as a thundercloud. The threat of a split was in the air. Yesterday our editorial trio held a special meeting to discuss the matter. A stupid trick on the part of *Neue Zeit* came unexpectedly to our rescue. In its issue No. 20, an unknown translator published Bogdanov's article on Mach, and blurted out in a foreword that the differences between Plekhanov and Bogdanov had a tendency, among Russian Social-Democracy, to become a *factional* disagreement between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The fool, whether man or woman, who wrote this foreword succeeded in uniting us. We agreed at once that an announcement of our neutrality was now essential in the very next issue of *Proletary*. This was perfectly in keeping with my own frame of mind after the appearance of the *Studies*. A statement was drawn up, unanimously endorsed, and tomorrow it will appear in issue No. 21 of *Proletary*, which will be forwarded to you.*

As regards your article, it was decided to postpone the matter, explain the situation to you in letters from each of *Proletary*'s three editors, and hasten my and Bogdanov's trip to see you.

And so you will be receiving a letter also from Al. Al. and from the third editor,¹⁵⁸ about whom I wrote you previously.

I consider it necessary to give you my opinion quite frankly. Some sort of fight among the Bolsheviks on the question of philosophy I regard now as quite unavoidable. It would be stupid, however, to split on this. We formed a bloc in order to secure the adoption of definite tactics in the workers' party. We have been pursuing these tactics up to now *without disagreement* (the only difference of opinion was on the boycott of the Third Duma, but that, first, was never so sharp among us as to lead to even a hint of a split, and,

* See p. 447 of this volume.—Ed.

secondly, it never corresponded to the disagreement between the materialists and the Machists, for the Machist Bazarov, for example, was with me in opposing the boycott and wrote a long article on this in *Proletary*.

To hinder the application of the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the workers' party for the sake of disputes on the question of materialism or Machism, would be, in my opinion, unpardonable folly. We ought to fight over philosophy in such a way that *Proletary* and the Bolsheviks, as a faction of the party, *would not be affected by it*. And that is quite possible.

And you, I think, ought to help in this. You can help by contributing to *Proletary* on neutral questions (that is, unconnected with philosophy) of literary criticism, publicism, belles lettres, and so on. As for your article, if you wish to prevent a split and help to localise the new fight—you should rewrite it, and everything that even indirectly bears on Bogdanov's philosophy should be placed somewhere else. You have other mediums, thank God, besides *Proletary*. Everything that is not connected with Bogdanov's philosophy—and the *bulk* of your article is not connected with it—you could set out in a series of articles for *Proletary*. Any other attitude on your part, that is, a refusal to rewrite the article or to collaborate with *Proletary* would, in my opinion, unavoidably tend to aggravate the conflict among the Bolsheviks, make it difficult to localise the new fight, and weaken the vital cause, so essential practically and politically, of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Russia.

That is my opinion. I have told you all my thoughts and am now looking forward to your reply.

We intended to go to you today, but find that we have to postpone our visit for not less than a week, perhaps two or three weeks.

With very best regards,
Yours, N. Lenin

THE NEW AGRARIAN POLICY

On Wednesday, February 13, Nicholas II received 307 deputies of the Third Duma. The tsar's amiable conversation with the Black-Hundred reactionaries Bobrinsky and Chelyshev was a comic aspect of the new ceremonial kiss of the autocracy and its gang of allies. Far more serious was the statement by Nicholas that the Duma was shortly to pass new agrarian laws, and that all thought of compulsory alienation must be dismissed, since he, Nicholas II, would never sanction such a law. "The tsar's speech," reports the correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "had a depressing effect on the peasants."

To be sure, the agitational value of this "agrarian statement" made by the tsar himself is very important, and we can but congratulate the talented agitator. But, apart from its agitational significance, this ominous thrust at compulsory alienation is highly important as conclusive proof that the landlord monarchy has embarked on a *new agrarian policy*.

The famous extra-Duma ukases under Article 87 of November 9, 1906, and successive dates, ushered in the era of this new agrarian policy of the tsarist government. Stolypin confirmed it in the Second Duma; the Right and the Octobrist deputies approved it; the Cadets (frightened by rumours picked up in lobbies of the camarilla that the Duma was going to be dissolved) refrained from denouncing it openly. Now, in the Third Duma, the Land Committee has recently accepted the basic thesis of the law of November 9, 1906, and has gone a step further by recognising the proprie-

tary rights of the peasants to their holdings in all village communes which had not carried out any reallotment in the course of twenty-four years. At the reception given on February 13, the head of feudal-landlord Russia gave his public blessing to that policy with the added threat, obviously for the benefit of the non-party peasants, that he would sanction no law for compulsory alienation in favour of the peasantry.

The fact that the government of the tsar, of the landlords, and of the big bourgeoisie (the Octobrists) has definitely given its support to the new agrarian policy is of tremendous historical importance. The destinies of the bourgeois revolution in Russia—not only the present revolution, but possible future democratic revolutions as well—depend *most of all* on the success or failure of this policy.

Wherein lies the essence of this change? It lies in the fact that up to now the sanctity of the old, medieval allotment landownership by the peasants and their "primordial" village communes had its most ardent supporters in the master classes of reactionary Russia. The serf-owning landlords, being the ruling class in pre-Reform Russia, the politically predominating class throughout the nineteenth century, pursued, by and large, a policy of *preserving* the old communal system of peasant landownership.

The development of capitalism completely undermined this system by the twentieth century. The old village commune with its social estate basis, the attachment of the peasant to the soil, the routinism of the semi-feudal countryside came into the sharpest conflict with the new economic conditions. The dialectics of history were such that the peasantry, who in other countries with a more or less well-ordered (from the point of view of the requirements of capitalism) agrarian system are a pillar of the regime, came forward in Russia during the revolution with the most destructive demands, including the confiscation of the landlords' estates and the nationalisation of the land (the Trudoviks in the First and Second Dumas).

These radical demands, which were even tintured with the ideas of petty-bourgeois socialism, were by no means the result of muzhik "socialism", but were due to the economic necessity of cutting the tangled knot of feudal land-

ownership, of clearing the way for the free farmer (the agricultural entrepreneur) on land freed from all medieval partitions.*

Capitalism has already irrevocably sapped all the foundations of the old agrarian system in Russia. It can make no further progress unless it breaks up that system, and it certainly and inevitably will break it up; no power on earth can prevent this. But this system can be broken up in the landlord way or the peasant way, to clear the path for landlord or peasant capitalism. The landlord way of breaking up the old order involves the forcible destruction of the village commune and the accelerated ruination and extermination of the mass of impoverished owners for the benefit of a handful of kulaks. The peasant way involves the confiscation of the landlords' land, and the transfer of all the land to free proprietors from among the peasantry (the *Narodniks'* "equal right to the land" means, in effect, the *farmers'* right to the land with the destruction of all medieval partitions).

The government of the counter-revolution understood this position. Stolypin had a correct grasp of the matter: unless the old system of landownership was broken up Russia could not develop economically. Stolypin and the landlords boldly took the revolutionary path, ruthlessly breaking up the old order, handing over the peasant masses as a whole to the mercy of the landlords and kulaks.

The liberals and petty-bourgeois democrats, beginning with the semi-Octobrist "Meons"¹⁶⁰ followed by the *Russkiye Vedomosti* people, and ending with Mr. Peshekhonov of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, are now raising a big outcry about the destruction of the village communes by the government, which they accuse of revolutionism! Never has the betwixt and between position of the bourgeois liberals in the Russian revolution stood out so sharply. No, gentlemen, whining over the destruction of the ancient foundations will not mend matters. Three years of revolution have shattered illusions

* The views here set forth are closely bound up with the criticism of our Party programme. In issue No. 21 of *Proletary* this criticism was touched on as a private opinion; in subsequent issues the question will be dealt with in detail.¹⁶¹

of conciliation and compromise. The question is clear. Either a bold call for a peasant revolution, even including a republic, and the thorough ideological and organisational preparation of such a revolution in alliance with the proletariat. Or useless whining, political and ideological impotence in face of the Stolypin-landlord-Octobrist attack on the village commune.

Make your choice—those who still have left in them a particle of civic courage and sympathy for the peasant masses! The proletariat has already made its choice, and the Social-Democratic Labour Party, now more firmly than ever before, will explain, propagate, spread among the masses the slogan of a peasant uprising in alliance with the proletariat as the *only* possible means of thwarting the Stolypin method of “renovating” Russia.

We will not say that this method is impracticable—it has been tested more than once in Europe on a smaller scale—but we shall make it clear to the people that it can be realised only by endless acts of violence of the minority over the majority in the course of decades and by the mass extermination of the progressive peasantry. We shall not devote ourselves to patching up Stolypin’s revolutionary projects, or attempting to improve them, weaken their effect, and so on. We shall respond by intensifying our agitation among the masses, especially among those sections of the proletariat that have ties with the peasantry. The peasant deputies—even though sifted through a number of police sieves, even though elected by landlords, even though intimidated by the Duma die-hards—have quite recently shown what their true strivings are. A group of non-party peasants, some of them from the *Right wing*, have declared, as we know from the newspapers, for compulsory alienation of the land and for local land institutions elected by the *whole population*! No wonder one Cadet stated in the Land Committee that a Right-wing peasant was more Left than the Cadets. Yes, on the agrarian question the stand of the “Right” peasants in all three Dumas has been more Left than the Cadets’, thereby proving that the monarchism of the muzhik is naïveté that is dying out, in contrast to the monarchism of the liberal businessmen, who are monarchists through class calculation.

The tsar of the feudal-minded gentry shouted at the non-party peasants that he would not stand for compulsory alienation. Let the working class in reply shout to the millions of "non-party" peasants that it calls them to the mass struggle for the overthrow of tsarism and for the confiscation of the landlords' lands.

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TRADE-UNION NEUTRALITY¹⁶¹

In the previous issue of *Proletary* we published the resolution of our Party Central Committee on trade unions.¹⁶² In reporting the resolution, *Nash Vek*¹⁶³ added that it had been adopted unanimously in the C.C., as the Mensheviks voted for it in view of the concessions it contains compared with the original Bolshevik draft. If this report is true (the defunct *Nash Vek* was in general exceptionally well informed about everything relating to Menshevism), it only remains for us to heartily welcome the big step towards united Social-Democratic activity in such an important field as the trade unions. The concessions referred to by *Nash Vek* are quite insignificant, and do not in the least affect the basic principles of the Bolshevik draft (which, incidentally, was published in *Proletary*, No. 17, October 20, 1907, along with a lengthy article in support of it, entitled "The Trade Unions and the Social-Democratic Party").

Our whole Party, consequently, has now recognised that work in the trade unions must be conducted not in the spirit of trade-union neutrality but in the spirit of the closest possible relations between them and the Social-Democratic Party. It is also recognised that the partisanship of the trade unions must be achieved exclusively by S.D. work within the unions, that the S.D.'s must form solid Party units in the unions, and that illegal unions should be formed since legal ones are impossible.

There can be no doubt that Stuttgart has been strongly instrumental in bringing the two factions of our Party closer together on the question of the nature of our work in the trade unions. The Stuttgart Congress resolution, as Kautsky pointed out in his report to the Leipzig workers,

puts an end to recognising the principle of neutrality. The high degree to which class contradictions have developed, their aggravation latterly in all countries, the long experience of Germany (where the policy of neutrality strengthened opportunism in the trade unions without preventing the appearance of special Christian and Liberal unions), and the widening of that special area of proletarian struggle which requires joint and concerted action by both the unions and the political party (the mass strike and the armed uprising in the Russian revolution, as the prototype of likely forms of the proletarian revolution in the West)—all these things have cut the ground from under the neutrality theory.

Among the proletarian parties the question of neutrality is unlikely now to evoke any serious controversy. The case is different with the non-proletarian quasi-socialist parties like our Socialist-Revolutionaries, who are in fact the extreme Left wing of the revolutionary bourgeois party of intellectuals and progressive peasants.

It is highly characteristic that in our country the only people to defend the *idea* of neutrality after Stuttgart have been the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Plekhanov. And they have done so very unsuccessfully.

In the last issue of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party organ, *Znamya Truda* (No. 8, December 1907), we find two articles devoted to the trade-union movement. In those articles the S.R.'s attempt primarily to ridicule the statement of the Social-Democratic newspaper, *Vperyod*,¹⁶⁴ that the Stuttgart resolution settled the question of the Party's attitude to the trade unions along the same lines as the London resolution, namely, in the Bolshevik spirit. Our answer is that in the very same issue of *Znamya Truda* the S.R.'s themselves cited *facts* which prove such an assessment to be absolutely correct.

"It was at that time, too," writes *Znamya Truda*, referring to the autumn of 1905, "and it is a characteristic fact, that the three Russian socialist factions: the Menshevik Social-Democrats, the Bolshevik Social-Democrats, and the S.R.'s, first met face to face to state their views on the trade-union movement. The Moscow Bureau, which was instructed to select from its midst a central bureau for convening a congress (of trade unions), organised a big meeting of worker

trade-unionists at the Olympia Theatre.* The Mensheviks put forward a classically Marxist, strictly orthodox delimitation between the aim of the Party and that of the trade unions. 'The task of the S.D. Party is to establish the socialist system and abolish capitalist relations; the task of the trade unions is to improve working conditions within the framework of the capitalist system, so as to secure for labour advantageous conditions for the sale of its labour-power'; the conclusion drawn was that the trade unions are non-partisan, and that they embrace 'all workers of a given occupation'.**

"The Bolsheviks argued that at the present time there could not be a strict separation of politics from occupation, and hence drew the conclusion that 'there must be close unity between the Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions, which it must lead'. Finally, the S.R.'s demanded that the unions be strictly non-partisan, in order to avoid a split in the ranks of the proletariat, but rejected any narrowing down of the tasks and activities of the trade unions to a limited sphere, formulating this task as an all-out struggle against capital, and therefore as both an economic and a political struggle."

That is how *Znamya Truda* itself describes the facts! And only a person who is blind or totally incapable of thinking can deny that of these three viewpoints it is the one that speaks of close unity between the Social-Democratic Party and the unions that "is confirmed by the Stuttgart resolution, which recommends close ties between the Party and the trade unions."***

To confuse this perfectly clear issue, the S.R.'s, in the most diverting manner, mixed up the independence of the

* The meeting was attended by about fifteen hundred people. See the report in *Bulleten Muzeya Sodeistviya Trudu*, No. 2, November 26, 1905 (quoted by *Znamya Truda*).

** It should be said, however, that the Mensheviks' idea of this "non-partisanship" was a rather peculiar one. Thus, their spokesman illustrated his points in the following way: "A correct answer to the question of partisanship has been given in the Moscow Printers' Union, which proposes that comrades join the S.D. Party as individuals." (Note by *Znamya Truda*.)

*** What the Mensheviks put forward in November 1905 was not orthodox but vulgar views on neutrality. Let the S.R. gentlemen remember that!

trade unions in the economic struggle with their non-party character. "The Stuttgart Congress," they write, "definitely stood also for the independence (the non-partisanship) of the unions, i.e., rejected the viewpoint of both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks." This conclusion is drawn from the following words in the Stuttgart resolution: "Each of the two organisations [the Party and the trade union] has its own sphere, determined by its nature, and within which it must act quite independently. At the same time, however, there is an ever expanding sphere," and so on, as quoted above. Yet we find wags who *mixed up* this demand for the "independence" of the trade unions in the "sphere determined by their nature" with the question of the non-partisanship of the unions or their close alignment with the Party in the political sphere and in dealing with the tasks of the socialist revolution!

In this way our S.R.'s completely suppressed the fundamental issue of the appraisal of the "neutrality" theory, a theory that in fact serves to strengthen the influence of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. In place of this fundamental issue, they preferred to speak only of the specifically Russian situation where there are several socialist parties, and did so in such a way as to throw a *false* light on what happened at Stuttgart. "One cannot argue that the Stuttgart resolution is hazy," writes *Znamya Truda*, "for Mr. Plekhanov removed all haziness and doubt when he addressed the International Congress as the Party's official representative; and so far no statement has been issued by the Central S.D. Committee that such a statement by Comrade Plekhanov disorganises the ranks of the united party..."

Gentlemen of the S.R. Party! You are entitled, of course, to speak ironically about our C.C. having called Plekhanov to order. You are entitled to think that one can respect, say, a party which officially *does not condemn* Mr. Gershuni's pro-Cadet conduct. But why tell a plain untruth? Plekhanov *was not* the representative of the S.D. Party at the Stuttgart Congress, but only one of its 33 delegates. And what he represented was the views not of the S.D. Party but of the present Menshevik opposition to that Party and to its London decisions. The S.R.'s cannot but be aware of this, which means they are telling a *deliberate* untruth.

"... In the committee that examined the question of the relations between the trade unions and the political party, he [Plekhanov] literally said the following: 'There are 11 revolutionary organisations in Russia; with which of them should the trade unions align themselves?... Introducing political differences into the trade unions in Russia would be harmful'. In answer to this the members of the committee *all unanimously* declared that the Congress resolution must not be interpreted in that way, that they 'do not by any means oblige the trade unions and their members to join the S.D. Party', that they, as stated in the resolution, demand their 'complete independence'" (*Znamya Truda's* italics).

You are mixing things up, gentlemen of *Znamya Truda*! In the committee a *Belgian* comrade asked whether it could be made obligatory for trade-union members to join the Social-Democratic Party, and *everyone* answered that it could not. Plekhanov, on the other hand, proposed an amendment to the resolution, saying: "Unity of the trade-union organisation, however, should not be lost sight of". This amendment was adopted, but not unanimously (Comrade Voinov, who represented the views of the R.S.D.L.P., voted for the amendment, and in our opinion was right in doing so). That was how matters stood.

Social-Democrats should never lose sight of unity of the trade-union organisation. That is quite right. But this applies also to the S.R.'s, whom we invite to ponder over this "unity of the trade-union organisation" when the latter announces its close ties with Social-Democracy! Nobody ever dreamt of "obliging" trade-union members to join the S.D. Party; fear made the S.R.'s imagine that. And to suggest that the Stuttgart Congress prohibited trade unions from declaring their close ties with the Social-Democratic Party or from establishing *such* ties in reality, in actual life, is a cock-and-bull story.

"The Russian S.D.'s," writes *Znamya Truda*, "are conducting a strenuous and unremitting campaign to win the trade unions and subordinate them to their Party leadership. The Bolsheviks are doing this frankly and openly ... the Mensheviks have chosen a more roundabout way..." Correct, gentlemen of the S.R. Party! For the sake of the prestige of the workers' International you are entitled to demand of us that we conduct this campaign in a tactful and restrained way, "not losing sight of the unity of the trade-union organisa-

tion". We readily admit this, and demand the same admission from you, but we shall not give up our campaign!

But then Plekhanov said that it was harmful to introduce political differences into the unions.... Yes, Plekhanov did say that stupid thing, and the S.R. gentlemen, naturally, were bound to pounce on it, as they always pounce on everything least worthy of imitation. However, we should not be guided by Plekhanov's words, but by the Congress resolution, which *cannot* be implemented without "introducing political differences". Here is a little example. The Congress resolution says that the trade unions should not be guided by "the theory of the harmony of interests between labour and capital". We Social-Democrats assert that the agrarian programme, which calls for equalised distribution of the land in a bourgeois society, is based on the theory of the harmony of interests between labour and capital.* We shall always declare our opposition to such a difference (or even a difference with monarchist-minded workers) being made the grounds for breaking the unity of a strike, etc., but we shall always "introduce this difference" into the workers' ranks in general, and into *all* workers' unions in particular.

Plekhanov's reference to eleven parties is just as foolish. First, Russia is not the only country where there are various socialist parties. Secondly, Russia has only two rival socialist parties of any importance—the S.D. and the S.R. parties, for it is quite ridiculous to lump together all the parties of the nationalities. Thirdly, the question of uniting the really socialist parties is quite a special one; by dragging it in Plekhanov confuses the issue. We must always and everywhere stand for the alignment of the unions with the socialist party of the working class, but the question as to which party in any given country, among any given nationality, is really socialist and really the party of the working class, is a special question, which is decided not by resolutions of international congresses, but by the outcome of the struggle between the national parties.

* Even some S.R.'s realise this now, and have thus taken a definite step towards Marxism. See the very interesting new book by Firsov and Jacoby, which we shall soon discuss in detail with readers of *Proletary*.¹⁶⁴

How erroneous Comrade Plekhanov's arguments on this subject are is shown in a most striking manner by his article in *Sovremenny Mir*,^{**} No. 12, 1907. On page 55 Plekhanov quotes a statement by Lunacharsky that trade-union neutrality is supported by the German revisionists. Plekhanov answers this statement as follows: "The revisionists say that the unions must be neutral, but understand by this that the unions must be used to fight orthodox Marxism." And Plekhanov concludes: "The elimination of trade-union neutrality will not help matters at all. Even if we make the unions closely and formally dependent on the Party, and revisionist 'ideology' triumphs in the Party, the elimination of trade-union neutrality will merely be a fresh victory for 'the critics of Marx'."

This argument is a typical example of Plekhanov's usual method of dodging the issue and suppressing the essence of the dispute. If revisionist ideology really does triumph in the Party, then it will not be a socialist party of the working class. It is not at all a question of how the party takes shape, and what struggle and what splits occur in the process. It is a question of the fact that a socialist party and trade unions exist in every capitalist country, and it is our job to define the basic relations between them. The class interests of the bourgeoisie inevitably give rise to a striving to confine the unions to petty and narrow activity within the framework of the existing social order, to keep them away from any contact with socialism; and the neutrality theory is the ideological cover for these strivings of the bourgeoisie. In one way or another, the revisionists within the S.D. parties will always clear a way for themselves in capitalist society.

Of course, at the outset of the workers' political and trade-union movements in Europe it was possible to uphold trade-union neutrality as a means of widening the original field of proletarian struggle during the period when it was comparatively undeveloped and when the bourgeoisie exerted no systematic influence on the unions. At the present time it is quite indefensible, from the point of view of international Social-Democracy, to uphold trade-union neutrality. One can only smile when reading Plekhanov's assurances that "even today, Marx would be in favour of trade-union neutrality in Germany", especially when that kind of argu-

ment is based on a one-sided interpretation of a single "quotation" from Marx, while ignoring the sum and substance of Marx's statements and the whole spirit of his teachings.

"I stand for neutrality, understood in Bebel's and not the revisionist sense," writes Plekhanov. To talk like that means to swear by Bebel and still get stuck in the mud. Needless to say, Bebel is such a great authority in the international proletarian movement, such an experienced practical leader, a socialist so keenly alive to the requirements of the revolutionary struggle, that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred he climbed out of the mud himself when he happened to slip into it, and he dragged out those who were willing to follow his lead. Bebel was wrong when he joined Vollmar in defending the agrarian programme of the revisionists in Breslau (in 1895), when he insisted (in Essen) on making a distinction in principle between defensive and offensive wars, and when he was ready to elevate trade-union "neutrality" to the level of a principle. We readily believe that if Plekhanov gets stuck in the mud only in Bebel's company, it will not happen to him often or for long. But we still think that Bebel should not be imitated when Bebel is wrong.

It is said—and Plekhanov makes a special point of it—that neutrality is necessary in order to unite all the workers who are beginning to see the need for improving their material conditions. But those who say this forget that the present stage of development of class contradictions inevitably introduces "political differences" even into the question of how this improvement is to be secured within the bounds of contemporary society. The theory of the neutrality of the trade unions as opposed to the theory of the need for close ties between them and revolutionary Social-Democracy, inevitably leads to preference being given to methods of securing this improvement that involve a blunting of the proletarian class struggle. A striking example of this (which, incidentally, is connected with the appraisal of one of the most interesting episodes in the modern labour movement) is to be found in *the very same issue of Sovremenny Mir* in which Plekhanov advocates neutrality. Side by side with Plekhanov, we find here Mr. E. P., extolling Richard Bell, the well-known English railwaymen's leader, who ended a dispute between the workers and the railway company by a

compromise. Bell is described as the "soul of the whole railwaymen's movement". "There is not the slightest doubt," E. P. writes, "that thanks to his calm, well-considered, and consistent tactics, Bell has won the complete confidence of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the members of which are ready to follow his lead without hesitation" (*Sovremenny Mir*, No. 12, page 75). This point of view is not accidental, but is essentially connected with the neutrality theory, which puts in the forefront unity of the workers for the improvement of their conditions, and not unity for a struggle that could promote the cause of proletarian emancipation.

But this point of view is not at all in accord with the views of the British socialists, who would probably be very much surprised to learn that the eulogisers of Bell write, without objection being raised, in the same journal as prominent Mensheviks like Plekhanov, Jordansky, and Co.

Justice, the British Social-Democratic newspaper, in a leading article on November 16, commented as follows on Bell's agreement with the railway companies: "We cannot but agree with the almost universal trade-union condemnation which has been pronounced upon this so-called treaty of peace ... it absolutely destroys the very reason of existence of the union.... This preposterous agreement ... cannot be binding on the men, and the latter will do well to at once repudiate it." And in its next issue, that of November 23, Burnett, in an article entitled "Sold Again!", wrote the following about this agreement: "Three weeks ago the A.S.R.S. was one of the most powerful trade unions in the country; today it is reduced to the level of a mere benefit society.... All these changes have taken place not because the railwaymen have fought and lost, but because their leaders have deliberately or stupidly sold them to the railway bosses ere the fight began." And the editor added that a similar letter had been received from "a Midland Railway Company's wage-slave".

But perhaps this is the "ardour" of "too revolutionary" Social-Democrats? No. *The Labour Leader*, organ of the moderate Independent Labour Party, which does not even want to call itself socialist, in its issue of November 15 published a letter from a trade-unionist railwayman in which, replying to the praise lavished on Bell by the entire capitalist press (from the radical *Reynolds News* to the Conserva-

tive *Times*), he stated that the settlement made by Bell was the "most contemptible one that has ever occurred in the history of Trade Unionism", and described Richard Bell as the "Marshal Bazaine of the trade-union movement". In the same issue another railwayman demands that "Mr. Bell ... should be called upon to explain" the nefarious settlement by which "the railwaymen ... are condemned to seven years' penal servitude...". And the editor of this moderate organ, in a leading article of the same issue, describes the settlement as "the Sedan of the British Trade-Union movement". "Never has such an opportunity presented itself for a national manifestation of the power of organised labour." Among the workers there prevailed "unprecedented enthusiasm" and a desire to fight. The article concludes with a scathing comparison between the dire needs of the workers and the triumph of "Mr. Lloyd George [the Cabinet Minister who played the role of lackey to the capitalists] and Mr. Bell hastening to prepare banquets".

Only the extreme opportunists, the Fabians, members of a purely intellectualist organisation, *approved* the settlement; so that even *The New Age*, which sympathises with the Fabians, blushed for shame and was obliged to admit that while the Conservative bourgeois *Times* had published the Manifesto of the Fabian Society's Executive Committee in full, apart from these gentlemen "no socialist organisation, no trade union, and no prominent labour leader" (December 7th issue, p. 101) had declared in favour of the settlement.

Here you have a specimen of the application of the neutrality theory by Plekhanov's colleague, Mr. E. P. The question was one not of "political differences" but of improving the workers' conditions in existing society. The entire British bourgeoisie, the Fabians, and Mr. E. P. declared for "improvement" at the price of renouncing the struggle and submitting to the tender mercies of capital; all the socialists and trade-unionist workers were for a collective struggle of the workers. Will Plekhanov now continue to advocate "neutrality", instead of a close alignment of the trade unions with the socialist party?

THE HAPPENING TO THE KING OF PORTUGAL.

The bourgeois press, even of the most liberal and "democratic" trend, needs must point a Black-Hundred moral when discussing the assassination of the Portuguese adventurer.

Take, for example, the special correspondent of one of Europe's best bourgeois-democratic newspapers—the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. He begins his story with a semi-humorous account of the way the flock of correspondents, as if descending on their prey, made a rush for Lisbon as soon as the sensational news was received. "I shared a sleeping compartment with a well-known London journalist," writes this gentleman, "who began to boast of his experience. He had already been to Belgrade on the same errand and could consider himself 'a special correspondent for cases of regicide'."

Indeed, the happening to the king of Portugal is a truly "occupational accident" of kings.

Small wonder that we have professional correspondents specialising in the description of their Majesties' professional "misadventures".

But however strong the element of cheap and vulgar sensationalism is with such correspondents, the truth has a way of asserting itself. "A merchant residing in the busiest shopping district" told the *Frankfurter Zeitung* correspondent the following: "As soon as I learned what had happened I hung out a mourning flag. But very soon customers and acquaintances started coming in and asking whether I had gone out of my mind and was determined to ruin my custom. Do you mean to say that no one has any feeling of compassion, I asked. My dear sir, you wouldn't believe what kind of answers I received! And so I removed the mourning flag."

Commenting on this, the liberal correspondent writes:

"A people as innately good-natured and friendly as the Portuguese are, must have gone through a harsh school to learn to hate so implacably even in the grave. And if this is true—as it undoubtedly is, and by keeping silent about it I would be distorting historical truth—if not only such mute demonstrations pronounce judgement on the crowned victim, if at every turn you hear words of abuse, even from 'law-abiding people', levelled at the victim of assassination, you naturally find yourself wanting to study the rare combination of circumstances which has made the psychology of a people so abnormal. For a people which does not concede to death its ancient and sacred right of atoning for all earthly sins, must be either morally degenerate already, or there must exist conditions engendering an unfathomable feeling of hatred, which clouds the clear eye of fair judgement."

O, liberal hypocrites! Why do you not brand as moral degenerates those French scholars and writers, who even to this day hate and virulently abuse not only the leading personalities of the 1871 Commune but even those of 1793? Not only the fighters of the proletarian revolution, but even those of the bourgeois revolution? Because the "democratic" lackeys of the *modern* bourgeoisie regard it as "normal" and "moral" that the people should "good-naturedly" endure every possible indignity, outrage, and atrocity at the hands of crowned adventurers.

Otherwise, continues the correspondent (i.e., otherwise than as a result of exceptional conditions), "one could not understand the fact that already today one monarchist newspaper speaks about innocent victims from among the people with almost greater sorrow than it does about the king, and we already see quite clearly how legends are beginning to form that will invest the assassins with a halo of glory. Whereas in almost all cases of assassination the political parties hasten to dissociate themselves from the assassins, the Portuguese Republicans are frankly proud of the fact that the 'martyrs and heroes of February 1st' came from their ranks...".

The bourgeois democrat, in his excessive zeal, goes to the length of being ready to describe as a "revolutionary legend" the respect which Portuguese citizens pay to the men who sacrificed themselves in order to remove a king who had made a mockery of the constitution!

The correspondent of another bourgeois newspaper, the Milan *Corriere della Sera*, reports the severe censorship imposed in Portugal after the assassination. Telegrams are not passed. Ministers and kings are not characterised by that "good nature" which appeals so strongly to the honest bourgeois in the case of the mass of the people! In war, as in war—rightly argue the Portuguese adventurers who have taken the place of the assassinated king. Communication has become almost as difficult as in war. Reports have to be sent by a roundabout route, first by post to Paris (perhaps to some private address), and thence transmitted to Milan. "Not even in Russia," writes the correspondent on February 7, "during the most violent revolutionary periods, did the censorship clamp down so hard as it now does in Portugal."

"Some Republican newspapers," this correspondent reports on February 9 (New Style), "write today [the day of the king's funeral] in terms which I positively dare not repeat in a telegram." In a report dated February 8, which arrived after that of the 9th, the comment of the newspaper *Pays* on the funeral arrangements is quoted:

"The mortal remains of two monarchs were borne past—the useless ashes of a wrecked monarchy, which had been sustained by treachery and privileges, and whose crimes have smirched two centuries of our history."

"This is a Republican newspaper, of course," the correspondent adds, "but is not the appearance of an article thus worded on the day of the king's funeral an eloquent fact?"

For our part, we will merely add that we regret one thing—that the Republican movement in Portugal did not settle accounts with all the adventurers in a sufficiently resolute and open manner. We regret that in the happening to the king of Portugal there is still clearly visible the element of conspiratorial, i.e., impotent, terror, one that essentially fails to achieve its purpose and falls short of that genuine, popular, truly regenerative terror for which the Great French Revolution became famous. Possibly the republican movement in Portugal will mount still higher. The sympathy of the socialist proletariat will always be on the side of the Republicans against the monarchy. But what they have suc-

ceeded in doing so far in Portugal is only *to frighten* the monarchy by the assassination of two monarchs, but not *to destroy* it.

The socialists in all European parliaments have expressed, to the best of their ability, their sympathy with the Portuguese people and the Portuguese Republicans, their loathing for the ruling classes, whose spokesmen condemned the assassination of the adventurer and expressed their sympathy towards his successors. Some socialists openly declared their views in parliament, others walked out during the expressions of sympathy towards the "sufferer"—the monarchy. Vandervelde in the Belgian parliament chose a "middle" way—the worst way—by squeezing out of himself a phrase to the effect that he honoured "all the dead", meaning both the king and those who had killed him. We trust that Vandervelde will be a solitary exception among the socialists of the world.

Republican tradition has weakened considerably among the socialists of Europe. This is understandable and to some extent justifiable, inasmuch as the imminence of the *socialist* revolution diminishes the practical importance of the struggle for a *bourgeois* republic. Often, however, the slackening of republican propaganda signifies, not vigour in the striving for the complete victory of the proletariat, but a weak consciousness of the proletarian's revolutionary aims in general. Not without reason did Engels, in criticising the Erfurt Draft Programme in 1891, impress upon the German workers with the greatest possible emphasis the importance of the struggle for a republic, and the possibility of such a struggle becoming the order of the day in Germany as well.¹⁰

With us in Russia the struggle for a republic is a matter of immediate practical significance. Only the most contemptible petty-bourgeois opportunists like the Popular Socialists or the "S. D." Malishevsky (see *Proletary*, No. 7, in regard to him) could draw from the experience of the Russian revolution the conclusion that in Russia the struggle for the republic is relegated to the background. On the contrary, the experience of our revolution has proved that the struggle for the abolition of the monarchy is inseparably bound up in Russia with the peasants' struggle for the land,

with the whole people's struggle for freedom. The experience of our counter-revolution has shown that a struggle for freedom which does not affect the monarchy is no struggle at all, but petty-bourgeois cowardice and flabbiness or downright deception of the people by the careerists of bourgeois parliamentarism.

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LESSONS OF THE COMMUNE¹⁰

After the coup d'état, which marked the end of the revolution of 1848, France fell under the yoke of the Napoleonic regime for a period of 18 years. This regime brought upon the country not only economic ruin but national humiliation. In rising against the old regime the proletariat undertook two tasks—one of them national and the other of a class character—the liberation of France from the German invasion and the socialist emancipation of the workers from capitalism. This union of two tasks forms a unique feature of the Commune.

The bourgeoisie had formed a "government of national defence" and the proletariat had to fight for national independence under its leadership. Actually, it was a government of "national betrayal" which saw its mission in fighting the Paris proletariat. But the proletariat, blinded by patriotic illusions, did not perceive this. The patriotic idea had its origin in the Great Revolution of the eighteenth century; it swayed the minds of the socialists of the Commune; and Blanqui, for example, undoubtedly a revolutionary and an ardent supporter of socialism, could find no better title for his newspaper than the bourgeois cry: "*The country is in danger!*"

Combining contradictory tasks—patriotism and socialism—was the fatal mistake of the French socialists. In the Manifesto of the International, issued in September 1870, Marx had warned the French proletariat against being misled by a false national idea¹¹; profound changes had taken place since the Great Revolution, class antagonisms had sharpened, and whereas at that time the struggle against the whole of European reaction united the entire revolution-

ary nation, now the proletariat could no longer combine its interests with the interests of other classes hostile to it; let the bourgeoisie bear the responsibility for the national humiliation—the task of the proletariat was to fight for the socialist emancipation of labour from the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

And indeed the true nature of bourgeois "patriotism" was not long in revealing itself. Having concluded an ignominious peace with the Prussians, the Versailles government proceeded to its immediate task—it launched an attack to wrest the arms that terrified it from the hands of the Paris proletariat. The workers replied by proclaiming the Commune and civil war.

Although the socialist proletariat was split up into numerous sects, the Commune was a splendid example of the unanimity with which the proletariat was able to accomplish the democratic tasks which the bourgeoisie could only proclaim. Without any particularly complex legislation, in a simple, straightforward manner, the proletariat, which had seized power, carried out the democratisation of the social system, abolished the bureaucracy, and made all official posts elective.

But two mistakes destroyed the fruits of the splendid victory. The proletariat stopped half-way: instead of setting about "expropriating the expropriators", it allowed itself to be led astray by dreams of establishing a higher justice in the country united by a common national task; such institutions as the banks, for example, were not taken over, and Proudhonist theories about a "just exchange", etc., still prevailed among the socialists. The second mistake was excessive magnanimity on the part of the proletariat: instead of destroying its enemies it sought to exert moral influence on them; it underestimated the significance of direct military operations in civil war, and instead of launching a resolute offensive against Versailles that would have crowned its victory in Paris, it tarried and gave the Versailles government time to gather the dark forces and prepare for the blood-soaked week of May.

But despite all its mistakes the Commune was a superb example of the great proletarian movement of the nineteenth century. Marx set a high value on the historic significance

of the Commune—if, during the treacherous attempt by the Versailles gang to seize the arms of the Paris proletariat, the workers had allowed themselves to be disarmed without a fight, the disastrous effect of the demoralisation, that this weakness would have caused in the proletarian movement, would have been far, far greater than the losses suffered by the working class in the battle to defend its arms.¹⁷⁰ The sacrifices of the Commune, heavy as they were, are made up for by its significance for the general struggle of the proletariat: it stirred the socialist movement throughout Europe, it demonstrated the strength of civil war, it dispelled patriotic illusions, and destroyed the naïve belief in any efforts of the bourgeoisie for common national aims. The Commune taught the European proletariat to pose concretely the tasks of the socialist revolution.

The lesson learnt by the proletariat will not be forgotten. The working class will make use of it, as it has already done in Russia during the December uprising.

The period that preceded the Russian revolution and prepared it bears a certain resemblance to the period of the Napoleonic yoke in France. In Russia, too, the autocratic clique has brought upon the country economic ruin and national humiliation. But the outbreak of revolution was held back for a long time, since social development had not yet created the conditions for a mass movement and, notwithstanding all the courage displayed, the isolated actions against the government in the pre-revolutionary period broke against the apathy of the masses. Only the Social-Democrats, by strenuous and systematic work, educated the masses to the level of the higher forms of struggle—mass actions and armed civil war.

The Social-Democrats were able to shatter the “common national” and “patriotic” delusions of the young proletariat and later, when the Manifesto of October 17th¹⁷¹ had been wrested from the tsar due to their direct intervention, the proletariat began vigorous preparation for the next, inevitable phase of the revolution—the armed uprising. Having shed “common national” illusions, it concentrated its class forces in its own mass organisations—the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, etc. And notwithstanding all the differences in the aims and tasks of the Russian revolution,

compared with the French revolution of 1871, the Russian proletariat had to resort to the same method of struggle as that first used by the Paris Commune—civil war. Mindful of the lessons of the Commune, it knew that the proletariat should not ignore peaceful methods of struggle—they serve its ordinary, day-to-day interests, they are necessary in periods of preparation for revolution—but it must never forget that in certain conditions the class struggle assumes the form of armed conflict and civil war; there are times when the interests of the proletariat call for ruthless extermination of its enemies in open armed clashes. This was first demonstrated by the French proletariat in the Commune and brilliantly confirmed by the Russian proletariat in the December uprising.

And although these magnificent uprisings of the working class were crushed, there will be another uprising, in face of which the forces of the enemies of the proletariat will prove ineffective, and from which the socialist proletariat will emerge completely victorious.

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A POLICE-PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATION MADE TO ORDER

The Duma's "big parliamentary day" of February 27 has evoked a touchingly unanimous appreciation from our bourgeois parties. All are pleased, all are elated and deeply moved, from the Black Hundreds and *Novoye Vremya* to the Cadets and *Stolichnaya Pochta*, which managed "on the eve of death", to write (in its issue for February 28):

"The general impression [of the Duma session of February 27] was a very good one."... "For the first time in Russian socio-political life the government has openly given its views to the country on questions of foreign policy."...

We too are prepared to admit that the big parliamentary day has very strikingly, if not "for the first time", revealed the deep unanimity of the Black Hundreds, the government, the liberals, and the "democrats" of the *Stolichnaya Pochta* brand, a unanimity on the cardinal questions of "socio-political life". Therefore, an attentive examination of the stand taken that day and in connection with that day by all the parties seems to us absolutely necessary.

The leader of the Octobrist government party is Mr. Guchkov. He addresses "a request to the government spokesmen" to explain the true state of affairs in the Far East. He explains from the eminence of the Duma rostrum the importance of cutting down expenditure—50,000 rubles per annum, say, to the Ambassador in Tokio instead of 60,000. We are making reforms, so don't laugh! He says that disturbing reports about Far-Eastern policy and the threat of war with Japan "have found their way into the press". Naturally, the leader of the capitalists says nothing about the Russian press being muzzled—why should he? Freedom of the press can be left as

an item in the programme. That is essential for a "European" party. But as to actually *fighting* against the gagging of the press, openly exposing the notorious venality of the influential organs of the Russian press—it would be ludicrous to expect that of Mr. Guchkov or of Mr. Milyukov. On the other hand, Mr. Guchkov did tell the truth about the connection between domestic and foreign policy, that is, he blurred out the true motives for the comic scene which the Duma enacted on February 27.

"The fact," he announced, "that we are moving swiftly towards pacification and tranquillisation should show our opponents that the attempts [by Russia] to defend her interests will this time definitely succeed." The Black Hundreds and Octobrists applaud. Of course! They, if anybody, understood only too well from the very beginning that the *crux* of the question under discussion and of the government's solemn declaration made through the medium of Mr. Izvolsky lay in proclaiming the counter-revolutionary policy of our Muravyov-hangmen¹¹¹ to be a matter of pacification and tranquillisation. Europe and the whole world had to be shown that the "external enemy" was confronted by a "united Russia", which was pacifying and tranquillising a handful of rebels (a mere hundred million or so of peasants and workers!) to ensure the success of the "attempts to defend her interests".

Yes, Mr. Guchkov managed to say what *he* wanted to say, what the combined landlords and capitalists wanted him to say.

Professor Kapustin, a "Left" Octobrist, the hope of the Cadets and mainstay of the advocates of peace between society and the authorities, hastened to follow in the footsteps of Guchkov, whose policy he seasoned with unctuous liberal hypocrisy. "God grant that the fame [the Duma's] of our saving public money becomes widespread." Fifty thousand a year for an ambassador—is that not a saving of a clear ten thousand rubles? Is that not a "splendid example" which will be "set by our highest dignitaries, who are alive to the grave and distressing moment which Russia is living through"?... "We are faced with the prospect of drastic reforms in the most diverse spheres of our country's life, and large funds are needed for that purpose."

Judas Golovlyov¹⁷² falls far short in comparison with this parliamentarian! A professor at the Duma rostrum going into raptures over the splendid example set by the highest dignitaries.... But why talk of an Octobrist when the liberals and bourgeois democrats are not far removed from this toadyism.

Let us pass to the speech made by Mr. Izvolsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. All he needed, of course, was a peg of the kind which Kapustin so obligingly offered. And the Minister dilated on the need for retrenchment—or for revising the staff lists in order to help ambassadors "who have no independent means". Izvolsky stressed that he was speaking with the permission of Nicholas II, and sang praises to "the strength, intelligence, and patriotism of the Russian people", who would "exert all their energies, both material and spiritual, for consolidating Russia's present Asiatic possessions and developing them to the utmost".

The Minister said what the camarilla told him to say. Then Mr. Milyukov, the leader of the opposition, spoke. He declared straightaway: "The Party of People's Freedom, represented by the Duma group present here, has listened to the words of the Foreign Minister with profound satisfaction, and considers it its duty to applaud his first public statement made before the country's representative assembly clarifying questions concerning Russian foreign policy. Without a doubt, at the present moment... the Russian Government needs ... to have the backing of Russian public opinion for its views."

Indeed, there is no doubt about that at all. For their intention, the government of the counter-revolution needs the backing of what abroad could be taken for (or be passed off as) Russian public opinion. This is particularly necessary in order to receive a loan, without which the whole Stolypin policy of tsarism, planned with a view to long-range measures of systematic and mass violence against the people, is faced with the threat of bankruptcy and ruin.

Mr. Milyukov quite understood the true significance of this ceremonial entrance of Izvolsky, Guchkov, and Co. This entrance was arranged by the Black-Hundred gang of Nicholas II. Every little detail of this police-patriotic demonstration was planned in advance. The Duma puppets

enacted a comedy, dancing to the tune of the autocratic camarilla, for without the support of the West-European bourgeoisie Nicholas II could not hold out. The *entire* Russian bourgeoisie, Left as well as Right, had to be made to formally express its confidence in the government, in its "peaceful policy", its stability, its intentions and ability to pacify and tranquillise. It was necessary as the blank endorsement of a bill. For that purpose, Mr. Izvolsky was brought into play as being most "pleasing" to the Cadets; for that purpose all that impudent hypocrisy was organised about the saving of public money, about reforms, and the government's "public" statement "clarifying" its foreign policy, although it was clear to one and all that it clarified nothing and that there was no intention that it should clarify anything.

As for the liberal opposition, they dutifully fulfilled the role of puppets in the hands of the Black-Hundred-police monarchy! At a time when an explicit statement of the truth by the Duma bourgeois minority would undoubtedly have played an important role and have prevented (or hindered) the government from borrowing thousands of millions for new punitive expeditions, gallows, prisons, and intensified security measures, the party of the Cadets "prostrated themselves" before the adored monarch in an effort to ingratiate themselves. Mr. Milyukov curried favour by trying to prove his patriotism. He posed as an expert on foreign policy, on the basis of having obtained information in some antechamber about Izvolsky's liberal views. Mr. Milyukov deliberately endorsed the bill by solemnly "applauding" the tsarist minister on behalf of the whole Cadet Party, knowing full well that on the very next day all the European newspapers would declare, as if under orders: The Duma has unanimously (not counting the Social-Democrats) expressed confidence in the government, has approved its foreign policy....

In three years Russian liberalism has gone through an evolution which, in Germany, took over thirty years, and in France over a hundred—an evolution from adherents of freedom to spineless and contemptible henchmen of absolutism. The specific weapon of struggle which the bourgeoisie possesses—the possibility of putting pressure on the purse, of withholding funds, of upsetting the "delicate"

approaches for new loans—this weapon could have been used by the Cadets many times during the Russian revolution. And on each occasion, in the spring of 1908 just as in the spring of 1906, they surrendered their weapon to the enemy, licking the hand of the pogrom-makers and swearing loyalty to them.

Mr. Struve took care in good time to put this practice on a firm theoretical basis. In the magazine *Russkaya Mysl*, which should really be called *Black-Hundred Mysl*,^{17*} Mr. Struve already advocates the idea of a "Great Russia", the idea of bourgeois nationalism; he attacks "the intelligentsia's hostility to the state", for the thousandth time striking out at "Russian revolutionism", "Marxism", "renegades", the "class struggle", and "banal radicalism".

We can only rejoice at this evolution in the ideology of Russian liberalism, for in fact it has *already shown itself* in the Russian revolution to be exactly what Mr. Struve has been trying systematically, wholeheartedly, deliberately and "philosophically" to make it. The elaboration of a consistent counter-revolutionary *ideology* is the key when there is a fully developed class that has acted in a counter-revolutionary manner at crucial periods in the country's life. The ideology conforming to the class position and the class policy of the bourgeoisie will help all and everyone to discard their last vestiges of faith in the "democratism" of the Cadets. And it will do good to discard them. They need to be discarded to enable us to make progress in regard to the really mass struggle for the democratisation of Russia. Mr. Struve wants a frankly counter-revolutionary liberalism. We want it, too, because this "frankness" of liberalism will best of all enlighten both the democratic peasantry and the socialist proletariat.

Reverting to the Duma session of February 27, it should be said that the only honest and proud word of a democrat came from a *Social-Democrat*. Deputy Chkhheidze took the floor and declared that the Social-Democratic group would vote *against* the Bill. He started to give the reasons, but after his first words: "Our diplomacy in the West has always been a bulwark of reaction and served the interests of ..." the Chairman stopped the mouth of the workers' deputy. "The instructions allow a member to give his reasons for

voting," muttered the Cadets. "Besides reasons there is such a thing as form," answered the bandit who calls himself Chairman of the Third Duma.

He was right from his point of view: who cares about instructions when the successful staging of the police-sponsored, patriotic demonstration was at stake.

The workers' deputy stood isolated on this question. This is all the more to his credit. The proletariat should show, and it will show, that it is capable of defending the behests of the democratic revolution despite all the treacheries of liberalism and the wavering of the petty bourgeoisie.

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DECEPTION OF THE PEOPLE BY THE LIBERALS

At the last, London, congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party the question of the attitude towards bourgeois parties was discussed and a resolution adopted on the subject. Controversy was particularly aroused at the Congress by the passage in this resolution which speaks of *deception* of the people by the liberals.* The Social-Democrats of the Right wing of our Party thought this passage to be highly incorrect. They even declared that it was not Marxist to speak in the resolution about the liberals' "deception" of the people, i.e., to account for certain sections of the population joining a given party (in this case the Cadet Party) not by the class interests of these sections, but by the "immoral" political practices of one or another group of parliamentarians, lawyers, journalists, and so on.

As a matter of fact, these specious arguments, arrayed in ostensibly Marxist garb, concealed a policy of weakening the class independence of the proletariat and subordinating it (in effect) to the liberal bourgeoisie. For these gentlemen do not seriously defend the interests of the democratic petty bourgeoisie who follow the Cadets, but *betray* them by their policy of intrigues and deals with the government, with the Octobrists, with the "historic authority" of the tsarist autocracy.

Extremely interesting material throwing new light on this question—one of the fundamental questions of Social-Democratic tactics in all capitalist countries—is afforded by the present struggle for universal suffrage in the Prussian Landtag (Diet). German Social-Democracy raised the banner of that struggle. The proletariat of Berlin, followed by all

* See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 501-02.—*Ed.*

the large cities of Germany, came out into the street, organised imposing demonstrations of tens of thousands of people, and inaugurated a broad mass movement, which already, at its very outset, has led to violent acts on the part of the constitutional authorities, to the use of military force and the beating up of the unarmed masses. Struggle grows out of struggle! The leaders of the revolutionary proletariat met these acts of violence proudly and bravely. But here the question came up of the attitude towards the democratic (and liberal) bourgeoisie in the struggle for the franchise. The debates on this question between the German revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists (revisionists, as they are called in Germany) bear a remarkably close resemblance to our own disputes on the subject of the deception of the people by the liberals.

The central organ of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party, *Vorwärts*, published a leading article, the gist and substance of which is clearly expressed in its heading: "The Struggle for the Franchise Is a Class Struggle!" As was to be expected, this article was received by the opportunists as a challenge, although it set forth in a positive form only established Social-Democratic axioms. The gauntlet was taken up. Comrade Südekum, a well-known worker in the field of municipal socialism, launched an aggressive campaign against this "sectarians' tactic", against the "isolation of the proletariat", against "Social-Democratic support of the Black Hundreds" (the Germans use the milder term—reactionaries). For to a German opportunist too the introduction of the class struggle into a cause common to both the proletariat and the liberals means supporting the reactionaries! "The introduction of universal suffrage in Prussia instead of the present three-class system is not the concern of any single class", wrote Südekum. This, he said, was the affair of "the urban population against the agrarians, of democracy against the bureaucracy, of the peasantry against the landlords, of Western Prussia against Eastern Prussia" (i. e., the industrially and capitalistically advanced part of the country against the economically backward part). "What has to be done now is to unite on this point all the friends of the reform, whatever the other issues which may divide them."

The reader sees that these are all very familiar arguments, that here, too, the garb is strictly and orthodoxly "Marxist", inclusive of the reference to the economic position and interests of definite elements of bourgeois democracy (the "urban democracy", the peasantry, etc.). There is hardly any need to add that the German liberal-bourgeois press has been harping systematically on this note for decades, accusing Social-Democracy of sectarianism, of supporting the reactionaries, and of inability to isolate the reactionaries.

What *arguments* did the German revolutionary Social-Democrats use to refute this reasoning. We shall list their chief arguments so as to enable the reader—viewing German affairs as a "bystander", "without anger or bias"—to judge whether the predominant part is played here by references to special conditions of place and time or to general principles of Marxism.

Yes, our freethinkers "demand" universal suffrage in their programmes, said *Vorwärts*. Yes, they have become more than usually zealous in making grandiloquent speeches about it today. But are they *fighting* for reform? Do we not see, on the contrary, that the truly popular movement, the street demonstrations, the broad agitation among the masses, the unrest of the masses, evoke in them ill-concealed fear, aversion, and at best, in rare cases, indifference?

We must distinguish between the programmes of the bourgeois parties, between the banquet and parliamentary speeches of the liberal careerists and their actual participation in the real struggle of the people. Bourgeois politicians, one and all, in all parliamentary countries, have always paid lip-service to democracy while betraying it.

Yes, "within the Centre and the Party of freethinkers [the Liberal Party] there are *undoubtedly* elements who are interested in universal and equal suffrage", said *Vorwärts*. But it is not these elements that lead the bourgeois parties, not the petty artisans, not the semi-proletariat, not the semi-ruined peasants. They follow the lead of the liberal bourgeois, who try to keep them away from the struggle by making compromises with reaction behind their backs, by corrupting their class-consciousness and not really defending their interests.

To draw these elements into the struggle for universal suffrage it is necessary to arouse their class-consciousness, to win them away from the vacillating bourgeois parties. "Within the Liberal [freethinking] Party they, the elements interested in universal suffrage, form an impotent minority, which is forever being fed with promises and then always *duped* once again, and whose political energy is completely paralysed. If, however, the freethinkers and the Centre are really to be forced to make concessions to democracy owing to the threat of losing votes, then it is the class struggle, which weakens the bourgeois parties, that is the only means of pushing the reluctant bourgeoisie to the Left."

For the political facts long ago proved that reaction is less hateful to the freethinkers than Social-Democracy. "We must therefore not only ruthlessly castigate the sins of all the bourgeois parties, but above all make it clear that the betrayals of the freethinkers and the Centre on the question of the franchise are a necessary consequence of the class character of these parties."

In the immediate future the question whether our Cadets are capable of "fighting" for the democratic demands put forward in their programme, or whether they are putting them forward merely to betray to the Octobrists the petty bourgeois and peasants who are following the liberals' lead, will confront the Russian Social-Democrats again and again, as it repeatedly did before in the course of the revolution. Therefore some people in our Party would do well to ponder these arguments of *Vorwärts*.

P. S. This article was sent to press before we read *Rech*, issue No. 52 (of March 1), containing an article by Mr. K. D., the Berlin correspondent of this newspaper, entitled "The Crisis of German Liberalism". The writer handles the controversy of *Vorwärts* with Südekum in the customary tone and with the customary methods used by our liberal falsifiers. He makes no attempt to give the line of reasoning of the parties concerned or exact quotations. He simply declares: "The official *Vorwärts* promptly throws mud at the heretic, and in a leading article, extremely unappetising on account of its offensive and blustering tone, accuses him of ignorance and unpardonable forgetfulness of party tenets." We leave it to the reader to judge whether Südekum himself will

find such a defence of him by the Cadets "appetising" or not. But such is the fate of the revisionists in any country—they are given generous support and heartfelt "recognition" of their efforts by the bourgeoisie. An alliance between the Südekums and the Struve gentry—could anything more "appetising" be thought of to confirm the correctness of our position?

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AN ESTIMATE OF MARX BY INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM

One of Turgenev's characters thus adapted a verse of the great German poet:

*Wer den Feind will versteh'n,
Muss im Feindes Lande geh'n*

that is, "To know your enemy you must go into the enemy's country" to get first-hand knowledge of his customs, manners, ways of thinking and acting.

Marxists would do well to cast a glance at the comments made on the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Marx by influential political organs in various countries, especially the liberal and "democratic" bourgeois newspapers, which combine the possibility of influencing the masses of readers with the right to speak on behalf of official, titular professorial scholarship.

We shall begin our review with *Russkiye Vedomosti*. This is the most sedate (and dullest), the most scientific (and farthest removed from real life) of professorial newspapers. Its short article on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Karl Marx's death (No. 51, March 1) is written in a predominantly dry wooden tone—"objectivity", as it is called in the language of professors "ordinary" and "extraordinary". The writer of the article tries to confine himself to facts and trifling facts. As an impartial historian, he is prepared to give Marx his due—at least as far as the past is concerned, a past which is already dead and can be spoken of in a lifeless way. *Russkiye Vedomosti* admits Marx to be a "remarkable figure", a "great man of science", an "outstanding leader of the proletariat", an organiser of the masses. But this recognition ap-

plies to the past: today, says the newspaper, "new paths are really necessary", i. e., new paths for the labour movement and socialism unlike the "old Marxism". What these new paths are, the paper does not say in so many words—that is too live a subject for professors and too "injudicious" a theme for virtuosi in the art of "tactful silence". But broad hints are dropped: "Many of his [Marx's] constructions have been destroyed by scientific analysis and the merciless critique of events. Among scientists there are practically no adherents faithful to his system as a whole; Marx's spiritual child—German Social-Democracy—has deviated a good deal from the revolutionary path which the founders of German socialism had mapped out." As you see, the writer leaves very little unsaid in his desire to *rectify* Marx in the revisionist way.

Another influential paper, *Rech*, the organ of a political party, which plays first fiddle in the concert of Russian liberalism, gives a much more lively appraisal of Marx. The tendency is, of course, the same as in *Russkiye Vedomosti*, but whereas there we saw a preface to a fat volume, here we have political slogans that are the immediate guide for many a speech from the parliamentary rostrum, in dealing with all current events and topics of the day. The article "Karl Marx and Russia" (No. 53, March 2) is written by the notorious renegade Mr. Izgoev, a specimen of those Russian intellectuals, who between the ages of twenty-five and thirty "try to pose as Marxists", between thirty-five and forty play at being liberals, and after that end up as Black Hundreds.

Mr. Izgoev deserted the Social-Democrats for the liberals (as he himself has declared and as that arch-renegade Mr. Struve said of him) just when the revolution, after its first staggering successes, entered a difficult period of a long and hard struggle against the growing counter-revolution. Indeed, Mr. Izgoev is highly typical in this respect. He is splendid at making it clear *who stands to gain* by professorial affectation in appraising Marx, and *whose work* this official "scholarship" is doing. "Marx the tactician of political intrigue," Izgoev thunders, "was a considerable hindrance to Marx the great scientist, and caused him to commit many mistakes." The chief mistake, of course, was that in addition to the correct, reasonable "*evolutionary* Marxism" accepted

by the "majority" (the majority of philistines?) there was born a mischievous, unscientific, fantastic revolutionary Marxism, "adulterated by home-brewed Narodism". What our liberal especially resents is the role of *this* Marxism in the Russian revolution. Would you believe it—they go to the length of talking of a dictatorship of the proletariat to carry out this very same "bourgeois revolution", or even of a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—which is absolutely fantastic in the mouth of Marxists". "No wonder that revolutionary Marxism in the form in which it was adopted in Russia by the Bolsheviks of all shades has completely failed."... "They are having to think of establishing an ordinary 'bourgeois' [the ironical quotation marks are Mr. Izgoev's] constitution."

There you have an ideologically ready-made and politically mature Octobrist, who is quite convinced that it is Marxism and revolutionary tactics that have failed, and not the Cadet tactics of compromise, betrayal, and treachery!

To proceed. From the Russian we shall pass to the German press, which operates in a free atmosphere, face to face with a legal socialist party, and which expresses its views in dozens of daily newspapers. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, one of the wealthiest, most widely read and most "democratic" bourgeois newspapers in Germany, devotes a big leading article to the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marx's death (No. 76, March 16, New Style, evening edition). The German "democrats at once take the bull by the horns. "One can understand the Social-Democratic press having honoured its teacher on this day in numerous articles," we are told. "But Marx has been recognised as a great man even in an influential national liberal paper, although with the usual reservations. Yes, of course, he was great, but he was a great corrupter."

This newspaper, representing the pick of that brand of Black-Hundred ideology known as European liberalism, explains that it does not in the least question Marx's personal honesty, but that his theories have caused incalculable harm. By introducing the conception of determinism and objective law in the sphere of social phenomena, by denying the significance of morality and the relative conditional nature of our knowledge, Marx founded an anti-scientific utopia and a

real "Church" of his sectarian disciples. But his most harmful idea is—the *class struggle*. Herein lies all the evil! Marx treated seriously the old aphorism about *two nations*,* about the existence of two nations within every civilised nation—a nation of "exploiters" and a nation of "exploited" (the newspaper puts these unscientific terms in deadly ironical quotation marks). Marx forgot the clear, obvious truth that is plain to all healthy people, namely, that in social life "the aim is not struggle but agreement". Marx "tore the nation asunder, for he hammered it into the heads of his people that there was nothing in common between them and the rest of the people, that they were deadly enemies".

"What could be more natural," the newspaper asks, "than that Social-Democracy, agreeing as it does with many of the bourgeoisie on a number of practical issues, should seek closer alignment with them? But that does not happen precisely because of Marxist theory. Social-Democracy has condemned itself to isolation. For a time it seemed as though a fundamental change was going to take place in this respect. It was when the revisionists began their campaign. But it turned out to be a mistake, and the difference between the revisionists and ourselves consisted, among other things, in that we understood this mistake while they did not. The revisionists believed, and still believe, that it is possible somehow to keep to Marx and yet become a different party. Vain hopes. Marx has either to be swallowed whole or completely rejected. A half-hearted course is of no use here..."

Quite right, gentlemen of the liberal fold! You do sometimes come out with the truth by accident.

"... So long as Social-Democracy honours Marx it will not be able to rid itself of the idea of the class struggle and of all those other things that make living with it so difficult.... The scientific world is agreed that not one of the politico-economic theories of Marxism has been proved true."...

Well, well, gentlemen. You have admirably expressed the essence of bourgeois science, of bourgeois liberalism, and its entire policy. You have grasped the fact that Marx cannot be swallowed piecemeal. This is something that the Izgoevs and the Russian liberals have not yet understood. But even they will, before long.

And here, in conclusion, is *Journal des Débats*, the conservative organ of the bourgeois republic. In its issue of March

* These two words are given by Lenin in English.—*Ed.*

15, it writes, on the occasion of the anniversary, that the socialists, those "wild equalitarians", preach the cult of their great men, that the chief evil of the teachings of Marx, who "hated the bourgeoisie", is the theory of the struggle of classes. "He preached to the working classes not temporary conflicts alternating with periods of truce, but a holy war, a war of extermination, of expropriation, a war for the promised land of collectivism... a monstrous utopia."...

The bourgeois papers write well when stung to the quick. Life becomes a more cheerful thing when you see this growing ideological unity among the liberal enemies of the proletariat all over the world, for this unity is one of the guarantees of the unification of the millions of the international proletariat, which will win for itself its promised land, come what may.

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